Sagar v. Vikram Singh (62) — 1990 DIGILAW 796 (RAJ)

BY THE COURT — These five writ petitions are directed against the common order passed by a Division Bench of the Board of revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer (for short the Board of Revenue) dated 7.11.1988 disposing of six appeals. For Rajasthan at Ajmer (for short the Board of Revenue) 2. It is alleged that against petitioners Bhala (Writ Petition No.948/89), Sagar(Writ Petition No.949.89) and the father of Megharam & Ors. i.e. Motaram (Writ petition No.947 of ), a suit for eviction under Sec. 180 (1)(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was File by late by Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji from who certain pieces of land were, taken by these petitioners for cultivation in village Nasal Bari and Nesal Choti whereas against petitioners Laxman (Writ Petition No.109/89) and Harisingh and Ors.(Writ Petition No.3465 of 1989), writs for eviction were brought under s.l80(l)(b) of the Act respondents No.l to 3, who are legal here of late Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwar ji. All these fruits were instituted in the year 1971 and they came to be dismissed by the trial court on 13.2.1975. It will be pertinent to note here that during the pendency of these suits before the trial Court, Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji died on 28.12.1971. However, appeals were filed before the Revenue Appelate Authority, Bikaner. The Revenue Appellate Authority set aside the judgment of the Sub-Division Officer, Bikaner and decreed the suits of the plaintiffs for eviction of the petitioners vide his Judgment dated 4.3.1978. Thereafter, second appeals were filed before the Board of Revenue and they were dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated 31.1.1986. 3. There after, a writ petition was filed before this Court bearing D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2316 of 1986, Megharam & Others V. Vikram Singh and others, which came to be disposed of by this Court vide its Order dated October 27,1987. It was sentenced before this Court that while deciding the appeal, the provisions of Sec. 19, which has been amended in the year 1979, have not been taken in to consideration by the learned Board of revenue and even no request was made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to take note of the attended provisions of Sec.19 of the Act, which came into force with effect from 29.12.1979. Thus, on the joint request, the case was remanded beck to the learned Board of Revenue for reconsideration. Both the parties were directed to appear before the board of Revenue on 4th of January, 1988 and the Board of Revenue was directed to re-hear the appeals as jointly agreed by the learned counsel for the parties. It was further directed that if the parties so desire, they can move application for amendment of the Pleading and it would be for the Board of Revenue to consider whether after such amendment, any further remand is necessary or the Board itself can decide on the basis of the available record or some other mode which it deems proper according to law. After remand, all the six appeals came to be dismissed by the learned Board of Revenue vide its judgment 7.11.1988. Hence, these writ petitions. 4. We have heard M/s R.N. Bishnoi and Vijay Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. S.N. Sharma for the respondents and Mr. H.R. Panwar, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 5. The only ground on which the previous writ petition bearing D.B. Civil Writ Petition. No.2316 of 1986 was filed, argued and decided was that amended provisions of s.19 of the Act, which came into force prior to the decision of the second appeals by the learned Board of Revenue, have not been taken into consideration by Board of Revenue. The Judgments of the court below were not challenged on their merits. Thus, the now is point that services for consideration before this Court now is whether the Board of Revenue has decided the appeals correctly in view of the aforesaid amendment in Sec. 19 of the Act, which came into force with effect from 29.12.1979. The provisions of ss,19 (AA) and 19 (2A) as amended by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 (No, 16 of 1979) have been extracted verbatim in the judgment of the learned Board of Revenue dated 7.11.1988 and, therefore, we need not quote them here. 6. The contention of Mr. The provisions of ss,19 (AA) and 19 (2A) as amended by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 (No, 16 of 1979) have been extracted verbatim in the judgment of the learned Board of Revenue dated 7.11.1988 and, therefore, we need not quote them here. 6. The contention of Mr. R.N. Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that as per Sec. 19 (1AA) of the Act, every person who, on the 31st day of December, 1969 was entered in the annual registers then current as the tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant or was not so entered but was a tenant of Khudkasht of sub-tenant of land other than grave land, has been made entitled subject to the exceptions contained in the provisions to sub-s.(1), as from the dated of the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) . Act, 1979 i.e. 29.12.1979 subject to other provisions contained in this Chapter, the Khatedar tenant of that part of the land held by him in which he has not acquired Khatedari rights under sub-s.(l) of sub-s. (AI), if before the said date, no proceedings for his ejectment under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-s.(l) or section 188 shall have started within the time limit prescribed by S.182-A or it on that date, no such proceedings previously started might have been pending Mr. Bishnoi has Submitted that the Petitioners were recorded as sub-tenant of the khudkasht. They took land way back in the Samvat years 2005 to 2008 from late Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji and were cultivating it regularly till the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act,1979 came into force and, therefore, they were entitled to get Khatedari rights. He has submitted that although Sec. 19(1AA) provides that these rights are subject to the exception contained in the provisos to sub-sec. (1) of S.19 of the Act but the embargo, that a person who is a sub-tenant of a Khudkasht holder who happens to be a widow should not be conferred any Khatedari rights, did not remain operative against the petitioners after 28.12 1971 when late Maji Sahib Shri Sahibawatji Govind Kanwarji died. These Khatedari rights are to be conferred with effect from the date the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force i.e. 29.12.1979. These Khatedari rights are to be conferred with effect from the date the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force i.e. 29.12.1979. He has, therefore, argued that the petitioners are entitled to be granted Khatedari rights of this land which they have held from Khudkasht holder i.e. late Maji Sahib Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji. In this respect, referred to sub-s.(2A) (i) and (2A) (ii) of Sec. 19 of the Act and has submitted that it is true that the petitioners have not made any formal application before the Sub Divisional Officer having jurisdiction for declaration of Khatedari rights in their favour, It was contended by him that that sub-clause(ii) of sub-s.2A of s.19 of the Act provides that the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction over the area concern may at his own motion or otherwise within one year of the said date and after making an enquiry in the same manner as is prescribed for an enquiry under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 15 and after affording a reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard and on being satisfied that Khatedari rights accrued to such tenant of KhudKasht or sub-tenant under sub-s.(lAA) may issue such a declaration to that effect. He has further contended that at the time when the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force i.e. 27.12.1979, the second appeals of the petitioners were pending before the Board of Revenue and the learned Board of Revenue is with all powers which can be exercised by the Assistant Collector or the Sub Divisional Officer. According to him, the was of word "may" in sub-clause (ii) of sub-s. (2A) of s.19 of the Act should be read as shall. In other words, he has submitted that the provisions of section 19 (2A) (ii) of the Act should be treated as mandates of the law that the Assistant Collector was required to issue such a declaration, if Khatedari rights have already accrued to subtenants or the tenants of the Khudkasht. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he has placed reliance on certain Authorities. 7. We may first refer to an authority of their lordship of the supreme Court in Textile Commr. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he has placed reliance on certain Authorities. 7. We may first refer to an authority of their lordship of the supreme Court in Textile Commr. V. Sagar Textile Mills (l), wherein their lordships have observed:- "The word "may" is capable of meaning must or shall in the light of the context and where a discretion is conferred upon, a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word may which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Considering the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those, who are likely to be affected by the exercise of the power, we are clear that the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is coupled with the duty to specify the particular period for which the directions shall be operative." 8. Our attention was next drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Govind Rao V. State of M.P.(2), wherein it has been observed: "The word may is often read as shall or must when there is something in the nature of the thing to be done which makes it the duty of the parson on whom the power is conferred to exercise the power" 9. In Ganesh Prasad V. Lakshmi Narayan (3),s. 11A of the Bihar Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,1947 lays down a proviso that the Court shall order the defence to be struck out, While considering the word shall, used in proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act, it was held that this being a beneficial legislation for favouring the tenants, the word shall should be treated as may. 10. On the strength of these authorities, it was contended by Mr. R.N. Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that sub-clasue (ii) of sub-s.2A of Sec.19 of the Act has been incorporated for the benefits of the tenants, and therefore, the word may used in that provision must be read as must. 11. Our attention was also drawn to a full Bench decision of this Court in Vishandas vs. Savitri Devi (4), where in para 10 of the Judgment, it was observed that the mere use of the word shall will not make the provision as mandatory. 11. Our attention was also drawn to a full Bench decision of this Court in Vishandas vs. Savitri Devi (4), where in para 10 of the Judgment, it was observed that the mere use of the word shall will not make the provision as mandatory. The word shall has been construed as may in view of the pronouncement of their lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s B.P. Khemka V. Birendra Kumar (5). 12. In Bhikhan Bobla V. Punjab State (6). A full Bench of the Punjab High Court observed as follows; "By the use of the word may in the phrase a subsequent scheme may be prepared in s.36, the Legislature cannot be intended to have granted a mere desecration, but rather to have imparted a positive and absolute duty. In this context, the word may does not signify mere faculty of power but an obligation. The word may does not imply in the context an option to refrain from a adhereing to the prescribed procedure. It does not indicate that an option is given to the Settlement Officer whether or not to prepare the subsequent scheme in accordance with the Act. S. 36 cannot, there for, be struck down because of the use of the word may." 13. The thrust of these authorities is that keeping in view the context in which the particular word has been used, it has to decided whether the word may should be treated as shall. We shall deal with this a prospect of the matter a little later when the appeals are considered on merits. 14. It was next contended by Mr. Bishnoi, the learned petitioners that on account of a change in the law, which has come into force after the filing of the suit, the court must have taken into considerations these amended provisions. There is no dispute about this aspect of the matter. It was on account of this very fact that D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2316 was accepted by this Court vide its Judgment dated October 27,1987 and case was remanded back to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration and the Board of Revenue was directed to take into consideration the amended provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act. 15. It was on account of this very fact that D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2316 was accepted by this Court vide its Judgment dated October 27,1987 and case was remanded back to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration and the Board of Revenue was directed to take into consideration the amended provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act. 15. Relying on the decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court in P.Venkateswarlu V. Motor General Traders (7) and the board of Revenue in Motilal V. Smt. Parbati (8), it was contended that subsequent events should be taken into consideration and the position as it existed at the time when the Amendments came into force should be considered. This argument was advanced in this context that the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force with effect from 29.12 1975 and on that day. Khudkasht holder late Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji was not alive and, therefore, the embargo placed on conferment of Khatedari rights as per s.46 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act read with proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 19 of the Act was not available to the landholders and, therefore, the Khatedari rights could be conferred on the petitioners. 16. It was contended by Mr. Bishnoi that there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioners were recorded as sub-tenants of Khudkasht on 31.12.1969, the date mentioned in sub-s.(lAA) of Sec.19 of the Act and, therefore, when they were recorded as sub- tenants on that date and late Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji died on 28.12,1971, the petitioners were entitled to be conferred Khatedari rights on 28.12.1971, on which date, their appeals were pending before the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue having been invested with all powers of the Assistant collector or Sub-Divisional Officer should have suo moto conferred these Khatedari rights on them by making a declaration under Sec. 19(2A) (ii) of the Act. These submission of Mr. Bishnoi have been seriously opposed by Mr. S.N. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. He has submitted that the situation as it existed on 31.12.1969 has to be taken into consideration. On that day, Mst. Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji was alive. She expired on 28.12.1971 and. therefore, on 31.12.1969, on Khatedari rights could be conferred on the petitioners. S.N. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. He has submitted that the situation as it existed on 31.12.1969 has to be taken into consideration. On that day, Mst. Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji was alive. She expired on 28.12.1971 and. therefore, on 31.12.1969, on Khatedari rights could be conferred on the petitioners. The petitioners are, therefore, not at all entitled to the conferment of any Khatedari rights on account of the embargo put on the conferment of such rights under s.46 read with proviso to s.19 of the Act. Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji being a widow, the tenant-petitioners were not entitled to conferment of any Khatedari rights as on 31.12.1969, although the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act,1979 came into force with effect from 29.12.1975 but the appointed date for conferment of Khatedari rights was 31.12.1969 and, therefore, if Khatedari right could not be conferred on that day, the petitioners cannot claim any Khatedari rights simply because Maji Sahib Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji died on 28.12.1971. 18. It was further contended by Mr. S.N. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that on that day,i.e. on 28.12.1971 when Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji died, the provision of s.l9(l-A) were not applicable to the petitioners because suit under Sec. 180 (1) (b) the was pending against them on the date the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force. According to him, when suits were pending against the petitioners under clause(a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 180, the petitioners were not covered by the provisions S.19 (1-A) of the Act It was next concerted that the provisions of Sec. l9(2A)(ii) are mandatory in character but they are discretionary and provided for certain formalities that are to be undertaken. Unless those formalities are undertaken, the petitioners are not facts entitled to conferments of any Khatedari rights in their favour. It was also submitted that no foundation of such a relief was led on behalf of the petitioners in their suits or appeals in spits of the fact that this Court granted them an opportunity to amend their pleadings and, there. The petitioners cannot claim any right ipso facto of Account of the provisions of Sec. 19(2.A) (ii) of the Act. According to Mr. The petitioners cannot claim any right ipso facto of Account of the provisions of Sec. 19(2.A) (ii) of the Act. According to Mr. Sharma, the Board of Revenue was perfectly justified in rejecting their appeals because neither it had exercised its discretion, which was conferred on it under Sec. 19(2A)(ii) of the Act nor any discretion was exercised by the learned Assistant Collector. No enquiry under Sec. 15 (5) of the Act was made and no opportunity of hearing was granted to the concerned parties within the specified time i.e. one year as provided by Sec.19 (2A)(ii) of the Act. He has submitted that when that provisions itself is discretionary, such a relief could not have been granted by the Board of Revenue. 19. We have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. The learned Board of Revenue was of the view that the provisions of S.19(1-A) of the Act takes into consideration the position as it existed on 31.12.1969 and on that day, Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govind Kanwarji was alive and so, no Khudkasht rights can be conferred on the petitioners and, therefore, it has refused to grant this relief in their Favour. It has further observed that the discretion conferred on the Assistant Collector under Sec. 19 (2A)(ii) of the Act has not been exercised by the Assistant Collector or for that matter by the Revenue Appellate Authority and Moreover, such a discretion cannot be exercised at this stage because that could have been exercised only within one year of the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 and, therefore, the exercise of that discretion has also became time-barred. It has held that the provisions of Sec. 19(2A) (ii) of the Act is discretionary and not mandatory. Of course, in para 13 of the Judgment, the learned Board of Revenue has calculated this period from 31.12.1969 but that in wring. The petition of one year was available for exercise of the discretion by the Board of Revenue with effect from 29.12.1979 and not from 31.12.1969. 20. Here, it will be useful to discuss the legislative history of these provisions. Initially, when s.19 was incorporated in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The petition of one year was available for exercise of the discretion by the Board of Revenue with effect from 29.12.1979 and not from 31.12.1969. 20. Here, it will be useful to discuss the legislative history of these provisions. Initially, when s.19 was incorporated in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 1955, it was provided that every person who at the commencement of this Act was entered in the registers than current as a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant of land other than more land or sub-tenant of land,other than grave land could be conferred Khatedari rights. Certain provisos were added to s.19 (19(1) of the Act restraining the conferment of Khatedari rights on the tenants. This section has undergone a radical change. Sub section (1) lays down the following conditions under which a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant would acquire Khatedari rights. Under clasue(a) of sub-s.(l), a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant would get the Khatedari rights only by operation of law i.e. a person who was entered in the annual registers at the commencement of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (15.10.1955) and is continuously so entered and has not ceased to be a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1959 (i.e.on 14.2.59) and before the appointed day i.e.5.5.59 shall by virtue of this legislative enactment become a Khatedar tenant of the holding. Thereafter vide Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) 1961 (No.12 of 1961), Sub-sec. (1-A) was added to S.19 of the 1961 Act, which came into force with effect from 5.4.1961, whereby it was provided subject to exceptions contained in the provision to sub-sec. (1), very person referred to in that sub-section i.e. a person who was entered in the annual registers then current as a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant of land other than grave land or was not so entered but was a tenant of khudkasht or sub tenant of land, other to the conferment of Khatedari rights from the date the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1961 came into force i.e. 5.4.1961. Thus, those persons who were either recorded in the annual registers as tenants of Khudkasht or Sub-tenants or were not even so entered but were actually tenants of Khudkasht or sub-tenants of on the appointed date i.e. 5.4.1961 were also made entitled to the conferment of these khatedari rights. Thus, those persons who were either recorded in the annual registers as tenants of Khudkasht or Sub-tenants or were not even so entered but were actually tenants of Khudkasht or sub-tenants of on the appointed date i.e. 5.4.1961 were also made entitled to the conferment of these khatedari rights. Thereafter, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was against amended by Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 (No. 16 of 1979, which came into force with effect from 29.12.1979 whereby sub.s. (1-AA) was added to s.19 of the Act. By insertion of s.l9(l- AA),every person who on the 31st day of December, 1969 was entered in the annual registers as the tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant or was not so entered but was a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant was made entitled to the Khatedari right from the date of the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 i.e. 19.12.1979. Those persons who have been entered in the annual register as tenants of Khudkasht or sub-tenants or were not so entered but were tenants of Khudkasht or sub-tenants were made entitled to the conferment of Khatedari rights by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act,1979, with effect from 29.12.1979. 21. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid discussion that so far as the eligible date for conferment of Khatedari rights is concerned, it is 31.12.1969. This date cannot be extended to a period beyond that. It is true that the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act,1979 came in force with effect from 29.12.1979 but that date is not material so far as the eligible date for conferment of Khatedari rights is rights from that date. It does not make any person eligible for conferment of Khatedari rights who has been recorded as a tenant or sub-tenant of Khudkasht in the annual registers or who has not been so entered but was a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant of the land but has acquired his status of tenant or sub-tenant of Khudkasht between 1.1.1970 to 29.12.79. We therefore with the view taken by the learned Board of Revenue that as on 31.12.1965. Maji Sahite Shri Shekhawatji Govindkanwerji was alive, the petitioners could not have been granted Khatedari rights. We therefore with the view taken by the learned Board of Revenue that as on 31.12.1965. Maji Sahite Shri Shekhawatji Govindkanwerji was alive, the petitioners could not have been granted Khatedari rights. We further agree with the view taken by the learned Board of Revenue that simply Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govindkanwarji died on 26.12.1971, the embargo put by s.46 read with S.19(1) of the Act lifted against the petitioners for conferment of Khatedari rights on them. If khatedari rights as per the provisions of s.l9(l) of the Act could not have been conferred on the petitioners on 31.12.1969 then simply because on account of subsequent i.e. the death of Maji Sahiba Shri Shekhawatji Govindkanwarji. Khatedari rights cannot be conferred on the petitioners. 22. It is true that Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 came into force with effect from 29.12.1979 but it specifically provides for the eligibility date for conferment of Khatedari rights which should be 31.12.1969 then that date cannot be extended simply because this provision has been incorporated for the benefit of the tenants. It is true that this provision has been made for the benefits of the tenants but is specifically provides for the eligible date i.e. 31.12.1969 and therefore, when the law itself provides for a particular date, then that date cannot be extended under the care of beneficial legislation. 23. It is the admitted case of the petitioners that they have not made any application under s.l9(2A) of the Act. They have only submitted that they are entitled to this relief under s.l9(2A) (ii) of the Act. are, firmly of the view that this provision is not mandatory is character but it is only an enabling provision. It is clear from the language which has been used in framing this sub-clause(ii) of s.l9(2A) of the Act. It provided that Where an application referred to in clause (1) has been made by the tenant or sub-tenant to whom the Khatedari rights accrued under sub-sec. (1AA), the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction may on his own motion or otherwise within one year of the said date and after making an enquiry in the same manner as is prescribed for an enquiry under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 15 and after affording a reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard and on being satisfied that Khatedari rights accrued to such tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 15 and after affording a reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard and on being satisfied that Khatedari rights accrued to such tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant under sub-sec. (1AA), may issue a declaration to that effect. Thus, this provision is only an analysing provision, which envisages that the Assistant Collector may on his own motion within one year of the said date can grant such a declaration in favour of a tenant. That can be done only when the enquiry is made as contemplated in Sec.19 15(5) of the Act. Not only that the Assistant Collector has to afford a reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard and thereafter, he must record his satisfaction that Khatedari rights have accrued to such tenants of Khudkasht, then alone he can grant such a declaration. Thus, the exercise of this power is not ipso facts. Certain enquiries have to be made and if they reveal that Khatedari rights can be conferred be a particular tenant or subtenant of khudkasht then reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned has to be afforded and thereafter , satisfaction has also to be recorded and that has to be done within one year of 31.12.79. 24. Mr. R.N. Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that in this case, the entire material which was necessary for the exercise of the discretion was there on record and no enquiry was necessary as contemplated by s.l5(5) of the Act. It Was the case of ejectment on the basis of yearly tenancy and, therefore, whether the Khatedari rights accrued to the petitioners or not needed an enquiry and moreover, the opposite party was also entitled to a hearing and thereafter, the satisfaction has to be recorded and thereafter for exercise of this discretion, certain procedure has been prescribed and when that has not been undergone and no corresponding obligation has been placed on the Assistant Collector that if he does not act in this manner, what will be the consequences then it has to be held that. It is only an enabling provision. It is only an enabling provision. Thus, from the context in which this section has been incorporated and the language that been used and the procedure that has been provided, this provision has to be treated as an enabling provision and not mandatory in character and, therefore we are firmly of the view that this, provision is not mandatory in character but it is only an enabling provision. 25. S.19(1AA) provides that if no suit or proceedings for ejectment of the tenants or sub-tenants of the Khudkasht under clause (a) or (b) sub.s.(l) of s.180 was pending against them within the time limit prescribed in S.182A or if on that date, no such proceedings previously started might have been pending then alone, such tenants of sub-tenants can take advantage of this section. It was argued by Mr. Bishnoi that actually for clause(b), it should be clause (d) of Sec. 188 of the Act. It is admitted case of the parties that suits were brought against the petitioners under s.l80(b) of the Act. Whether the legislature provided for exclusion of conferment of Khatedari rights on a person against whom a suit has been brought under s.l80(l)(b) or 180 (1) (b) of the Act. We cannot do better then to refer to the Gazette Notification, whereby this provision was brought into force. It is contained in the Rajasthan Gazette Part IV-A(Extra Ordinary) dated 28.12.1979. It clearly provides that no proceedings for ejectment under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section(l) of s.180 should have started within the time limit prescribed by Sec. 182A or if on that date, no such proceeding previously started might have been pending. Thus, it is clear that on the date, when this provision came into force i.e. 29.12.1979, suit under as.l80(l) (b) were pending against the petitioners and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 19(1AA) could not have been made applicable to the petitioners. 26. It is true that S.182A of the Act provides for time limit for certain applications under s.180. It provides that no application for ejectment under clause (a) or clause (d) of Sec. 180 shall be entertained if made after the expiry of three years from the commencement of this Act. 26. It is true that S.182A of the Act provides for time limit for certain applications under s.180. It provides that no application for ejectment under clause (a) or clause (d) of Sec. 180 shall be entertained if made after the expiry of three years from the commencement of this Act. However, a proviso has been added and the said proviso provides that where land is held by Ghair Khatedar or a tenant of Khudkasht, or a sub-tenant from any the persons enumerator in s.46,such application for ejectment may be presented within three years from the date of commencement of this Act or within three years from the date which the disability contemplated by that section Course, which ever may be letter. Mr. R.N. Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has laid stress on the use of words such application and has submitted that it only relates to S.180(1) (b) or 180(l)(b) of the Act . We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Bishnoi. Sec. 182- A deals with time limit for applications that are to be filed under Sec. 180 of the Act. It provides for applications which have to be filed under clauses(a) or (d) of sub-s.(l) of Sec. 180 of the Act. Its proviso is general in character and it says that where the land is held by a Ghair Khatedar tenant or a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant from any of the persons enumerated in s.46, such application need not be filed within three years even in relation to clauses (a) or (d) of Sec. 180 of the Act but such an application for ejectment could he filed within three years from the date of the commencement of the Act or the period contemplated by that section ceases. Thus, if a man hold the lend from a minor, the suit for ejectment can be filed within three years of his attaining the majority. If a man hold the land belonging to a widow, then suit can be brought within three years from the date of the death of the widow. 27. Our attention has been drawn to certain observations made by a learned single Judge of this Court in Balveer Singh vs. Board of Revenue & Ors. (9). If a man hold the land belonging to a widow, then suit can be brought within three years from the date of the death of the widow. 27. Our attention has been drawn to certain observations made by a learned single Judge of this Court in Balveer Singh vs. Board of Revenue & Ors. (9). In that case, there was a dispute whether sub.s.(l-A) of Sec. 19 of the Act deals with suite mentioned in clauses (a) or (s) of sub-s. (1) of s.180 of the Act. The Court after considering the provisions of s. 180 182A resolved the controversy and held that they related to Sec. 180 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. 28. In the result, we find no force in these writ petition and, therefore, they are dismissed. 29. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of these writ petitions..