This appeal arises out of the order passed by the Employees' State Insurance Court, Gauhati setting aside the order passed by the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation under section 85B of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, hereinafter 'the Act'. 2. Two very important questions of law have arisen in this appeal for consideration-(1) What is the effect of repeal of an Amending Act on the continuance of the amendments made in the principal Act by the enactment so repealed ? (2) What is the scope and ambit of powers under section 85B of the Act to recover damages for failure to pay the amount of contribution or any other amount payable under the Act ? 3. Before dealing with the legal questions, it will be appro­priate to briefly state the fact of the present case. The respondent, Associated Industries (Assam) (Spinning Unit), hereinafter referred to as the 'employer' is a factory covered > under the Employees' State Insurance Act. It was required to pay certain contributions in accordance with section 40 of the Act within the time prescribed in Regulation 26 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulation framed under the Act. As according to the Corporation, the employer failed to pay three contributions amounting to Rs.390.60, Rs. 312.00 and Rs. 97.50 within the prescribed time, damages were levied under section 85B of the Act at the maximum rate of 100% of the amount of arrears. The employer filed an application under section 75 of the Act before the Employees' State Insurance Court of Assam at Gauhati, hereinafter "E.S.I. Court" challenging the order of levy of damages on the ground that the delay in payment of the contributions was properly explained and the order was passed arbitra­rily without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. 4. The E.S.I. Court noticed that the Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1975 by which section 85B was incorporated in the text of the principal Act was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1978 (Act No. 1978). The E.S.I. Court, therefore, held that the section 85B under which the order was passed, levying damages was not in existence on 30.9.80 when the impugned order was passed. On that basis, it held the order as without jurisdiction, and set aside the same. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the E S.I. Court did not decide the merits of the case. 5. On that basis, it held the order as without jurisdiction, and set aside the same. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the E S.I. Court did not decide the merits of the case. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the E.S.I. Court, the E.S.I. Corporation has come up before this Court challenging the said order. Mr. S.N. Chetia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant E.S.I. Corporation submits that the E.S.I. Court acted most illegally and without jurisdiction in holding that the repeal of the Amending Act affected the continuation of the amendments made by the Amending Act so repealed. In other words, according to him, section 858 which was incorporated in the principal Act by the Amendment Act of 1975 continued to be a part of the principal Act even after the repeal of the Amendment Act of 1975 I have considered the submission of the learned counsel and also heard Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the respond­ent. On careful consideration of the rival submissions of both the counsel and the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act and the Repealing Act, I find that there is substance in« the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 6. In the principal Act, the Employees' State Insurance Act, as originally enacted, there was no provision for levy of damages for failure to pay the contributions or other amounts payable under the Act within the specified time Such provision along with certain other provisions was incorporated for the first time in the Act by the Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act No, 38 of 1975) with effect from 1.9 75. The Amendment Act was later repealed by the Repealing and Amendment Act, 1978 which repealed a number of enactments mentioned in the schedule thereto including the aforesaid Amendment Act 38 of 1975. The question that now arises for consideration is that what is the effect of the such repeal of the Amending Act. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the counsel for both the parties. It appears that similar point came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Jethanand vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89 . In that case also by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1975, the Indian Wireless (Amendment) Act, 1949 was repealed. It appears that similar point came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Jethanand vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89 . In that case also by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1975, the Indian Wireless (Amendment) Act, 1949 was repealed. By the Amend­ment Act so repealed, a new section namely section 6 (1-A) was inserted in the Indian Wireless Telegraphic Act, 1933 whereunder the possession of wireless transmission was constituted as separate offence. The petitioner in that case was convicted under that section. It was contended before the Supreme Court that in view of the repeal of the Amending Act, the said section 6 (1-A) inserted by the Amending Act was no more on the statute book and, as such, the conviction was liable to be quashed. The Supreme Court considered the contentions and held that it was not tenable in law in view of the provision of section 6 (A) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 A of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: - "6-A Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation- Where any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the comm­encement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the contin­uance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid section 6 A of the General Clauses Act, the Supreme Court in Jethanand (Supra) held that as by the Am­ending Act, text of the Telegraphic Act, 1933 was amended by the insertion of section 6 (1-A) therein, the repeal of the Amending Act by Repealing Act of 1952 did not affect continuance of the amend­ments made by the enactments so repealed. The Supreme Court also repealed the contention of the appellant in that case to the effect that for application of section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, text of any enactment have been amended and that it would not cover a case of insertion of a new section as it would not amount to textual amendment but a substantial law. The Supreme Court also repealed the contention of the appellant in that case to the effect that for application of section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, text of any enactment have been amended and that it would not cover a case of insertion of a new section as it would not amount to textual amendment but a substantial law. Repelling the aforesaid contention, the Supreme Court observed :- "The word 'text' in its dictionary meaning, means 'subject or theme'. When an enactment amends the text of another, it amends the subject or theme of it, though sometimes it may expunge unnecessary words without altering the subject. We must, therefore, hold that the word 'text' is comprehensive enough to take in the subject as well as the terminology used in a statute". 8. The Supreme Court in that case also observed :-"It is, therefore, clear that the main object of the 1952 \ct was only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise dead matter from statute book in order to lighten the burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind. The object of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 was only to expurgate the Amending Act of 1949, along with similar Acts, which had served its purpose." 9. The case at hand is fully covered by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, It also falls with the four corners of section 6A of the General Clauses Act. By the Amending Act of 1975, section 85B was inserted in the text of the principal Act and thereby the text of the said Act was amended. The said amendment did not get affected by the repeal of the amending Act. Section 85B, therefore, continued to be a part of the text of the principal Act even after repeal of the Amending Act and it continued to be in force on the date of levy of damages in the instant case under the said section. In fact it continues to be in operation even till to-day. Mr.A.K.Phukan, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on certain decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 155 . The aforesaid decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In fact it continues to be in operation even till to-day. Mr.A.K.Phukan, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on certain decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 155 . The aforesaid decision has no application to the facts of the present case. The point involved in the present case is fully coveted by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jethanand (Supra) Mr.Phukan also referred to section 4 of the Repealing Act which is a saving provision and pointed out that the amendment made by the Amending Act was not covered by the said section, and as such, it should be deemed to have been repealed. It, however, appears that the Supreme Court also considered similar argument in Jethanand (Supra), and held that in view of the provisions of section 6 A of the General Clauses Act, arguments based on section 4 of the Repealing Act do not in any way help the appellant. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, submission of Mr. Phukan cannot be accepted. I, therefore, hold that the amendments made by the Amending Act of 1975 continued to be in force despite repeal of the Amending Act by the Repealing and Amendment Act, 1978 and as such, the E.S.I. Corporation did not commit any jurisdictional error in exercising power under that section for the purpose of levying of damages in the instant case. The order of the-E.S.I. Court, therefore, is not tenable in law and is accordingly set aside. 10. I now take up the next submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. It is submitted that the impugned order levying damages at the maximum rate is most arbitrary. It is not a speaking order. The employer in its explanation gave very elaborate explanation with very cogent reasons for the delay m payment of the contributions in question in time and on the face of the said explanation, the E.S.I. Corporation was not justified in levying damages. It is also submitted that damages were levied in the instant case at the maximum rate, that is, equivalent to the amount of arrears which was not justified at all on the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is also submitted that damages were levied in the instant case at the maximum rate, that is, equivalent to the amount of arrears which was not justified at all on the facts and circumstances of the present case. In fact, by his submissions Mr.Phukan has raised very important question regarding the nature, scope and ambit of the powers of the E.S.I. Corporation to recover damages under section 85B of the Act. Section 85B of the Act reads as follows : ''85B. Power to recover damages-(1) Where an employer fails to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or any other amount payable under this Act, the Corporation may recover from the employer such damages not exceeding the amount of arrears as it may think fit to impose : Provided that before recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) Any damages recoverable under sub-section (1) may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue." 11. Section 85B thus empowers the authorities to recover damages from an employer on his failure to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or only other amount payable under the Act. The maximum amount that can be recovered by way of damages is restricted. 12. It may be pertinent to mention here that section 85B was not there in the principal Act as originally enacted. It was inserted by the Amending Act of 1975 as the penal provisions then existing were not found to be effective in checking the defaults in payment of contributions. The object of insertion of this new provision, as stated in the, objects and reasons, was to provide for imposition of enhanced and more deterrent penalties for defaults in payment of the contributions. It is, in fact, a penalty by way of 'damages'. The damages are exemplary or punitive. The maximum limit of such penalty has been specified. The nature of the powers of the authorities to determine the quantum or damages has been described by the use of expression 'as it may think, fit to impose' which makes it clear that the authority concerned has also to apply its mind before determining the quantum of damages. The power under section 85B is a quasi-judicial power. The nature of the powers of the authorities to determine the quantum or damages has been described by the use of expression 'as it may think, fit to impose' which makes it clear that the authority concerned has also to apply its mind before determining the quantum of damages. The power under section 85B is a quasi-judicial power. The proviso to the said section makes it incumbent on the part of authorities before recovering such damages to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer concerned. The power given can again be exercised within the limit fixed by the section. While fixing the amount of damages, all rele­vant factors are to be considered. The order under section 85B, therefore, has to be a speaking order containing the reasons in support of it (See Organo Chemical Industries vs. Union of India reported (1979) 1SCC573). 13. As 'damages' under section 85B in substance is a penalty imposed on the employer for breach of statutory obligation, it should not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. The authority concerned will have to apply its mind to the various relevant factors such as the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. Even then the determination of the amount of 'damages' will require application of mind. Merely because an employer failed to pay the contributions in time will not be lawful to impose maximum damages. Whether damages should be imposed in a particular case for failure to perform the statutory obligation to pay the contribution in time is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of the relevant circumstances. The authority under section 85B will be justified in not imposing damages even if there is a failure to pay the contribution in time if there are materials to satisfy that there was reasonable cause for such failure. If it is not so satisfied, then it has to decide the quantum of damages and for that purpose also again apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot impose the maximum damages without applying its mind to this aspect of the matter. The order must be a speaking order. 14. In the present case. If it is not so satisfied, then it has to decide the quantum of damages and for that purpose also again apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot impose the maximum damages without applying its mind to this aspect of the matter. The order must be a speaking order. 14. In the present case. it is contended by Mr.A.K.Phukan that damages at the maximum rate were ordered to be recovered from the respondent without considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without assigning any reason therefore. I have considered the order passed by the Regional Director of the Corporation. No reasons appear to have been recorded for imposing maximum damages. However, as the Employees State Insurance Court did not go into this aspect of the matter in view of the erroneous view taken by it on the point of jurisdiction, in my opinion, it would be proper to remand this matter to the Employees' State Insu­rance Court to decide as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case levy of damages at the rate of 100 percent of the amount of arrears was justified in the present case. The Court will decide this matter in the light of the observations made above regarding the scope and ambit of the powers under section 85B of the Act. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to cost.