Gopal Lal Sharma v. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies
1990-12-04
I.S.ISRANI, MOHINI KAPUR
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - This Special Appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, has been filed against the order dated July 13, 1990, passed by the learned Single Judge in S B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1367/90. The appellant was appointed on October 10, 1971 in Dholpur Sahakri Boomi Vikas Bank Ltd., by respondent No. 2 and, thereafter, confirmed as LDC vide order dated August 20/27, 1973 He was promoted on the post of Supervisor vide order dated September 26, 1981 (Ex. 1) and was confirmed on this post vide order dated April 23, 1988 (Ex. 2). Vide order dated September 30, 1990 (Ex. 11), the appellant has been put under suspension, which was challenged by him in the writ petition. 2. The contention of Mr. B.L. Sharma learned counsel for the appellant, is that the petitioner has been suspended by the Secretary/Chairman, whereas the Appointing Authority of the appellant is Board of Directors, neither Secretary, nor Chairman had any authority to suspend the appellant It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that Rule 41 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Rules, 1966 (for brevity, 'the Rules 1966') indicates that it is Committee, which can place a paid officer or servant under suspension. It is further submitted that even if the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. Rajasthan, seeks suspension of an employee of a Co-operative Society, he is also required to direct the Board of Directors of the Co-operative Society to place such an employee under suspension. It is also pointed out that it also provides that disciplinary proceedings in the absence of any approved Service Rules of the co-operative Institution the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules, 1958 shall apply. It is submitted that it is evident from the notification dated 3.3.80 (Anx. 2-3/2) filed by the respondents that it is only the Appointing Authority, who can impose major penalty on the employee, therefore, only Board of Directors is competent to take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. It is further submitted that bye law No. 30(a) of the Bye-laws mentioned above are not applicable and bye-law No. 27(f) (3) clearly provides that it is only Board of Directors, who can remove an employee from service appointed by Board of Directors. 3.
It is further submitted that bye law No. 30(a) of the Bye-laws mentioned above are not applicable and bye-law No. 27(f) (3) clearly provides that it is only Board of Directors, who can remove an employee from service appointed by Board of Directors. 3. A bare reading of Rule 41(4) of the Rules, 1966 shows that this Rule provides that where in the course of an audit under Section 68 or an inquiry under Section 70 or an inspection under Section 71 or 72, the Registrar is informed that a paid officer or servant of the Society is responsible for misappropriation/breach of trust/any other offence in relation to the Society, the Registrar may, if in his opinion, a prima facie evidence exists against such officer/servant, direct the Committee of the Society pendine investigation to place such paid officer/servant under suspension from such date as may be specified by him. Thus, it is evident that these provisions are attracted only when a direction is given by the Registrar. In the case under consideration, admittedly, no action has been taken under Rule 41 of the Rules, 1966 and the appellant was suspended on the directions of the Chairman of the Bank. As pointed out by Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the respondents, that it is evident from Annx. R 2-3/4, that the appellant made an application to the Chairman of the respondent-Bank for appointment as Typist in the respondent-Bank and, thereafter, he was appointed by the Chairman vide order dated October 9, 1971 (Anx. R 2-3/5). 4. Notification dated March 3, 1980 (Annexure R 2-3/2) is issued under signature of Registrar, in which it has been mentioned that the procedure for Disciplinary action against the employees of Co-operative Institutions other than Central Co-operative Banks and Rajasthan State Co-operative Bank, in absence of any approved service rules of the Cooperative Institutions, the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1958 shall apply with amendments made thereto, from time to time.
It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that Exhibit 1 by which promotion to appellant was given on probation basis to the post of Supervisor which was issued by Administrator is dated September 26, 1981 and Exhibit 2 by which the appellant was confirmed on the post of Supervisor was issued by directions of Chairman under signature of the Secretary on April 23, 1988 This was done after the notification dated March 3, 1980 (Annx. R-2-3/2). A bare reading of bye-law No. 27 (f) (3) shows that any employee who has been appointed by Board of Directors can be removed by order of Board of Directors. This bye-law is evidently not relevant for the purpose of this case since no order for removal of the appellant from service has been passed. Bye-law No. 30(a) clearly mentions that the Chairman shall have overall control over the affairs of the Bank Therefore, it cannot be said that the Chairman had no power to issue the suspension order. It may also be pointed out that Ex. 15 dated February 10, 1990 consists of memorandum, charge-sheet and statement of allegations which are all signed by the Chairman. The covering letter of the same date is signed by the Secretary. Therefore, it is clear that the Appointing Authority of the appellant is Chairman and he is having supervisory control over the affairs of the Bank and can be said to be Chief Executive Officer of the Bank in whom all such powers have been vested. Needless to add, Appointing Authority has always power to suspend. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to The Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan ( AIR 1989 SC 1582 ) which was a case regarding disciplinary action for removal taken by the Vice-Chancellor. This is a matter by which the Act confers both express and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express powers include that the provisions of Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned. However, no such situation arises in this case for consideration. This authority, therefore, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the matter under consideration. 5. Consequently, we do not find any force in this Appeal which is, therefore, dismissed.Special Appeal Dismissed. *******