JASRAJ CHOPRA, J.-These two revision petitions one filed by petitioner Daulatram and the other filed by petitioner Bhaddar Sen, raise similar legal question and, therefore, they were heard together and now, they are being decided by a common order. 2. It is alleged that the respondent Punjab National Bank through its Branch Manager, Srikaranpur filed applications before the prescribed authority i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sri Ganganagar against the petitioners Daulatram and Bhadder Sen for the recovery of Rs. 37,076.72p and Rs.56,838.90p. respectively under the Rajasthan Agricultural Credit Operations (Removal of Difficulties) Act,1974 (for short the Act herein) These applications were filed on 12.10.1984 and on the same day, the competent authority issued attachment warrants. 3. Against this order of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Sri Ganganagar, revision petitions were filed by the petitioners before the Board of Revenue but they were dismissed on the ground that the Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction under the Act because the impugned order has been passed by Civil Court and, therefore, any appeal or revision against the order of the Civil Court would lie to the Civil Court. 4. It is alleged that ex parte orders were passed by the competent authority in both these cases on 23.6.1987 and on the very next day, the petitioners submitted applications for setting aside the ex parte orders mentioning therein that due to marriage, the learned counsel for the petitioners was not present in the Court and petitioners could not attend the Court on account of the death of their relative. These application came to be dismissed by an order dated 27.6.1988 of the Prescribed authority. Aggrieved against that order dated 27.6.1988, appeals were filed before the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Sri Ganganagar Camp at Srikaranpur and these appeal came to be dismissed on 23.7.1988 on the ground that as the Act does not provide for an appeal, no appeal is maintainable and the learned Addl. District Judge has no authority to hear any appeal. It is against this order dated 23.7.1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.l. Sri Ganganagar Camp at Srikaranpur that these two revision petitions have been filed. 5. It is the admitted case of the parties that the Act does not provide specifically for filing of an appeal. District Judge has no authority to hear any appeal. It is against this order dated 23.7.1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.l. Sri Ganganagar Camp at Srikaranpur that these two revision petitions have been filed. 5. It is the admitted case of the parties that the Act does not provide specifically for filing of an appeal. s.l3(2) of the Act reads as Follows: S. 13(2) Every order passed by the prescribed authority in terms of sub-s(l) shall be deemed to be decree of a civil court and shall be executed by him in the same manner as a decrees of such court. Explanation : For the purpose of exercising powers conferred by this sub-s the prescribed authority shall be deemed to a civil court." 6. It was contended by Mr. S.L. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the prescribed authority in passing an order on the application filed by the Bank under s.13 of the Act has been treated to be a Civil Court and any order passed by the Prescribed Authority in terms of sub-s.(l) of s.13 of the Act been deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court and it has been made executable in the same manner as decrees of the Civil Court. He has, therefore, content that the Court i.e. the prescribed Authority being treated to be a Civil Court and the order passed by it under Sec. 13(1) of the Act has been treated to be a decree and is executable as a decree, an appeal lies against such an order, under s.3 read with s.96 of the Code of Civil procedure. This contention is seriously opposed by Mr. N.P. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. He has submitted that the right of appeal is the creature of the statute. It does not provide for any right of appeal and therefore, no right of appeal can claimed and order passed by the learned Addl. District Judge is perfectly valid and does not deserve to be set aside. 7. Our attention has drawn by Mr. He has submitted that the right of appeal is the creature of the statute. It does not provide for any right of appeal and therefore, no right of appeal can claimed and order passed by the learned Addl. District Judge is perfectly valid and does not deserve to be set aside. 7. Our attention has drawn by Mr. N.P.Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sainiks Motors V.S.T. Authority (1), wherein it has been held that appeals are creations of statute and unless a person can bring himself within the four corners of the Statute law prescribing appeals, he cannot go before any appellate authority. 8. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in Kishanlal V. Sohanlal (2), wherein it has been observed that a right of appeal is a creation of statute, and it is to the statute alone that Courts must look to determine whether such a right a in exists particular instance or no. Further, there is noting unreasonable or wrong that a right of appeal to the highest tribunal in the State is circumscribed by certain well- defined restrictions. 9. Mr.Gupta has further placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Bai V. Vijay Kumar (3), wherein it has been observed that there is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute, one may, at ones peril, bring a suit of ones choice. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard* to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inherent in no one and therefore, an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute 10. But the position in regard* to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inherent in no one and therefore, an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute 10. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Munshi Ram v. Hukam Singh (4), wherein against an order of the Tribunal, a revision was filed and the Court held that a perusal of the scheme of the Act shows that the matters mentioned in the Act were to be dealt with by the Tribunals and not by ordinary courts and while s.40 of the Act provided for appeals to the High Court from the decision of the Tribunals, that right was restricted where the subject-matter of the appeal was less than Ra.5,000/-. In that case, the subject-matter of the appeal was Rs.4373/2/6 and, therefore, it was held that the appeal or revision is not maintainable. This decision of course, is one where the right of appeal has been provided but it has been restricted to some extent. In the case on hand, the relevant Act itself does not provide for any appeal. Mr. S.L. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has, therefore, submitted that in such matters, the ordinary law of the land will govern the case. S.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads as under: S.3. Subordination of Court :- For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is Subordinate to the High Court and every civil court of grade inferior to that of a District Court and every court of small causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court." 11. Mr. Jain has contended that according to S.13(2) of the Act, when the prescribed authority is a Civil Court then it has to be treated as inferior to District Court and when it is a court inferior to the District Court than an appeal against any order passed by a Civil Court will lie to the court of District Judge under s.96 C.P.C., which reads as follows :- S. 96. Appeal from original decree-(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) No appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by by court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees." 12. Mr. Jain has contended that for the purposes of S.13(2) of the Act, the prescribed authority is deemed to be a Civil Court and the order passed by it is deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court and is executable in the same manner as a decree of the Civil Court and, therefore, this Civil Court being subordinate to the District Court as per s.3 C.P.C., an appeal against such an order shall ordinarily lie under s.96(l) C.P.C. to the Court of District Judge and, therefore, the learned Addl. District Judge was justified in dismissing this appeal as not maintainable. 13. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Jain has placed reliance on a decision of the Delhi High Court in Gul Mohd. V. Smt. Samar Jahan(5), wherein the suit laid by Muslim for the dissolution of his marriage was decreed by the sub-judge. The Sub Judge was considered to be a Kazi under the Muslim Marriage Act and his judgment followed by the decrees were appealable under s.96, C.P.C. It was held that the fact that by reason of the provisions of the dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, the Sub Judge also exercise the powers of the Kazi did not mean that the decision was final and unassailable. The dismissal of the appeal filed under s.96 C.P.C. on such pleas was set aside and the lower appellate court was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits. 14. The dismissal of the appeal filed under s.96 C.P.C. on such pleas was set aside and the lower appellate court was directed to dispose of the appeal on merits. 14. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Mysore High Court in Narayan V. Shankar (6), wherein it has been observed: that the Court of Mamlatdar, Collector or Assistant Collector maybe presided by a revenue Officer but neither the designation of the Officer presiding over the court nor the authority in whom the power of making the appointment of such presiding Officer vests is relevant in considering whether the court is a civil court or not. In that sense, even the Officers presiding over the Civil Courts are appointed by the Governor. Bout what is material is the power and the function which the law creates the court entrusts to such a presiding officer. A narrow construction of the expression civil Court and of s.3 of Civil P.C. would exclude a large body of Tribunals and authorities which are expressly constituted as Courts and are entrusted with powers and functions of deciding disputes of a civil nature. 15. It was further observed as follows: S.3 of Civil P.C. must be interpreted as a comprehensive declaration, as a matter of corollary, of the subordination of all courts of civil judicature to the District Court in a District area and to the High Court in a provincial area. Once it is held that the Courts of the Mamlatdar, Collector, Assistant Collector, Deputy Collector are assistant Commissioner are Civil Courts, it necessarily follows that they are subordinate to the High Court and a revision petition can be entertained under Sec. 115 of Civil P.C. against their orders. 16. Mr. Jain has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Collector, Varansi V. Gauri Shanker (7), while deciding that case, the decision in Hanskumar Kishanchand V. U.O.I. (8) was relied on. In Hanskumar Kishanchands case (supra), a contention was raised that the appeals were not maintainable for two reasons viz., (a) the decision appealed against is neither a decree, judgment or final order and (b) the decision in question was not that of a Court. Both these contentions were upheld. In Hanskumar Kishanchands case (supra), a contention was raised that the appeals were not maintainable for two reasons viz., (a) the decision appealed against is neither a decree, judgment or final order and (b) the decision in question was not that of a Court. Both these contentions were upheld. On the second ground taken Venkatarama Aiyar, J. who spoke for the Court, observed: Under the law, no appeal would have laid to the High Court against the decision of such an arbitrator. Thus, the provision for appeal to the High Court under Sec. 19(1) (f) can, only be construed as a reference. to it as an authority designated and not as a Court." 17. Now,we apply these two tests to the case on hand. Here, the order that has been passed by the Prescribed authority is treated to be a decree of the Civil Order and the Court which decided the case is treated to be a Civil Court and, therefore, by inference, it has to be held that the Court which has decided this matter is a Civil Court and the order which it has passed is a decree of the Civil Court and hence, it is appealable under Sec. 3 read with s.96 C.P.C. 18. In para 4 of the judgment in Collector, Varanasi case (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution recognised a hierarchy of court and to their adjudication are normally intruded all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the state. These Courts can be described as ordinary courts of Civil Judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with question of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is as judicial process. It was further observed that the powers which these court exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. The hierarchy of courts in this country is an organ of the State through which its judicial power is primarily exercised. It was further observed that the powers which these court exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. The hierarchy of courts in this country is an organ of the State through which its judicial power is primarily exercised. As stated above, in this case,s. 13(2) of the Act clearly provides that the prescribed authority should be treated as a Civil Court and the orders Passed by it should be treated was decrees of Civil Court and, therefore, there appears to be no difficulty in treating the Prescribing Authority to be a Civil Court. 19 In Rajah of Venkatagiri V. Mahabood (9), it has been observed as follows: "In proceedings under s.l5,Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, the Sub-Collector and the District Collector are hearing and determining disputes of civil nature and the proceeding before them should be regarded as civil proceedings and their courts as Civil Courts for the purposes of s.3. The declaration of the relative subordination of Civil Courts in s.3 for the purposes of the Code must be taken to cover revenue courts as well in the absence of any saving of such courts, and subject to its revisional jurisdiction under S.115.S.3 was intended to declare, as a matter of corollary, the relative statue and authority of all courts including revenue courts in the hierarchy of civil courts of which the High Court froms the apex. The sub- Collectors order under s.15(4), Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and the District Collectors order purporting to set it aside are open to revision by the High Court under Sec. 115,Civil P.C. 20. Mr. Jain has next drawn my attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Chaturbhuj V. Mauji Ram (10) wherein it has been observed: "that the Court exercising jurisdiction under s.5 of the Act, is a Civil Court and as such, subordinate to High Court. High Court is, therefore, in accordance with. 115 Civil P.C. competent to revise the order passed by a Court under s.5 Agriculturists Relief Act. High Court is, therefore, in accordance with. 115 Civil P.C. competent to revise the order passed by a Court under s.5 Agriculturists Relief Act. There is noting in that Act that can be interpreted to divest High Court after expressly or by necessary implication of the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 115, Civil P.C. The more denial to the decree-holder of aright of appeal cannot warrant the inference that the Legislature intended to her the revisional jurisdiction of High Court. The provisions in cl.(2) of s.5 that the decision of the appellate court shall be final means no more than this, that the order passed by the appellate court cannot be made the subject of a second appeal. The provision about the finality of the decision of the appellate court contained in cl. (2) of s.5 cannot therefore, warrant the inference that the legislature intended to any. way to limit or control the revisional jurisdiction conferred on high court by Sec.115, Civil P.C." 21. Mr. Jain has lastly drawn my attention to a decision of the Patna High Court in Imperial Tobacco Co. vs. Asstt. Labour Commr., Patna (10), wherein it has been observed: "that it is now well settled that person or authority entrusted with the responsibility of judicial functions to be exercised in judicial manner i.e. in accordance with the principles of law and following the procedure laid down by any law, will be taken as a Court. In that sense, although an authority acting under a particular statute may not be termed as a Court and some other authority or some other Court may as referred to in some other context in the same statute, yet such authority entrusted with judicial functions will be deemed to be a Court." While adverting to s.,3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was observed that every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every court of small causes is subordinate to the High Court and the District Court. That was a case where of course, an appeal was provided against the order of the concerned authority under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and, therefore, was held that the appeal could not lie to the court of District Judge but it is under the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court 22. That was a case where of course, an appeal was provided against the order of the concerned authority under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and, therefore, was held that the appeal could not lie to the court of District Judge but it is under the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court 22. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid authorities that where a particular statute does not provide for an appeal but still if the authority has decided the matter functioning as a judicial Court and as per the provisions of law, it has been deemed to be a Civil Court and every order of that Court has been deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court then that Court has to be treated as a Civil Court and its order has to be treated as a decree of the Civil Court and a person aggrieved by that order may file an appeal before the court of District Judge as per s.3 read with s.96, C.P.C., It may be that particular Act does not provide for right of appeal the provisions Of a.3 read with s.96 C.P.C. are also statutory in nature and, therefore, if the right of an appeal arises to a particular party to these Provisions then that appeal has to be entertained. I am, therefore, firmly of the view that the learned Addl. District Judge was wrong in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners as not maintain-able. 23. In the result, I accept these revisions petitions, set aside the order of the learned Addl. District Judge No.l, Shri Ganganagar camp at Srikaranpur dated 23.7.1988 and remand the two appeals back to learned Addl. District Judge for deciding them on merits as per the provisions of law. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Addl. District Judge, No.l. SriGanganagar camp at Sri Karanpur on January 3,1991. 24. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs of these revision petitions.