A Ragbuvir, C.J.— The writ petitioners unsuccessfully sought admission in Medical Colleges of Assam or the Regional Dental College of North East Council. The three were also unsuccessful in an administrative appeal before the State Government. They have now approached this Court for a direction to the Medical Selection Board to admit the three petitioners for the 1989-90 Session of the Medical Course. The facts leading to the three cases are common and fall in a very narrow compass. The facts are as follows : ' On July 7, 1989 Rules regulating admission of students to M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. Courses were promulgated by the Assam State Government. The earlier Rules of 1974 were repealed from July 10, 1989. On July 11 in Assamese newspaper and in English newspapers an advertise­ment appeared inviting application for the Session of 1989-90 Courses. The three petitioners applied for one seat each out of six seats reserved under sub-clause (i) of Rule 8 for the children of working or retired doctors. The Selection Board held a written test on September 30. A viva voce was conducted on December 17, A select list was published on December 23 in which only three candidates with Hall Ticket Nos. 1062, 6893 and 6899 were shown selected. The three petitioners were not shown in the list of selected candidates because the Government had reduced six seats to three seats for the children of the doctors. The three petitioners learnt that after the advertisements appeared in the newspapers the Service Associations in the Health Department and other Service Associations in other departments protested before .the State Government as regards reservation of six seats for the children of doctors. The Secretary to the Health Department on August 10 thereupon moved and the Cabinet of the State Govern­ment reconsidered the issue thereafter. Either on August Moron November 17 the reservation under clause (i) of Rule 8 was reduced to three seats. At the outset we may mention this Court is not considering whether a reservation should or should not have been made for the children of the doctors. Reservation for any category of person raises a controversial issue and no wonder the Service Associations protested when six seats were made under clause (i) of Rule 8. In the Constitution of India reservations are contemplated for students and for employment under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Reservation for any category of person raises a controversial issue and no wonder the Service Associations protested when six seats were made under clause (i) of Rule 8. In the Constitution of India reservations are contemplated for students and for employment under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Unlike in other States in Assam there is a statute-The Assam Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Reservations of Vacancies in Services and Posts Act XII of 1959 in that reservations are specified as service conditions. Reservations for services are made under Article 309 of the Constitution. Besides statutory instruments sometimes reservations are specified to benefit backward classes to enable them more of the State welfare measures. In the 1989 Rules of Medical Colleges reservation is made for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes (Plains), Scheduled Tribes (Hills). Reservation is made for sons and daughters of defence personnel. There is a reservation quota for the children of tea garden and ex-tea garden communities. The O. B. C. / M. O. B. C. have their quota of reservation. There is reservation made for brothers, sisters, sons and daughters of the martyrs of Assam movement. When reservations are made for such a variety of classes under the Con­stitution, under the statute and under the executive instructions it may not be incorrect to state that the general public are vitally interested to know for whom the reservation is made. What is the percentage or quota reserved for each of the classes. See the case of Balaji vs. The State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 . In that case it was held all reservations in educational institutions cannot exceeded half of the seats. As to how in welfare measures reserva­tions are made-see the case of Rukma Moran vs. Assam Board of Revenue, (1989 ) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 379 ( 1989 (1) GLJ 14) These aspects are recounted to show that the general public are inte­rested to know for whom the reservation is made and what percentage is allocated for what category of persons. In view of these necessities reservations rules and decisions affecting the reservations are given wide publicity in the press and in other media besides the publication in the State and District Gazettes. In the instant case the 1989 Rules for Admission to Medical Colleges were published on July 10, 1989 in the State Gazette and in the press. In view of these necessities reservations rules and decisions affecting the reservations are given wide publicity in the press and in other media besides the publication in the State and District Gazettes. In the instant case the 1989 Rules for Admission to Medical Colleges were published on July 10, 1989 in the State Gazette and in the press. But the decision to reduce six seats to three seats was not published either in the Gazette or in the press. In such a state of record whether the Selection Board was obliged~ to select six candidates is the issue raised by the three petitioners. In resisting the issue the State Government does not contend that the decision should not be published. Their contention is the non-publication either in the Gazette or in the press does not take away the efficacy of the decision or make the decision void in law. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the conten­tion referred to a case in AIR 1951 SC 467 , Harla vs. The State of Rajasthan where the issue was sustain ability of conviction under Jaipur Opium Act, 1924 when Jaipur was a princely State. The Opium Act, 1924 was not published in violation of a law in Jaipur. That law required all enactments to be published in the Gazette. The Court explained not to publish the statutes and enforce them was against natural justice. It was emphasised citizens can not be punished under a law, which is not made known to the general public. The liberty of citizens cannot be jeopardised by the provi­sions of law which are not published. The State it was held before enforcing any law should broadcast the enactment in the recognisable way so that all affected persons may act according to law. That a decision reached in secret recesses of chamber (as in the instant decision of the Cabinet wherein reservation of six is reduced to three ) to which the public have no access and decisions in such chambers should affect liberty, lives and property of the citizens was held 'abhorrent' and shocks the conscience of civilised men. In this case the State Government hardly suggested any defence for not publishing the decision under which reservation of six seats was reduced to three seats. In this case the State Government hardly suggested any defence for not publishing the decision under which reservation of six seats was reduced to three seats. The petitioners also relied on a more recent case- (1987) 1 SCC 658 , B K. Srinivasan vs. State of Karnataka wherein an Indian innovation (at page 669) is evolved as a principle in interpretation of statutes referred as Ganga Clause or Ganges Clause. The water of River Ganges in Aryan civilisation cleanse the sins of the beli­evers. The belief was referred for validating proceedings. In the above case a Karnataka enactment all steps required for publication were not followed. The issue arose when a development plan of Bangalore city was not properly published in a Gazette notification. The Statute prescribed the development plan was to be published instead the plan was displayed and a copy of the plan was made available for inspection to all concerned at the concerned offices. In the Gazette the plan was not published as required under the Act. But there was a Gazette notification in that the availability of the plan was indicated. The complaint in the case was plan was not published in the Gazette. What was indicated in the Gazette was not publication of the plan, therefore the statutory requirement was not complied. The Supreme Court held the law was not fully complied with. There was deficiency in publication of the plan. In that connection Ganges Clause was referred to have validated the proceedings. The Ganges Clause thus came to be innovated. The non-publication of the plan in the strict sense was a curable defect and that defect the Supreme Court held stood validated. That case also elucidated as to how a delegated authority is to publish the rules. But that aspect is not relevant in the instant case. In the Jaipur case it was pointed out that the modes of publication vary from country to country. What is good in one case it was pointed out is not best in another circumstance. What is valid in Scotland was shown not good enough in England and Wales. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the writ petitions relied on two more decisions of the Supreme Court. One among the two is AIR 1983 SC 1143 , A. A. Calton vs. The Director of Education. What is valid in Scotland was shown not good enough in England and Wales. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the writ petitions relied on two more decisions of the Supreme Court. One among the two is AIR 1983 SC 1143 , A. A. Calton vs. The Director of Education. The ratio in that case is too remote therefore we do not analyse the case but the second case AIR 1983 SC 1199 , Or. Vinay Rampal vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir supports the petitioners on all fours. The second case related to the admission of Post Graduate Course in Jammu. A notification No. 4 of 1981 was published in the press and applications were invited by the Jammu & Kashmir Govt. The terms of the published notification were found at variance with a Government order of the State which was not published on March 23, 1979. Notwithstanding the variance the State Govt. was held bound by what they have advertised and the student candidate was accorded a seat in the Medical College. If what was not published in the press is held to have prevailed the student could not have been accorded the seat. The learned counsel for the petitioners next invoked the principle of promissory estoppel for application to the facts of the case. The learned Senior Government Advocate argued rather vehemently that the doctrine (for short we refer promissory estoppel in these cases as the doctrine) has no application at all. The doctrine the learned counsel argued cannot be applied. The petitioners can draw no advantage from the principle from the doctrine on the facts of the case. We wish to elaborate the argument of the State Government before we consider the implication of the argument advanced in this regard. It is argued the petitioners would have appeared for the written test and viva voce whether seats reserved were six or three, for that matter the petitioners would have appeared for the tests even no reservation was made under Rule 8. This is focused to hold the State Government made no promise or assurance and the petitioners have not at all acted to their detriment or prejudice. It is pointed out six out of total 292 seats were res­erved for the children of the doctors which works out to two percent. This is focused to hold the State Government made no promise or assurance and the petitioners have not at all acted to their detriment or prejudice. It is pointed out six out of total 292 seats were res­erved for the children of the doctors which works out to two percent. When protests from the public were received the Government rea­lised two percent of total seats for the children of the doctors was not warranted therefore reduced the reservation to one percent. Such a decision was taken before the written test was held. Stressing these aspects the State Government argued it is against the public interest now to revert to two percent and if such a course is ordered it would be inequitable for all the 292 seats by this date are filled up. Further it is contended adoption of such a course would prej­udice the "merit students”. This is explained as in sequel the merit students have to make room for the petitioners. Besides it is argued 1989-90 Session commenced in January, 1990. This Court did not direct seats to be kept vacant. To accommodate the petitioners three seats are to be added which in turn requires sanction of the Medical Council. Based on these factors it is pointed out if seats, are increased the Medical Colleges might get derecognised at the hands of the Medical Council. Before we deal these aspects or factors we may review some of the relevant decisions to find out whether the principle of promissory estoppel can be applied to the facts of the case. We have advisedly restricted this review to Indian cases. The earliest of Indian cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel was applied is found in a Calcutta and a Bombay case (1880) 1LR 5 Calcutta 669, Ganges Mfg. Co. vs. Surajmull and (1905) ILR 29 Bombay 680, The City of Bombay vs. Secretary of State for India. In the Bombay case the Judges searched for a name to christen the doctrine. Having failed in the search the doctrine remained without a name for decades. The two High Courts however held the doctrine if accepted will be a facet of estoppel. Speaking of the name for life doctrine the search is continuing to this date in the commonwealth countries. Sometimes the doctrine is called 'equitable estoppel'. Some call it 'quasi estoppel1, 'Denning's estoppel'. The two High Courts however held the doctrine if accepted will be a facet of estoppel. Speaking of the name for life doctrine the search is continuing to this date in the commonwealth countries. Sometimes the doctrine is called 'equitable estoppel'. Some call it 'quasi estoppel1, 'Denning's estoppel'. In Kenya it is called 'High Trees estoppel', because of the name of a case where the doctrine was extrapolated. In the Bombay and Calcutta cases the Government was ordered to carry out the promise made. The State cannot retract an assurance which was acted on by a citizen on the ground of expediency. These two cases are found reported earlier to the Constitution. The bare bones of this doctrine after the Constitution were formulated in AIR 1963 SC 1667 , Rai Ram Kishan vs. State of Bihar. In that case the doctrine did not emerge in full form. The facts show attempt was made to grapple with the doctrine. In the next case AIR 1968 SC 718 , Union of India vs. Anglo Afghan Agencies a citizen's rights under common law was highlighted. It was held the Government was not exempt to carry out its representation. The State cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly -made by it- The argument that executive necessity militates against the doctrine was not sustained. In AIR 1972 SC 1311 , Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ulhansnagar Municipal Council the Supreme Court held : Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry oat representations when concerned persons altered their position to their prejudice. In the case of AIR 1973 SC 2734 , Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. vs. Hunger for Investment Trust Ltd. the doctrine was held to be founded on equity. In AIR 1972 SC 1021, State of Kerala vs. G. R. Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co, a company purchased land on the representation that the State will not acquire the land for sixty years, if timber in the forest was used by the vendee for production of rayon cloth. Contrary to such a promise the land was acquired. The company did got succeed in invoking the doctrine in the Courts. (Wvg.) Co, a company purchased land on the representation that the State will not acquire the land for sixty years, if timber in the forest was used by the vendee for production of rayon cloth. Contrary to such a promise the land was acquired. The company did got succeed in invoking the doctrine in the Courts. The doctrine came out with a bang in AIR 1979 SC 621 , M. P. Sugar Mills vs. State of U. P. wherein it was held in our juris­prudence the Government is not exempt from the application of the doctrine. The Government it was held cannot on some unde­fined or undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency avoid the assurances made. It was proclaimed in high overtones for the information of all as though in a manner blowing a counch "high or low all are covered by the doctrine of promissory estoppel'. The doctrine proclaimed such "jurisprudence" is our constitutional democracy. In a reverberating voice the Court said : "Let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court" so saying the doctrine was incorporated as part of our legal culture. Soon thereafter in AIR 1980 SC 1285 . M/S. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar vs. State of Haryana, the doctrine suffered a serious set back. The doctrine was held not a good law. It was held the doctrine was not available against statutes and cannot prevent the State discharging statutory functions. When Government act within its province it was held the doctrine - can have no application. Thus the roots of the doctrine were shaken. The Court held that the contracts and covenants entered into by the Crown are not to be construed to exclude the exercise of powers for public good. The Crown cannot evade compliance of its obligations whenever it thinks fit. No estoppel' can operate or prohibit legitimate action of the Government. If these were the last words the doctrine would have gone by the Board. Fortunately in AIR 1986 SC 806 . Union of India vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. the doctrine re-entered the scene. In that case it was held the doctrine is founded on equity and the Government cannot resale from promises made. The rationales in the earlier cases was reaffirmed. There is a case 1983 Excise Law Times (Delhi) 1688, Jain Soon Vanaspatfai Ltd. & Anr. Union of India vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. the doctrine re-entered the scene. In that case it was held the doctrine is founded on equity and the Government cannot resale from promises made. The rationales in the earlier cases was reaffirmed. There is a case 1983 Excise Law Times (Delhi) 1688, Jain Soon Vanaspatfai Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & others wherein equity component of the doctrine was emphasised by the Court. The learned Government Advocate argued that the three peti­tioners have not suffered any prejudice and relied on the case AIR 1989 Orissa 120, Dr. Asfantosh Biswas vs. State of Orissa. The counsel pointed out after a provisional admission to a Medical College in that case the student was turned out of the College after he had resigned a Government post to pursue his studies. This circumstance was pointed out as an instance of sufferance of prejudice and for application of the doctrine. From the cases it is seen in the formative period of the doctrine the Supreme Court did speak of prejudice for application of the doctrine. In later days it was explained "damage, detriment or prejudice” is not necessary for invocation of the doctrine. In the case of (1988) 1 SCC 86 , Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court referred the Motilal case (1979) 2 SCC 409 where detriment or prejudice was explained to mean injustice and nothing else. It is hoped after this unequivocal explanation this argument will not resurface. Two cases of this Court require consideration. In the case (1987) 2 GLR 389, Bidhan Chandra Chakma vs. The Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, a Division Bench of this Court in para 12 held detriment is to be proved for the application of the doctrine. la another Division Bench case AIR 1989 Gauhati 12, Anchar Ali vs. State of Assam in para 9 this Court held prejudice must be shown before the doctrine is applied. In view of the decision in (1988) 1 SCC 86 the two cases are no more good law. In a third case, AIR 1990 Ganhatl 24, Joyjit Das vs. State of Assam which one of us (C. J.) is a party this Court did not allow to resile from its assurances. In this review of cases we have avoided reference to eases in United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries. In a third case, AIR 1990 Ganhatl 24, Joyjit Das vs. State of Assam which one of us (C. J.) is a party this Court did not allow to resile from its assurances. In this review of cases we have avoided reference to eases in United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries. The doctrine is not accepted even to-day in full measure in the United Kingdom. The doctrine to this day is condemned. See the Law Revision Committee 1945 and the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee. The House of Lords in a case held the doctrine is not coherent 1972 AC 741, Wood House Ltd. vs. Nizerjan Produce Ltd. The two Appeal Court Judges Sir George Russell in a case ridiculed the doctrine. Another Law Lord Backburn held the doctrine is founded on a " mistake". The High Trees case thus is still under "fire" ( Discipline in Law p. 222 Denning ). The further extrapolation of the subject in the context of foreign cases we feel is not necessary in view of the binding nature of the decisions of the Supreme Court. We hold the State Government assured six candidates will be selected from among the children of the doctors. That assurance w« hold it is a promise and the State can act be allowed to resile as based on that assurance candidates have had applied for admission to the medical colleges. In equity and the justice demands the State should not be allowed to resile from such an assurance. We may now consider other objections raised by the learned Government Advocate. One of the objections is the list was pub­lished in January therefore we should not order the students to be admitted" at such a late hour especially when this Court did not order to reserve three seats. We have been informed only in the second week of May the quota of students allotted to the Central Government were filled up therefore we see no ground to sustain the objection. The next objection that is canvassed is that if the petitioners are admitted three merit students will have to be displaced. This objection cannot hold water. The petitioners in their performance of written and viva voce tests acquired a right to enter the medical colleges ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy). The next objection that is canvassed is that if the petitioners are admitted three merit students will have to be displaced. This objection cannot hold water. The petitioners in their performance of written and viva voce tests acquired a right to enter the medical colleges ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy). The State therefore can create supernumerary three seats and avoid displacement of three merit students. The learned Government Advocate pointed out if seats are increased without the sanction of the Medical Council there is the danger of colleges being derecognised. Finally it is argued teacher student ratio will be disturbed if three seats are increased. We only remind ourselves that justice be done even if hell should bar the way. The Medical Council is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Such an authority will not derecognise Medical Colleges when justice is rendered by this Court to citizens. We are unable to hold any insurmountable difficulties will be faced (including the apprehension founded on teacher student ratio in a class) if three students are added to the total number of 292 students. We hereby order the State Government, Selection Board and the Principal of Medical Colleges to receive the three petitioners for 1989-90 Session of M. B. B. S. Course. The writ petitions are allowed with costs. Advocate's fee of Rs. 250/-in each case. The respondents prayed oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. No question of law of general importance is involved in the cases which is required to be considered by the Supreme Court. Oral leave therefore is rejected.