JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. 1. The petitioner, an allottee of a house no- 103, MIG Govindpur Avas Vikas Colony, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the accommodation in dispute) approached this court with the grievance that she had been forcibly dispossessed from the same by the Allahabad Development Authority, (hereinafter referred to as the Authority) and J. B. Singh, the respondent no. 5.' 2. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Authority by its Joint Secretary. The Standing Counsel represents the Station House Officer, the respondent no. A but no counter-affidavit has been filed on his behalf. A counter-affidavit has been filed by J. B. Singh. Rejoinder- affidavits have been filed by the petitioner. The petition has not been formally admitted as yet. However, it is ripe for hearing. With the consent of the counsel lor the parties, we have heard this petition with a view to dispose it of finally and we are doing so. The material facts, which have "emerged after the exchange of the affidavits, are these. The petitioner was allotted the accommodation in dispute by the Authority She did not pay the instalments. The Authority by a notice dated 24th May, 1988 called upon her to pay up a sum of Rs. 29,680/- towards the arrears of instalments failing which the allotment was to be cancelled Neither any payment was made nor the allotment was cancelled. Therefore, there was a lull. On 12th April, 1990, a notice no. 66/90-91 (hereinafter referred to as the first notice) was sent to her by the Authority under registered post at her Mumfordganj, Allahabad address. This notice required her to pay up a sum of Rs. 49,184-00 plus interest thereon within a period of fifteen days from its receipt by her failing which, in accordance with agreement, steps were to be taken for the realisation of the arrears, for the cancellation of the order of allotment and for her eviction' from the accommodation in dispute.- A similar notice was sent by the Authority under registered post to the petitioner at her Govindpur Allahabad address on 19th April, 1990. This notice shall be hereinafter called the second notice. Upon an application made by J B. Singh on 3rd May, 1990, the Authority allotted the accommodation in dispute to him on the same day. He was required to deposit a sum of Rs. This notice shall be hereinafter called the second notice. Upon an application made by J B. Singh on 3rd May, 1990, the Authority allotted the accommodation in dispute to him on the same day. He was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,000/- on the same date and a further sum of Rs. 16,500/- had to be deposited by him within fifteen days from that date. On 4th May, 1990, the Joint Secretary of the Authority informed the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, about the allotment in favour of J. B. Singh and requested him to lend police force to J.B. Singh to enable him to take possession on 5th March, 1990. On 5th May, 1990, a certificate of possession was handed over to J. B. Singh by and on behalf of the Authority. 3. On 7th May, 1990 Sri V. D. Ojha, an Advocate of this court, was appointed as a Commissioner with a direction to visit the spot and give his report as to which party was in actual possession of the accommodation in dispute. ON May 7/8, 19.90, Sri Ojha submitted his report. According to this report J. B. Singh was not effectively residing in the accommodation in dispute, but he had kept some articles therein. 4. The focus is on the order dated 2nd May, 1990, cancelling the allotment of the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the (impugned order). The order of allotment dated 3rd May, 1990, in favour of J. B. Singh is consequent to the impugned order. According to the impugned orders the order allotting the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner had been cancelled as she failed to comply with the notice dated 24th April, 1990. On a perusal of the relevant record, as placed by Sri Ashok Mohiley, learned counsel for the Authority, we are satisfied that in the impugned order 24th April, 1990, had been inadvertantly typed out instead of 12th April, 1990. Indisputably before the passing of the impugned order, the petitioner neither paid off the amount as mentioned in the two notice nor did she put in appearance before the Authority. 5. It shall be presumed that the first and second notices despatched to the petitioner under registered post were duly delivered to her in the normal course. She has not sworn the rejoinder-affidavit. Her husband has done so as her Pairokar. 5. It shall be presumed that the first and second notices despatched to the petitioner under registered post were duly delivered to her in the normal course. She has not sworn the rejoinder-affidavit. Her husband has done so as her Pairokar. In the rejoinder-affidavit filed in reply to the counter- affidavit of J.B. Singh there is an averment that the said notices were not received by the petitioner. However, in the rejoinder-affidavit filed in reply to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Authority no such averment has been made at all. On account of this fact coupled with the fact that the petitioner has not mustered courage to file her own affidavit, the presumption that the notices were duly delivered to her in the normal course remains unrebutted 6. The question still is : whether the impugned order could be passed by the Authority before the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the second notice by the petitioner ? She could have received the said notice on 20th April, 1990, at the earliest. Counting from 21st April, 1990, the 15th day would fall on 5th May, 1990, whereas the impugned order was passed on 2nd May, 1990. It was not imperative upon the Authority to cancel the order of allotment within a specified period after the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of the service of the first notice upon the petitioner. In particular, the Authority was under no legal obligation or compulsion to pass an order cancelling the allotment of the petitioner immediately after the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of the service of the said notice upon her. The notice clearly meant that the order of cancellation could be passed on any date immediately after the expiry of a period of fifteen days from its service upon the petitioner. The Authority had not given up its right to extend the period within which the petitioner could make the deposit of the arrears so as to obviate the cancellation of the allotment. The Authority could extend the period either on its own or upon an application made by the petitioner. Even under the statutes of limitation a person may bind himself not to execute a decree within a certain period. The Authority could extend the period either on its own or upon an application made by the petitioner. Even under the statutes of limitation a person may bind himself not to execute a decree within a certain period. It is also well settled that the parties may consent to enlarge the stipulated time. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued on, behalf of the petitioner that by issuing the second notice the Authority gave out that it would not pass an order of cancellation of the allotment before the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of service of that notice upon the petitioner. Even if the Authority acquired the right to pass an order of cancellation immediately after the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of service of the first notice, its conduct warranted an inference of the relinquishment of such a right. 7. "The word 'reasonable' has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know"-Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition page 2258 In the back drop that, in spite of the earlier notice dated 24th May, 1988 and in spite of the default on the part of the petitioner, the Authority took no action to pass an order of cancellation, the petitioner could, as a reasonable person, legitimately infer that by giving the second notice the Authority purported to give her more breathing time to pay up the arrears. It follows that the authority acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in passing the order of cancellation before the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the second notice by the petitioner and the petitioner acted rationally in not taking an appropriate action on the basis of the first notice. 8. The audi altera partem rule is still fluid. "Rules of natural justice are not embodied. The standard of reasonableness in the matter of hearing varies from case to case. However, it is now clear that a person should be given a fair chance of presenting his or her side of the case. Therefore, a minimum standard of fairness has to observed. "Rules of natural justice are not embodied. The standard of reasonableness in the matter of hearing varies from case to case. However, it is now clear that a person should be given a fair chance of presenting his or her side of the case. Therefore, a minimum standard of fairness has to observed. The petitioner was not given a fair chance of presenting her case by the Authority as it took an action before the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of the service of the second notice upon her. This hasty action deprived the petitioner of her right to effectively prepare her case with a view to answer the charge as levelled in the two notices. The impugned order, therefore, is also liable to be struck down on the ground that the Authority passed it by observing the principles of natural justice in their breach- Sri V. B. Upadhya, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed strong reliance upon the alleged communication dated 30th March, lb?90 of the Secretary of the Authority to the Deputy Secretary and Law Officer of the Authority stating therein that no recovery certificate should be sent to the Collector for making realisation from the allottees under the Govindpur Housing Scheme as no decision bad been taken with regard to the price of the land and the constructions. On the basis of this communication an argument of malafide was sought to be built up. This document has been filed as an annexure to the rejoinder-affidavit. There is force in the objection of Sri Mohiley that this document should not be looked into as he had no opportunity to rebut it. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the submission made on the basis of the said material. 9. Dr. Padia, on behalf of J. B. Singh, has urged that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain this petition. We are unable to appreciate this submission. Admittedly, the allotment in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled by the impugned order. She is directly affected by it. Counsel has tried to strengthen his argument by drawing our attention to the fact that, according to the petitioner herself, she was not living in the accommodation in dispute and one Sri Sen was living therein. Admittedly, the allotment in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled by the impugned order. She is directly affected by it. Counsel has tried to strengthen his argument by drawing our attention to the fact that, according to the petitioner herself, she was not living in the accommodation in dispute and one Sri Sen was living therein. We cannot overlook the feet that, according to the petitioner, Sri Sen was living in the accommodation in dispute as her care-taker. Therefore, the petitioner was in constructive possession over the accommodation in dispute. 10. Counsel next contended that, in any view of the matter, this court has no jurisdiction, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, to issue any direction for the ejectment of J. B. Singh from the accommodation in dispute. This contention too is not sound. J. B. Singh was allotted the accommodation in dispute as a consequence to the cancellation of the order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner. He was put into alleged possession on the basis of an allotment made in his favour as well as on the basis of a letter by the Joint Secretary of the Authority to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad. This, therefore, is a typical case where the order of allotment in favour of J. B. Singh must fall the moment the impugned order is quashed. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 2nd May, 1990, is quashed. The consequential order dated 3rd May, 1990, allotting the accommodation to I. B. Singh is also quashed. The respondents, and J. B. Singh in particular, are directed to restore the possession of the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner. They shall do so within a period of two weeks from the date of passing of this order. We make it clear that it will be open to the Authority concerned to take fresh action against the petitioner in accordance with law. 11. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.