Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This First Appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 20-8-1982 passed by Shri Bhagwati Prasad, 3rd Additional Sub-Judge, Ranchi in Title Suit No. 183/78 of 1978/82, whereby and whereunder the said learned court dismissed the plaintiffs-appellants suit for specific performance of contract. 2. The facts of the case lie in a vary narrow compass. 3. The property in suit is a piece and parcel of lands measuring 6 kathas 6 chatak and 30 sq. ft. with a building on a portion thereof situate on M. S. Plot No. 179 marked as sub-plot No. 179/A and M. S, Plot No. 185 and M. S. Plot No. 178 towards west, situated at Ratu Road, Ranchi, Police Station and district Ranchi, within Municipal holding No. 149 and 149/A. The said property admittedly belonged to Haji Hedayat Khan. The said Haji Hedayat Khan by virtue of a registered deed of sale dated 26-11-1973 transferred his right, title and interest in favour of his son Abdul Rahim Khan who was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the court below. Admittedly, the original plaintiff as also the defendant No. 1 were tenants of the defendant No. 2 in a portions of the aforementioned premises in suit. The plaintiff was a tenant in the eastern portion of the building in question on a monthly rent of Rs. 42.00 . Whereas the defendant No. 1 was a tenant under the defendant No. 2 in respect of the shop rooms situated on the western portion of the said building. 4. It is further admitted that by reason of an agreement of sale, dated 22-7-1975, the plaintiff as also the defendant No. 1 expressed their intention to purchase the properties in suit for a consideration of Rs. 62,500.00 from the defendant No. 2 ; where for a sum of Rs. 7,000.00 was paid by them by way of advance and part payment towards the agreed consideration amount. 5. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 2 accepted the said amount and allowed the plaintiff as also the defendant No. 1 to continue to possess the said tenancy in their own right i.e. by way of part performance of the said agreement. However, according to the defendant No. l despite execution of the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975, the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 continued to be tenants under the defendant No. 2. 6. However, according to the defendant No. l despite execution of the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975, the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 continued to be tenants under the defendant No. 2. 6. It is an admitted fact that at the time of execution of the deed of sale, the plaintiff was not in a position to pay his share of the consideration amount and as such allegedly on 18-1-1976, an oral agreement of sale was entered into by and between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 for purchase of the entire property from the defendant No. 2 by the defendant No. 1 subject to the condition that if the plaintiff pays back his share of the consideration amount i.e. half of the aforementioned sum of Rs. 62,500.00 the defendant No. 1 shall convey half of the property in question to him as per the original agreement dated 22-7-1975. It is further admitted that a deed of sale dated 20-1-1976 was executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1. 7. According to the plaintiff, in order to give effect to aforementioned oral agreement of sale dated 18-1-1976, he raised necessary fund for making payment of his share of the consideration amount to the defendant No. 1 by entering into an agreement of sale dated 24-2-1976 with Mrs. Subhadra Ghosh which was marked as Ext. 3. It is further the case of the plaintiff that pursuant to the aforementioned agreement dated 24-2-1976, he executed a registered deed of sale dated 22-9-1978, he executed a registered deed of sale dated 22-9-1978 in favour of the aforementioned Mrs. Subhadra Ghosh. Certified copy of the said sale deed was marked as Ext. 4, before the learned court below, 8. The plaintiff, however, received a notice dated 2-9-1978 issued by Shri Debi Prasad, Advocate whereby and where under the plaintiffs tenancy was sought to be terminated. 9. However, it appears that prior to the receipt of the aforementioned notice, the plaintiff had also served a notice upon the defendant No. 1 through his advocate dated 21-8-1978 calling upon him to perform his part of contract in terms of the said oral agreement entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. 10. The aforementioned suit was not contested by the defendant No. 2. 10. The aforementioned suit was not contested by the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1, however appeared and filed a written statement contending inter alia therein that after the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975 was entered into, the plaintiff became doubtful with regard to the title of the defendant No. 2 in relation to the property in suit and further as he did not have the requisite amount to pay to the defendant No. 2 his share of consideration amount in terms of the aforementioned agreement of sale dated 22-7-1975 and he abandoned the said agreement and/or backed out therefrom. According to the defendant No. 1, the plaintiff even did not make any contribution towards the purchase of non-judicial stamps required for execution of the registered deed of sale by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 1 has asserted that the entire amount for purchasing the requisite non-judicial stamps was spent by him. 11. The defendant No. 1 in his written statement further denied and disputed the assertion of the plaintiff that pursuant to the agreement of sale dated 22-7-1975, the plaintiff was to remain in possession of the premises in suit in his own right i.e. in part performance of the aforementioned contract and not as a tenant under the defendant No. 2. According to the defendant No. 1, after execution of the deed of sale dated 20-1-1976 executed by the defendant No. 2 in his favour, he became the landlord of the plaintiff and he determined the said tenancy by serving a notice dated 22-9-1978 through his advocate. The defendant No. 1 further denied and disputed the existence of the alleged oral agreement dated 16-1-1976. 12. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the earned trial court framed the following issues: (1) Is the suit as framed maintainable ? (2) Has the plaintiff any valid cause of action (3) Had the agreement dated 22-7-1975 arrived at between Rahim Khan on the one hand and plaintiff and defendant No. 1 on the other hand failed on account of plaintiff backing out from the furtherance of the contract on the ground of defect of title of Rahim Khan in the suit property as also on the ground of short of funds to provide him share of consideration money? (4) Had there been any contract or oral contract on 19-1-1976 between plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant No. 1 on the other as alleged by the plaintiff in respect of half of the property described at the fact of the plaint. If so, the contract, legal, valid and enforce able? (5) Had the plaintiff contributed any amount of money towards the purchases of the stamp paper for the execution and the registration of the sale deed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 ? (6) Has the plaintiff been ready and willing to perform his part of contract dated 15-1-1976? (7) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for specific performance of Contract? (8) Is the plaintiff entitled to the relief or reliefs claimed? 13. The learned court below took up issue Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 together and held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of any oral agreement dated 18-1-1976 in order to enable him to obtain a decree for specific performance of the said agreement. He further held on the basis of the evidence on record that so far as the agreement dated 22-7-1975, entered into by and between the defendant No. 2 on the one hand and the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 on the other hand, is concerned, the plaintiff backed out from the said agreement and the defendant No. 1 purchased the entire property from the defendant No. 2 by reason of the aforementioned deed of sale dated 20-1-1976, 14. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant submitted that the trial court committed an illegality in dismissing the plaintiff-appellants suit in so far as it failed to take into consideration the circumstantial evidence which coupled with the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant proved the existence of the aforementioned oral agreement dated 18-1-1976. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has referred to the evidences of P. W. 4 Sitaram Chaudhary, P. W. 6 Radhey Shyam Ghosh and P. W. 7 Narain Chandra Ghosh, the plaintiff himself. 15. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned trial court while deciding the aforementioned issue Nos. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has referred to the evidences of P. W. 4 Sitaram Chaudhary, P. W. 6 Radhey Shyam Ghosh and P. W. 7 Narain Chandra Ghosh, the plaintiff himself. 15. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned trial court while deciding the aforementioned issue Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 failed to take into consideration that even P. W. 2 Shri Sagir Ahmad and P. W. 10 Shri Divendu Majumdar who had been the advocates of the parties admitted that the plaintiff was a party to the agreement dated 22-7-1975 and he also contributed half of the advance payable to the defendant No. 2 by the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 jointly. The kerned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that the parties were being advised by two advocates, there was no necessity of bearing off the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975 inasmuch as, if, really the plaintiff had backed out from the said agreement and/or abandoned his right arising there under, it could have been a normal course of conduct on the part of all the parties concerned to obtain an endorsement to that effect from the plaintiff on the back of the aforementioned agreement. The learned Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff has also been able to prove that he had been occupying the premises in question in his own right and in part performance of the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975, inasmuch as from the month of August. 1975 till the institution of the suit, no rent receipts was produced to show that the defendant No. 2 realised any rent from the plaintiff. 16. The learned Counsel further submitted that the oral evidence adduced in order to prove the oral agreement dated 18-1-1976 is also corroborated by the circumstantial evidences brought on including the agreement of sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and Mr. Subhadra Ghosh which became necessitated as the plaintiff had to raise the necessary fund for acquiring the properties (sic) in question the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the recitals made in the agreement of sale executed by the original plaintiff in favour of Mrs. Subhadra Ghosh which became necessitated as the plaintiff had to raise the necessary fund for acquiring the properties (sic) in question the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the recitals made in the agreement of sale executed by the original plaintiff in favour of Mrs. Subhadra Ghosh (Ext 3) for the purpose of showing that even in the body of the aforementioned instrument, the original plaintiff had categorically recoiled that the necessity to execute a deed of sale was for the purpose of rise in the requisite fund for paying the stipulated consideration amount to the defendant No. 1 in terms of the oral agreement dated 18-1-1976. 17. Mr. Prasad further submitted that the aforementioned circumstances are so tell-tale that the same deals only to one conclusion that the allegations of the plaintiff relating to the agreement of sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 whereby and where under the defendant No. 1 promised to sale the property in question on receipt of half of the consideration amount from the original plaintiff within a period of three years, were correct. 18. The learned Counsel further submitted that from the evidence of P. W. 2 and P. W. 10, the Advocates, it could appear that they were not aware of the talks which took place between the parties to the suit with regard to the destruction of the agreement. 19. It has further been brought to my notice that plaintiff did not consult P. W. 10 with regard to the defect of title of the defendant No. 2. 20. The learned Counsel, in this connection, has further brought to my notice passbook of Bank of India (Ext. 7) for the purpose of showing that there has been sufficient fund on the hands of the original plaintiff. 21. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that for the purpose of coming to a conclusion as to whether there had been an oral agreement of sale or not could be judged not only from the circumstantial evidence which were obtaining at the time when the said agreement was entered into but also on the basis of the conduct of the parties subsequent therein. 22. Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No. 1-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that there is nothing to show that the alleged oral agreement was for any consideration. 23. 22. Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No. 1-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that there is nothing to show that the alleged oral agreement was for any consideration. 23. The learned Counsel further submitted that there could not have been an oral agreement by and between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 which allegedly took place on 18-1-1976 in view of the fact that the defendant No. 1 himself acquired the property in question by virtue of a registered deed of sale executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 on 20-1-1976. 24. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned court below has correctly appreciated the evidence on record in order to come to a conclusion that there had been no agreement for sale whatsoever, as alleged by the plaintiff and as such he is not entitled to any decree for specific performance of contract. 25. The learned Counsel further submitted that in any event, the said agreement was void by reason of uncertainty of the terms and conditions thereof. It was further submitted that in any event the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff to prove the alleged oral agreement is unreliable and as such the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 26. In my opinion, the submission of the learned Counsel for the component that the alleged agreement dated 18-1-1976 is hit by Secs. 25 and 29 of the Contract Act, is not correct. The plaintiff in his pleadings also in his evidence stated the consideration amount which was to be paid by him to the defendant as also the other terms and conditions, which were agreed to of performed by the parties. Farther an agreement for sale does not become void only because no advance has been paid. 27. la this view of the matter, the only question which arises for consider-ration is as to whether the plaintiff, in the facts and circumstances of the case had been able to prove the existence of alleged oral agreement of sale dated 18-1-1976. 28. The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. 29. The parties to the Us have not disputed that there had been an agreement for sale, dated 22-7-1975 entered into by and between the defendant No. 2. 28. The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. 29. The parties to the Us have not disputed that there had been an agreement for sale, dated 22-7-1975 entered into by and between the defendant No. 2. On the one hand plaintiff and defendant on the other, whereby and whereunder the defendant No. 2 agreed to transfer the properties in question in favour of plaintiff and defendant No. 1 on receipt of a consideration of kg. 62,500. 30. It is further not in dispute that for some reason or the other, the plaintiff did not become a party to the deed of sale, dated 20th January, 1976 whereby and where under the defendant No. 2 transferred his right, title and interest in favour of the defendant No. 1. 31. The plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit not for the purpose of enforcing the aforementioned agreement for sale, dated 20-7-1975 but for enforcing an alleged oral agreement dated 18-1-1976. 32. For what reasons, the plaintiff could not become a party to the deed of sale executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1, in term, of the aforementioned agreement for sale dated 22-7-1975 disputed. Howevers the fact remains that despite the admitted existence of the aforementioned agreement dated 2-7-75, the plaintiff for some reason or other did not purchase half of the property which was the subject-matter of the aforementioned deed of sale, dated 20th January, 1976, although, he vas a party to the aforementioned agreement of sale dated 22-.-1975. 33. In such a situation, the plaintiffs suit must stand or fall on his own case, i.e. whether the oral agreement, dated 18-1-1976 was entered into by and between him and the defendant No. 1 or not. 34. In law, a suit for specific performance of contract for enforcing an oral agreement for sale is maintainable, The background and the circumstances leading to the aforementioned alleged agreement for sale play an important rule. 35. It is admitted that the plaintiff was a tenant under the defendant No. 2. 34. In law, a suit for specific performance of contract for enforcing an oral agreement for sale is maintainable, The background and the circumstances leading to the aforementioned alleged agreement for sale play an important rule. 35. It is admitted that the plaintiff was a tenant under the defendant No. 2. Even assuming that by reason of the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975, the statute of the plaintiff in relation to the premises in his occupation charged, namely, he began to possess the sale property in his own right presumably in terms of Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the same looses all its significance in view of the fact that the plaintiff on his own showing was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract in terms of the aforementioned agreement or sale dated 22-1975 and thus he cannot take advantage thereof. Further, admittedly the said agreement was not acted upon and was allegedly torn off. 36. In terms of Sec. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendant No. 1, who stood into the shows of his purchaser, thus became entitled to treat the plaintiff as his tenant. 37. It is true that the defendant No. 1 has not been able to prove any rent receipt for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff had overpaid rent to the defendant No. 2 after the said agreement came in into being out onus of proof in absence of any document hi writing having been brought on record that the plaintiff caused to be it tenant and had been in occupation of the suit premises in his own right, was upon him. 38. Admittedly, the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-75 was executed and the plaintiff was himself a party to the aforementioned document. It must be presumed that he was either in possession of one of the copies of the said deed proposed simultaneously and executed by all concerned or any event he must have been in possession of a true and correct copy of the said agreement. 39. The plaintiff for reasons best known to him did cot produce the said document nor could lead satisfactory secondary evidences to prove the covenant that he was in occupation of the said premises in pan performance of the said agreement for sale. 40. As noticed hereinbefore, Mr. 39. The plaintiff for reasons best known to him did cot produce the said document nor could lead satisfactory secondary evidences to prove the covenant that he was in occupation of the said premises in pan performance of the said agreement for sale. 40. As noticed hereinbefore, Mr. N.K. Prasad has submitted that the plaintiff could not have any doubt with regard to the title of the defendant No. 2 inasmuch as the defendant No. 2 had also purchased the properties from his father. 41. However, the plaintiff examined Sitaram Choudhary (P. W. 4). The said witness (stated that Hidayat Khan left behind three sons and some daughters also, 42. From the evidence of the said P. W, 4, it appears that wife of Hidaya Khan, namely, Saira Khatoon (the mother of the defendant No. 2) was his landt lord, but in respect of the said premises, one Mangi Lal Agarwal, (sic) against, him. 43. Saira Khatoon died and after her death, allegedly Hidayat Khan came in possession of the said, suit premises Mangi Lal Agrawal claimed to have purchased the property in dispute from Abdul Khalil on (c) of the brothers of the defendant No. 2 Rahim Khan and the said P. W. 4 allegedly, purchased the said suit premises from Hasina Khatoon one of the daughters of Saira Khatoon. 44. The aforementioned Hasina Khatoon and Abdul Khalil both were parties in that suit. The said P. W. 4 purchased the said property in the year 1976 which year, Rahim Khan, the defendant No. 2S executed the sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1 and prior thereto, as noticed hereinbefore, on 22-7-i 575, he had executed an agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit property. 45. In the said suit, the plaintiff Narain Ghosh deposed as a witness on behalf of P. W. 4. It is thus expected that the plaintiff had the knowledge that the other sons and daughters of Hidayat Khan had also been claiming the properties. If the plaintiffs have been supporting P. W. 4, such an event, it must be held that he had reasons to suspect that the defendant No. 2 did not have absolute title therein as otherwise, he would have not supported the case of P. W. 4. 46. If the plaintiffs have been supporting P. W. 4, such an event, it must be held that he had reasons to suspect that the defendant No. 2 did not have absolute title therein as otherwise, he would have not supported the case of P. W. 4. 46. It is an admitted case that even according to the plaintiff he had allegedly contributed his share for the purpose of purchasing the non-judicial stamp, if that was so end further, if he had no doubt in his mind about the title of the defendant No. 2 is the suit properties, the only reason for his non-joining the defendant No. 1, in the matter of purchase of the properties in suit from the defendant No. 2 must be shortage of fund. 47. As noticed hereinbefore, the agreement of sale was executed on 22-7-1975 and the deed of sale was executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1 on I8-8-1971-. The plaintiff himself has produced Ext. 7 for the purpose of showing that he had sufficient balance is his bank. 48. However, the plaintiff had not filed his bank account to show that he had sufficient fund In January, 1976. it appears that the aforesaid balance account was opened 06-12-.1977. An noticed hereinbefore, that the wife of the plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale on 24-2-1976 purported to have been in favour Sort. Subhadra Ghosh wife of one Gopal Chandra Ghosh, wherein the consideration money was shown as Rs. 25,000 and out of the said sum a sum of Rs. 1.000 was allegedly paid is advance. In this document as has been contended by Mr. N.K. Prasad a stipulation was made by the wife of the plaintiff that her husband intends to purchase a land containing shop room in Ratu Road in which he had been running a hotel. 49. However, the defendant No. 1 respondent produced from his custody another agreement for sale, dated 14-12-1977 purported to have been executed by the wife of the plaintiff in favour of the same aforesaid lady, namely, Subhadra Debi in respect of the self-same property wherein consideration amount was shown as Rs. 32,000 out of which Rs. 10,000 was allegedly paid by way of advance. 50. The execution of this agreement dated 4-12-1977 which was marked as Ext. A was admitted by the plaintiff in his evidence. 51. 32,000 out of which Rs. 10,000 was allegedly paid by way of advance. 50. The execution of this agreement dated 4-12-1977 which was marked as Ext. A was admitted by the plaintiff in his evidence. 51. Ext, A being a later document it was expected that reference of an earlier document namely Ext. B would have found place therein. It further appears curious as to how there could have been a difference in the amount of consideration as also the amount allegedly advanced to the wife of the plaintiff by the aforementioned Subhadra Ghosh in the aforesaid two agreements, 52. Further nothing has been brought on record to explain the disparity on the consideration amount, although, both the aforementioned agreements, namely, Ext. 3 and Ext. A relate to the self-same property. 53. The plaintiff has? further brought on record a registered deed of sale dated 22-71975 which was marked on Ext. 4, The said deed of sale was executed by the wife the plaintiff in favour of the aforementioned Subhadra Ghosh. In the said document, reference has been made to Ext. 3 only and the same amount of consideration and advance namely, Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 3,000 respectively have been mentioned. 54. Thus, it is clear that even in Ext. 4, no reference has been made to the sum of Rs. 10,000, allegedly, received by the wife of the plaintiff in terms of the aforementioned agreement dated 4-12-1977 (Ext. A). 55. The plaintiff in paragraph 9 of the plaint stated that the aforementioned deed of sale was executed in favour of a stranger. However, the plaintiff in his evidence admitted that Mrs. Subhadra Ghosh was the brothers wife of his wife i.e. the transferor, being the wife of the plaintiff, transferred the property in favour of her brothers wife. It is, therefore, not at all understandable as to why the plaintiff deliberately made a wrong statement in his pleadings. 56. In such a situation, there is no escape from concluding that recitals in Ext. 3, as mentioned hereinbefore, wore made only for the purpose of the suit and the same did not reflect a genuine transaction. 57. Further, the learned Court below had rightly analysed the evidence on record for the purpose of showing that only with that cud in view, deposits in the banks were made by the plaintiff. 58. 3, as mentioned hereinbefore, wore made only for the purpose of the suit and the same did not reflect a genuine transaction. 57. Further, the learned Court below had rightly analysed the evidence on record for the purpose of showing that only with that cud in view, deposits in the banks were made by the plaintiff. 58. It is not necessary in the circumstances, to reiterate the reasoning of the learned court below, which in my opinion are absolutely correct. No argument has been advanced by Mr. Prasad to show that the reasoning of the learned court below are perverse or otherwise not sustainable. 59. Further, it appears that the aforementioned deed of sale (Ext. 4) was executed near about the time when the dispute between the parties arose in view of the notice dated 2 9-1978 which is contained in Ext. 1. 60. In my opinion, the question as to whether there had been a defect in title of the defendant No. 2 in the suit premises or not is not very relevant in view of the fact that admittedly, the plaintiff for some reason or other did not join with the defendant No. I in the defendant No. 1 in the deed of sale dated 2Cth January, 1976. 61. In a case of this nature, where the plaintiff not only alleges that he paid not only The advance to the defendant No. 2, in terms of the agreement dated 32-7-1975, but did not receive the same back the said amount the further in view of the fact that he had also allegedly contributed towards purchase of the non-judicial stamp and together with the fact that the plaintiff has been from time to time consulting his lawyer, there cannot be any doubt that in the aforementioned background, it would be expected of the plaintiff to enter into an agreement in writing with the defendant No. 1. 62. Normally an agreement for sale is expected only when the party offering to sale the properties has acquired title therein. The purported oral agreement dated 18-1-1976 was in effect and substance a de novo agreement as thereby, the position of the parties changed but also in view of the fact that the defendant No. 1 was to transfer the half share in the properties which he was yet to acquire from the defendant No. 2 on a subsequent date. 63. The purported oral agreement dated 18-1-1976 was in effect and substance a de novo agreement as thereby, the position of the parties changed but also in view of the fact that the defendant No. 1 was to transfer the half share in the properties which he was yet to acquire from the defendant No. 2 on a subsequent date. 63. In this situation, as a matter of prudence and more so when the plaintiff had been taking advises from a lawyer it is normally expected that he would have insisted upon the defendant No. 1 to execute an agreement in writing. 64. In this background, the contention of Sri Prasad relating to the agreement dated 22-7-1975 may be noticed. 65. As noticed hereinbefore, Mr. prasad submitted that as the parties were being advised by their lawyers, it would be expected that an endorsement of the plaintiff on the back of the said agreement would have served the purpose and it was not necessary to bear off the agreement at all. 66. It is now well known that different person act differently in a given situation. It is further well known that parties may review different advises; from different counsel. 67. As in the instant case the agreement dated 22-7-1975 could not have been gives! effect to; in view of the fact that pursuant thereto the property was not to be transferred is favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 jointly but the entire property was to be transferred by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. S, alone, the said agreement dated 27.-7-1975 lost all its importance for all intent and purport. 68. The deed of sale dated 20th January, 1976 was not executed in terms of the aforementioned agreement for sale dated 22-7-1973, but the same was executed in a completely changed situation. The possibility of the document, therefore, being destroyed as the same has lost all importances, cannot be ruled out. 69. The fact that the plaintiff was also an attesting witness the aforementioned deed dated 20th January, 1976 coupled with his admission that he had knowledge about the center of the said documents, clearly go to show that the original agreement dated 22-7-1.975 was destroyed not only at the instance of defendant Nos. I and 2 but also at the behest of the plaintiff. 70. I and 2 but also at the behest of the plaintiff. 70. So far as the oral evidence is concerned, the plaintiff has examined P. Ws. 4 and 5 to prove the said agreement. 71. As noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiff was a witness in a suit in which P. W. 4 was a party 72. Apart from the said fact, the said witness, although could not remember the date of death of his father, gave the exact date and time when the lime when the alleged talks relating to agreement for sale in respect of properties in suit by and between die plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 took place. His evidence, therefore, cannot be believed P. W. 5 Bharat Singh is a electric goods dealer. He also admitted that P. W, Sita Rain Choudhary is his friend, He also deposed for Sita Ram Choudhary in the case filed by the aforementioned Mangi Lai Agrawal. 73. He remembered the date of agreement, dated 18-1-1976 but he did not remember the date when he deposed in the suit filed by P. W, 4. Which was subsequent to 18 1-1976. He further came to depose at the instance of the plaintiff. He admitted that defendant No. 2 was not present when sale took place. P. W. 6 is the own brother of the plaintiff. The said witness had reigned his ignorance about the daughters of the Hidayat Khan, although, the he was also living in the he use of Hidayat Khan on rant, 74. P. W. is the plaintiff himself. 75. As against this, the defendant No. 1 examined various witnesses. Out of the witnesses, examined by the defendant, D. Ws. 2 and 10 are advocates, practising in the Civil Court at Ranchi. D. W. 2 deposed that the aforementioned agreement dated 22-7-1975 was not translated in action and Narayan Chandra Ghosh hated out from the agreement as Rahim had sisters who had also been claiming shares in the suit property and, thereafter, the Ekrarnama was torn off. 76. D. W. 4 has also stated that the Ekranama was town off and thereafter the deed of sale was executed. 77. D. W. 10, who is also an advocate practicing in the Civil Court at Ranchi fully supported the case of the defendant No. 1 on all points. 76. D. W. 4 has also stated that the Ekranama was town off and thereafter the deed of sale was executed. 77. D. W. 10, who is also an advocate practicing in the Civil Court at Ranchi fully supported the case of the defendant No. 1 on all points. He had also stated that the plaintiff backed out because Rahim had sisters, who according to the plaintiff, had also share in the property, He further stated that at that Juncture, the plaintiff asked for return of the advance amount paid by him to which defendant No. 2 declined. At that time, defendant No. 1 became ready to purchase property and he returned back advance amount to the plaintiff. 78. Nothing had been brought out to show as to why those two advocates, who had acted for different parties would tell lies, 79. With regard to the alleged contribution of the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing the non-judicial stamp, the defendant No. 1 examined D, W. 5. According, to the said witness, the entire amount was paid by the defendant No. 1, which also becomes apparent in view of the endorsement made in this regard at the back of the deed of sale dated 20th January, 1976. 80. The learned trial Court had also the occasion to look to the daemon of the witnesses, regard being had to the fact and circumstances of this case, and this further in view that nothing has been pointed out before me to show that the evidence on behalf of the defendants was not believable. I agree with the reasoning adopted by the learned trial Court in disbelieving the witnesses of the plaintiff and accepting those of the defendant No. 1. 81. In my opinion, it is not believable that in a case of this nature, the plaintiff will not be interested for an agreement in writing. 82. In this view of the matter, the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 1 had entered into an oral agreement. Whereby and hereunder he promised to transfer half of the properties purchased by him from the defendant No by deed of sale dated 20th January, 1976 appears to be improbable. 83. Taking thus, all facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the view that there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. Whereby and hereunder he promised to transfer half of the properties purchased by him from the defendant No by deed of sale dated 20th January, 1976 appears to be improbable. 83. Taking thus, all facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the view that there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.