JUDGMENT 1. - The counsel for the parties have prayed that since the questions involved in this case are pure questions of law the matter may be finally disposed of. Therefore on the request of both the parties the case is taken up for final decision. 2. This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 8.1.88 and 25, 8, 89 whereby the punishment of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect was imposed against the petitioner in an inquiry held under Rule 16 of the C.C A. Rules and the same was upheld in a Review Petition filed by by the petitioner under Rule 34 of the C.C.A. Rules 1958. 3. The petitioner's case is that while he was working as Assistant Engineer in the Ground Water Department of the Government of Rajasthan he was served with a memorandum proposing an inquiry under Rule 16 against the petitioner on the basis of charges and allegations annexed therewith with regard to the incident of 1977-78. The petitioner filed the reply dated 22nd of September, 1984 and it is the further case case of the petitioner that in view of the reply filed by him the inquiiy should have been dropped but instead of dropping the inquiry the order was passed for holding a joint injury under Rule 18 of the C.CA. Rules against the petitioner and one other delinquent Shri Govind Moolchandani who was the concerned L.D.C. The petitioner has also alleged that the order for holding joint inquiry under Rule 18 was passed in the year 1985 with regard to the incident of 1977-78 when it had become practically impossible for the petitioner to put for ward the effective defence and evidence in his support as the incident was more than seven years old by the time the order of joint inquiry under rule 18 was passed. The petitioner has also alleged in para 4 of the petition that during the course of inquiry he asked for the various documents so as to make use of the same in his defence but the same were not made available to the petitioner and on the basis of the inquiry report the order dated 8th of January 1988 was passed against the petitioner by the department of Personnel imposing the penalty of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect. Against this order dated 8th of January, 1988 the petitioner preferred a Review petition a copy of which has been placed on record as schedule W. This Review petition was decided by the order dated 25th of August 1989 and the Review petition was rejected. It appears from the reading of the order dated 8th of January, 1988 that no charge except charge No. 1 was found to be proved against the petitioner by the Inquiry officer but while dealing with the inquiry report the Disciplinary Authority held the charge No. 1 as well as charge No. 4 to be proved against the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following five contentions for consideration : 5. The first contention of the petitioner is that while passed the order dated 8th January, 1933 in an action under Rule 16 of the C C A. Rules no copy of the inquiry report was made available to him before passing this order and therefore the punishment order stands vitiated. 6. His second contention is that as per the order passed in the Review petition the respondents have taken the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect to be a minor punishment under Rule 14(11) which is absolutely wrong because it has been held in number of cases that the punishment of stoppage of grade increment with cumulative effect is a major punishment. 7. The third contention of the petitioner is that although only charge No. 1 has been held to be proved against him. the Disciplinary Authority has also held charge No. 4 to be proved against him and for that no reasons for its disagreement have been given. 8. The petitioner's counsel next contended that he had not been riven copies of the documents asked for by him during the course of inquiry and therefore the reasonable opportunity was denied to him and he has further submitted that as not the mention made while dealing with charge No. 4 in the order dated 25th August, 1984 Anx 6 it has been recorded that merely because the documents were not made available the inquiry cannot be vitiated and this by itself is sufficient to show that it was a case in which the reasonable opportunity was denied from very inception. 9. 9. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in this case the incident is of 77-78 for which the inquiry was proposed in the year 1985 the order for joint inquiry was passed in the year 1985 and now the incident is as old as of 12 to 13 years and. therefore no de novo inquiry should be allowed to be held. 10. Shri R.P. Dave appearing on behalf of the Government has contested the aforesaid submissions and his case is that once the opportunity of giving the show cause notice with the copy of the inquiry report was done away under the Rules in conformity with the constitutional amendment in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India there is no question of giving the copy of the inquiry report and the reasonable opportunity cannot exceed the scope of the Rules. He has also submitted that so far as the reasons of disagreement with regard to the charge No. 4 are concerned, the order itself shows that the reasons for disagreement have been duly recorded. On other aspects of the petitioner's challenge he has supported the impugned orders on the basis of the reasoning contained therein and has submitted that even if the impugned order is set aside the matter should be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority for passing appropriate orders. 11. First of all I may deal with the question with regard to the contention that the copy of the inquiry report was not made available to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of punishment. It is no doubt true that in terms of the 42nd Amendment made in the Constitution. the requirement of giving a show cause notice before proposed punishment was done away and it remained no more necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to give a show-cause notice proposing punishment and therefore,' the opportunity to make a representation against the proposed punishment simply does not arise. However, the question still remains as to whether the delinquent officer is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report or not on the basis of which the order or punishment is passed. In the facts of this case it is admitted position that the Disciplinary Authority itself did not hold the inquiry. However, the question still remains as to whether the delinquent officer is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report or not on the basis of which the order or punishment is passed. In the facts of this case it is admitted position that the Disciplinary Authority itself did not hold the inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority had appointed an Inquiry Officer who held this inquiry recorded the evidence and submitted an inquiry report containing his findings on each of the charges and it is on the basis of this inquiry report that the punishment order was passed against the petitioner. In such cases I find that the copy of the inquiry report must be made available to the delinquent officer so that he is able to offer his criticism against the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority before it proceeds to examine the inquiry report has before it the case of delinquent officer against the material made use of by the Inquiry Officer and also against the reasoning's on the basis of which the findings have been arrised at by the Inquiry Officer. What has been dispensed with by the Constitutional amendment and the consequential amendments in the Rule is the requirement of a notice proposing punishment and therefore even if the notice of proposed punishment is not given to the petitioner it is the duty of the Disciplinary Authority on the principles of fair play and reasonable opportunity that the delinquent Officer must be apprised of the report which is sought to be made us of against him for the purpose of inflicting punishment and therefore it is on the requirement of (first) principles of natural justice fair play and reasonable opportunity that a copy of the inquiry report should be made available to the delinquent officer before the final order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority notwithstanding the fact that the requirement of notice proposing punishment has been done away. In the case of 1) Ramsingh Vs U.S.R.T.C. reported in 1986 (1) judicial Surveyor page 139, it was held by a single Bench of this Court that in such cases a copy of the inquiry report should be made available to the delinquent officer before passing the order of punishment. In (2) Union of India Vs. In the case of 1) Ramsingh Vs U.S.R.T.C. reported in 1986 (1) judicial Surveyor page 139, it was held by a single Bench of this Court that in such cases a copy of the inquiry report should be made available to the delinquent officer before passing the order of punishment. In (2) Union of India Vs. E Bashyan reported in A.L.R. 1986 S. C. 1000, the question came up before the Supreme Court in the Bench of two Judges as to whether the failure to supply a copy of the report of the inquiry Officer to the delinquent before the Disciplinary authority makes up its mind and records the findings of guilt as against him would constitute failure of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and violation of the principles of natural justice and while dealing with this question the Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed in para 6 of the judgment that the question arising is not with regard to the giving of the notice as to what penalty should be imposed the question is whether it is the right of the delinquent to persuade the authority which makes tip its mind and records the guilt of the delinquent that such a finding is not warranted in the light of the report of the Inquiry Officer. The Supreme Court further observed that the decision on this point will affect millions of employees in the service today as also those who may enter Government service hereinafter fir time to come and that the matter thus needs careful consideration in depth and if necessary at length. It was further observed that the Bench was comprised of two Judges and therefore it was not considered proper to pass any order in that petition, though prima facie the two Hon'ble Judges were not inclined to grant leave to the Union of India in view of the two recent decisions which had been cited before then. However the matter was left open by observing that this question was not directly in issue although it was observed in para 5 of this judgment that in the event of failure to furnish the report of the inquiry officer the delinquent is deprived of crucial and critical matter which is taken into account by the real authority i.e. the Disciplinary Authority who holds him guilty. The Disciplinary Authority is the real authority because the Inquiry Officer does no more than to act as a delegate and furnishes the relevant material including his own assessment for final evaluation by the Disciplinary Authority who alone records the effective findings in the sense that it is the disciplinary Authorities findings which ultimately prevails for the passing of the final order. Non-supply of the report therefore constitutes violation of principles of natural justice and accordingly will tantamount to denial 3f reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. However, the counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kamal Joshi has cited before me the latest decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a Bench of three Judges in (3) Union of India & Ors. Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in JT 1990(4) SC 456 (also reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 ) and in this judgment it has been categorically held that non-supply of the inquiry report to the delinquent officer amounts to the violation of Rules of natural justice; the 42nd amendment has not brought about any change in this regard and the delinquent is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report and is also entitled to make a representation against it. The question has been specifically formulated in para 1l of this judgment as under : "The question which has now to be answered is whether the Forty- Second Amendment has brought about any change in the position in the matter of supply of copy of the report and the effect of non-supply thereof on the punishment imposed." While answering this question it has been observed by the Supreme Court in paras 12 13 14 and 15 as under : 12. We have already noticed the position that the Forty-Second Amendment has deleted the second stage of the inquiry which would commence with the service of a notice proposing one of the three punishments mentioned in Article 311(1) and the delinquent officer would represent against the same and on the basis of such representation and/or oral hearing granted the disciplinary authority decides about the punishment. Deletion of this part from the concept of reasonable opportunity in Article 311(2) in our opinion does not bring about any material change in regard to requiring the copy of the report to be provided to the delinquent. 13. Deletion of this part from the concept of reasonable opportunity in Article 311(2) in our opinion does not bring about any material change in regard to requiring the copy of the report to be provided to the delinquent. 13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Art 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one occasion has states that two phases of the inquiry contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to the 42nd amendment were judicial. That perhaps was little stretching the position. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding there can be no dispute that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facts do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. As this court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by the conclusions of the inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-Second Amendment the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion rules of natural justice would be affected. Prof. Wads has pointed out : The concept of natural justice has a listed for many countries and it has crystallised into two rules; that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing. Prof. Wads has pointed out : The concept of natural justice has a listed for many countries and it has crystallised into two rules; that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing. They (the Courts) hive been developing and extending the principles of natural justice so as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this once again by assuming that Parliament always intends powers to be exercised fairly." (Administrative Law). 14. This Court in Mazbarul Islam Hashmi Vs. State of U. P. & Anr. (1979)4 SCC 537 pointed out : Every person must know what he is to meet and he must have opportunity of meeting that case. The legislature however can exclude operation of these principles expressly or implicity. But in the absence of any such exclusion the principle of of natural justice will have to be proved." 15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report of the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(21 has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the affect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary & to have the proceedings completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceeding, & the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd amendment. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceeding, & the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd amendment. We therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would therefore be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position." In para 17 of this judgment the Supreme Court has further noted that different High Court following 42nd amendment has taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report and on some occasion even the Supreme Court had taken this view but the Bench of 3 Judges deciding this case has observed that they had reached a different conclusion and therefore the judgments in the different High Court taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law and it has also been noted that no decision of any coordinate Bench or larger Bench of the Supreme Court taking a contrary view had been cited and therefore the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law but it has also been observed by the Supreme Court in end of para 17 that this will have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. Thus so far as the proposition of law is concerned it must now be taken to be settled that furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report is a condition precedent and a prerequisite before passing the final order of punishment at the hands of the Disciplinary Authority. Thus so far as the proposition of law is concerned it must now be taken to be settled that furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report is a condition precedent and a prerequisite before passing the final order of punishment at the hands of the Disciplinary Authority. But the question still remains that once the Supreme Court has observed that this proposition will have a prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground then what should be the fate of the punishment orders which have already been passed without giving the copy of the inquiry report Shri R. P. Dave submits on this basis that notwithstanding the above position of law the punishment which has already been imposed in this case should not be interfered with and the impugned order of punishment should be allowed to stand because according to the Supreme Court itself this proposition of law has prospective application only. On the other hand it has been urged by Shri Kamal Joshi that the cases in which the punishment order is already under challenge and has not become final cannot be exempted from this proposition on the theory of prospectivity. I find considerable force in the argument of Shri Kamal Johi and I am of the opinion that his argument carries conviction and deserves to be accepted. Once it has been held by the Supreme Court that the furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report is a condition precedent it will be reasonable to apply this proposition against all those orders of punishment which have not attained the finality and it sounds reasonable and plausible to amply the observations made by the Supreme Court in the context in which the observations have been made. Had the intention of the Supreme Court been to cover all those punishment orders which have been imposed prior to the date of this judgment on the basis of prospectivity the Supreme Court would not have interfered with the order passed in the case which was there before the Supreme Court itself and this reasoning lends strength to the proposition that the observation about prospective application made by the Supreme Court means to cover only those cases in which the punishment orders have already become final and have already withstood the challenge before the court of law. The observation in this Supreme Court decision that it will have prospective application and no punishment imposed still be open to challenge on this ground" in my opinion means to cover only those cases which have already become final and which are not facing any challenge before any authority or in a pending case at any stage before any Court. 12. In this view of the matter the contention raised by Shri R. P. Dave on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the end of para 17 cannot be sustained and the same is rejected. Therefore I bold that the supply of the copy of the inquiry report before passing the order of punishment is essential and the failure to follow this requirement is fatal to the order of punishment. 13. So far as the petitioner's grievance that reasons for disagreement have not been given in regard to the finding on charge No. 4 by the Disciplinary Authority it will be sufficient to say that I have gone through the punishment order dated 8 1.1988 and I find that the disciplinary authority has considered the finding on charge No. 4 against the petitioner in detail and the adequate reasons for disagreement have been given in the body of the order and therefore this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is rejected. 14. Regarding the petitioner's contention that the reasonable opportunity wag denied to him in the sense that the document asked for had not been made available I may refer to the discussion at point No. 4 in the body of the impugned order dated 25th of August, 1989. It is therefore clear that the documents had not been made available to the petitioner and it is not the case of the respondents that the documents asked for by the petitioner were irrelevant and therefore, it was immaterial whether the documents had been given or wit nor it is the case of the respondents that the denial of these documents have not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. In this view of the matter I hold that reasonable opportunity was denied to the petitioner in the matter of defending him and accordingly I hold that the inquiry stands vitiated. 15. In this view of the matter I hold that reasonable opportunity was denied to the petitioner in the matter of defending him and accordingly I hold that the inquiry stands vitiated. 15. The petitioner's next contention that although the stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect a major punishment it has been imposed against the petitioner as if it was a minor punishment. as has been recorded in the impugned order passed in review. I find that this is immaterial. No doubt the punishment of stoppage of one grade annual increment with cumulative effect is not a minor punishment under Rule 14 (ii) as his been mentioned in the impugned order by the Author of the order while dealing with points Nos. 6 and 7 but the fact remains that the inquiry was held against the petitioner under Rule 16 and in an inquiry under Rule 16 the punishment of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative a feet could be very well imposed and therefore even if a major punishment has been passed and it has been described as a minor punishment it is not going to make any difference because in an action under Rule 16 the Disciplinary Authority was competent enough to impose the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect. Had it been a case of action under Rule 17 and then the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect would have been imposed it would have been a different matter altogether. 16. Once it has been held that a reasonable opportunity had been denied to the petitioner and the inquiry stands vitiated and further that the impugned order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 8th of January, 1988 as also the order dated 25th of October, 1989 passed in Review are bad in the eye of law as the same had been passed without furnishing a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner the impugned order dated 8-11-88 as also the order dated 25-8-89 Anx. 3 and 6 respectively are quashed and set aside. 17. 3 and 6 respectively are quashed and set aside. 17. Now the question remains as to whether the matter should be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority for an inquiry de novo or the matter should be closed it may be straightway observed that admittedly the incident is as old as of 1977-78 as per the impugned order dated 25- 8-89 wherein it has been observed while dealing with point No. 11 that there was no oblique motive on the part of the petitioner and it is a case of technical breach of some procedure/rule it will not be proper at this stage after 13 years to remand the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority for a trial denovo. Shri Kamal Joshi appearing on behalf of the petitioner has cited before me the cases (3) Gwalior Coop. Distt. Central Bank Ltd. Vs. Ramesh Chandra reported in A I.R. 1985 S.C. 337 and (5) Bhagat Ram Vs State of H P. & Ors. reported in 1983 S.C. unreported Judgments 29 par 7 [ 1983 (2) SCC 442 ] and has submitted that in all these decisions the Supreme Court has taken the view that the denovo inquiry should not be ordered in the case where the subject matter of the charge is old and stale. I accordingly hold that it is not a fit case in which the matter should be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority for an inquiry de novo and I direct that this chapter should be considered to be closed for ever. 18. The writ petition is accordingly allowed as indicated above. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits as if the impugned order dated 8.1.88 Annexure-3 had never been passed against him. No order as to costs.Petitions allowed. *******