This petition under section 397/401 read with section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") is directed against the order dated 1.7.89 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandel in his Cril. Misc. Case No. 44 -of 1989. On 1.7.89 the respondent No. 1 Smt. Ningthoujam Ongbi Rashi Devi filed a complaint petition before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandel against the petitioner alleging, inter-alia, that her husband Ningthoujam Angou Singh was murdered on 28.1.89 by Shri Mayanglambam Achou Singh (petitioner) and some others. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, passed an order on 1.7.89 directing the Officer-in-Charge of Chandel Police Station to investigate the cases and submit the report as early as possible. The order is very brief and it reads as follows : "This is a complaint filed by Smt. Ningthoujam Ongbi Rashi Devi praying for taking cognizance and trial of the offence u/s 302/34 I.P.C. against the accused Shri Mayanglambam Achou Singh. Register it as Cril. Misc. Case. Peruse the complaint petition. Heard the complainant through his counsel Shri Chonjon Singh, Advocate. Considered the circumstances of the case and I find that the case requires investigation. Ask the O/C Chandel P.S. to investigate the case and sub­mit the report as early as possible. Send a copy of this order along with complaint petition bearing No. CJM/CDL/89/340 dated 1.7.89 to the O/C Chandel P.S. for necessary action." It is to be noted here that the complainant was not examined under section 200 Cr.P.C. and that the O/C was directed to investi­gate the case before the complainant was examined under section 200 Cr.P.C. 2. Shri N. Kerani Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, has streneuously urged that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate erred in law in passing the impugned order inasmuch as it violates the proviso to sub-section (1) and proviso to sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code. Shri Ahanthem Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, forcefully submits that the lea­rned Magistrate was fully justified in passing the impugned order and that there was no illegality or irregularity committed by the learned Magistrate in passing the impugned order. 3. Shri Ahanthem Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, forcefully submits that the lea­rned Magistrate was fully justified in passing the impugned order and that there was no illegality or irregularity committed by the learned Magistrate in passing the impugned order. 3. Now, proviso to sub-section (1) and proviso to sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code imposes two limitation on the power of the Magistrate in respect of the offences exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. Clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (1) bars a Magistrate from sending such a case to the Police Officer or some other persons for investigation. He is to enquire himself. But this proviso does not bar him to order investigation by the police under section 156(3) before taking cognizance. The proviso to sub-section (2) obligates the Magistrate in such a case to call upon the com­plainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. On this point, Shri A. Nilamani Singh submits that the proviso to sub-section (1) and proviso to sub-section (2) are applicable only when the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and that since the impugned order was passed before taking cognizance by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3), no irregularity or illegality was committed by the learned Magistrate. Shri N. Kerani Singh, however, submits that the learned Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence by hearing the compl­ainant through his counsel and, therefore, the impugned order is violative of the two provisos to sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 202 of the Code. Therefore, the crucial point for consideration is whether the impugned order was passed by the learned Magistrate before or after taking cognizance of the offence. 4. Now, the expression "take cognizance" has not been defined. When the Magistrate on receiving a complaint applies his mind for proceeding under sections 200 and 203, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence winhin the meaning of section 190(1)(a). If he takes action of some other kind, such as, issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation or ordering investigation by the police under section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Cognizance is taken upon complaint when process is issued, but to restricted interpretation can be given to the phrase. If he takes action of some other kind, such as, issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation or ordering investigation by the police under section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Cognizance is taken upon complaint when process is issued, but to restricted interpretation can be given to the phrase. On this point, we may refer to the decision made by the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshinaryana Reddy and others, Appellants v. V. Narayana Reddy and others, Respondents, AIR 1976 S. C. 1672. 5. In the above case, it was torsely held as follows ; "The expression taking cognizance of an offence by the Mag­istrate has not been defined in the Code. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in Clause (a), (b) and (c) of section 190 (1). Whether the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstan­ces of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the prelim­inary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speak­ing when on receiving complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under section 200 and su­cceeding section in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken cognizance of offence within the meaning of sec­tion 190 (1) (a). If instead of proceeding under Chapter IX has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kinds such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation or ordering investigation by the police under section 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cogni­zance of any offence." 5. In the same case it was also held as follows :- "The power to order police investigation under section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at diff­erent stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post cognizance stage where the Magis­trate is in seisin of the Code. The two operate in distinct spheres at diff­erent stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post cognizance stage where the Magis­trate is in seisin of the Code. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable off­ence, the power under section 156 (3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he taken cognizance of the offence under section 190 (1) (a)." In the case of Nirmaljit Singh Hoon, Appellant vs. The State of West Bengal and others, Respondents, AIR 1972 S.C. 2639 , it was also held that where a Magistrate has applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under section 156(3) or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 6. Now, the allegation of the complainant is that her husband was killed by the present petitioner and some others and, therefore, the complaint petition discloses that the offence was of exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The complainant was not at all examined under section 200 Cr. P. C. Instead of examining him under section 200 Cr. P. C., the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order directing the officer-in-charge of Chandel Police Station for investigation even though the complaint discloses an offence which is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. In fact, the Magist­rate, after hearing the complaint though his counsel, was satisfied that the matter required investigation and, therefore, he passed an order directing the Officer-in-Charge of the Chandel Police Station to investigate the matter. Therefore, I take it that the learned Magistrate had applied his mind only for ordering investigation un­der section 156 (3) and that he had never taken cognizance of the case. Hence, I have been persuaded irresistibly to held that the leaned Magistrate did not commit any irregularity or illegality in pas­sing the impugned order. For those reasons, the revision has no force and it is, there­fore, dismissed.