JUDGMENT 1. - A short question, which arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the notice of demand issued under the provisions of the Rajasthan Salex-tax Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the order of assessment passed by the competent authority and the order passed by the Additional Commissioner on the stay application during the pendency of the appeal filed by the assessee against the order of assessment ? 2. The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered Office at Delhi and factory at Bhiwadi. The petitioner is engaged in manufacturing of foot-wear in its factory at Bhiwadi. It also claims that it is registered as Small Scale Industry. According to the petitioner, it has been submitting its sales-tax returns regularly. A raid was conducted at the premises of the factory of the petitioner by the Anti Evasion Branch of the Sales-tax Department on 17.12.1988. Records and books of the petitioner company were seized. The same were subsequently, released in January, 1989. A notice dated 25.4.1989 was issued by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Anti Evasion alleging that the petitioner had sold goods worth Rs. 24,25,643/- and had claimed exemption under the notifications dated 8.3.1988, 23.6.1988 and 7.11.1988 issued by the Sales-tax Department. It was also alleged in the notice that the petitioner had failed to pay the requisite sales-tax. In response to this notice, one of the Directors of the petitioner-company appeared before the Commercial-Tax Officer. The Commercial-Tax Officer (Anti-Evasion) (Head Quarters) passed the assessment order dated 31.5.1989 and imposed tax and penalty amounting to Rs.11,63,768/-. He also ordered issuance of demand notice for the aforesaid demand. 3. According to the petitioner,an appeal has been filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Appeals) III, Jaipur on 29.7.89, against the order dated 31.5.1989. A stay petition was also filed before the Additional Com,missioner (Anti Evasion), Jaipur for stay of the recovery of the amount specified in the order of assessment. The Additional Commissioner has dismissed this stay petition vide his order dated 16.9.89 observing that he did not find any infirmity in the order of assessment passed against the petitioner. A stay petition was also filed before the Additional Com,missioner (Anti Evasion), Jaipur for stay of the recovery of the amount specified in the order of assessment. The Additional Commissioner has dismissed this stay petition vide his order dated 16.9.89 observing that he did not find any infirmity in the order of assessment passed against the petitioner. According to the petitioner, now the appeal has become meaningless because the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) will not be in a position to go contrary to the order passed by the Additional Commissioner. According to the petitioner, this amounts to dismissal of appeal as a whole. The petitioner has reproduced the abstracts of the Notifications issued on 8.3.88, 23.6.88 and 7.11.88. It has asserted that according to these exemption notifications, it is not required to pay sales-tax because the foot-wear manufactured by it are valued below Rs. 20/-. 4. In response to the notice issued by this court, a reply has been filed and in the said reply it has been stated that the appeal filed by the petitioner is still pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). The same has not been decided by the Deputy Commissioner on merits. The decision of the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion) cannot be said to be a decision on merits. According to the respondents, writ petition has been filed only for grant of interim relief against the payment of tax and penalty and there is no justification for filing of such writ petition against the order passed by a competent authority on the stay application. The respondents have contested the claim of the petitioner regarding exemption from payment of sales tax. The respondents have asserted that it would be for the appellate authority to judge the correctness of the assessment order passed against the petitioner. 5. Shri R.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that although an appeal filed by the petitioner might be pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), in view of the order passed by the higher authority nothing now services for decision. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) being a lower authority will feel bound by the observations of the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion) and, therefore, according to him the decision of the appeal should be taken as fore-gone conclusion. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) being a lower authority will feel bound by the observations of the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion) and, therefore, according to him the decision of the appeal should be taken as fore-gone conclusion. Shri Mathur further submitted that the question of interpretation of the notifications is involved in the present case and, therefore, there is every justification for the petitioner to approach this court by way of writ petition. Shri Mathur further submitted that heavy liability has been fashioned against the petitioner on account of the order of assessment and it would be impossible for the petitioner to continue with its factory in case this court does not grant relief to the petitioner. 6. Shri G.S. Bafna, learned counsel for the Department has, on the other hand, submitted that filing of the writ petition merely with the object of seeking interim relief from the court amounts to abuse of the process of the court. According to Shri Bafna when the petitioner has chosen to avail remedy of appeal, it is not open for it to turn round and say that remedy is not effective. Shri Bafna submitted that no person shall be allowed to avail two remedies simultaneously. 7. It is true that the power of judicial review which vests with the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide and pervasive. Ordinarily, there is no limitation on the exercise of this power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India except in cases where the law is enacted for excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court by virtue of Article 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution of India. The High Court can in appropriate cases issue any writ, order or direction. The High Courts in India are not bound by the technicalities of English law in exercise of their power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Whereever the court finds that there has been a violation of the constitutional rights or legal rights and such violation results in menifest injustice, the Court would extend its reach to undo the injustice. To do justice is the constitutional obligation of the courts in India. However, at the same time, the Court always keeps a guard against the attempts of abuse of process of the court. To do justice is the constitutional obligation of the courts in India. However, at the same time, the Court always keeps a guard against the attempts of abuse of process of the court. The High Courts do not readily interfere against the orders of the authorities passed under various statutes where a remedy is avail,able to the aggrieved party. under the statute itself or where separate machinery has been provided for vindication of the lights by the aggrieved party. Availability of an effective or efficacious alternative remedy is one of the grounds, on which the High Courts at times declined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, it is not a constitutional embargo or prohibition but a self imposed restraint that the High Courts decline to interfere in a matter where effective remedy is available. It cannot be over looked that in most of the tax statutes a complete machinery for appeals, revisions is provided. Provision has also been made in several enactments providing revision before the High Court. The Rajasthan Sales-tax Act provides a self contained code for different remedies to an aggrieved person against the alleged unlawful order passed by the assessing authority. Specific remedy of revision is also provided before the High Court, where important question of law is involved. A question relating to interpretation of notification will certainly, may in a given case, give rise to an important question of law. There is no reason whatsoever to think that the appellate authority exercising its jurisdiction under the Rajasthan Sales tax Act cannot set aside or modify the order of assessment passed by a lower authority. If it is found by the appellate authority or in a given case, by the High Court that the assessing authority had unlawfully imposed tax or penalty or that some tax or penalty has unlawfully been realised from a person, appropriate orders for refund and also for payment of interest can be passed by the appellate authority or by the High Court. In my view it is a sound exercise of jurisdiction not to interfere with the order passed for assessment resulting in imposition of tax or penalty and recovery thereof under the provisions of the Rajasthan Sales-tax Act or the statutes. 8. The Supreme Court has in recent years observed that in such cases, the High Court should not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction.In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. 8. The Supreme Court has in recent years observed that in such cases, the High Court should not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction.In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ( 1983 (2) SCC 433 ) , the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitioner on the short ground of availability of alternative remedy. While dismissing the writ petition, the Supreme Court had made the following instructive observations: "We are constrained to dismiss these petitions on the short ground that the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, then a second appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) (a) thereof, and thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief to have the case stated to the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. In Releigh Investment Company Limited v. Governor General in Council, ( AIR 1947 PC 78 ) Lord Uthwatt, J. in delivering the Judgment of the Board observed that in the provenance of tax where the Act provided for a complete machinery which enabled an assessee to effectively raise in the courts the question of the validity of an assessment denied an alternative jurisdiction to the High Court to interfere. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Company case, was in relation to a suit brought for a declaration that an assessment made by the Income Tax Officer was a nullity, and it was held by the Privy Council that an assessment made under the machinery provided by the Act, even if based on a provision subsequently held to be ultra vires, was not a nullity like an order of a court lacking jurisdiction and that Section 67 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 operated as a bar to the maintainability of such a suit. In dealing with the question whether Section 67 operated as a bar to a suit to set aside or modify an assessment made under a provision of the Act which is ultra vires, the Privy Council observed: In construing the section it is pertinent, in their Lordship's opinion, to ascertain whether the Act contains machinery which enables an assessee effectively to raise in the courts the question whether a particular provision of the Income-tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra vires. The presence of such machinery, though by means conclusive, marches with a construction of the Section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to inquire into the same subject matter." 9. Their Lordships further observed : "Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage : "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. ....But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.... the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." 10. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, ( 1984 (2) SCC 436 ) , the Supreme Court observed as under : "We are constrained to make the observations which follow as we do feel dismayed at the tendency on the part of some of the High Courts to grant interlocutory orders for the mere asking. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, ( 1984 (2) SCC 436 ) , the Supreme Court observed as under : "We are constrained to make the observations which follow as we do feel dismayed at the tendency on the part of some of the High Courts to grant interlocutory orders for the mere asking. Normally, the High Court should not as a rule, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution grant any stay of recovery of tax save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant of stay in such matters, should be an exception and not a rule. "It is needless to stress that a levy or impost does not become bad as soon as a writ petition is instituted in order to assail the validity of levy. So also there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at the very threshold of the proceedings. The only consideration at that juncture is to ensure that no prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the proceedings. This object can be attained by requiring the body or authority levying the impost to give an undertaking to refund or adjust against future dues, the levy of tax or rate or a part thereof as the case may be, in the event of the entire levy or a part thereof being ultimately held to be invalid by the court without obliging the tax payers by the court to institute a civil suit in order to claim the amount already recovered from them. On the other hand the Court cannot be unmindful of the need to protect the authority levying the tax, for, at that stage the court has to proceed on the hypothesis that the challenge may or may not succeed. The Court has to show awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a municipality cannot function or meet its financial obligations if its source of revenue is blocked by an interim order restraining the municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that the municipality has to maintain essential civil services like water supply, street lighting and public streets etc., apart from running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, liabraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. And that the municipality has to maintain essential civil services like water supply, street lighting and public streets etc., apart from running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, liabraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. The grant of an interlocutory order of this nature would paralyze the administration and dislocate the entire working of the municipality. It seems that these serious ramifications of the matter were lost sight of while making the impugned order." 11. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vi. Dunlop India Ltd. and Othersl, while allowing the appeal against the grant of an interim order passed by the Calcutta Hip Court in central excise matter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had started the judgment with the following remarks : "It is indeed a great pity and, we wish we did not have to say it but we are afraid we will be signally failing in our duty if we do not do so some courts, of late; appear to have developed an unwarranted tendency to grant interim orders with a great potential for public mischief for the mere asking. We feel. greatly disturbed. We find it more distressing that such interim orders, often ex parte and non-speaking are made even by the High Courts while entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution." The Court further observed : "It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public inquiry and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 12. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 12. There are large number of other decisions of this Court and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, where the Court has declined to interfere in such matters on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 13. In K.S. Rashid & Sons. v. Income-tax Investigation Commissioner etc. 1954 SCR 738 the Supreme Court had observed that the remedy provided under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary remedy and the High Court has always discretion to refuse any writ, if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate and suitable relief elsewhere. 14. In Jaipur Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India & others, SB CWP 626/86 Dated 19.7.1986 (Raj.) after referring to a large number of authorities cited on behalf of both the parties, the Court observed as under : "A perusal of the above cited authorities will show that the existence of the statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of this court to issue a writ. The Court has imposed a self restraint on its own wisdom to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate and alternative remedy. Thus, where an alternative and efficacious remedy exists, it will be sound exercise of jurisdiction to refuse to interfere in the writ petition unless there is good ground therefor, such as constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged, the order challenged is without jurisdiction, the order has been made in contravention of principles of natural justice, the fundamental right of the petitioner is involved and the same principles will apply in case even if an alternative remedy is available or/ and has been availed and the appeal is pending. (Underlying is ours)15. In Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and ors, DB CSA 254/86. D/d. 19.9.86 (Raj.) the Division Bench made these observations : "In our opinion, there is no ground to entertain this appeal. The existence of alternative remedy by way of an appeal under the provisions of the aforesaid Act is not disputed. (Underlying is ours)15. In Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and ors, DB CSA 254/86. D/d. 19.9.86 (Raj.) the Division Bench made these observations : "In our opinion, there is no ground to entertain this appeal. The existence of alternative remedy by way of an appeal under the provisions of the aforesaid Act is not disputed. That being so, there is no reason why any interference should be made with the conclusion rightly arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition without exercising the alternative remedy provided under the provisions of the aforesaid Act should not be entertained." 16. In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others, DB CWP 1/1987. D/d. 30.6.1989. (Raj.) (by a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble M. B. Sharma and Hon'ble I. S. Israni, JJ.) The Division Bench referred to a decision of the Gujrat High Court in Ambica Mata Yarn Mft. Co. v. Superintendent of Central Excise Range IV, Baroda and others, 1982 ELT 244 and proceeded to observe as under : "In the aforesaid case, the view has also been taken that the jurisdiction of the High Court after all the remedies under the Act are availed, is restricted to the question whether or not the decision rendered by the competent authority under the Act is plausible one or whether it discloses an error apparent on the face of the record calling for interference in exercise of the High prerogative jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Chief Justice further held that the authorities constituted under the Act must be permitted to discharge the functions for which they are constituted. They must be given an opportunity to play their statutory role in accordance with law and decide such questions in exercise of the functions entrusted to them by legislature under the Act. It is birth right as also the statutory obligation of these authorities to fulfil the purpose for which they have been created by the sovereign will, Hon'ble Chief Justice refused to invoke jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. There can be no dispute that a mode of challenge to test the order of the Assistant Collector is provided under the Act. There can be no dispute that a mode of challenge to test the order of the Assistant Collector is provided under the Act. The order of the Assistant Collector is appealable to the Collector (Appeals) and the procedure of appeals has been provided under Section 33-A of the Act. The order of Collector is appealable under Section 35-B of the Act to the appellate Tribunal, then there is provision for the statement of the case to the High Court or statement of the case to the Supreme Court in certain cases under Sections 35-G and 35-H of the Act respectively. The contention of Shri Sen, learned Senior Advocate, for the N.B.I. is that in the instant case when the writ petition No. 1/87 was filed, the court has stayed further proceedings in the notice and, the Assistant Collector wanted to over-reach the court and in spite of the stay orders, made final order of the Assessment, therefore, it is a case where notwithstanding that the appeal has been filed against the order of the Assistant Collector this Court should invoke extraordinary jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that mere existence of statutory alternative remedy in any Act does not effect the jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that mere existence of statutory alternative remedy in any Act does not effect the jurisdiction of this court to issue a writ. The Court has imposed a self restraint in its own wisdom and where there is alternative efficacious remedy which has been availed of, or not availed of, the Court generally does not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, unless constitutional validity of the Act is challenged or order under challenge is without jurisdiction or, the order 'has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice or, the fundamental right of the petitioner is involved. In our opinion, the same principle should apply in the case where alternative remedy has been availed of, as is in the present case. In our opinion, the same principle should apply in the case where alternative remedy has been availed of, as is in the present case. In the case of Jaipur Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India and others (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 626/86) which was decided along with companion writ petitions by an order dated July 9, 1986 passed by one of us (M.B. Sharma, J.), it was held that in matter involving state revenues, in case there is alternative remedy which might have been availed of or not even availed of, the Court should not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India unless any of the conditions as stated by us tarlier are made out. That order (dated July 9, 86 in the case of Jaipur Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India ) was challenged before the Division Bench and, the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 254/86 M/s Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and others , vide an order dated September 19, 86 agreeing with the aforesaid view, dismissed the special appeal. In our view, the appeal is already pending where it is yet to be decided as to whether after coming into force of the Tarrif Act, in view of the Note of Sections and Chapters and in view of the Rules of Interpretations provided in the Tarrif Act, itself the polished steel balls fall under Heading No. 84.82 of Chapter 84 of Heading No. 87.11 read with 87.14 of Chapter 87 of the Schedule of the Tarrif Act, we are not inclined to decide it by passing hierarchy of authorities provided under the Act. This is a matter which must be left to be decided by the adjudicating authorities under the Act read with Tarrif Act. Only after all remedies under the Act are exhausted, the Court, if necessary, may go into the question as to whether there is error apparent on the face of the order of the adjudicating authorities." 17. Again in Modern Syntex (India) Ltd. v. Union of India and others, D.B. CWP 1754/88. D/d. 23.1.1989 (Raj.) (by Hon'ble M. B. Sharrha and 1. Again in Modern Syntex (India) Ltd. v. Union of India and others, D.B. CWP 1754/88. D/d. 23.1.1989 (Raj.) (by Hon'ble M. B. Sharrha and 1. S. Israni, JJ.) the Court reiterated the view that the Officers/authorities under the Act and hierarchy of Tribunals should be allowed to have their say and to adjudicate the dispute finally and the writ jurisdiction should be exercised rarely.In the light of these observations of the Supreme Court and this court, in my view this court will normally not interfere with the order passed by the authorities under the Sales Tax Act where remedy of appeal and then of revision is available to the aggrieved party.So far as the present case is concerned, the petitioner has admittedly availed remedy of appeal. The question of interpretation of notifications referred to hereinabove and the legality of the orders passed by the authorities is under examination by the appellate authority. Although in my opinion, it would not have made a difference even if the petitioner had come to this court after withdrawal of the said appeal, so far as the present case is concerned, the appeal is pending. It it yet to be decided on merits. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority will not decide the appeal with an open mind in view of rejection of the stay passed by the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion). It is clear that the petitioner itself had thought that remedy of appeal is speedy, effective and efficacious. If the Addl. Commissioner (Anti Evasion) had granted stay, the petitioner would have enjoyed the stay order sitting at home and there could have been no occasion to make a grievance. It has approached this court only after rejection of the stay application by the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion). The petitioner has thought that remedy of appeal is not an effective remedy only after the rejection of its application for grant of stay. Thus two remedies are being prosecuted by the petitioner at the same time. Imagine how anamolous it would be that in a given case the High Court accepts or rejects the writ petition on merits and the competent authority, who is hearing the appeal passes exactly contrary order either accepting or rejecting the appeal. Thus two remedies are being prosecuted by the petitioner at the same time. Imagine how anamolous it would be that in a given case the High Court accepts or rejects the writ petition on merits and the competent authority, who is hearing the appeal passes exactly contrary order either accepting or rejecting the appeal. This is precisely the reason why the court will not interfere where the party has already availed an alternative remedy. The Court will not permit the party to chose a remedy according to its sweet will. It will clearly be an abuse and misuse of the process of the court, if extraordinary jurisdiction is allowed to be invoked by a party who has either filed a civil suit or an appeal under a statute in redressal of its grievance and then files a writ petition by withdrawing such suit or appeal without any cogent reason or prosecutes two remedies at a time. The only intention prosecute such remedies is to take chance of success in either of the forums. In my view the petitioner cannot, for a moment, be allowed to contend that the remedy of appeal is not an effective remedy merely because the stay application has been rejected by the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion).18. In Shivnath Singh v. Assistant Appellate Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1967 Cal. 382 a Full Bench of Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider a similar situation. The Full Bench of Calcutta High Court held that where a party was taking advantage of alternative remedy and was actively persuing it, he cannot at the same time carry on two peralel remedies and his case should not be entertained. A some what similar view has been expressed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bhanwarlal v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN (UC) 45 .Shri R.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of Greeves Cotton Company Ltd. v. Sales-tax Officer, 1987 (67) STC 364 . In that case, on a writ petition filed for grant of stay in a sales-tax matter, one of the learned Judge (R.C. Patnayak, J.) of the Bench held that after finding prima-facie case in favour of the petitioner, there was no ground for granting of partial stay only. He, therefore, observed that full stay should be granted till the disposal of the appeal. He, therefore, observed that full stay should be granted till the disposal of the appeal. The other learned Judge (S.C. Mahapatra, J.) did not agree with the view. The matter was referred to the third Judge (G. B. Patnayak, J.) and the third Judge held that when there was difference of opinion between two Judges, the view beneficial to the assessee should be adopted.19. From a perusal of the Judgment, I find that there is no discussion on the question of alternative remedy. In fact S.C. Mahapatra, J. had considered a judgment of the Supreme Court in Income-tax Officer, Kannanore v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 and held that even the Appellate Tribunal should not exercise the power of stay in routine and after referring to this judgment, he declined to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. No reason is found in the said judgment of the majority for grant of stay except that a prima facie case was made out. No discussion has been made on the subject as to whether a party can be allowed to prosecute two remedies at a time. In my view the judgment of the majority in the case of Greeves Cotton (supra) is clearly against the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Titaghur Papers Mills Ltd. (supra) and Dunlop India Ltd. (supra) and in the face of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, that case cannot be considered to be laying down a correct proposition of law.20. In State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd, 1977 (39) STC 328 . the question decided by the Supreme Court was as to whether the Hume Pipes were covered by the term Senatory fittings. The High Court had entertained a writ petition in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction and the Supreme Court declined to interfere after holding that the Hume Pipes cannot be treated as Senatory fittings. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable because no question with reference to the prosecution of two remedies by a party was raised or decided by the Supreme Court. The High Court had directly entertained the writ petition and the Supreme Court had found that the interpretation of the High Court was correct. In my view, this case is of no help to the petitioner.21. The High Court had directly entertained the writ petition and the Supreme Court had found that the interpretation of the High Court was correct. In my view, this case is of no help to the petitioner.21. The result of the above discussion is that I do not find any justification for entertaining this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. It is however, ordered that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) shall decide the appeal of the petitioner as early as possible aid in any case, within a period of one month from the date of this order. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) shall not take into consideration the observations made by the Additional Commissioner (Anti Evasion) on the merits of the case while deciding the stay application of the petitioner.The parties are left to bear their own costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******