Judgment :- NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. 1. The petitioners in the writ petitions are the appellants in these writ appeals. The Respondents in the Writ petitions are the Respondents in these writ appeals. We propose to refer to the parties as per their nomenclature in the writ petitions. The petitioners are teaching staff. They were originally appointed to the school at Kundrakudi under the control of the third respondent. The relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973. hereinafter referred to as the Act, govern the service position of the petitioners. While the petitioners got inducted into the services, they entered into agreements under Form VII-A prescribed by the Rules under the Act. The petitioners were earlier in the year 1988 transferred to the school at Kaliimandayam also under the control of the third Respondent. According to the third Respondent that was done taking note of the requests of the petitioners. Subsequently in June, 1990, by the orders impugned in the writ petitions, the petitioners have been re-transferred to the school at Kundrakudi. Before the learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petitions, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the third Respondent has no inherent power of transfer and there being no provision for transfer in the statutory agreements entered into between the parties, the impugned orders of transfer must be struck down. Reliance in this behalf was placed on a pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in T. Chandrasekar v. The Committee of Management of Pachaiyappas Trust and others 1 . The learned single Judge found that the petitioners were transferred from Kundrakudi to Kallimandayam only on their requests as per their letters, pleading family circumstances and they have been transferred back to Kundrakudi again as per the very terms of the said letters, which provided that there could be such re-transfers when the family circumstances eased out. Taking note of these facts, the learned single Judge declined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. These writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge. 2. Mr. Taking note of these facts, the learned single Judge declined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. These writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge. 2. Mr. N.S. Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that there being no inherent power of transfer vested in the third Respondent, the statutory agreements not conferring such power on the third Respondent, the petitioners now working in the school at Kallimandayam cannot be disturbed by the impugned orders of transfer. Learned counsel for the petitioners pressed forth into service the pronouncement of the Bench referred to above. Learned counsel for the petitioners also impeached the genuineness of the signature stated to be of the petitioner in one of the writ petitions; in the letter concerned. As against this, Mr. R. Gandhi, learned counsel for the third Respondent, would submit that the very appointments of the petitioners were only to the school and there were letters given by the petitioners requesting at Kundrakudi for transfer to the school at Kallimandayam on account of their family circumstances and the petitioners have agreed to be re-transferred to any school under the control of the third Respondent on improvement in their family circumstances and hence there could be re-transfer back to the school at Kundrakudi, and only in implementation of these requests, the transfer earlier and the re-transfer now, have taken place. Learned counsel for the third Respondent wants to distinguish the decision of the Bench referred to above by pointing out the above circumstances. 3. We assessed the factual position in the light of the legal proposition set down by the pronouncement of the Bench referred to above. Briefly stated the legal proposition is “There could not be a term either express or implied in a contract of service between the Management of private schools and their staff, which has not been laid down and settled by the statutory prescriptions. The forms containiug the terms and conditions of service do not provide for power of transfer for the Management of private schools. When terms and conditions of service are prescribed by Authority in exercise of powers under the statute, it is impermissible to travel beyond the statutory sphere and enter into a contractual sphere to spell out an implied term or an inherent power to transfer. When terms and conditions of service are prescribed by Authority in exercise of powers under the statute, it is impermissible to travel beyond the statutory sphere and enter into a contractual sphere to spell out an implied term or an inherent power to transfer. There cannot be any supplementation to statutory terms and conditions of service.” If the propositions are to be taken note of and applied, then the very orders of transferor done earlier in the year 1988 cannot be sustained. They have, in fact, travelled beyond the statutory sphere. But the petitioners themselves wanted such transfers and that was accepted by the third respondent. It is true that there is a dispute with reference to the genuineness of the letter given by one of the petitioners, who is the appellant in W.A. No. 790 of 1990. Even ignoring the letters, we find that the appointments of the petitioners having been made to the school at Kundrakudi and there being no statutory term empowering the third respondent to transfer, we can only characterise what happened earlier in the year 1988 as totally lacking the support of any statutory term. To put it in other words; those transfers were in breach of the statutory contracts. The petitioners acquiesced in such breach obviously because it suited them. When the position is being sought to be reversed, they raise a voice of complaint because they find it inconvenient. It is possible to view the impugned orders of transfer as reversing and rectifying the breach of the statutory contracts, and viewed from this angle, we cannot strike down the present orders of transfer, impugned in the writ petitions. Mr. N.S. Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the earlier Form VTI-A agreements have practically lost the efficacy because service registers have been opened for the petitioners only at the school at Kallimandayam. This is a formality, which would have necessarily happened; but that cannot give a lever to the petitioners to impeach the present orders of transfer. The petitioners have been re-transferred to the school, to which they were originally appointed. Further more, the conduct of the petitioners, as rightly held by the learned single Judge, dissuades this Court from exercising the highly prerogative writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners, assuming they have a case on merits. The petitioners have been re-transferred to the school, to which they were originally appointed. Further more, the conduct of the petitioners, as rightly held by the learned single Judge, dissuades this Court from exercising the highly prerogative writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners, assuming they have a case on merits. They cannot be allowed to approbate when it suits them and reprobate when it does not suit them. For all these reasons, we are not inclined to interfere in writ appeals. Accordingly, these writ appeals are dismissed. No costs.