JUDGMENT 1. Respondents Banney Singh and Basant Singh were tried for the charges under Sections 302, 302 read with 34 and 109 I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge. Jaipur City, Jaipur in connection with the murder of one Ibrahim Khan in Roop Basant Hotel, Jaipur. Vide judgment dated February 6, 1982 the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents which caused grievance to the State of Rajasthan as well as the complainant Sattar. Hence, the State of Rajasthan preferred appeal bearing No. D.B Criminal Appeal No. 382 of 1982 and Complainant Sattar came in Revision beading No. D.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 206 of 1982. 2. As the appeal as well as the revision petition arise out of the same judgment, we propose to dispose them of by one judgment. 3. Succinctly narrated the prosecution case leading to the trial of the respondents, present appeal and revision petition, is that on August 31, 1981 at about 5.00 p.m. deceased Ibrahim Pahalwan was taking food in the upper storey of Roop Bisant Hotel at Station Road. Jaipur. His friend Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) who had come to see him and was waiting for him down stairs, on hearing his cries rushed up stairs and saw Roop Singh (co-accused since discharged by the trial Court) standing on the stairs and Basant Singh respondent inflicting knife blows to Ibrahim Pahalwan lying down and Banney Singh respondent instigating Basant Smgh to kill Ibrahim Khan. Abdul Sattar restrained them bat in vain. He then ran away to the shop where Sattar (PW. 1), brother of the deceased, was working and informed him about Banney Singh and his sons causing knife injuries to his brother and asked him to inform the police. Sattar (PW. 1) went to the Police Station nearby and informed about Banney Singh etc. causing injuries to his brother. He then rushed to the place of occurrence. Abdul Sattar (PW. 4), Inayat Ali (PW. 2) and Bundu Khan (PW. 3) also accompanied him up stairs. At that time they saw Roop Singh and Basant Singh with blood stained clothes coming down stairs and running away from there. Basant Singh is said to be having a knife in his hand at that time. Immediately thereafter, Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 14). Station House Officer, Thana Sadar reached the site and found Ibrahim in injured condition. He was sent with the Police to the hospital. Basant Singh is said to be having a knife in his hand at that time. Immediately thereafter, Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 14). Station House Officer, Thana Sadar reached the site and found Ibrahim in injured condition. He was sent with the Police to the hospital. He recorded the statement of Sattar (PW. 1) brother of the deceased and sent that statement Ex. P/2 to the Police Station for registering the case and he himself proceeded with the investigation. He prepared site plan Ex. P/3 and site inspection memo Ex. P/3A. Banney Singh present at the site was arrested vide memo Ex. P/7 and his blood stained clothes were taken in possession and sealed. The SHO then went to the hospital where Ibrahim breathed his last. Panchayatnama of the dead body was prepared. The autopsy over the dead body was conducted by Dr. B B.L. Goswami (PW. 13). Medical Jurist, Sawai Mansingh Hospital, Jaipur and postmortem examination report Ex. P/9 was prepared. The Doctor noted 15 injuries on the dead body caused by sharp and blunt object. On Sept. 1, 1981 SHO Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 14) arrested Basant Singh vide memo Ex. P/8 and on his information recovered one blood stained bushirt Ex. 2 from over a cot in the house of Nathu Balai. On September 3. 1981 in pursuance of the information furnished by Basant Singh, the SHO recovered one blood stained knife Ex. 1 vide Ex. P/11 from the room in Roop Bisant Hotel lying in the clothes. The SHO had on the date of occurrence also taken in possession the blood stained clothes of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4). 4. Upon completion of necessary investigation charge sheet against the respondents and co-accused Roop Singh was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 12 Jaipur City and the case on committal reached the Court of Sessions Judge, Jaipur City. The learned Judge discharged accused Roop Singh and proceeded with the trial against the two respondents. The case of prosecution was not held to be established and the judgment of acquittal assailed in this Court was passed. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for Sattar have assailed the findings of the trial Court on the ground that the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of Abdul Sattar (PW. The case of prosecution was not held to be established and the judgment of acquittal assailed in this Court was passed. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for Sattar have assailed the findings of the trial Court on the ground that the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4), the eye witness in the case and had attached undue importance to the inconsistencies in his version and his conduct on seeing the occurrence. It has been strenuously contended by the learned counsel that the learned trial Judge should not have discarded the testimony of Sattar (PW 1), Inayac Ali (PW. 2). Bundu Khan (PW. 3) and Abdul Sattar (PW 4) when they have categorically stated that they have seen Basant Singh running away from the site. Argument has also been advanced regarding the confession of Banny Singh when the witnesses reached the site. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of Banney Singh and Basant Singh, justifying the findings of the trial Court, submitted that the only witness examined as eye witness in the case was a chance witness whose conduct was abnormal and therefore, his statement has rightly been discarded by the trial Court. Regarding the knife the argument of the learned counsel is that from the statement of Doctor B.B.L. Goswami (P.W. 13). the knife, Ex. 3 could not be the weapon of offence and therefore, this recovery has rightly not been taken into consideration against Basant Singh. The inconsistencies in the statement of the witnesses regarding the confession by Banney Singh have also been referred (he learned counsel to substantiate his case that the findings of the trial Court about the prosecution case not being established does not call for any interference. 7. At the very out set it may be observed that the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of the single eye witness viz. 7. At the very out set it may be observed that the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of the single eye witness viz. Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4); and the circumstance of Banney Singh being found near the dead body when the witness and the Police reached the site, Basant Singh and Roop Singh with blood stained clothes going from the hotel; Basant Singh having a knife with him which is said to have been later on recovered by the Police in pursuance of the information furnished by him and the recovery of the blood stained bushirt from the house of Nathu Balai in pursuance of the information furbished by Basant Singh. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. A. K. Bhandari, learned counsel for Sattar have laid much emphasis on the prompt lodging of the F.I.R. by Sattar (P.W. 1) on being informed about the incident by Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) and submitted that this fact in itself is sufficient to believe the prosecution case that Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) was actually there in the hotel at the time of the occurrence and on hearing the notice from up stairs reached there and saw Basant Singh causing knife injuries to Ibrahim and Banney Singh instigating him for doing so. 9. In the case of the State of Punjab v. Wassan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 697 , the witness who claimed to be an eye witness to the occurrence had rushed to Police Station so promptly that practically he had no time to concoct a false story and that fact was considered to be an important circumstance for believing that informant. 10. If the information in a case is lodged promptly that is a circumstance to suggest that no time was taken for embroidering the prosecution story or falsely implicating an innocent person. In the present case, the FIR was not lodged by Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) but by Sattar (PW. 1). brother of the deceased, who is said to have been informed by Abdul Sattar. There are two informations in the case. One is Ex. P/1 entered in the Roznerocha on Sattar (PW. 1 i informing the Police and the other is Parcba Bayan Ex. P/2 of Sattar (PW. 1) recorded by Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 13) on reaching the site on the basis of which case against the respondent was registered. Ex. P/1 is that Sattar (PW. One is Ex. P/1 entered in the Roznerocha on Sattar (PW. 1 i informing the Police and the other is Parcba Bayan Ex. P/2 of Sattar (PW. 1) recorded by Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 13) on reaching the site on the basis of which case against the respondent was registered. Ex. P/1 is that Sattar (PW. 1) went to the Police Station crying that in the upper storey of Roop Basant Hotel Banney Singh and his two sons were causing knife injuries to his brother Pahalwan who may be saved If this was the information then it contained the place of occurrence, the assailants and the Weapon of offence. It was this information which set the investigation into motion i.e. upon this information Leeladhar Sharma (PW. 14) had gone to the site. This information no where contains the name of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) as informant of Sattar (PW. 1) and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the FIR promptly lodged contains the name of Abdul Satiar (PW. 4 and therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve his presence at the hotel and his seeing the occurrence, has no force. 11. It has been Dext argued that Parcha Bayan Ex. P/2 should be treated as FIR. 12. The learned counsel for Banney Singh and Basant Singh submitted that in view of the details in Ex. P/1, the information was complete and on its basis investigation had commenced and any information or document prepared subsequent thereto after the SHO reaching the site was hit by Sec. i 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As such, the learned counsel contended, the fact of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) being at the site at the time of the incident and his informing Sattar (PW. I) about the incident in Ex. P/2 would not amount to the name of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) being there in the FIR. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel referred the case of the State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and another, 1960 Cr.LJ 532 where in following observations have been made : "The first information report is the information recorded under S. 154. It is an information given to a police officer relating to the commission of an offence. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel referred the case of the State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and another, 1960 Cr.LJ 532 where in following observations have been made : "The first information report is the information recorded under S. 154. It is an information given to a police officer relating to the commission of an offence. It is also an information given by an informant on which the investigation is commenced It must be distinguished from information deceived after the commencement of the investigation which is covered by Sections 161 and 162.......................... ........................................ Where a document is not a first information report, not being the first complaint by the informant made to the Police, it is hit by Sections 161 and 162, and the judge should not have relied upon it except to the extent permitted by the proviso to S. 162 i.e. to contradict the informant with reference to any particular statement therein". 13. In the case of Narayan Dutta v. The State, 1980 Cr.LJ 264 the position of a complaint found to have been received after commencement of the investigation came for consideration and it was observed that the importance of the FIR lies in its being the first recorded statement of the occurrence It is also the earliest information on which the investigation is commenced. A document found to have been filed after the commencement of the investigation was not taken to be FIR. The conclusion to be drawn would be that presence of Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) cannot be taken to be established merely because his name is referred to Ex. 2 Parcha Bayan of Sattar (PW. 1) recorded after the commencement of the investigation on the basis of Ex. P/1. 14. Ex. P/1 does not appear to have been made upon any information furnished by Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) to Sattar because Sattar has only stated about his being informed about Banney Singh and his sons causing injuries to his brother and not about the weapon of offence being used though the weapon is mentioned in Ex. P/1. As Abdul Sattar (PW. P/1 does not appear to have been made upon any information furnished by Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) to Sattar because Sattar has only stated about his being informed about Banney Singh and his sons causing injuries to his brother and not about the weapon of offence being used though the weapon is mentioned in Ex. P/1. As Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) is the only eye witness to the prosecution case, the learned Judge has carefully examined his statement and we would examine his statement and the record with a view to see as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge discarding his testimony is based on sound grounds. 15. Abdul Sattar (PW. 4) happened to be the friend of deceased Ibrahim. He was an employee of GRP and at the relevant time was posted at Bikaner. him, he, on August 31, 1981, had come to Jaipur and went to see Ibrahim at Roop Bisant Hotel. His house was at a distance of five miles from the place of occurrence. He according to the learned counsel for the respondents was therefore, a chance witness who was not present at the time of the incident but might have reached there subsequently on getting the information of the incident with his friend. 16. A chance witness is a witness who could not normally be expected to be at a place where he claims to be at the time of the incident. If Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) being a friend of deceased Ibrahim, on coming to Jaipur had gone to see him there was nothing strange in it, but the question is whether he had as all gone there. If his presence is assured at the time of the occurrence then he would not be taken to be a chance witness. There are however factors in the case which suggest that the presence of the witness at the time of the incident is not free from doubt. As argued by the learned counsel for Banney Singh and Basant Singh, if Abdul Sattar(P W. 4)had gone to the hotel only to meet Ibrahim and was informed about Ibrahim being up stairs, he would have gone up stairs or called him, instead of waiting at the place where tea was being served. According to him he only went up stairs on hearing the cry of Ibrahim Pahalwan "Muje Bachao Muje Mar Liya". According to him he only went up stairs on hearing the cry of Ibrahim Pahalwan "Muje Bachao Muje Mar Liya". The defence versior is that Ibrahim was taking food with some one up stairs and Mahadev (D.W. 2) was serving the food. That, at that time Banney Singh on hearing noise came from his room and saw that other person causing knife injury to Ibrahim and then running away from there. Attention of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) was drawn to his Police statement Ex. D/2 where he had stated about Banney Singh raising the cry and not about his hearing any voice of Ibrahim Pahalwan. This inconsistency regarding the person at whose noise the witness went up stairs casts a doubt upon the presence of the witness at the hotel. 17. Much emphasis has been laid on the clothes of Abdul Sattar (P.W.4) being stained with blood and being taken by the Police on the date of occurrence itself. Mr. Bhandari learned counsel for the petitioner-Sattar vehemently argued that if the witness would not have been there how his clothes would have been stained with blood. It has also been argued that his statement was recorded on the date of the occurrence itself. 18. It is significant to observe that if Abdul Sattar (P.W.) was the eye witness then the Police, instead of recording Parcha Bayan of Sattar (P.W. 1), should have recorded the statement of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4). According to Leeladhar Sharma (P.W. 14). S.H.O , Abdul Sattar (P.W 4), Inayat Ali (P.W. 2) and Bundu Khan (P W. 3) went to the hospital along with him and he had recorded the statement of all the three at one time. The version of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) is that he stayed at the site 15 or 20 minutes after the arrival of the police and then Ibrahim was taken to the hospital and he was taken to the police station where his statement was recorded. 19. Recording the statement of the witness on the day of occurrence itself is ordinarily not taken to be delay but if the witness is of significance and the prosecution case rests only upon his evidence then prompt recording of the statement is required. 20. In the case of Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 SC 135 . 20. In the case of Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 SC 135 . the question of delay in recording the statement came for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it was observed that delay of a few hours simpliciter in recording the statement of eye witness may not by itself, amount to a serious infirmity in the prosecution case but it may assume such a character if there are concomitant circumstances to suggest that the investigator was deliberately marking time with a view to decide about the shape to be given to the case and the eye witnesses to be introduced. 21. In the present case Ex. P/1 does not contain the name of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) and Ex. 2 is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Statement of Sattar if at all present at the site was not recorded immediately after the police reaching there. The police had taken him to the police station for recording his statement. These facts cast a doubt about the presence of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) at the time of occurrence. 22. The learned Public Prosecutor laid much stress upon the blood stained clothes of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) being taken in possession and argued that if he would not have been there how his clothes would have been stained with blood. 23. The clothes of Sattar (P.W. 1), brother of the deceased were also stained with blood but the Investigating Officer did not take those clothes in possession. Ex. P/10 is the memo for the recovery of the blood stained clothes of Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) by the S.H.O. Abdul Sattar has stated that he first went to the Police Station after Ibrahim being taken to the hospital and then he went to the hospital. At hospital police did not take his clothes nor asked him to give his clothes. On being shown Ex. P/10, the memo for recovery of clothes, the witness stated that on taking his blood stained clothes the police neither prepared any memo nor Ex P/10 bears his signatures. He has further admitted that in his presence, the police had not written anything at the site or at the hospital nor was he asked to sign any document. 24. P/10, the memo for recovery of clothes, the witness stated that on taking his blood stained clothes the police neither prepared any memo nor Ex P/10 bears his signatures. He has further admitted that in his presence, the police had not written anything at the site or at the hospital nor was he asked to sign any document. 24. Presence of stains of blood on the clothes of Abdul Sattar when similar was the position of Sattar, brother of the deceased and others who took the deceased to the hospital would not establish that Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) had seen the occurrence. It so appears that in order to show the presence of the witness at the site the Investigating Officer, late in the night took the clothes of the witness for which the witness categorically denied to have signed any memo. 25. The learned trial Judge has disbelieved Abdul Sattar because of his unnatural conduct and certain circumstances not explained by the prosecution. It appears strange that out of so many persons present at the hotel and near about, Abdul Sattar (P.W. 4) alone had heard the noise up stairs. Even if it was so he must have raised the cry while down stairs or at least on reaching up stairs. He did not even enquire about the cause of beating. He has admitted that on getting down stairs he did not tell anybody as to what was happening there, nor did he do so while returning after informing Sattar. It is also significant that he has not pointed out to the police the place where from he had seen the occurrence. 26. The Investigating Officer has not conducted the investigation properly, Ex. P/3 is the site plan. The Investigating Officer has stated that it was prepared at the instance of Sattar. It is not so mentioned in Ex. P/3 nor does it bear the signatures of Sattar. If it had come to the notice of the S.H.O. that Abdul Sattar had seen the occurrence from the stair case, he should have prepared the site plan at his instance but he has not done so Not only that his signatures even have not been taken on the site plan. The S.H.O. has not shown in the site plan the place where the witness at the time of the incident was. The S.H.O. has not shown in the site plan the place where the witness at the time of the incident was. When the only eye witness according to the prosecution was there at the time of the preparing the site plan, it is curious that the place he was at the time of the occurrence has not been shown in the site plan nor his signatures have been taken on it. This is a serious infirmity in the investigation. 27. The pertinent question is whether the learned trial Judge has rightly discarded the testimony of the single eye witness in the case viz. Abdul Sattar (P. W. 4). It is a settled principle that conviction can be based even on the testimony of a single witness it that witness is of sterling worth Evidence Act does not require a particular number of witnesses to prove all facts. It is the quality and not the quantity that matters. If there is only one witness to a fact it is the duty of the Court to find out whether his statement inspires confidence and the evidence may be taken to be sufficient to bring home the guilt against the culprit. The criteria would be whether it would be just and proper to convict a person on the testimony of a single witness. 28. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for Sattar submitted that there are corroborating circumstance to the evidence of Abdul Sattar (P. W. 4) and in the light of those factors his evidence, despite certain inconsistencies should have been taken to be credible. One such circumstance pointed out by Mr. Bhandari is the alleged confession of Banney Singh. This point does not detain us much because Sattar (P. W. 1) and Abdul Sattar (P. W. 4) do not speak of any confession by Banney Singh that they had done away with Ibrahim. Inayat Ali (P. W. 2) states about such utterance by Banney Singh before the arrival of Police, where as Bundu Khan (P. W. 3) states about Banney Singh making such utterances even after police reaching there. The investigating Officer does not speak of any such utterance by Banney Singh. 29. Another circumstance pointed out by Mr. Bhandari is the witnesses seeing Basant Singh and Roop Singh with blood stained clothes and Basant Singh having knife in his hand while running from the hotel. Inayat Ali (P. W. 2). The investigating Officer does not speak of any such utterance by Banney Singh. 29. Another circumstance pointed out by Mr. Bhandari is the witnesses seeing Basant Singh and Roop Singh with blood stained clothes and Basant Singh having knife in his hand while running from the hotel. Inayat Ali (P. W. 2). Bundu Khan (P. W. 3) Riksha Drivers are said to be there outside the hotel. Their version is that they along with Sattar and Abdul Sattar went up stairs and saw Basant Singh and Roop Singh running downwards. It is important to note that Abdul Sattar has stated that when Sattar had left for the Police Station, he rushed back to the hotel. If it was so how he and Sattar would have been below the stairs simultaneously along with Inayat Ali (P. W. 2) and Bundu Khan (P. W. 3). These persons have admitted that none of them have tried to apprehend Basant Singh and Roop Singh nor did they ask anybody to catch hold of them. Even if the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that as Basant Singh was having a knife it was risky to catch hold of him is considered, still there was no reason not to apprehend Roop Singh. The witnesses have given inconsistent statement regarding Basant Singh having a knife with him at the time. Inayat Ali (P. W. 2) expresses ignorance about there being any thing in the hand of Basant Singh. Bundu Khan (P. W. 3) in his police stated about the knife being blood stained. Abdul Sattar (P. W. 4) has stated in the Court about the knife being in the hand of Basant Singh but on his attention being drawn to this omission in his police statement Ex. P/2, he stated that per mistake he did not state so there. From this type of evidence it cannot be held that the witnesses had seen Basant Sirgh running with a knife in his hand. Apart from it the alleged recovery of knife does not connect the respondent Basant Singh with the commission of the crime in view of the medical evidence. Dr. B. B. L. Goswami P. W. 13) has stated that looking to the condition of the edge of the knife Ex. 3 shown to him in the Court, it could not have caused the injuries sustained by Ibrahim Khan. Dr. B. B. L. Goswami P. W. 13) has stated that looking to the condition of the edge of the knife Ex. 3 shown to him in the Court, it could not have caused the injuries sustained by Ibrahim Khan. The S. H. O. has admitted that the condition of the blade of the knife at the time of the recovery was as it was when shown in the Court. The recovery of the knife also appears to be implanted one. So is the case of recovery of bushirt with blood stains, at the instance of Basant Singh. Why Basant Singh would have placed his blood stained bushfire on the cot of Nathu Balai and why Nathu Balais would have permitted him to do so. The bushirt is said to have been recovered on the day of arrest. But till September 3, 1981 as stated by the S. H. O., he did not tell anything regarding the knife despite being interrogated a number of times. The key of the room is said to have been recovered according to the S.H O. in the clothes in an almirah outside the door of the room. If prosecution case is to be believed that after the police reaching there the constables remained deputed to safeguard the site and Basant Singh had left the hotel and could only be apprehended on the next day of the occurrence, then where was the occasion for Basant Singh to conceal the knife in the room i.i upper storey. 30. All there facts indicate that the story of Basant Singh running with a knife and getting the knife recovered after four days is unbelievable story and the learned trial Judge has rightly not attached any importance to it. 31. Coming to the case of Banney Singh the argument of Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for Sattar is that his presence with blood stained clothes and instigating Basant Singh shows his complicity in the commission of the crime. The argument has no substance. Inayat All (P. W. 2) has stated that he head the voice of Banney Singh "MARO MARO". His attention was drawn to his police statement Ex. D/1 where he has not stated so and he could not give the reason. Bundu Khan (P. W. 3) has stated that on hearing the noise of "MAR DO MAR DO" he rushed to the hotel. His attention was drawn to his police statement Ex. D/1 where he has not stated so and he could not give the reason. Bundu Khan (P. W. 3) has stated that on hearing the noise of "MAR DO MAR DO" he rushed to the hotel. This fact does not find place in his police statement. Abdul Sattar has stated that Banney Singh was instigating his sons to do away with Ibrahim. For the reasons discussed above, we have not believed the presence of Abdul Sattar (P. W. 4) at the time of the occurrence at the site. 32. Banney Singh in his written statement has stated that when he was sleeping in his room in the hotel he heard noise and on coming out he saw a stranger quarrelling with Ibrahim and causing injuries to him and then running away. Mahadev (D. W. 2) has supported this version by stating that he had served food to Ibrahim and one other person upstairs and they were taking food together and thereafter there was noise and the man running away injuring Ibrahim. Mahadev (D W. 2) happens to be an employee in Roop Basant Hotel belonging to Banney Singh and might be interested in saving his employer but there is no reason to disbelieve Gulab Chand (D. W. 1), nearest neighbour and taken as motbir to to the site plan who has stated that when after taking lunch at his house, he was just to leave for the shop on hearing the noise of Banney Singh he saw from his gallery adjacent to the hotel, he saw one man causing knife injuries to Ibrahim. That, Banney Singh was crying "ARE KAYA HO GAYA KAYA HO GAYA". According to the witness the assailant ran away from there. He stated that the assailant was not Basant Singh. He was rather a fat man. He also stated that he told this fact to the police and the police told him that he had been taken as witness. The witness being taken as a motbir to the site plan and his being the nearest neighbour to the hotel i. e. the place of occurrence not being disputed, there appears to be no reason to disbelieve him. 33. The witness being taken as a motbir to the site plan and his being the nearest neighbour to the hotel i. e. the place of occurrence not being disputed, there appears to be no reason to disbelieve him. 33. Defence witnesses are very often taken to be untrustworthy, either because of their interest in the accused or having come to the witness box without narrating the facts they claim to know to the police or anyone else, but it is not proper to assume that they always tell a lie and only prosecution witnesses are trust worthy. It would depend upon the nature of the statement of a defence witness. In the present case Gulab Chand (D.W. 1) was the nearest neighbour and being taken as a motbir to the site plan, prosecution should have examined him as its witness. The prosecution failing to do so, if the witness has come from the defence side that would not undervalue his testimony. 34. Clothes of Banney Singh being stained with blood not surprising because he himself has admitted that he was there at the time of the stranger causing knife injuries to Ibrahim and at that time blood oozed and his clothes got stains of bood. This is the prosecution case even that blood had spread there. 35. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for Sattar referred to the statement of Hanuman (P.W.7) and submitted that prosecution has established motive for Banney Singh to commit the crime. This witness has stated that on August 20, 1981 at 9.00 A.M. he was near a Trolly and Ibrahim Khan was there. From there they went to the hotel. There Ibrahim demanded money from Banney Singh who said that he was not in a position to pay at that time. Ibrahim told him that he has to perform the marriage of his son. At this Banney Singh asked him to come on 31st and take the money. According to the witness Ibrahim was demanding his own money from Banney Singh. The witness stated that as he wanted money from Ibrahim he had accompanied him. The witness stated that on September 2. 1981 he told this fact to Sattar and his statement was recorded on September 4, 1981. Sattar (P.W.2) has not stated about Hanuman telling him anything and he taking him to Police Station for giving statement. The witness stated that as he wanted money from Ibrahim he had accompanied him. The witness stated that on September 2. 1981 he told this fact to Sattar and his statement was recorded on September 4, 1981. Sattar (P.W.2) has not stated about Hanuman telling him anything and he taking him to Police Station for giving statement. This falsifies the version of Hanuman on the point and the learned trial Judge has rightly not attached any importance to this statement. 36. Upon discussing the material on record in the light of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be profitable to have some discussion about the scope of interference in the order of acquittal and the principles enunciated in the certain decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. 37. In the case of Ganesh Bha van Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 135 (supra) while discussing the power of the High Court in an appeal from the order of acquittal, it has been observed as under:- "Although in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, it should always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses". 38. It is the settled rule that where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 39. 38. It is the settled rule that where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 39. In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, in an appeal by a Special Leave before the Court on pure finding of fact recorded by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court it was held that such a concurrent finding of fact cannot be reopened in an appeal by special leave unless it is established that the finding is based on no evidence or that the finding is perverse, it being such as no reasonable person could have arrived at even if the evidence was taken at its face value or the finding is based and built on inadmissible evidence, which evidence, if excluded from vision, would negate the prosecution case or substantially discredit or impair it or some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked. 40. The learned counsel for the complainant side submitted that in that case the Court did not interfere in the judgment of conviction. True it is, but the principles are equally applicable to the case against the order of acquittal. When the question of interference in the finding of the trial court arises. 41. In the case on hand, the learned trial Judge cannot be said to have overlooked or misread any material fact. The conclusion arrived at by him is based on good grounds. We therefore do not find any ground warranting interference in the reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial Judge 42. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan and the Revision petition filed by complainant Sattar are dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******