JUDGMENT R.K. Golati, J. 1. This writ petition arises out of proceedings under Sec. 21 (1) a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" 2. Briefly stated the facts are that the petitioner is a tenant of a double storeyed house v situated in Mohalla Puliva Garbi. Qasba Etah. The ground and first floor of that house bears Municipal No. 315, while the second floor is numbered as Municipal No. 316 (hereinafter referred to as House nos. 315 and 316, respectively). House no 315 was allotted to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs 12/-by an order dated 6-9-1958. The petitioner came to occupy the other house as licensee of one Krishna Gopal Sharrna, the erstwhile owner. The accommodation in house no. 313 consists of five big rooms. One varandah, one kitchen, a bathroom, a courtyard and a well on the ground floor. On the first floor there is one room and an. open terrace. On the second floor (i.e. house no. 3161 there are two rooms, a latrine and some other amenities. The third respondent Smt Kasturi Devi is the owner and landlady of the premises aforesaid She filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner and for the release of the accommodation under tenancy in her favour, on the grounds, inter alia, that she was living in a tenated accommodation at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month; the accommodation at her disposal besides being in deplorable and dilaoidated condition, was wholly inadequate for her residential need and the needs of her family, which consisted of as many as 22 members; that she purchased the house in question in the year 1981 for her personal occupation. The family included four sons out of which three were married, their wives and grand children of growing age between 2 to 13 years. The accommodation available to her contained one room 12' x 8', a verandah 12' x 8', a Kothri with tinshed 8' x 6', one kitchen, a latrine and a small Angan She also asserted that relations between daughter-in-laws were not pleasant and cardial, and they often quarrelled. The atmosphere in the house was not congenial, and on account of paucity of accommodation it was not feasible t? The atmosphere in the house was not congenial, and on account of paucity of accommodation it was not feasible t? provide separate accommodation to her family members Further she has also three married daughters who often visit her with their husbands, but she has no place to 1make their stay comfortable. She also brought on record a notice served on her by her landlord to vacate the premises, a part of which had fallen, arid in support of it some photographs were filed by way of additional evidence before the prescribed authority. 3. According to the case of the landlady, the tenant petitioner who was a retired employee of civil court, did not require the accommodation under his tenancy which he kept locked most of the time. Two of his sons who were married and employed decently in Rajastban were living comfortably with their families at the place of their employment. The petitioner's three daughters were also married and were living with their respective husband. The family of the petitioner consisted of himself and his wife only. 4. The petitioner contested the release application. He claimed that one of his married daughter and her two children were also residing with him because his son-in-law who is a supervisor, was not able to kept his family with him, for he was required to supervise four to five districts. Further, a son who is employed at a place called Dhirmai, Etah, at a distance of 6 to 7 kilometres, often visits him and is living with him On consideration of rival claims the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application holding that the need of the respondent landlady was. genuine and bonafide The comparative hardship which is being caused to the landlady is greater than that which would be caused to the petitioner after his eviction, The appeal against that order was also dismissed. The present writ petition has been filed, challenging the two order passed by the courts below. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. For the petitioner, it was argued that the need of the contesting respondent is neither genuine nor bonafide and the findings to the contrary can not be sustained. In any case, the release application should have been dismissed for non-compliance of the Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. There is no merit in either of the two arguments. In any case, the release application should have been dismissed for non-compliance of the Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. There is no merit in either of the two arguments. Whether a need of a person in respect of a particular accommodation is bonafide or genuine, is essentially a question of fact. The bonafide need of a particular landlord depends on peculiar factors and circumstances appearing in the case The finding in this regard can not be vacated on mere asking. It must be shown that the conclusion reached, by the fact finding authority or court is either perverse or arbitrary in the sense that it is not supported by the evidence on record. The question as to whether a landlord who requires a residential accommodation for bona fide seed for his own occupation or for the need of his _ family members, in turn depends upon a further question as to whether be is occupying another residential building sufficient to his need. From this point of view, it goes without saying that adequacy or otherwise of residential building would be a very pertinent factor to be gone into. The bare occupation by the landlord of any other residential building, however, inadequate it may be for him, cad not be made a ground to reject the application for eviction of a tenant under section 21 (1) of the Act. 7. From the orders under challenge it is clear that the statutory authorities have examined the case in detail in this respect. Considering the evidence adduced by the respective parties they have come to the conclusion that the need of the respondent-landlady was genuine and bona fide. The accommodation in possession of the respondent landlady was got verified through a local commissioner. The case set up by the landlady that the accommodation with her was in a deplorable and dilapidated condition was found correct and so also the extent of accommodation available to her. There is not an iota of evidence that the release application is actuated by any malafide motive in seeking eviction of the petitioner. The living accommodation available to the respondent-landlady is just one room. The varandah and kitchen can not be considered as living accommodation, because the varandah or kitchen can be used as varandah or kitchen only. There is not an iota of evidence that the release application is actuated by any malafide motive in seeking eviction of the petitioner. The living accommodation available to the respondent-landlady is just one room. The varandah and kitchen can not be considered as living accommodation, because the varandah or kitchen can be used as varandah or kitchen only. Even if varandah is being used as bed room, the landlady can not be forced for all times to come to hustle herself to use varandah as bed room. When a person builds up or' purchases a property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, be should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove the bonafide requirement and ownership It has come on record that the kothri which had a tinshed has fallen- The notice of ejectment sent to landlady by her landlord, has also been duly proved and there is constant threat that she would be thrown out at any time To expect a family of 22 members to live in an accommodation of one room, is not only unreasonable but cruel, particularly, when the family consists of three married sons and all of them are living with their wives in the same room. To solve the problem, the respondent landlady sold a piece of land and purchased the disputed accommodation in the hope that one day she and her family members will have comfortable Jiving accommodation. The owner of a bouse can not be compelled nor required to live as a passenger on a railway platform or in a second class waiting room- To establish the bonafide of a need, it is not the requirement of law that the landlord must be actually on the street. Strained relations between brother's wives and between mother-in- law and daughter-in-laws has been held to be a good ground for maintaining an application under section 21 of the Act. 8. In Dr. Jamuna Dutt Tewari v. 2nd Additional District Judge. Allahabad, 1982 (1) ARC 81. Honourable R. M. Sabai, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as under : "Strained relation between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brothers is not unusual feature of our society. Where the differences arise the, mental peace of male members is disturbed, can not be disputed. Allahabad, 1982 (1) ARC 81. Honourable R. M. Sabai, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as under : "Strained relation between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brothers is not unusual feature of our society. Where the differences arise the, mental peace of male members is disturbed, can not be disputed. It, therefore, may furnish reasonable ground for allowing an application for release of an independent accommodation. A landlord may not have the luxury of selecting accommodation but inability to live with brother's family due to differences between brother's wives and mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is certainly a ground on which he may seek vacation of bis own house occupied by a tenent. Nor can it in any manner minimise the bonafide requirement of landlord to own independent accommodation within meaning of section 21 of the Act." From the above discussion, it is evident that having regard to the size of the family, the accommodation, and other attending circumstances, if it is shown that the person can not have a comfortable living, bonafide of the need must be held to be made out. In the instant case, this has been adequately established. It is no body's case that in coming to the conclusion regarding the bonafidies of the contesting respondent, the authorities have failed to take into consideration any relevant material, or have misconstrued or misread the same the conclusions are obviously based on the facts and circumstances appearing on the record. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any infirmity in the finding as regards to the bonafide need. There exists no ground, whatsoever, to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the court below. The submission is accordingly rejected. 9. The contention that the release application was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act, is equally untenable. This argument is advanced forgetting that the application for release was under clause (a) of subs-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. Under this clause a landlord can seek eviction of a tenent on the ground that the building or any specified part thereof under the tenancy is required in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, for the occupation of landlord or any member of his family. Rule 17 has no application to such an application. Under this clause a landlord can seek eviction of a tenent on the ground that the building or any specified part thereof under the tenancy is required in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, for the occupation of landlord or any member of his family. Rule 17 has no application to such an application. It applies where the application is made under clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 21 of the Act which reads; "that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction " Under clause (b) release is not sought for the bonafide need of the landlord nor for the occupation of the landlord himself or for members of his family. When the release of an accommodation is demanded under clause (b) aforesaid on the footing that it has become .unsafe for habitation or other use of the tenent on account of its dilapidated condition, or reconstruction the tenant has not only a right to claim re-entry but is also entitled to allotment by virtue of the provisions contained under section 24 (2) of the Act. The scope and ambit of application of Rule is con6ned to applications under Sec. 21/(1) (b) of the Act, is also evident from the opening part of that Rule, as it speaks of section 21 (i) (b) only. It is not in dispute that the application in the instant case war filed under clause fa) of sub-section (1). of section 21 of the Act. The fact that in the release application it is also mentioned that the disputed accommodation is required for occupation after demolition and new construction, besides stating in its existing form, does not convert the application from clause (a) to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act. There is nothing to show that the release application in the instant case was granted on the ground of demolition, and new construction although the application made by the landlady was a composite one. The condition put forward on behalf of the petitioner is accordingly, rejected. 10. It was next contended that so far as the accommodation in house no. 316 is concerned, the release application was misconceived inasmuch as there existed no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties, the petitioner being only a licensee of the erstwhile owner. The condition put forward on behalf of the petitioner is accordingly, rejected. 10. It was next contended that so far as the accommodation in house no. 316 is concerned, the release application was misconceived inasmuch as there existed no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties, the petitioner being only a licensee of the erstwhile owner. To substantiate this contention learned counsel for the petitioner referred to paragraph 4 of the release application. From that clause a case was sought to be built up by skying that the petitioner has been referred as a tenant of house no. 315 and licensee of house no. 316 According to the learned counsel the courts below ought to have rejected the application in respect of house no. 316 instead of relying on the written statement or objection to the release application filed by the petitioner with a view to pin down the petitioner where he had accepted that be was a tenant of both the houses. IT was urged that the plaintiff can succeed only on the case disclosed in the plaint, and not by the allegations made in the written statement by the defendant. Now the object and purpose of the pleading is to enable the adverse party to know the case it has to meet, it is necessary that a party should set out essential and material facts so that the other side has no cause of complaint that he is taken by surprise. In rent control proceedings, the pleadings are not to be construed strictly but should be construed liberally. It is settled that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat the justice on hair-splitting technicality On a fair reading of paragraph 4 of the release application, which is the basis of the present argument, it is clear that it first recites a past event namely, the petitioner came in possession of house no 316 as licensee of its previous owner, then it says that as the petitioner did not vacate the house when the present owner purchased it, the petitioner was allowed to live therein as a tenant. The said paragraph in unambiguous terms says that the petitioner is monthly tenant of both the houses i.e. house nos. 315 and 316. The said paragraph in unambiguous terms says that the petitioner is monthly tenant of both the houses i.e. house nos. 315 and 316. In the objections to the release application vide paragraph 6 the petitioner has not only refuted the suggestion that he was a licensee of the previous owner, but has specifically asserted that he is a tenant of both the houses by virtue of allotment order dated 6th September. 1958 and he has been paying rent month by month, in the same paragraph it is further stated, that on the respondent-landlady refusing to accept the rent, the same is being deposited in the court of Munsif under Section 30 of the Act being case no. 57 of 1983 Sri Nivas v. Kasturi Devi. 11. It is evident from the pleadings that there has no contest between parties so far as the relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned. It was at a later stage that the petitioner thought of taking a misconceived plea based on being a licensee. The word 'Licensee' in the release application is employed to narrate a past event when the house in question was owned by some one else. The understanding of paragraph 4 of the release application, on the part of the petitioner is incorrect. The courts below have correctly read the release application when they held that there existed a relationship of landlady and tenant (between the contesting landlady and the petitioner in respect of both the houses. In any case, in view of the stand' taken by the petitioner in his objections to the release application, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to urge that there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between the contesting parties, in respect of the accommodation on tie second floor. The argument that the provisions of the Act are not applicable is devoid of any merit and is accordingly rejected. 12. Another and the last submission urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the impugned orders can not be sustained. As the courts below have failed to address themselves on rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act " ' In M/s. Novelty Glass House and Crockery, Jhansi v. 1st Additional District Judge, Jhansi, 1989 (I) ARC 90, I had an occasion to deal with a similar question. As the courts below have failed to address themselves on rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act " ' In M/s. Novelty Glass House and Crockery, Jhansi v. 1st Additional District Judge, Jhansi, 1989 (I) ARC 90, I had an occasion to deal with a similar question. In that case it was held that before an accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act could be released, it is necessary to establish two-fold requirement. Firstly, the need of the landlord is bonafide. Secondly, the landlord is likely to suffer greater hardship than that of the tenant, if application for release was to be rejected. The requirement of second condition is contained in the fourth proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 21 of the Act which, inter-alia, says that the authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose, shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. Rule 16 of the Rules prescribes the factors spoken of in the fourth proviso referred to above. Clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 16 requires that in a case of residential accommodation, the court shall consider whether the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a portion of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part. If it is found that this could be possible then the rule under consideration further directs that only a part of the building would be released to the landlord which should meet his requirement. 13. It is no doubt true that the statutory authority namely, the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority have concurrently found that the need of the respondent-landlady is genuine and bonafide and greater hardship would be caused to her in Case the released application is rejected, but this in itself is not sufficient. The combined effect of clause (a) of Subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act read with Rule 16 (1) (d) is that a landlord is required to establish qualitative as well as quantitative aspect of his case. In other words, not only the bonafide need but the extent of his requirement in respect of the accommodation sought for is also to be shown. In other words, not only the bonafide need but the extent of his requirement in respect of the accommodation sought for is also to be shown. Where an application is made for release of the entire accommodation under tenancy, under general law the applicant can successfully maintain that the court is not entitled to pass a decree of partial eviction for the eviction is to be decreed either for the whole premises or not at all. To overcome such a possible objection. Rule 16 (1) (d) is enacted. Now, in a case where it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the requirements of the landlord could be reasonably satisfied with a portion of tenanted premises, though he may have sued for the entire premises, on the ground of bonafide requirements, the court shall decree partial eviction only, allowing the tenant to occupy the rest provided the tenant's need would be adequately met by part of the building under his tenancy. This being the requirement of law it is incumbent for the court or statutory authority to address itself to the provisions of Rule 16 (1) (d) The orders under challenge, do not in any way, demonstrate the court's awareness of and advertence to the provision of Rule 16 (I) (d) and for this reason the same can not be sustained in law. 14. The contention that no such plea was raised either in the written statement nor was canvassed before amy of the authorities below is of no avail to a landlord. In a similar situation when a plea based on Rule 16 (1) (d) was not raised, nor considered by the statutory authorities and this court refused to entertain the plea, the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Additional District Judge, 1980 ARC 311 set aside the order of this Court and remanded the case for determination of the issue aforesaid. The Supreme Court observed "It is clear that under the relevant rule, it is a duty of the court to take into account that aspect while considering the requirement of personal occupation of the landlord and, therefore, this issue will have to be remanded to the High Court." The position in the present case being similar, the above decision fully applies. The material furnished on the record of this writ petition, is not sufficient to enable this court to decide this issue for itself. In this view of the matter, there is no option but to set aside the appellate order for a limited purpose to consider the applicability of Rule 16 (1) (d) with reference to the facts of the present case, and to decide the case afresh to that extent. 15. The order of the appellate authority is accordingly set aside and the case is remanded back for fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. If necessary the appellate authority shall allow the contesting parties to lead fresh evidence if it feels that the material and evidence on the record is not sufficient to come to a firm decision. The matter shall be decided as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 3 months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the appellate authority. 16. The writ petition succeeds in part and, is accordingly, allowed. There shall be order as to costs.