JUDGMENT - I.G. SHAH, J.:---The Shops Inspector, Pune Municipal Corporation has filed this appeal against the order of acquittal of the present respondent No. 1 of the offences punishable under sections 8 and 5 read with section 52(1)(c) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Criminal Revision Application No. 127 of 1979 setting aside the order of conviction and sentence of fine of Rs. 25/- passed against respondent No. 1 by the trial Court. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this appeal are as under:--- 2. Respondent No. 2, the original accused is the Divisional Manager of the United India Fire and General Insurance Company, Pune. The Shop Inspector filed a complaint against the present respondent No. 1 contending that respondent No. 1 had not complied with the provisions of sections 8 and 15 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. The defence of respondents No. 1 was that the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 were not applicable to his establishment, as it is a nationalised General Insurance Company and is a subsidiary of the General Insurance Corporation of India. The trial Court negatived the said contention relying upon an unreported judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 1974, in which it was held that the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 applied to the United India Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. It appears that on behalf of respondent No. 1 it was tried to be contended that the Government itself has decided that the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the office of the Company of the respondent No. 1 and therefore, there was no violation committed by respondents No. 1 of any of the provisions of the said Act. To substantiate this contention reliance was placed on two letters dated 21-7-1978 and 18-9-1978, which are at Exhibits 35 and 37 and which are written by the Section Officer, Government of Maharashtra, Industries, Energy and Labour Department, Mantralaya, Bombay. To substantiate this contention reliance was placed on two letters dated 21-7-1978 and 18-9-1978, which are at Exhibits 35 and 37 and which are written by the Section Officer, Government of Maharashtra, Industries, Energy and Labour Department, Mantralaya, Bombay. The trial Magistrate did not accept the defence and held that to be exempted from the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, there must be notification under section 4 of the said Act under which an exemption could be given by the State Government and in the absence of such a notification the Company of the respondent No. 1 cannot be said to be exempted from the operation of the said Act. The trial Magistrate, therefore, on facts found that the present respondent No. 1 had committed-violation of section 15 and section 8 of the said Act and therefore, convicted the present respondent No. 1 and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence of fine the present respondent No. 1 went in revision to the Sessions Court, Pune and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge allowed the said revision application relying upon the letters issued by the Government, which were addressed by the Section Officer of the Government of Maharashtra to the Company of respondent No. 1 and, therefore, acquitted respondent No. 1. Being aggrieved by the said order of acquittal, the Shop Inspector has filed this appeal. 3. On behalf of the appellant it is strenuously contended that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in relying upon the letters which are issued by the Section Officer of the State Government of Maharashtra. It was contended that even if it is assumed that the said two letters did intimate to the present respondents No. 1 that his Company was exempt from the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948, these letters cannot take the place of a notification. It was contended that section 4 empowers the State Government to exempt shop and establishment from the operation of the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act and it provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Act mentioned in the third column of Schedule II shall not apply to the employees and other persons mentioned against them in the second column of the said schedule. It further empowers the Government to issue a notification and add to, omit or alter any of the entries of the said schedule subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification and it further provides that on the publication, of such notification, entries in either column of the said schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. There is no doubt that the State Government has power to add or omit or alter any of the entries of Schedule II and thereby grant exemption from certain provisions of the said Act to even additional establishment. But issuance of such notification as provided in the said section is necessary and if no such notification has been issued a mere letters issued by an officer of the State Government cannot take the place of a notification. Therefore, the two letters, which have been held sufficient by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, to hold that the Company of respondent No. 1 was included in the exempted establishments cannot be held as correct. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was definitely in error relying on the interpretation put by the Section Officer of the State Government, for that by itself cannot provide any justification. Ultimately it is the interpretation of the status that will be applicable and not the interpretation, though done by the officer of the Government, which could be accepted as the only correct interpretation. On behalf of the State Government the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing before me tried to contend that when interpretation was made by the officer of the State of Maharashtra and the said interpretation was intimated to respondent No. 1, it cannot be said that respondent No. 1, erred in relying upon the same. This cannot be an answer to the question, which arises for determination here. Where the provisions of the Act of which violation is alleged to have been committed by the present appellant, one will have to interpret the said provision and then decide as to whether the said provisions were not applicable, as the present respondent No. 1's company was exempt from the same. Where the provisions of the Act of which violation is alleged to have been committed by the present appellant, one will have to interpret the said provision and then decide as to whether the said provisions were not applicable, as the present respondent No. 1's company was exempt from the same. It is clear that in Schedule II Serial No. 79 under the entries head entry (zd) the office of General Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay is mentioned in Column No. 2, in which the shops, employees or other persons, who are exempt, as per section 4 are mentioned. In Column No. 3, the provisions from which exemption is granted are also mentioned. Now no doubt in Column No. 3, exemption from sections 13, 14, 15, 17 and 18 in respect of outdoor staff and watchmen of the office of the General Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay are mentioned to have been exempted. But it is only the office of the General Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay, which is exempt. It, therefore, necessarily means that the branches of the General Insurance Corporation of India, if any, outside Bombay or its subsidiaries anywhere in the State of Maharashtra could not be said to be exempt also. Under these circumstances the defence of respondent No. 1 that his Company is exempt from the provision of section 15 of the said Act must be held to be without any force. As far as section 8 is concerned, there is nothing to show that exemption in respect of the same has also been given even to the office of General Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay. In view of this, the view taken by the trial Court was the correct and the revisional Courts was in error in setting aside the said view. 4. However, it is necessary to consider whether in fact there has been violation of section 8 and section 15 of the Act. In view of this, the view taken by the trial Court was the correct and the revisional Courts was in error in setting aside the said view. 4. However, it is necessary to consider whether in fact there has been violation of section 8 and section 15 of the Act. Section 8 provides for registration of an establishments and it further provides that within the period specified in sub-section (4) all the employers of every establishment shall intimate to the Inspector of the local area concerned a statement in a prescribed from together with such fee, as may be prescribed, containing names of employer and manager, if any ......It is the case of the Shop Inspector that in the present case there is violation of section 8 as a duty is cast on the employer to notify to the Inspector in a prescribed form, any change in any of the particulars contained in the statement submitted under section 7 within such period, if a change has taken place as the State Government may prescribe in respect of the establishment or class of establishments. The case of the Shop Inspector against the present respondent No. 2 that on his assuming charge as manager of the establishment of his Company he had not intimated the change within 30 days from his taking over as provided in section 8. Now in this respect a plain reading of section 8 etc. shows that change has got to be reported within a period. If change has taken place, as the Government may prescribe in respect of any establishment or class of establishments. There is nothing to show on record that the Government has prescribed any period. There is not even an allegation that period of 30 days was prescribed for notifying the change by the State Government. On behalf of the appellant it is tried to be contended that period of 30 days given in section 7 is the period, within which change has to be reported. The said contention cannot be accepted as correct proposition, as even a plain reading of section 8 is sufficient to discard the said contention. Hence, as far as the violation of section 8 is concerned, it must be held that the Shops Inspector has failed to establish the same. 5. The said contention cannot be accepted as correct proposition, as even a plain reading of section 8 is sufficient to discard the said contention. Hence, as far as the violation of section 8 is concerned, it must be held that the Shops Inspector has failed to establish the same. 5. As far as violation of section 15 is concerned, unfortunately for the present appellant it is clear that timings fixed cannot be said to be violative of the said section. What section 15 provides is that the period of work of an employee must be so fixed that no period of continuous work shall exceed five hours and it further provides that no employee shall be required or allowed to work for more than five hours before he has had an interval for rest of at least one hour. Now, in the present case timings prescribed are admittedly from 10 a.m. to 1-15 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 5-15 p.m. of full working days and on Saturday 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. As far as the period of Saturdays is concerned, there can be no violation at all. On behalf of the Shop Inspector it is contended that the period of rest which is 1-15 to 2 p.m. is short of one hour and, therefore, there is violation of section 15. The said contention must be negatived as being incorrect. What is necessary to be seen is that the first part of section 15 provides only that the period shall be so fixed that no period of continuous work shall exceed five hours and the second part provides that no employee shall be required or allowed to work for more than five hours before he has an interval of rest of at least on hour. Now, therefore, in the present case, there is no violation of the first part of the section, as there is no continuous five hour's work, that is being extracted. Even the second part is not violated as no five hour's work is being taken from 2 p.m. to 5-15 p.m., so as to require giving of rest of one hour before the said period of work. Crucial words are "before he has had an interval for rest of at least one hour". The word "before" clarifies the picture clearly. Even the second part is not violated as no five hour's work is being taken from 2 p.m. to 5-15 p.m., so as to require giving of rest of one hour before the said period of work. Crucial words are "before he has had an interval for rest of at least one hour". The word "before" clarifies the picture clearly. If a person is required to work for more than five hours, then he must have had an interval of rest of at least an house before the period of five hours. In the present case there is no such situation at all. Therefore, there is no violation of section 15 at all. 6. In the results, no offence can actually be said to have been committed at all by the present respondent No. 1 and therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge will have to be upheld though on different grounds. Hence the order :--- The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----