JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed against the order of the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Madurai dated July 7, 1981 made in W.C. Application No. 158 of 1979 where under the authority below awarded a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- to the second respondent herein on account of the death of her husband Thiru George (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman'.) 2. The case of the second respondent before authority below was that her husband, the deceased workman, was employed by Thiru Surulimani who is the husband of the appellant as driver on a monthly wage of Rs. 200/-. It has been further claimed that on April 7, 1974 when the workman was driving the car in question, it collided with a lorry and due to the said accident, both the workman as well as Surulimani, the employer, got injured. As a result of the same, the worker died on April 9, 1974 and the employer died on April 11, 1974. The applicant as the only dependent of the deceased workman claimed compensation of Rs. 8,000/-. 3. The appellant objected to the claim on the ground that the deceased workman was not employed by her husband, that the car belonged to one Chandrasekar Narayanasamy and that the second respondent could claim the compensation from the insurer. It was also contended by the appellant before the authority below that her husband travelled in the car just as a friend of the owner, that he was not the employer of the workman and that at any rate, the quantum of compensation was excessive. Since the car was not owned by her husband, it was her case that the deceased workman was not employed by her husband. 4. After considering the material on record, the authority below came to the conclusion that the deceased workman was employed by the husband of the appellant and he died of injuries sustained in the accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. As against the quantum claimed, a sum of Rs. 6,000/- was awarded and the appellant was held liable to pay the same as the heir of deceased husband. Hence, this appeal. 5. Mr. As against the quantum claimed, a sum of Rs. 6,000/- was awarded and the appellant was held liable to pay the same as the heir of deceased husband. Hence, this appeal. 5. Mr. Vijayanarayanan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that admittedly in the present case, the accident occurred on April 7, 1974 at a place called Vellur (Peyyanoor P. S. Limits) in Kerala State when the vehicle was returning from Mysore en route to Bodinayakanur (via) Cannanore. If that be the position, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act ought to have been presented, by virtue of Section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 before a Commissioner for the area in which the accident took place which resulted in the injury. Pursuing the said submission, the learned counsel submitted that this not having been done, the order of the authority below is totally without jurisdiction and, therefore, is liable to be set aside. Secondly, the learned counsel contended that under Section 10 of the Act, no claim shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence of the accident or date of death, as the case may be, and in the case on hand as against the date of accident, viz., April 7, 1974, the claim was made only in March 1978 and consequently, the entertainment of the claim by the authority below without even considering whether there was any sufficient cause for the delay renders the order under appeal liable to be set aside. 6. The second respondent in spite of service of notice is not appearing by counsel or in person. On a perusal of the records, I find that none of the two objections raised before me has been raised before the authority below. Consequently, the authority below had no occasion to either consider the said issues and under its findings on give an opportunity to the applicant before the authority to set right matters as best as could be possible. 7. Consequently, the authority below had no occasion to either consider the said issues and under its findings on give an opportunity to the applicant before the authority to set right matters as best as could be possible. 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, viz., the death of the workman and the quantum of compensation awarded, I consider that it may not be proper, as well as in the interest of justice, to permit the appellant to take such a stand for the first time before this court which will have the effect of unsettling matters after a long time. The nature of the objections taken, in my view, are such that the objections are not so formidable as to totally bar the claim application and destroy the rights of the claimant once and for all, for making a claim for compensation. If only an objection had been taken in respect of Section 10 of the Act, what was required to be done was only to plead some sufficient cause on the basis of which the authority below could have condoned the delay. It is only in this context that the non-raising of an objection on this account at the proper time became relevant and material. The lapse in this regard in my opinion ought not to be condoned and the appellant allowed to raise the same at this stage. 8. So far as the venue of filing the claim and the objection raised in this regard with reference to Section 21 of the Act is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is a matter pertaining to the very jurisdiction of the authority below and, thereof, could be raised even at this stage before this court. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel referred to the decisions reported in Pioneer Traders v. Chief Controller, Imports & Exports, ; Arunachalam Pillai v. Southern Roadways Ltd., ; Gopal v. Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, and an unreported decision of S. Ramalingam, J. in Tamil Nadu Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. v. N. Chidambaram, W.P. No. 1006 of 1982, decided on November 15, 1988. After considering the various judgments placed for my consideration, I am of the view that these judgments only make it clear that it is open to the court concerned to allow the point pertaining to jurisdiction raised for the first time though not raised at the initial stage. But at the same time, in my view, the decisions could not be pressed into service to contend that invariably the court is obliged to permit the raising of such a question at the later stage though not raised at the initial point. That, in my view, is one left to the discretion of the court before which the point is sought to be raised too. The discretion of this court has got to be exercised ultimately, having regard to the surrounding circumstances and the reasonableness for decision of the case under consideration. It is in this context that the decision of the Division of Bench of this court reported in Indian Bank v. R. S. Thiruvengadam, 1990-II-LLN-26, becomes relevant where under the learned Judges of the Division Bench consisting of Dr. A. S. Anand, C.J. and Kanakaraj, J. repelled the plea to raise such an issue pertaining to jurisdiction after long lapse of time. While declining leave to raise the issue at this stage, the learned Judges emphasised the need to keep in mind the principles of equity as well as the necessity to do substantial justice without being carried away by technicalities which will have the result of legalising injustice. 9. In the light of the principles laid down by the Division Bench, I am inclined to follow and adopt the same to the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Even if the objection based on Section 21 of the Act is tested, it can be seen from the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 21 and the second proviso to the said provision that the sad provisions of the Act recognise the position that a Commissioner of the area in which the accident took place is empowered to transfer the proceedings to any other Commissioner in that State or another State if only the parties agree for such a transfer. I am inclined to consider that the participation of the appellant amounts to acquiescing in the judgment and what remained to be done was only the formal presentation before the Commissioner of the area in which the accident took place and an odder of transfer. I am highlighting this aspect for the simple reason that the objection cannot be taken to be one which undermines the jurisdiction in toto and that if the parties consenting, the claim could be disposed of by the Commissioner in other areas too. Unlike the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, the point now sought to be raised is not one which was not available to the appellant to be raised at that time, and if in spite of this, the parties effectively participated in the proceedings, it will not be in the interest of justice to allow such a person to retrace the steps takes and wriggle out of the commitments. 10. For all the above reasons, I am not in a position to agree with any of the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. The appeal fails and is rejected. No costs.