JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner prays for quashing the letter dated 31-10-1987 demanding a sum of Rs. 89,920.30 being 25% of the difference between the premium paid and the market value of the shop room at the time of sale as envisaged by condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed as prescribed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (for short 'the NOIDA'). 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner was granted lease of shop room no. 3, Block D Section 18 by the NOIDA, condition no 5 of the lease- deed is as follows "5 (i) The lease may sublet the shop room but he will not be entitled to transfer the lease hold rights in the shop room without prior permission of the Chief Executive Officer of the Lessor and subject to such conditions as 'Chief Executive Officer' may impose. (ii) In the case of transfer of leasehold rights in the shop room by the lessee 25% of the difference between the premium paid and the market value of the shop room at the time of the sale shall be paid by the lessee of lessor. The decision of the Chief Executive Officer in respect of Market value shall be final, conclusive and binding on the lessee. Explanation : The expression Market value in the para means the premium that may be obtained the event of auction of the shop room on the date of such transfer." On 26th August, 1986, the petitioner moved an application to the Chief Executive Officer NOIDA seeking his permission for the transfer of the aforesaid shop soom in favour of one Sri R. P. Sharma, which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. As the said application was not accompanied with a draft of Rs. 100/- required as per condition of the lease-deed, the petitioner obtained a draft of Rs. 100/.- and made another application on 28-8-1986 to the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA, such application and the draft are Annexures "2" and "3" respectively to the petition. The application (Annexure "2") was not disposed of by the respondents for quite sometime and then the petitioner sent a reminder on 21-7-1987 which is Annexure "5" to the writ petition. By that time the validity period of the draft dated 28th August. The application (Annexure "2") was not disposed of by the respondents for quite sometime and then the petitioner sent a reminder on 21-7-1987 which is Annexure "5" to the writ petition. By that time the validity period of the draft dated 28th August. 1986, had expired and the same was got re-validated by the petitioner, which is Annexure "6" to the writ petition. By letter dated 18th September, 1987, the respondent demanded a sum of Rs. 89,920.30 being 25 per cent difference of the premium and the market value of the shop on the date of sale. The demand was reiterated in letter dated 31-10-1987 (Annexure "7" to the writ petition) by NOIDA and it is this letter which is sought to be quashed by the petitioner. The averment of the petitioner is that the respondent has not disclosed the basis and the date with reference to which market value has been calculated by the respondent in view of condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed. In paragraph 20 of the petition, it is averred that the impugned demand is illegal and arbitrary. In paragraph 21 of the petition, the petitioner contends that the market value of the shop should have been determined with reference to the date of her application made to the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA, for seeking permission to make transfer. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that a valid application with a draft of Rs 100/- had been made on 28-8-1986 and that the respondent raised the demand on 18-9-1987, i.e. after more than a year, and such delay is wholly ascribed to the respondent What is contended is that if the market value were determined immediately after receipt of the petitioner's application, then the demand would have been much less than that raised beyond a year. It is also contended in paragraph 25 by the petitioner that the market value of similar property on the date of application was Rs. 5,500/- per square meter, but as per the demand raised by the respondents, the market value comes to Rs. 13,000/- per square meter. According to the petitioner, the increase in the market value is due to delay caused by the respondent in determining the market value, for raising the demand of difference within the meaning of condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed. 4. 13,000/- per square meter. According to the petitioner, the increase in the market value is due to delay caused by the respondent in determining the market value, for raising the demand of difference within the meaning of condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed. 4. The respondent in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit contended that the market value was determined strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease-deed and that the decision of the Chief Executive Officer is final in this regard. The controversy involved in this writ petition revolves round the interpretation of the phrase : "The market value of the shop room at the time of sale" occurring in condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed as reproduced 5. The short question for consideration is as to which is the relevant date for determining the market value of the property for the purposes of computing 25% difference as envisaged by condition 5 (ii). Is the respondent free to consider the petitioner's application made for seeking permission at any time and to determine the market value after considerable lapse of time ? it is a matter of common knowledge that by lapse of time, the market value of the immovable property goes up. So more the delay in disposal of the petitioner's application, more would be the increase in the market value of the property. If condition 5 (ii) is 'construed in a manner giving more and more latitude to the respondent to determine the market value any time at its will, then undoubtedly the lessee, who proposes to transfer the shop room, would be burdened more, in so far as the payment of 25% of the difference is concerned. The only harmonious interpretation of condition no. 5 (ii) is that the application made by the lessee for seeking permission should be disposed of by the respondent within a reasonable time from the date of its receipt, so that the lessee may not be required to pay more difference on account of considerable increase in the market value due to lapse of time. In this case the petitioner made proper application with a draft of Rs. 100/- on 28-8-1986 and if it had been considered by the respondent within the reasonable time, then the petitioner would have been saved from the increase resulting from the belated consideration of the application. In this case the petitioner made proper application with a draft of Rs. 100/- on 28-8-1986 and if it had been considered by the respondent within the reasonable time, then the petitioner would have been saved from the increase resulting from the belated consideration of the application. No time limit has been prescribed in the lease-deed for considering such application. Cardinal principle of law is that when no time is prescribed, reasonable time may be determined by the court. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we think a months' time would have been very reasonable for the respondent to consider such application. Putting the harmonious construction on the condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed, we are of the view that the petitioner's application dated 28 - 8-1986 should have been considered by the respondent within a month and the market value as obtaining then or in the near proximity of time should have been determined. Any other construction of condition 5 (ii) will lead to injustice. Though not argued, but may be argued, that the petitioner may also delay the actual sale after obtaining permission and there by may recover such higher price from the buyer than the market value as determined by the respondent at the time of according permission. Condition no. 5 (i) of the lease-deed takes care of the situation, inasmuch as it states that permission by the Chief Executive Officer would be subject to such conditions as the Chief Executive Officer may impose. So, while according permission the Chief Executive Officer may impose a condition that the sale would be affected by the lessee within a reasonable time from the date of permission and, therefore, there is no chance for the petitioner to exploit or misuse the permission granted by the Chief Executive Officer. 6. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent is that under clause 5 (ii) the market value would be taken as obtaining at the time of sale. A combined reading of conditions 5 (i) and 5 (ii) clearly shows that non-transfer can be made by the lessee, unless permission is obtained from the Chief Executive Officer. It means the permission would always precede the actual sale and, therefore, the respondent cannot successfully argue that the market value would be taken as obtaining on the date of sale. A combined reading of conditions 5 (i) and 5 (ii) clearly shows that non-transfer can be made by the lessee, unless permission is obtained from the Chief Executive Officer. It means the permission would always precede the actual sale and, therefore, the respondent cannot successfully argue that the market value would be taken as obtaining on the date of sale. In any case the market value will have to be determined before the actual sale is effected when the application is presented by the lessee for seeking permission. It also appears from the terms and conditions of the lease-deed that no permission can be obtained by the lessee in the absence of any negotiations of sale The application for permission may be made by a lessee only when the negotiations are finalised, but before the actual sale, because any sale made without permission would entail serious consequences, as stated in the last paragraph Of the Explanation to sub-condition (ii) of condition 5, which states that In the event of transfer being made without obtaining previous permission of the Chief Executive Officer such transfer shall not be recognised by the authority and it shall be open to the authority to cancel the allotment and resume the possession of the shop room without any compensation. For the reasons, we accept the contention of the petitioner that condition 5 (ii) of the lease-deed enjoins upon the respondents to consider the petitioner's application within a reasonable time, say within a month, from 28-8-1986, when the proper application (Annexure "2") was made with the draft of Rs. 100/ (Annexure "3"). It is note-worthy that the respondent has not disclosed the date with reference to which market value was determined. There is no averment in the counter-affidavit that the market value, on the basis of which 25 per cent was worked out, obtained at the time when the application (Annexure "2") to the petition was made by the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned letter dated 31-10-1987 (Annexure "7" to the writ petition) deserves to be quashed. 10 In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the letter dated 31-10- 1987 (Annexure 7" to the writ petition, calling upon the petitioner to pay Rs. Therefore, the impugned letter dated 31-10-1987 (Annexure "7" to the writ petition) deserves to be quashed. 10 In the result, the writ petition is allowed, the letter dated 31-10- 1987 (Annexure 7" to the writ petition, calling upon the petitioner to pay Rs. 89,920.30 p. representing the 25 per cent difference of the premium and the market value on the date of sale is quashed and the respondent is directed to redetermine the market value afresh in accordance with law considering the market value as obtaining in the near proximity of time when the application (Annexure "2" to the writ petition) was made. Petition allowed.