ORDER S.H.A. Raza, J. - The simple question involved in this writ petition is as to whether the Labour Court at Lucknow, after giving a finding to the effect that the termination of employment of workman Shankar Prasad Tewari with effect from 3rd Sept. 1975 must be held to be bad in law, can deny the claim of the said workman for reinstatement in service. 2. According to the petitioner, he was appointed as a driver in the Lucknow establishment of U.P. Roadways Corporation on 15-2-1973 and was thereafter absorbed in a clear vacancy on 30-4-1973 and since then he has been working till his services were terminated with effect from 3rd Sept. 1975 and this gave rise to an industrial dispute which was ultimately referred for adjudication. The petitioner had claimed that the termination of his services comes within the meaning of `retrenchment' under Section 2(oo) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and that his services were terminated in violation of Section 25F of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, as such the order of termination was bad in law. 3. According to the written statement filed on behalf of the Road Transport Corporation Luck now, before the Labour Court after the constitution of the Corporation on 1-6-1972 all the employees of the U.P. Government Roadways including the petitioner continued their services in the Corporation and their services were to be governed by the same terms.and conditions of employment which were already applicable to them at the time when they were working in the U.P. Government Roadways till the Corporation does not frame its own rules and regulations. The petitioner was temporarily appointed as driver by the order dated 24-3-1973 for a specified period and his period of temporary appointment was extended from time to time according to the exigencies of work and as per service conditions of his appointment, his services could be terminated vide order dated 3rd Sept. 1975. 4. It was averred by the petitioner that the petitioner was never in the employment of State Government inasmuch as he joined the services of the Corporation in 1973 and even for that reason the service conditions regarding the U.P. Government Employees could not be made applicable to him. 1975. 4. It was averred by the petitioner that the petitioner was never in the employment of State Government inasmuch as he joined the services of the Corporation in 1973 and even for that reason the service conditions regarding the U.P. Government Employees could not be made applicable to him. It was also stated that since the place where the petitioner was working in the employment of the Corporation was an industrial establishment within the meaning of the word under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946, it is the Standing Orders alone which could govern his conditions of service and not the rules relating to the U.P. Government Employees. As no Standing Orders were framed by the Corporation, Model Standing Orders would be applicable to the Industrial Establishment of the said Corporation and it was further averred that in terms of the same the petitioner would become a permanent employee after three months of his employment. 5. The question as to whether the petitioner was permanent or temporary will not resolve the controversy inasmuch as the Labour Court itself has found that the termination of the service of the petitioner is a case of retrenchment and it was further found that the retrenchment was illegal. 6. There is no denying of the fact that U.P. State Road Transport Corporation is an industry and the petitioner being a driver was a workman and the definition of word "retrenchment" as contained in Section 2(oo) is wide enough to govern the case of the petitioner. The Labour Court indicated in its order as under : "Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, as discussed above, this conclusion would appear to be irresistible that the action of the employers in abruptly terminating the employment of the workman Shankar Prasad Tewari a few months before the expiry of his fixed term, was not bona fide; and that actually this workman has been victimised or punished for some alleged misconduct on his part without giving him any opportunity to explain his position. It must, therefore, be held that there has been a colourable exercise of power on the part of the employers and their action has been mala fide. In this view of the matter, the termination of the employment of the workman Shankar Prasad Tewari w.e.f. 3rd Sept. It must, therefore, be held that there has been a colourable exercise of power on the part of the employers and their action has been mala fide. In this view of the matter, the termination of the employment of the workman Shankar Prasad Tewari w.e.f. 3rd Sept. 1975 must be held to be bad in law and it has to be set aside." Even after giving this finding the Labour Court held that the petitioner could claim wages for the period 3rd Sept. 1975 to 29th Feb. 1976 only. The Labour Court further observed that if the employment of the petitioner came to be terminated on 29th Feb. 1976 on the expiry of the term fixed for his employment, he would have been entitled to retrenchment compensation, as according to the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sundara Mony ,(1976 SCC (L & S) 132 : (1976 Lab IC 769) it would be a case of retrenchment where the employment of a workman stands terminated due to the running out of the stipulated term of employment. This workman was in continuous service of the employers from 15th Feb. 1973 to 29th Feb. 1976; he would have been entitled to retrenchment compensation for three years i.e. 15 days wages for each year of service. The claim of petitioner for reinstatement was not accepted by the Labour Court but he was awarded compensation in lieu of back wages. 7. Even after holding that the petitioner was workman and the Corporation mentioned above was an Industrial Establishment, the Labour Court totally ignored to consider that the services of the workman could only be terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F of the Central Industrial disputes Act and Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the record shows that the services of the petitioner were terminated only after giving him one month's notice. Before retrenching the petitioner no notice in the prescribed manner was served on the State Government and he was not paid the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the record shows that the services of the petitioner were terminated only after giving him one month's notice. Before retrenching the petitioner no notice in the prescribed manner was served on the State Government and he was not paid the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The order of termination of services of the petitioner without observing the conditions laid down under Industrial Disputes Act was void ab initio and the Labour Court fell in error by not ordering the reinstatement of the petitioner only for the reason of the fact that his term was extended from time to time. The petitioner worked till 3-9-1975 and thus he had completed more than one year service and hence his services could not have been terminated without following the procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act. Right to live is guaranteed under the Constitution. Livelihood is a part of life. A person cannot be denied his livilihood except in accordance with law. In the instant case even the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the termination of services of the petitioner was bad in law, as such the Labour Court ought to have held that as the services of the petitioner were wrongly terminated, the petitioner deserves to be reinstated in service. In a similar situation relying upon the case of Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, ( 1984 (1) SCC 509 : (1983 Lab IC 1865) in the case of Narotam Chopra v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court 1989 Supp (2) SCC 97 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "It is not well settled that if the services of an employee are terminated in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. the order of termination is rendered ab initio void and the employee would be entitled to continuity of service along with his back wages, see Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and modify the award of the Labour Court and we further direct that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other allowances." 8. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and modify the award of the Labour Court and we further direct that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other allowances." 8. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the award in Adjudication Case No. 76 of 1977 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) to the extent that it has not granted to the petitioner the relief of reinstatement with fullback wages and continuity of service. A writ of mandamus is also issued directing the opposite party No. 2 to restore back Adjudication Case No. 76 of 1977 and decide the same in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order by the petitioner. Howev_4p,'no order is made as to costs.