JUDGMENT M.L. Bhat, J. - The order of the respondent No. 2 dated 2.7.1990 confirming the order of stay granted by him exparte on 13.6.1990 is challenged in this writ petition. The impugned order is said to be without jurisdiction and bad in law. To appreciate the controversy it is necessary to live a brief resume of facts. 2. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 along with 25 others were candidates for the office of Sabhasad of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad in the same Constituency, namely, the constituency of Ward No. 4, which is a double member constituency. The respondent No. 1 and one Sri Bhakt Ram were declared elected on 31.7.1989. The election of the respondent No. 1 was challenged through the medium of an election petition presented before the District Judge, Allahabad in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, hereinafter called 'the Act'. The election petition was transferred by the District Judge to the court of the respondent No. 2 who by his order dated 31-5-90 held the election of the respondent No. 1 void and declared the petitioner to have been elected as a member of the said Constituency. The said order is said to have taken effect on 1.6.1990 in terms of section 77 of the Act. An appeal was filed against the said order before the High Court under Section 74 of the Act and an application for staying the operation of the order dated 31-5-1990 was also filed along with the appeal. This Court issued notice in the stay matter and the said appeal is still pending for disposal. 3. Thereafter another application seems to have been moved before this court, which was also ordered to be listed but no exparte stay order was granted. The respondent No. 1 thereafter seems to have filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC before the respondent No. 2 for setting aside the ex parte order dated 31-5-1990. On the day when the said application was filed the respondent No. 2 granted an exparte stay order staying the operation of the judgment dated 31-5-1990 passed by him. The petitioner appeared before him and the said order was confirmed by the respondent No. 2 on 2.7.1990, the effect of this order is that the declaration of the petitioner as a successful candidate is stayed. The petitioner appeared before him and the said order was confirmed by the respondent No. 2 on 2.7.1990, the effect of this order is that the declaration of the petitioner as a successful candidate is stayed. The decision on selection petition holding the election of the respondent No. 1 as void is also stayed. On the basis of the aforesaid grounds the petitioner has challenged that the order of stay passed by the respondent No. 2 is without jurisdiction, bad in law and has caused miscarriage of justice. 4. The election of a person can be questioned under the Act by moving an election petition to the District Judge exercising jurisdiction in the City of any one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 71 of the Act. The District Judge at the conclusion of the trial of the election petition is competent to pass any of the following orders : as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case: (a) dismissing the election petition ; or (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or (c) declaring the election of all or any of the resumed candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. 5. The grounds on which the election can be declared void are mentioned in Section 71 of the Act. An appeal against the order of the District Judge passed under Section 69 of the Act can be filed before the High Court within 30 days from date of the order. Sub-section (6) of Section 74 of the Act provides that where an appeal has been preferred against the order under clause (b) of Section 69,. the High Court may, on sufficient cause being shown, stay operation of the order appealed from and in such a case the order shall be deemed never to have taken effect under Section 77 of the Act and shall not take effect until the dismissal of the appeal. It may be mentioned here that the order passed under Section 69 of the Act takes effect on the day next following the day on which the same was pronounced. 6. It may be mentioned here that the order passed under Section 69 of the Act takes effect on the day next following the day on which the same was pronounced. 6. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the High Court, while exercising the power of appeal, has a limited power of issuing stay order, the respondent No. 2 has no power to issue stay order and entrain application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The High Court's power to grant stay is only limited to clause (b) of Section 69 of the Act. It has no power to grant stay order if the order is under clause (c) of Section 69 of the Act. Clause (c) empowers the District Judge to declare a candidate elected after declaring the election of the elected candidate void. The power of the respondent No. 2 to grant stay of his own order is, therefore, assailed on the round that he could not grant stay order when there is a declaration by him in respect of the petitioner as having been elected. It is further contended that the District Judge is not a Civil Court for the purpose of deciding election petition, therefore, he could not entertain an application for setting aside his own order, much less stay the operation of his own order. It is stated that the election petition was allowed by the respondent No. 2 thereafter he became functus officio. The High Court has power to issue stay order in Appeal, if filed within time, Since the High Court has refused to grant exparte stay order, therefore, stay order could not be granted, as a matter of course, by the respondent No. 2 staying the declaration in favour of the petitioner. 7. Reliance is placed on Rule 8 of the rules framed under the Act and it is contended that since the jurisdiction of the District Judge is limited and, therefore,he is not to act a Civil Court. 8. On the basis of Rule 9 of the rules framed under the Act Mr. 7. Reliance is placed on Rule 8 of the rules framed under the Act and it is contended that since the jurisdiction of the District Judge is limited and, therefore,he is not to act a Civil Court. 8. On the basis of Rule 9 of the rules framed under the Act Mr. Tripathi has submitted that the District Judge in an election petition has all the power of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and the respondent No. 2 had the power to pass interim order under Section 151 CPC which gives inherent power to the respondent No. 2 to secure the ends of justice. It is stated that the impugned order is only an interlocutory order, therefore, no writ petition lies. 9. Mr. Upadhaya appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the authority of this Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub Divisional Officer, Ghatampur and others, reported in AIR 1963, Allahabad 518. The finding is based on the proposition that the Sub-Divisional Officer has no power which is conferred upon Civil Court under Section 94 and 151 or under Order 39 CPC. There fore it cannot grant interim stay or injection. Reliance is also placed by him on the case of Tej Singh v. The District Judge, Saharanpur and another, reported in 1990 ALJ 106. This was case under the U.P. Kshetriya Samities (Election of Block Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1961. It was held therein that the Election Tribunal in exercise of its powers under Rules cannot grant any injunction or stay in an election petition presented under Rule 35. On the basis of Rule 40 of the aforesaid rules it was held that since the entire provisions of the CPC have not been applied, what is applied is the procedure of suits provided in the Code of the hearing of the petition to the extent it is not inconsistent with any provisions in the Act and rules. The application of CPC was limited, therefore, there was no power in the election Tribunal to grant injunction. Reference is also made lo the observation in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Ltd and others, reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1272. The application of CPC was limited, therefore, there was no power in the election Tribunal to grant injunction. Reference is also made lo the observation in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Ltd and others, reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1272. In paragraph 21 thereof it is held that while exercising the inherent power, the Court should overlook the statutory provision, which clearly indicates that injunction to restrain initiation of proceeding cannot be granted and it must be remembered that inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provisions. Even in an interlocutory order the Court has power to interfere if it causes gross injustice by illegal exercise of power of the authority. This is held in Raghbir Singh Gill v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Orissa and others, reported in AIR 1974 Orissa 103. 10. Mr. Tripathi has contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction initially to entertain the election petition because it was the District Judge alone, who could entertain the election petition. The High Court has the power to transfer the election petition form one District Judge to another under the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. The District Judge has no power to assign the matter in which it has to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. He refers to the definition of 'District Judge' as given in Section 2 (18) of the Act. It says that 'District Judge' includes an Additional District Judge to whom any function of the District Judge has been transferred under this Act. At the same time Mr. Tripathi has referred to Rule 9 which according to him empowers the District Judge to exercise all the powers of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. If that he so, the District Judge is within its power to transfer an election petition to the Additional District Judge. However, we refrain ourselves to express any opinion on this question because this question may come up for consideration in appeal and the respondent No. 2 may have to consider this argument while deciding the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. 11. As to whether the respondent No. 2 had the jurisdiction to try the election petition filed by the petitioner herein would solely depend on fact whether the District Judge could transfer the election petition to him for disposal. 11. As to whether the respondent No. 2 had the jurisdiction to try the election petition filed by the petitioner herein would solely depend on fact whether the District Judge could transfer the election petition to him for disposal. Since we are not going into that aspect of the case in this writ petition, therefore, it is not necessary for us to determine that issue. We have purposely refrained from expressing any opinion on the question for jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 to try the election petition or to pass any order therein or on any application which may have been filed before him either by the petitioner or by the respondent No. 1 in this petition the petitioner does not challenge specifically the proceeding pending before the respondent No. 2 of the instance of the respondent No. 1 The petitioner challenges only an inter-locutory order and not the entire proceedings. Therefore, if we express any opinion on the validity or otherwise of the proceedings now pending before the respondent No. 2 that may prejudge the case of one party or the other. We only are going to determine about the validity or otherwise of the impugned order which, though inter locustory, has some implications for the partner and the respondent No. 1. 12. Another reason why we do not wish to enter into the controversy regarding the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 is because the High court in its appellate jurisdiction under the Act will have to consider the question of jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 while deciding the main election petition. Any order passed in thus writ petition is likely to preempt the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction to consider the question of jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2. 13. Mr. Tripathi has submitted that the respondent No. 2 is Civil Court, therefore, it can under its inherent powers pass any order which can prevent miscarriage of justice or which, in the opinion of the Court, any be required to be passed to secure the ends of justice. According to him the respondent No. 2 can exercise powers under Section 151 CPC and the impugned order passed by him is valid. According to him the respondent No. 2 can exercise powers under Section 151 CPC and the impugned order passed by him is valid. He relies on the celebrated authority of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal, reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 in support of his contention. The Supreme Court has held that if a case is not covered by Order 39 Rule 1 or 2 CPC the Court can still grant injection under its inherent powers. Mr. Tripathi wanted to take us to the merits of the case of the respondent No. 1 as to why it was necessary for the respondent No. 2 to pass the impugned order. However, we are not going into the merits of the decision given in the main election petition. That decision is not the subject matter of this writ petition nor do we want to make comment on any question which in other proceedings is pending before the High Court. But his contention was that the decision given by the respondent No. 2 in the election petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent No. 1 is liable to be set aside because it suffers from some patent legal infirmities. As stated, we do not want to enter into the factual controversy about the validity or other wise of the order given by the respondent No. 2 in the main election petition. 14. Mr. Tripathi has also relied on an unreported judgement of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 25.1.1990 in writ petition No. 20870 of 1990. A bunch of petitions arising under the U.P. Kshetriya Samilis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 was decided by this judgment. The controversy in those petitioners was about the representative character of one Rachhpal Singh of Cooperative Society known as Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti. The contention was that the said person was not qualified to be a member of the Kshetriya Samiti. Therefore, he could not be a representative from the Cooperative Society in the Samiti. He was said to B.A. imposter and his representation was said lo be actuated by fraud. A dispute was raised in an election petition under Section 14 (2) of the U.P. Kshetriya Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 and it was averred that the said Rachhpal Singh was not even a member of the Kshetriya Samiti. He was said to B.A. imposter and his representation was said lo be actuated by fraud. A dispute was raised in an election petition under Section 14 (2) of the U.P. Kshetriya Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 and it was averred that the said Rachhpal Singh was not even a member of the Kshetriya Samiti. The District Judge granted an interim injunction restraining the said Rachhpal Singh and 15 coopted members from participating in the election of the senior and junior Pramukhs. The affected persons challenged the order of the District Judge in the writ petitions, which were decided by the aforesaid judgement. In the writ petitions among other arguments it was argued that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to pass an ad interim order. The learned Single Judge repelling this argument held that the District Judge had passed the restraint order under sub-Section (1-A) of Section 7 of the U.P. Kshetriya Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 and not under Order 39 Rule 2 CPC. The reason tor issuing the order was that 'in case of falsehood and fraud by a party to litigation any Court has power inherent to protect itself and further stall the perpetuation of fraud'. 15. The learned Single Judge seems to have noticed some fraud having been perpetuated by the said Rachhpal Singh which was prevented from being carried forward by the restrain order and held that the District Judge had inherent power to stop perpetuation of fraud. We do not dispute this proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge. In fact it is the duty of every Court or authority to stall the perpetuation of fraud, whenever it comes to its notice, by passing such orders which may be required to be passed because if a Court or authority shuts its eyes to a glaring fraud and allows the fraud to continue that may shake the faith of the public in the Administration of Justice. 16. This authority cannot help the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as we have not noticed any fraud in this case. On a given set of facts its seems to have been necessary to issue a restraint order by the District Judge to prevent perpetuation of fraud and the High Court was right by saying that on the facts and circumstances of that case the order of the District Judge was justified. 17. On a given set of facts its seems to have been necessary to issue a restraint order by the District Judge to prevent perpetuation of fraud and the High Court was right by saying that on the facts and circumstances of that case the order of the District Judge was justified. 17. We are faced with some different problems in this case. The Jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 to pass any order is yet to be decided. Assuming that he has the jurisdiction to decide the matter, the question still would arise whether he could pass an interim order of the nature which is assailed in this petition. The determination of the question of jurisdiction is not free from difficulty. It is not a case where one can without going into that question consider the validity or otherwise of the impugned order. As stated by us, we would not pronounce on the jurisdiction of the authority which has passed the impugned order. The law on this point is very clear, if an objection is raised regarding the jurisdiction of a statutory Tribunal or a Court, that question is to be decided by the authority or Court itself. Therefore, it is the respondent No. 2, who was to decide its own jurisdiction. It is now well settled that every Court has power to decide its own jurisdiction, although as a result of its enquiry it may turn out that it has no jurisdiction to try or hear a matter brought before it. This principal has received judicial recognition. (See M/s Bhatia Cooperative Society v. D.C. Patel, reported in AIR 1953 SC 16 ). 18. The existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction are two separate matters. If a Tribunal or Court acts without jurisdiction its decision may fall for want of patent jurisdiction. If a Tribunal or Court has jurisdiction but the same is not properly exercised, which affects it decision, it cannot be said to be a case of lack of patent jurisdiction. The existence of jurisdiction is not to depend on the correctness of the decision given by a Tribunal or Court. 19. The question of the jurisdiction of respondent No. 2 has arisen because of its constitution and character It is empowered to exercise all powers of a Civil Court by legal fiction, which is contained in Rule 9 of the rules framed under the Act. 19. The question of the jurisdiction of respondent No. 2 has arisen because of its constitution and character It is empowered to exercise all powers of a Civil Court by legal fiction, which is contained in Rule 9 of the rules framed under the Act. A meaning is to be given to the expression' the District Judge shall have all the powers of Civil Court in trying an election petition' appearing in Rule 9 of the rules. This expression could be explained by us had the petitioner challenged the entire proceedings pending before the respondent No. 2 in the present writ petition. We are not, therefore, called upon to consider the validity or otherwise of the proceedings pending before the respondent No. 2 on account of his jurisdiction or lack of it. The petitioner has only challenged the interim order whereby the respondent No. 2 has stayed his own order under Section 69 (c) of the Act. 20. In a proceeding of this nature the Tribunal has first to decide its jurisdiction and then to arrogate to itself power to deal with the proceeding. The Tribunal may pass any incidental or auxiliary order which may serve the ends of justice but before assuming jurisdiction it appears doubtful as to whether tribunal can pass an order of interim stay which has the effect of suspending its own order. 21. Where a jurisdictional question is disputed before a Tribunal, the Tribunal must necessarily decide it. If it refuses to do so, it has wrongfully declined the jurisdiction and the Court will order it to act properly. If a Tribunal decides its own jurisdiction, the decision is not conclusive and such a decision is always subject to judicial review. 22. De Smith in his book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, IV Edition, explains the meaning of 'jurisdiction'. It says 'jurisdiction' means the authority to decide. Whenever a Tribunal is empowered or required to go into a question of law and fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally on an application for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. The author states that 'it a matter is decided even wrongly by a Court which has jurisdiction, it will not be called a jurisdictional error. The author states that 'it a matter is decided even wrongly by a Court which has jurisdiction, it will not be called a jurisdictional error. 'The author further states that' in so far as the question of Tribunals jurisdiction is conceived of as being determinable at the commencement and not at all the conclusion of the enquiry it is to be expected that the matters relating to the existence or otherwise.of jurisdiction in a Tribunal be treated as preliminary." the matters relating to jurisdiction to be determined for finding out whether tire Tribunal has jurisdiction or not may pertain to a number of things such as constitution of the Tribunal, validity of the proceedings before it etc. etc. 23. If a Tribunal determines a question without addressing itself to an essential issue, it is then said to have acted without jurisdiction. 24. In the present case it was, therefore, necessary for the respondent No. 2 to consider the question of its jurisdiction over the matter and thereafter entertain the petition which was purportedly filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC before it by the respondent No. 1. Whether he could entertain such an application that should have been decided by him first and thereafter he could pass any ancillary order. If it transpires at a later stage that he has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter it may amount to usurpation of jurisdiction i.e. the same as declining to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, the condition precedent for issuing any order in the proceeding was determination of the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 in the first instance, which he could determine himself. Since he has not done so, therefore, in our opinion, the interim order staying his own judgment under Section 69 (c) of the Act is bad in law and can be termed as without jurisdiction. The jurisdiction could be assumed by the respondent No. 2 after he had determined the question of jurisdiction in accordance with law. In the appeal filed before the High Court, the High Court did not pass any stay order ex parte. It seems to have chosen to hear the parties concerned. Therefore, notice was issued in the stay matter also. High Court's power to issue stay is confined to such cases which are decided under Section 69 (b) of the Act. It is a limitation imposed by statute. 25. It seems to have chosen to hear the parties concerned. Therefore, notice was issued in the stay matter also. High Court's power to issue stay is confined to such cases which are decided under Section 69 (b) of the Act. It is a limitation imposed by statute. 25. After the filing of appeal in the High Court could a Tribunal pass an order of interim nature which the High Court had not passed without hearing the parties. As stated earlier, the Tribunal had become functus officio and the order passed by it on 31-5-1990 was given effect to from 1.6.1990 in terms of Section 77 of the Act. If the order was already given effect to could the Tribunal make it ineffective by interim order passed by the Tribunal exparte and confirmed on 2.7.1990. So the first thin to be ascertained by the Tribunal was whether the order had taken effect or not under Section 77 of the Act. If it had taken effect it could not stay anything. 26. If the High Court in appeal passes an order of stay in cases coming within the purview of Section 69 (b) of the Act the rigour of Section 77 is diluted. Under Section 74 (6) of the Act it is provided that if stay is granted and the operation of the order is stayed, the order under appeals deemed never to have taken effect under Section 77 of the Act and shall not take effect until the dismissal of the appeal . With the grant of stay the operation of Section 77 is also postponed. It cannot be said that the operation of the order is stayed by filing an application under order 9 Rule 13 CPC. even if it is assumed that such an application is maintainable and congnizable by the respondent No. 2 The Tribunal has, there fore, postponed the effect of Section 77 of the Act without having any authority vested in him to do so. 27. For the reasons stated above, we arc of the opinion that this writ petition must be allowed and the order of the Tribunal staying the operation of its judgment dated 31-5-1990 requires to be quashed.The said order is passed in violation of law and is rendered bad. 28. The result is that the writ petition is allowed. 27. For the reasons stated above, we arc of the opinion that this writ petition must be allowed and the order of the Tribunal staying the operation of its judgment dated 31-5-1990 requires to be quashed.The said order is passed in violation of law and is rendered bad. 28. The result is that the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 2.7.1990 where by the order dated 31-5-1990 is confirmed by the Respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed. It is further directed that the respondent No. 2 now will address itself to the main controversy and determine its own jurisdiction to deal with the matter after affording reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard.