Judgment :- The petitioners in T.C. No. 158 of 1981 were finally assessed to tax on a turnover of Rs. 1, 13, 093.37 under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as "the CST Act" for the year 1975-76 in the proceedings of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated January 31, 1977. By notice dated July 4, 1978, the assessing authority stated that a turnover of Rs. 38, 34, 611.95 being the sale value of ossein effected by the petitioners to M/s. Rallis India Ltd., Bombay (for short "RIL, Bombay"), during the year 1975-76 had escaped from assessment and therefore it was proposed to assess the said turnover under the CST Act. The petitioners by their letter dated August 2, 1978, contended that the movement of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin was not occasioned in pursuance of orders received from M/s. RIL, that in any event M/s. RIL, should be considered as their agent and lastly that the sale had taken place on the high seas after the vessel had crossed the customs frontier. By another notice dated January 21, 1980, it was proposed to assess the said turnover at 10 per cent and the petitioners were called upon to submit their objections. In the objections, the petitioners contended that the goods, ossein, were only stock transferred to Cochin branch and that they remained unascertained goods at the point of transfer and that at the time of movement, there was no specific concluded agreement. Alternatively, it was contended that the sales were export sales. The assessing authority rejected the objections and held that the turnover was liable to be taxed under section3(a) of the CST Act at 10 per cent in respect of the turnover of Rs. 25, 92, 061.83. In respect of the turnover of Rs. 1, 42, 550.12, the rate of 4 per cent was applied because valid "C" form declarations had been filed. On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was held that the goods moved from Uthagamandalam to Cochin only in pursuance of the contract of sale entered into between the petitioners and RIL, Bombay, but the matter was remanded back to the assessing authority to entertain "C" forms by giving opportunity to the petitioners. On further appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On further appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is this order of the Tribunal dated October 30, 1980, which is before us in Tax Case (Revision) No. 158 of 1981.1(a). The Tax Case (Revision) No. 374 of 1981 relates to the assessment year 1974-75. In that case also by a notice dated May 9, 1978, it was proposed to reopen the assessment and tax a turnover of Rs. 44, 41, 542.27 being similar riles effected to RIL. There also similar replies were given but in that case "C" form declarations were accepted and the turnover was taxed at 4 per cent. The appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal having failed, the above Tax Case (Revision) No. 474 of 1981 has been filed. By an order dated November 21, 1986, made in TCMP No. 529 of 1986, cause-title in Tax Case (Revision) No. 474 of 1981 has been amended by making Rallis India Limited as petitioners. 2. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance on the following circumstances to contend that no particular sale or purchase occasioned the movement of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin, and therefore section3(a) of the CST Act is not attracted : (1) The petitioner-company has a branch office at Cochin which is also registered under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. (2) For the goods manufactured, namely, ossein, the petitioner has no place of storage except in Cochin. (3) The dispatches from Uthagamandalam are regular as and when the goods are produced, the despatches are not relatable to any purchase orders. The modus operandi of the transfer of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin was that the goods had been consigned showing the consignee as "PPI, Cochin" in the transfer challan and form XX. The goods are not earmarked in any document as if it is for any particular purchaser. (4) The goods being stocked in standard polythene covers with outer gunny bags, are marked and stencilled only at Cochin after receipt of an export order or a sale order. The remarks of the assessing authorities that a copy of the delivery challan had been marked in every case to RIL, Bombay, has no bearing on the issue because the forms used were printed forms from the days when RIL, promoted the petitioner-company. Subsequent forms do not contain the said clause. The remarks of the assessing authorities that a copy of the delivery challan had been marked in every case to RIL, Bombay, has no bearing on the issue because the forms used were printed forms from the days when RIL, promoted the petitioner-company. Subsequent forms do not contain the said clause. (5) The order of the Maritime Collector of Central Excise and Customs dated December 21, 1979, would clearly show that there was no correlation between the delivery challans and the shipping bills or customs documents either for the quantity or in respect of the period of shipment. This suggests that the movement of goods was not against any particular order. 3. We will deal with the facts of the case in Tax Case (Revision) No. 158 of 1981. During the year 1975-76, there were ten shipments by way of exports. Of these ten shipments, two items were directly exported by the petitioners and the balance of eight items were routed through M/s. RIL, Bombay. The assessments relate only to the quantity of ossein transferred from Uthagamandalam to Cochin to give effect to the eight items of shipments routed through M/s. RIL, Bombay. On January 8, 1975, M/s. RIL, Bombay, placed orders for 166.47 tonnes on the petitioners for effecting export sales to M/s. Inter Mas Ltd., England. According to the respondents, against the said order dated January 8, 1975, the petitioners had moved goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin on March 25, 1975, March 26, 1975, March 27, 1975, March 28, 1975, April 12, 1975, April 15, 1975 and April 16, 1975. Similarly to give effect to an order from Tvl. Audel Industries Corporation, New York, M/s. RIL, Bombay, placed orders on the petitioner on April 15, 1975 for a quantity of 39.990 tonnes. According to the respondents, in pursuance of the said order dated April 16, 1975, the petitioner had moved the goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin on April 17, 1975, April 19, 1975, April 21, 1975, April 24, 1975 and April 28, 1975. Similarly, there was an order dated November 24, 1975 for 39.360 tonnes and an order dated December 8, 1975 for 88.560 tonnes. Finally there was an order dated October 31, 1975 for a quantity of 3, 000 tonnes. The respondents have given certain dates as the dates on which the goods were moved to conform to the said purchase orders. Similarly, there was an order dated November 24, 1975 for 39.360 tonnes and an order dated December 8, 1975 for 88.560 tonnes. Finally there was an order dated October 31, 1975 for a quantity of 3, 000 tonnes. The respondents have given certain dates as the dates on which the goods were moved to conform to the said purchase orders. Thus, it is concluded that the petitioners had moved the goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin on a prior order received from M/s. RIL, Bombay. Therefore, there is clear indication that there were two sales involved, each distinct and separate, one from the petitioners to RIL, Bombay and another from RIL, Bombay, to foreign buyers. In every case, the foreign buyers placed order on M/s. RIL, Bombay and in turn M/s. RIL, Bombay placed orders for the same quantity on the petitioner-company. The payment was made by RIL to the petitioners as soon as the proceeds against the export were received by them. After the goods were placed on the vessels, the petitioners sent the shipping documents to M/s. RIL, Bombay. The Cochin office of the petitioner-company prepared the invoice in favour of RIL, for the sales effected. On the advice of RIL, the petitioner-company got payment from State Bank of India, Bombay. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has given the facts and figures in respect of each shipment which were routed through M/s. RIL, Bombay. It is also remarked that the registered office of the petitioners was shifted from Cochin to Uthagamandalam. 4. On the above facts, the question is whether the purchase order in each case issued by M/s. RIL, Bombay, had occasioned the movement of goods from Tamil Nadu to Kerala. We will now take up the various authorities cited by both parties on the issue in question. In Cement Distributors (P) Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1969 (23) STC 86 (Mad.), the facts were more or less similar. The assessee in that case was manufacturing cement at Dalmiapuram, in Madras State. Cement being a controlled commodity was being despatched under orders of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. ("STC of India Ltd."). The STC of India Ltd., apart from allotting the cement produced within Madras State, had also directed the assessee in that case to send large quantities of cement to Calcutta. Cement being a controlled commodity was being despatched under orders of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. ("STC of India Ltd."). The STC of India Ltd., apart from allotting the cement produced within Madras State, had also directed the assessee in that case to send large quantities of cement to Calcutta. The assessee in that case was making shipments from the port at Cuddalore to Calcutta in the name of its branch at Calcutta. For the years 1960-62 the shipments were made on April 25, 1961, December 19, 1961, January 14, 1962, January 22, 1962, February 17, 1962 and March 18, 1962. The assessees' branch at Calcutta cleared the goods and authorised their shipping agents to deliver to the respective allottees such quantities of cement fixed by the State Trading Corporation of India Limited under the letters of allotment issued to such purchasers. It was argued in that case that the goods were unascertained until they were appropriated at Calcutta. The following observations are important : "Whereas section3 of the Central Sales Tax Act makes a sale of ascertained goods exigible to tax by the despatching State by reason of the movement of the goods having been occasioned under the contract, in the case of unascertained goods the despatching State has no jurisdiction to treat it and tax it as an interstate sale merely because a movement is involved."Again the following passage is very relevant : " No doubt, the goods moved in bulk pursuant to an authorisation from the State Trading Corporation of India Limited addressed to the petitioner. This is for consumption in Calcutta during a specified period. But the fact remains that the purchaser or allottee is unable to identify his goods straightaway until it is separated and delivered to him by the clearing agent under express authority from the petitioner's branch office at Calcutta." * It was, therefore, held in that case that the sales in question cannot be brought into the net of taxation by the State of Madras as the situs for such jurisdiction had been shifted by reason of the sale being an out-of-State sale in relation to the State of Madras. In the same volume at page 32, the case of English Electric Company of India Limited v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1969 (23) STC 32 (Mad.) is reported. In the same volume at page 32, the case of English Electric Company of India Limited v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1969 (23) STC 32 (Mad.) is reported. On the facts of that case, it was held as follows : "The above modus operandi has resulted in the buyers securing the specific goods from the State of Madras through the intervention of the Bombay office; but the goods have been admittedly despatched from Madras by the petitioner, to the place of business of the buyer." * In English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1976 (5) CTR 454, 1977 AIR(SC) 19, 1976 (38) STC 475, 1976 (4) SCC 460 , 1977 (1) SCR 631 , 1976 UJ 850 , 1976 TaxLR 2157, the Supreme Court held in favour of the Revenue on the following facts : The appellant in the present case sent the goods direct from the Madras branch factory to the Bombay buyer at Bhandup, Bombay. The railway receipt was in the name of the Bombay branch to secure payment against delivery. There was no question of diverting the goods which were sent to the Bombay buyer. When the movement of goods from one State to another is an incident of the contract it is a sale in the course of inter-State sale. It does not matter in which State the property in the goods passes. What is decisive is whether the sale is one which occasions the movement of goods from one State to another. The inter-State movement must be the result of a covenant, express or implied, in the contract of sale or an incident of the contract. It is not necessary that the sale must precede the inter-State movement in order that the sale may be deemed to have occasioned such movement. It is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, that the covenant regarding inter-State movement must be specified in the contract itself. It is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, that the covenant regarding inter-State movement must be specified in the contract itself. It will be enough if the movement is in pursuance of and incidental to the contract of sale." * In Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1973 AIR(SC) 2526, 1973 (32) STC 629, 1973 (2) SCC 551 , 1974 (1) SCR 463 , 1973 (2) CTR 406, 1973 (2) CTR 406, 1973 TaxLR 2558, 1973 (2) CTR(SC) 406, 1973 (2) CTR 406 (SC), the assessee had a factory at Faridabad in Haryana. It manufactured refrigerators, deep-freezers, compressors and other similar articles. It had a registered office at New Delhi. The assessee also had godowns at Delhi. The entire sale of refrigerators, compressors, etc., were made to Spencer & Co. Ltd. at Delhi. On April 26, 1965, the assessee entered into distribution agreements with three companies selling refrigerators under three different brand names called "Kelvinator", " Leonard"and" Gem". The refrigerators manufactured at Faridabad were transferred to the sales office at Delhi under despatch notes. The distributors placed their specific orders on the Delhi office and bills were also issued by the sales office at Delhi. The assessing authorities in that case held that the movement of refrigerators from Faridabad to Delhi was held to be occasioned by the sales to the distributors. It was held in that case by the Supreme Court of India that movement of goods which takes place independently of a contract of sale would not fall within the ambit of section 3(a) of the CST Act. The following sentence is interesting to note : "Perusal of section 3(a) further makes it manifest that there must be a contract of sale preceding the movement of the goods from one State to another, and the movement of goods should have been caused by and be the result of that contract of sale. The following sentence is interesting to note : "Perusal of section 3(a) further makes it manifest that there must be a contract of sale preceding the movement of the goods from one State to another, and the movement of goods should have been caused by and be the result of that contract of sale. If there was no contract of sale preceding the movement of goods, the movement can obviously be not ascribed to a contract of sale nor can it be said that the sale has occasioned the movement of goods from one State to the other." * On the argument that the sale took place at Faridabad and that it was at Faridabad that the refrigerators were appropriated towards the agreement with each of the three distributors, the Supreme Court rejecting the argument observed as follows : "The argument proceeds upon the assumption that trade mark name plates on the refrigerators were affixed at Faridabad by the appellant-company, There is, however, no direct material to show that the name plates on the refrigerators were actually affixed at Faridabad and not in Delhi. Assuming that the name plates were, in fact, affixed to the refrigerators by the appellant at Faridabad, there was nothing to prevent the appellant from changing the name plate of a refrigerator and affixing the name plate of a different brand of refrigerator on the refrigerator from which the name plate was removed. The three different brands of refrigerators were in all respects identical except in respect of the name plate. The said name plates, it has been demonstrated to us, are easily interchangeable. In the circumstances, the alleged affixation of trade mark plates to the refrigerators at Faridabad would not necessarily show that the appropriation of the refrigerators towards the agreement with a particular distributor took place at Faridabad." * But there was one distinguishing feature in that case, namely, that the orders in respect of the various refrigerators were placed by the distributors in Delhi after the refrigerators had been transported to Delhi sales office and godown. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the three agreements between the assessee and the distributors were not agreements of sale and that there was no movement of refrigerators from Faridabad to Delhi under a contract of sale. 5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the three agreements between the assessee and the distributors were not agreements of sale and that there was no movement of refrigerators from Faridabad to Delhi under a contract of sale. 5. In South India Viscose Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1981 AIR(SC) 1604, 1981 (48) STC 232, 1981 (3) Scale 1049 , 1981 (3) SCC 457 , 1982 (1) SCR 44 , 1981 UJ 682 , 1981 TaxLR 3038, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "In order to constitute an inter-State sale as defined in section3(a) of the Act, two factors should co-exist - (i) a sale of goods and (ii) movement of goods from one State to another under the contract of sale. If there is a conceivable link between a contract of sale and the movement of goods from one State to the other in order to discharge the obligation under the contract of sale, the interposition of an agent of the seller who may temporarily intercept the movement ought not to alter the inter-State character of the sale." * It was held in that case that there was clear evidence of the existence of prior contract of sale as per the terms of the allocation card. 6. In Union of India v. K. G. Khosla and Co. Ltd. 1979 (43) STC 457, 1979 (2) UJ 381, 1979 (2) SCC 242 , 1979 AIR(SC) 1160, 1979 TaxLR 1817, 1979 UPTC 751, 3 SCR 453, 1979 SCC(Tax) 101 (SC), it was held that the movement of the goods was occasioned from Faridabad to Delhi as a result or incident of the contracts of sale made in Delhi. It was observed : "It is true that in the instant case the contracts of sale did not require or provide that goods should be moved from Faridabad to Delhi. It was observed : "It is true that in the instant case the contracts of sale did not require or provide that goods should be moved from Faridabad to Delhi. But it is not true to say that for the purposes of section3(a) of the Act, it is necessary that the contract of sale must itself provide for and cause the movement of goods or that the movement of goods must be occasioned specifically in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale." * To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1985 AIR(SC) 1754, 1985 (S2) SCR 780, 1985 (4) SCC 173 , 1985 (2) SCALE 789 , 1985 (3) CompLJ 239, 1986 (1) CCC 782, 1985 (60) STC 301, 1985 (2) Scale 789 , 1986 UPTC 105. In that case, the transfers made by the registered office at Hyderabad to its branches at Bombay, Calcutta and Coimbatore of non-standard goods was the subject-matter of controversy. It was held that the movement of the goods from the very beginning from Hyderabad all the way until delivery was received by the buyer, was an inter-State movement. The transactions were held to be inter-State sales exigible to tax under section3(a) of the CST Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in that case the branch office merely acted as a conduit through which the goods passed on their way to the buyer. The following sentence is relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners : "It would have been a different matter if the particular goods had been despatched by the registered office at Hyderabad to the branch office outside the State for sale in the open market and without reference to any order placed by the buyer. In such a case if the goods are purchased from the branch office, it is not a sale under which the goods commenced their movement from Hyderabad. It is a sale where the goods moved merely from the branch office to the buyer. The movement of the goods from the registered office at Hyderabad to the branch office outside the State cannot be regarded as an incident of the sale made to the buyer." * In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. It is a sale where the goods moved merely from the branch office to the buyer. The movement of the goods from the registered office at Hyderabad to the branch office outside the State cannot be regarded as an incident of the sale made to the buyer." * In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1970 AIR(SC) 1281, 1970 (26) STC 354, 1970 (1) SCC 622 , 1970 (3) SCR 862 (SC), it was found by the High Court that the terms and covenants of the contract made it clear that since the vehicles were despatched in pursuance of orders irrespective of appropriation or specific vehicles being sent to specific dealers the despatch and supply to the dealers must of necessity be regarded as integral part of a single transaction.But the Supreme Court disagreed with the above factual assertion of the High Court. The Supreme Court further observed : "The Assistant Commissioner himself found that sometimes the vehicles were sent from the works at Jamshedpur even before an allocation letter had been issued. It would appear from the materials placed before us that generally the completion of the sales to the dealers did not take place at Jamshedpur and the final steps in the matter of such completion were taken at the stock-yards. Even if the appellant took into account the requirements of the dealers which it naturally was expected to do when the vehicles were moved from the works to the stockyards it was not necessary that the number of vehicles allocated to the dealer should necessarily be delivered to him. The appropriation of the vehicles was done at the stock-yards through specification of the engine and the chassis number and it was open to the appellant till then to allot any vehicle to any purchaser and to transfer the vehicles from one stock-yard to another. Even the Assistant Commissioner found that on some occasion vehicles had been moved from a stockyard in one State to a stock-yard in another State. It is not possible to comprehend how in the above situation it could be held that the movement of the vehicles from the works to the stock-yards was occasioned by any covenant or incident of the contract of sale." * 7. It is not possible to comprehend how in the above situation it could be held that the movement of the vehicles from the works to the stock-yards was occasioned by any covenant or incident of the contract of sale." * 7. Glenrock Wood and Allied Enterprises v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 (4) CTR 255, 1975 (36) STC 316 (Mad.) is relied on for the purpose that the conduct of the assessee in obtaining "C" forms would not preclude the assessees from contending that they were not inter-State sales and that the goods had been transported by way of branch transfers. Similarly, Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Suresh Chand Jain 1988 AIR(SC) 1197, 1988 (2) JT 81 , 1988 (70) STC 45, 1988 (1) Scale 693 , 1988 (S) SCC 421, 1988 (3) SCR 446 , 1988 SSCC 421 (SC), is relied upon for the contention that merely because transfer permit was applied for from the Forest Department, it cannot be presumed that there was inter-State sale. The said decision is also authority for the proposition that the onus lies on the Revenue to disprove the contention of the appellant that the sales in question were not inter-State sales. 8. We may also add that the judgments reported in Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Joins Commercial Tax Officer 1972 (30) STC 96 (Mad.), India Pistons Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) 10 STL 92 (Mad.) and Ashok Spares v. State of Gujarat (1984) 10 STL, 239 (Guj) (Trib), are also in favour of the proposition that if there is no link or nexus between the assessee and the outside State purchaser, the transactions would really be of the nature of stock transfers and not Inter-State sales as contended by the Revenue. 9. Learned Additional Government Pleader has taken us through the orders of the assessing authority and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is argued that there has been no direct export orders in favour of the petitioner-company. It is pointed out that the two direct exports by the petitioner-company has not been taxed. It is only those goods which had been exported through M/s. RIL, Bombay, that have been made the subject-matter of taxation under section3(a) of the CST Act. Learned Additional Government Pleader also points out that the petitioner-company had no consistent case and the petitioner has been putting forward inconsistent pleas at various stages. It is only those goods which had been exported through M/s. RIL, Bombay, that have been made the subject-matter of taxation under section3(a) of the CST Act. Learned Additional Government Pleader also points out that the petitioner-company had no consistent case and the petitioner has been putting forward inconsistent pleas at various stages. This argument is apparently based on the fact that the petitioner-company has given up the plea of "agency" put forward before the assessing authority. After going through all the decisions cited at the Bar, we feel that a minute difference in facts has been the cause of what apparently looks to be inconsistent decisions. Since the application of the law will ultimately depend upon the facts of the case, we would once again look into the facts of the case with reference to the authorities cited above. If the assertion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner stating that each order placed by M/s. RIL, Bombay, on the petitioner-company was followed by despatch of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin is proved, we have no doubt that the Revenue has a good case. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners had filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, a chart for the two assessment years, viz., 1974-75 and 1975-76 showing the date of orders, the date of despatch of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin, the stock of goods on the date of each shipment, etc. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has merely taken the despatch of goods on all dates subsequent to a purchase order as being goods despatched in pursuance of the said purchase order. What is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the despatches had taken place irrespective of purchase orders and on a given date, there were more stocks at Cochin than the quantity covered by a purchase order. Learned counsel has taken us through the charts to illustrate his arguments. We can take the position as on the date of the one purchase order from M/s. RIL, Bombay. We will take the order placed on the petitioner-company on January 8, 1975 by M/s. RIL, Bombay. It is as follows : "RALLIS INDIA LIMITED EXPORT HOUSE Ref : CRC/14 January 8, 1975 Messrs. Protein Products of India Limited, Sandyanallah, Ootacamund-6 (The Nilgiris), Tamil Nadu. We will take the order placed on the petitioner-company on January 8, 1975 by M/s. RIL, Bombay. It is as follows : "RALLIS INDIA LIMITED EXPORT HOUSE Ref : CRC/14 January 8, 1975 Messrs. Protein Products of India Limited, Sandyanallah, Ootacamund-6 (The Nilgiris), Tamil Nadu. Dear Sirs, OSSEIN We have pleasure in placing the following purchase order with you : 1. Product : OSSEIN, sizes 3/8"and 5/8" 2. Quantity : 300 (three hundred) metric tonnes 3. Packing : In new jute and/or polythene lined bags, weighing approximately 30 kilograms per bag. 4. Price : Pounds sterling 671.30 (Pounds Sterling six hundred and seventy one and 30 pence) per metric ton f.o.b. Cochin. 5. Shipment : During January/February/March/April/May/June, 1975 subject to availability of shipping opportunities. Notifying party : M/s. Rousselot Limited, Provincial House, 98/106, Cannon Street, London EC 4N 6LS. The goods to be placed free on board the vessels at Cochin. The shipping documents after the shipments to be forwarded to us. 6. Destination : Antwerp 7. Payment : To be made as soon as proceeds against the export are received by us. Yours faithfully, Per. pro. RALLIS INDIA LIMITED Sd/- (P. S. Seshadri)" * According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as against this order goods were despatched to Cochin on March 25, 1975, March 26, 1975, March 27, 1975, March 28, 1975, April 12, 1975, April 15, 1975, and April 16, 1975. The goods despatched on the above dates are as follows : "Dates Tonnes of ossein 25-3-1975 ... 6.750 26-3-1975 ... 6.000 27-3-1975 ... 7.500 28-3-1975 ... 5.550 12-4-1975 ... 6.000 15-4-1975 ... 6.750 16-4-1975 ... 7.140 45.690" * The total quantity despatched adds up to 45.690 tonnes. On April 17, 1975, a quantity of 25.900 was shipped and the shipping marks affixed at Cochin. In other words, as against the order for 300 tonnes, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been able to show a despatch of 45.690 tonnes and there was already existing stock of 1.500 tonnes at Cochin. From this it is impossible to come to the conclusion that the order dated January 8, 1975, for 300 tonnes occasioned the movement of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin on March 25, 1975, March 26, 1975, March 27, 1975, March 28, 1975, April 12, 1975, April 15, 1975, and April 16, 1975 amounting to a total of 45.690 tonnes. The figures do not tally. The figures do not tally. The same is the story in respect of all orders referred to by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On the other hand, the explanation of the petitioner fits in with the actual despatches being regular without reference to orders from M/s. RIL, Bombay. As and when orders are received by Uthag amandalam office, the goods already accumulated in Cochin were being shipped. In fact from the chart, we see that for a particular period there was no purchase order from M/s. RIL, Bombay but the despatches were continuing as and when ossein were manufactured. 10. Learned Government Pleader refers us to clauses 6 and 7 of the collaboration agreement dated July 4, 1965 between M/s. RIL, Bombay and Company Rousselot. Under the said clauses, the foreign company had undertaken to sell or take up for their own consumption 950 tonnes of ossein per annum. The Indian company which was to be brought into existence should undertake to make the said quantity of ossein available to the foreign company. It was also agreed that no ossein shall be sold unless the same had been first offered to company Company Rousselot and only if the latter company declined to purchase the same, the Indian company can sell to others. The question which falls for our consideration is, whether the regular despatches from Uthagamandalam to Cochin was in pursuance of sale or purchase orders or whether the despatches were being made regularly just for the purpose of storing the goods in the godown at Cochin. We must confess that there is only a thin line of difference between the arguments of the assessee and the Revenue. It is not the case of the assessing authority that the despatches from Uthagamandalam to Cochin were made in pursuance of clauses 6 and 7 of the collaboration agreement, nor can such a contention be urged by the Revenue. The case is only that as per the purchase orders placed by M/s. RIL, Bombay, the goods were despatched from Uthagamandalam to Cochin. According to the Revenue, only after each purchase order that the goods were despatched on various dates from Uthagamandalam to Cochin. According to the assessee, the despatch is not with reference to any particular purchase order but it was being made regularly for the purpose of storing the goods at their only godown at Cochin. According to the Revenue, only after each purchase order that the goods were despatched on various dates from Uthagamandalam to Cochin. According to the assessee, the despatch is not with reference to any particular purchase order but it was being made regularly for the purpose of storing the goods at their only godown at Cochin. The despatch of the goods cannot be related to any particular purchase order on the basis of quantity. From the chart filed by the petitioners, it is seen that irrespective of orders from M/s. RIL, Bombay, goods were being despatched from Uthagamandalam to Cochin regularly for the purpose of storing in the godowns at Cochin. The fact that petitioners have no facility for storing the goods at Uthagamandalam is not disputed. Therefore, the maximum that can be said against the assessee is that they were moving the goods to Cochin in the sure hope of getting orders from M/s. RIL, Bombay or from foreign buyers. That is the hope with which every person manufactures goods. The fact that goods are earmarked only at Cochin is also a point in favour of the assessee. At any point of time, stocks were available at Cochin. The Revenue has not been able to show that assessee despatched goods just to meet one particular order, and stopped further despatches until they received the next order. We have already noted that irrespective of orders, despatches were being made to Cochin. 11. The facts of the case in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1970 AIR(SC) 1281, 1970 (26) STC 354, 1970 (1) SCC 622 , 1970 (3) SCR 862 (SC), Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1972 (30) STC 96 (Mad.), Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1973 AIR(SC) 2526, 1973 (32) STC 629, 1973 (2) SCC 551 , 1974 (1) SCR 463 , 1973 (2) CTR 406, 1973 (2) CTR 406, 1973 TaxLR 2558, 1973 (2) CTR(SC) 406, 1973 (2) CTR 406180 (SC), India Pistons Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) 10 STL 92 (Mad.) and Ashok Spares v. State of Gujarat (1984) 10 STL 239 (Guj) (Trib) and the ratio laid down therein more aptly applies to the facts of the present case. 12. 12. We are, therefore, obliged to hold that the turnover involved in the reopening of assessment does nor comprise inter-State sales, within the meaning of section3(a) of the CST Act. 13. The fact that the Kerala authorities considered the matter and held that there was no assessable turnover or that they are reopening the matter cannot be of any decisive value in determining the question involved in this case. 14. We, therefore, hold that the assessing authorities and the Tribunal were not right in holding that the goods in question were transferred to Cochin in pursuance of contracts of sale. We hold that section 3(a) does not come into play. It is the specific case of the petitioners that "C" forms were filed under protest reserving their right to press afterwards a case for reduced rate of tax. On the mere fact that "C" forms are available to cover the entire turnover relating to the transfer of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin describing M/s. RIL, Bombay, as purchasing denier and the petitioner-company as seller, it cannot be presumed that the movement of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin was on the basis of the orders from M/s. RIL, Bombay. As we have already stated, the tact whether the assessee had sold ossein from the Cochin godown and whether such sales are assessable to tax in that State or not are beyond the scope of these tax cases. 15. For all the above reasons, the tax cases are allowed. The order of the assessing authority in both the cases as confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal are set aside. There will be no order as to costs.