JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against cancellation of petitioners promotion from Class IV post to Class III post by the impugned order with consequent reversion to Class IV post. 2. Petitioners 1 and 3 Rajendra Kumar and Hemendra Kumar Katara were posted as Superior Field Workers in Malaria Eradication Branch of the Department of Medical, Health and Family Welfare in districts of Agra and Mathura and petitioners 2 and 4 Pravendra Singh and Pramod Kumar were posted as Ward Boys in different hospitals at Mathura. The offices and hospitals fall under the administrative charge of Additional Director of Medical, Health and Family Welfare, Agra Division. By order dated 17-10-1987 petitioners 1 to 3 and by order dated 5-9-1987 petition No. 4 were promoted to the post of clerk-cum-typist. This post was a Class III ministerial post. These promotion orders were passed by Dr. K. N. Seth who at that time was posted as Additional Director, Medical, Health and Family Welfare, Agra Division, Agra. Dr. Seth retired from service on 30-9-1988. Thereafter from the afternoon of the said date Dr. U.P. Singh took charge as officiating Additional Director. It appears that after taking over charge of the post of Additional Direct Dr. U. P. Singh wrote to the Director General of the Department pointing out that promotion orders passed by his predecessor in respect of the petitioners were illegal inasmuch as neither the post had been advertised nor any selection had been held in accordance with Rules. The Director General there after cancelled the promotion orders of the petitioners and directed their reversion from Class III post to Class IV post. In pursuance of this order Dr. M. K. Ansari who had meanwhile taken over charge of the post of Additional Director, Agra Region, Agra passed the impugned orders of reversion dated 16-12-1988. These orders have been challenged by the petitioners on the ground that they are arbitrary, illegal, mala fide, unjust, improper and violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the orders have also been described to be discriminatory. It is also 5 pleaded that principles of natural justice have been violated inasmuch as no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioners before passing the impugned orders. 3. It is also 5 pleaded that principles of natural justice have been violated inasmuch as no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioners before passing the impugned orders. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite-party No. 3, namely, the Additional Director, Agra Division, Agra, it has been stated that the petitioners were appointed by the then Additional Director on the basis of application made by the petitioners without advertising the post and without constituting any Selection Committee and without holding any typing or written test. 4. Against the aforesaid counter affidavit petitioner No. 3 has filed rejoinder affidavit in which it has not been asserted that any advertisement was issued or that any Selection Committee was constituted although it is asserted that the petitioners were tested for typing and were also interviewed. 5. At the time of arguments learned counsel for the State Sri I. M. Quddusi invited my attention to the Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1975. Rule 7 deals with sources of Recruitment. It states that recruitment to the lowest grade of the ministerial staff in a subordinate office shall be made by direct recruitment through the Selection Committee referred to in Rule 6 on the basis of academic and other attainments as provided in Rule 12. To this Rule there is a proviso which says that upto 10 per cent of the vacancies in a particular subordinate office may be filled by the appointing authority by promotion from High School pass Class IV employees of that office in accordance with the orders of Government issued from time to time. In view of the Proviso if the petitioners possessed the High School qualification they could be considered for promotion against 10% vacancies, if available. We may assume that the petitioners possessed the educational qualification mentioned in the Proviso. Rule 15 lays down that the vacancies shall be notified to the Employment Exchange. It also provides that the appointing authority may invite applications directly too from the persons who have their names registered in the Employment Exchange. These names, under the rule, are required to be placed before the Selection Committee. Rule 16 lays down the procedure to be adopted by the Selection Committee. Under this Rule the Selection Committee is required to prepare a merit list of the candidates. These names, under the rule, are required to be placed before the Selection Committee. Rule 16 lays down the procedure to be adopted by the Selection Committee. Under this Rule the Selection Committee is required to prepare a merit list of the candidates. The merit list is to be prepared in accordance with the allocation of marks under various Heads mentioned in the rule. From sub-clause (a) of sub-rule 11) it appears there has to be a minimum qualifying examination and thereafter there has to be interview. Thus there has to be a written test and viva voce. Under sub-rule (5) those required to perform typing work are required to be tested for their proficiency in typing. After the select list has been preparted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Rule 16 the appointment orders are to be issued by the appointing authority under Rule 29. 6. There is no assertion either in the writ petition or in the rejoinder affidavit that the procedure mentioned herein-above was followed before the petitioners were issued promotion orders. In paragraph-16 of the counter affidavit the following specific assertion has been made : - "That the petitioner's appointment to the post of clerk is illegal as no selection committee was formed. No advertisement to the post was published. No typing of written test held....". This paragraph and paragraph-17 have been replied to in the rejoinder affidavit through paragraph-16 which reads as follows :- "That the contents of paras 16 and 17 of the said counter are denied and it is submitted that the petitioner had to go through a lest of typing and interview by a number of persons including the Additional Director of Medical and Health against whom a stenographer has made numberous false allegations. The petitioners appointments are fully legal and justified and as such, are not subject to reversion...." 7. From the above it is apparent that there is no controversion of the opposite-parties plea that no advertisement was issued, no selection committee was formed and no written or typing test was held. The petitioners vaguely assert that they went through a test of typing and interview by a number of persons including the Additional Director of Medical and Health. The rules do not contemplate interview and typing test by a number of persons. This has to be done by the selection committee constituted under the rules. The petitioners vaguely assert that they went through a test of typing and interview by a number of persons including the Additional Director of Medical and Health. The rules do not contemplate interview and typing test by a number of persons. This has to be done by the selection committee constituted under the rules. It is apparent, therefore, that the petitioners were not promoted in accordance with 1975 Rules mentioned herein-above. 8. The aforesaid rules have been framed in exercise of the power conferred by the Proviso to Rule 309 of the constitution and have statutory force. When a method of recruitment has been prescribed by statutory rules that method will have to be followed for recruitment and recruitment cannot be made by any other method. Recruitment made by any other method will have to be held as null and void and non est in the eye of law. Accordingly the impugned orders of cancellation of promotion and consequent reversion cannot be faulted. The present is not a case of reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution but is a case of correction of illegality and, therefore, reliance placed by the learned counsel on Article 311 (2) is misconceived. 9. The impugned order of cancellation of promotion and consequent reversion has not been passed on any allegation of misconduct against the petitioners and, therefore, there was no question of giving the petitioners opportunity of hearing. In this Court the petitioners had opportunity to show that they had been appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statutory rules. The petitioners merely allege their promotion to be legal but are unable to show that the procedure prescribed in the rules was actually followed. On undisputed facts the petitioner's promotion was illegal. As such it would be an exercise in futility to quash the impugned order and require the concerned authority to pass fresh order after giving the petitioners opportunity of hearing. 10. On behalf of the opposite parties the right of the Additional Director to appoint the petitioners has also been challenged. According to the opposite-parties the appointing authority of Class III post in the districts is the Chief Medical Officer and not the Additional Director of Medical, Health and Family Welfare. 10. On behalf of the opposite parties the right of the Additional Director to appoint the petitioners has also been challenged. According to the opposite-parties the appointing authority of Class III post in the districts is the Chief Medical Officer and not the Additional Director of Medical, Health and Family Welfare. Unfortunately, neither the petitioners nor the State has invited my attention to the relevant rule or Government Order prescribing appointing authority for the post in question. The petitioners merely assert that the Additional Director was the appointing authority. On behalf of the State reliance is placed on Government Order D/-11-4-1988 (Annex. CA-2) for submitting that the Chief Medical Officer was the appointing authority. Reliance placed on this document is misconceived as this document does not prescribe appointing authority for the post in question. Paragraph 4 of this order reads as follows : - "Zila Astar Par Chathurth Shrenike Padon Par Chayen Hetu Vibhaglya Chayen Samiti Ka Woh Gathan Niyamanusar Karega Evan Mandal Ke Zilon Metratiya Shreni Ke Pedon Par Chayen Samiti Ka Gathan Niyamanusar A Par Nideshak Mandal Dwara Kiya Jayega." This paragraph only prescribes the authority competent to constitute Selection Committee for appointment to Class IV and Class III posts. For Class IV post the authority-competent to constitute the selection committee is the Chief Medical Officer and for Class III post the Additional Director of the Region. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has tried to take advantage from paragraph-4 of the aforesaid Government Order for submitting that Additional Director of the Region is the appointing authority for Class III post. No such inference can be drawn from the aforesaid paragraph. From paragraph-10 of the writ petition itself it appears that Chief Medical Officer is the appointing authority for the post in question. In this paragraph the petitioners have pointed out that one Ram Prasad was appointed to Class III post by the Chief Medical Officer, Mathura. In paragraph-11 also the petitioners have referred to the promotion of Rajpal Singh by Chief Medical Officer, Aligarh and his appointment was approved by the Additional Director of the region. Approval of appointment is one thing and appointment itself is quite another. The examples cited by the petitioners themselves lead to the conclusion that the appointing authority of Class III post in the district was the Chief Medical Officer and not the Additional Director. Approval of appointment is one thing and appointment itself is quite another. The examples cited by the petitioners themselves lead to the conclusion that the appointing authority of Class III post in the district was the Chief Medical Officer and not the Additional Director. Thus the petitioners promotion suffers from the additional illegality that they were not promoted by the authority competent in that behalf. 12. It is also the case of the petitioners that they had been treated with discrimination. The plea of discrimination is sought to be substantiated by submitting that persons similarly promoted have been retained on the promoted post while the petitioners have been directed to be reverted. The facts pertaining to discrimination have been vaguely stated in paragraphs 10 and 11. In these paragraphs reference has been made to two persons who were promoted by the Chief Medical Officer and whose promotions were approved by Dr. U. P. Singh who reported against promotion of the petitioners.-In paragraph-10 the expression of parity used by the petitioners is "same method". There is no assertion either in the original writ petition or in the rejoinder affidavit that in the promotion of these persons no advertisement was issued and no selection committee was constituted. On the basis of the vague assertions made in paragraphs 10 and 11 the plea of discrimination cannot be sustained. 13. In paragraph-12 of the writ petition the petitioners have mentioned the following authorities as supporting their case :- (1) 1986 (3) SCC 273 : (1986 Lab IC 1191). (2) 1987 (1) SCC 63 : (1987 Lab IC 981). (3) 1985 LCD (3) 124. (4) AIR 1987 SC 1015 : (1987 Lab IC 707) and (5) (13) AIR 666. The title of none of the cases has been mentioned in the above paragraph. The title, if the first case is S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka, S.R.T.C and other. In this case the appellants before their Lordships had been brought on the select list prepared for appointment to the post of conductor in the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. Thereafter he was appointed for a period of more than 240 days. While he was working as conductor his services were terminated on the ground of his being found unsuitable for the post. Thereafter he was appointed for a period of more than 240 days. While he was working as conductor his services were terminated on the ground of his being found unsuitable for the post. The termination order further directed that the appellant would forfeit his chance of appointment in terms of selection and his names shall stand deleted from the select list. The order of termination was held by their Lordships to be violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and was accordingly quashed. This is not a case of select list being prepared in violation of statutory provisions. Accordingly this authority has no application to the facts of the present case. 14. The title of the second case is M. D. N. Panikar v. S.A.I.L. This is a case of equal payment for equal work. This too has no application to the facts of the present case. 15. The title of the third case decided by a Division Bench of this Court is Syed Hasan Askari v. U. P. State. This is a case in which different dates had been fixed for payment of washing allowance and holiday allowance to two sections of the Police Establishment who were found to be similarly situated. This authority also has no relevance to the facts of this present case. 16. The title of the fourth case is Yogender Pal Singh v. Union of India. This case related to grant of preference to sons and near relations of persons serving in the Department in the matter of appointment. This provision was held by their Lordships to be ultra vires of Article 16 of the Constitution. No such situation arises in the present case. Accordingly this authority is irrelevant. 17. The citation of the last case is incomplete inasmuch as the year is not disclosed. 18. Even though it was apparent to the petitioners that their promotion had not been made by Dr. K. N. Seth in accordance with Rules they made unwarranted allegations against Dr. U. P. Singh to challenge the impugned order of cancellation of appointment and reversion. In paragraph-6 of the petition it has been stated that Dr. U. P. Singh "started making false and frivolous allegations against various acts performed by Dr. K. N. Seth. - In view of the findings recorded herein above the allegation of "false and frivolous allegations" against Dr. U. P. Singh is wholly unjustified. In paragraph-6 of the petition it has been stated that Dr. U. P. Singh "started making false and frivolous allegations against various acts performed by Dr. K. N. Seth. - In view of the findings recorded herein above the allegation of "false and frivolous allegations" against Dr. U. P. Singh is wholly unjustified. The petitioners must, therefore, pay costs of opposite-party No. 3 who has contested the writ petition by filing counter affidavit. 19. In view of the above the writ petition is dismissed with costs to opposite party No. 3 which are assessed at Rs. 400/- (Rupees four hundred).