JUDGMENT V. K Mehrotra, J.—This appeal is directed against an order dated November 6, 1981 of Chief Justice Shri V, D. Misra in Contempt Petition (Civil) No 5 of 1981. The learned Chief Justice, after noticing the circumstances brought before him on the record said in his order of November 6, 1981, that : "I must hold that respondent No. 1 is guilty of having committed civil contempt of the court. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by him he is discharged. He is, however, directed to pay costs of this petition. Counsels fee Rs. 200. Sd/- Vyas Dev Miira, C. j.” 2. The present appellant, Shri Mohindra Lal, was the first respondent in Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 5 of 1981. 3. One of the questions agitated before us, when the appeal was taken up for hearing, was about the maintainability of appeal. It was said that, inasmuch as, the appellant had been discharged by the learned Chief Justice, the present appeal was not maintainable. The submission in this regard was founded upon some observations of the Supreme Court in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, (l988) 3 SCC :6. The decision of the Supreme Court was in regard to an appeal filed under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereafter, "the Act") by Teneja whose application for contempt filed against respondent Bhajan Lal, then the Chief Minister of the State, had been dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Taneja then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. 4. The Supreme Court said fin paragraph 8) that under section 19 (1) of the Act the right of appeal will be available only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. And, that— "……..It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. It further said (in paragraph 10) that: "……..Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution." 5. Relying upon the aforesaid observations, and in particular, upon the last sentence of the quotation from paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it was urged that in the present case the High Court did not impose any punishment upon appellant Mohindra Lal, but discharged the notice issued to him. As such, the High Court cannot be said to have exercised its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. Consequently, no appeal would lie against the order of the High Court under section 19 (1) of the Act which says that : "19. Appeals.(I) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt— (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Beach to the Supreme Court: Provided……………………..(emphasis supplied)". 6. 6. The observations of the Supreme Court must be understood in the background of the fact that the Punjab and Haryana High Court had dismissed the application of Taneja and discharged the rule nisi. It had done so, according to the Supreme Court, as — "the learned Single Judge of the High Court, after considering the application, affidavits and the submissions made on behalf of the parties, took the view that there were circumstances to indicate that it was not a fit case in which the court should exercise its jurisdiction under the Act " 7. It was not a case, like the present, where the alleged contemnor was held guilty of having committed civil contempt of the Court but was discharged in view of the unconditional apology tendered by him. In a case like the present, where a single Judge of the High Court has, after considering the material on record, found the alleged contemnor guilty of contempt but refrained from awarding punishment to him on being satisfied with the apology tendered by the contemnor, as provided in section 12 of the Act, an appeal under section 19 (1) would be maintainable. The order of the learned single Judge, in such a case, would be one made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Taneja would not be attracted in such a case. The stage for awarding punishment under section 12 would only arise in a case where a finding of guilt has been recorded against the alleged contemnor. Such a finding would, naturally, be recorded by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and not otherwise, When as in the case before the Supreme Court, the High Court takes the view that there were circumstances which indicated that the case was not a fit one in which the Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the Act, the position would naturally be entirely different. In such a case, as held by the Supreme Court, it could not be said that the High Court had passed the order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 12 (1) of the Act reads: "12. In such a case, as held by the Supreme Court, it could not be said that the High Court had passed the order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 12 (1) of the Act reads: "12. Punishment for contempt of Court.-—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Explanation—An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide." 8. It was urged, in support of the plea that an appeal will not lie, that the proviso contemplates discharge of an accused, on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court, as an alternative to punishment awarded to him being remitted which showed that the discharge of an accused was not treated to be a punishment. As such, the discharge of the accused albeit after recording a finding that he was guilty, by the High Court on acceptance of an apology made by him could not be treated to be an order made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- The submission cannot be upheld for. as said earlier, the stage of discharge of an accused under the proviso to section 12 (1) would only be reached after the High Court finds the alleged contemnor guilty of having committed such contempt of Court for which he deserved to be punished. A finding of this nature can only be recorded by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt The finding affects the right of a party aggrieved Such a finding would clearly be subject to an appeal under section 19 As said by the Supreme Court in Purshotam Dass Gael v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. 5. Justice B. 5. Dhillon and others AIR 1978 SC 1014, regarding the scope of section 19 (1) : "It would appear from a plain reading of the section that an appeal shall lie to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt……It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court, as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved ……" The Supreme Court was considering the question whether an order of issuance of notice by the High Court to the alleged contemnor was appealable under section 19. It held that mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. 9. We may notice what the Supreme Court said in Ram Partap Sharma and others v. Dava Nand and others, AIR 1977 SC 809, while reversing a decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in connection with the acceptance of an apology under the Act. It said (in paragraph 9 that: "…….The elementary basis of acceptance of apology is that there is to be a finding of committal of contempt" And, later in (paragraph 16) that : “We are of opinion that the Full Bench fell into the error of accepting the apology without finding that the appellants committed any contempt. In the absence of such a finding no question arises for acceptance of apology. 10. The law seems to be clear. The order of the learned Chief Justice in the present case was made by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The present appeal is, therefore, maintainable under section 19 (1). 11. The second question agitated before us was about the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned Chief Justice on its merits. It was urged that no contempt was committed by the appellant, and the view to the contrary, was not correct. 12. The present appeal is, therefore, maintainable under section 19 (1). 11. The second question agitated before us was about the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned Chief Justice on its merits. It was urged that no contempt was committed by the appellant, and the view to the contrary, was not correct. 12. What had happened was that by an order of September 27, 1972, the Revenue Assistant (Sub-Divisional Magistrate), Theog had made a grant of 10 bighas 15 biswas of land in favour of respondent Dr. Han Dav for horticulture purposes under Rule 16 of the H P. Nautor Land Rules, 1968, (for brief, "the Rules"). A sum of Rs 537,50 towards the price of land and Rs. 7,745.10 towards the price of the trees was to be deposited by the grantee. When he went to do so in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Shimila, an objection was raised by the Head Vernacular Clerk working in the office that Dr Hari Dev was not a resident of village Mandroli so that Nautor land could not have been granted in his favour. Dr. Hari Dev appeared before the Deputy Commissioner many a times but the amount was not permitted to be deposited nor was Patta issued in his favour under Rule 18. Civil Writ Petition No. 183 of 1974 was then filed by Dr. Hari Dev seeking a direction for deposit of the amount and issuance of the Patta. The petition was disposed of on May 30, 1975 by C R. Thakur, J , who held that Dr Hari Dev fulfilled the requirement of bonafide resident of village Mandroli in terms of Rule 3 (d) of the Rules. But, inasmuch as, these Rules were mere executive instructions, no enforceable right could be founded thereon by the petitioner The decision was challenged in Letters Patent Appeal No 44 of 1975 by Dr. Hari Dev. This appeal was decided by a Division Bench on December 6, 1978. The Bench, after referring to its earlier decision on similar matters, held that though the Nautor Rules were executive in nature, they had the force of law and a breach thereof would give a cause of action to a party. Hari Dev. This appeal was decided by a Division Bench on December 6, 1978. The Bench, after referring to its earlier decision on similar matters, held that though the Nautor Rules were executive in nature, they had the force of law and a breach thereof would give a cause of action to a party. The Bench also said that the definition of resident’ as brought in by an amendment on August 4, i969, requiring that a person can claim to be a resident only if he was residing in the concerned estate from generation to generation offended Article 14 of the Constitution. The Bench then said that: “….We allow this appeal and remand the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, to consider to question whether the appellant is covered by the definition of resident or not in the light of the observations made by us in the common judgment... .." 13. The common judgment is reported in ILR 1979 HP 35, Percy Chauhan v. State and another. Later, the matter was authoritatively decided by a Full Bench in Mangheru etc v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1982 HP 1. 14. Even though the direction aforesaid was made by the Division Bench in its decision on December 6, 1978, no action was taken thereon, according to Dr Hari Dev by the Deputy Commissioner. He, therefore, filed another Writ Petition, being C. W. P. No. 266 of 1979 (Hari Dev v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others. In it, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, was arrayed as respondent No 2 while the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was impleaded as respondent No. 3. The prayer that Dr. Hari Dev made in this petition was that the respondent Deputy Commissioner be directed to take a decision in accordance with the direction of the Division Bench dated December 6, 1978. 15. When the matter came up before the another Division Bench, a statement was made by the Advocate General before the Court that the matter would be decided as expeditiously as possible. In view of this statement the petition was not pressed by the Counsel for the petitioner and was dismissed as having become infructuous. 16. Dr. 15. When the matter came up before the another Division Bench, a statement was made by the Advocate General before the Court that the matter would be decided as expeditiously as possible. In view of this statement the petition was not pressed by the Counsel for the petitioner and was dismissed as having become infructuous. 16. Dr. Hari Dev says that inspite of the statement made by the Advocate General, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla procrastinated and did not take a decision in the matter, even though the Law Officer from the office of the Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh, had addressed a letter on November 7, 1979 itself to him to decide the matter within one month. Subsequently, after waiting for a long time, a letter dated November 25, 1980, was addressed by Dr. Hari Dev to the Chief Justice bringing to his notice the facts aforesaid and praying that he be rescued from the clutches of bureaucracy. 17. It appears from the reply filed in the contempt petition by the appellant that he assumed charge as Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, on May 22, 1980, whereafter the file relating to the case was put up before him for the first time on August 26, 1980. He directed that the petitioner Dr. Hari Dev be summoned for September 8, 1980. Meanwhile, a complaint dated May 18, 1^80, together with a resolution of the concerned Panchayat dated May 14, 1980, had been received from the residents of some villages on July 8, 1980, from the office of the Chief Minister, Himachal Pradesh for enquiry and report. The complaint was about wrong for sanction of land under the Special Nautor Scheme. He personally visited the area and made enquiries on the spot and found that the grant was not correct. He directed the Tehsildar, Kotkhai, to send a report to him after making enquiries. When the report was received, he asked the Tehsildar to place the file be fore him with a query whether the Nautor could be granted to the non residents. The reply further says that a confidential letter dated November 28, 1980, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, was received from the Deputy Registrar-cum-Secretary to the Chief Justice enquiring whether the matter had been decided in terms of the order of the High Court dated November 7, 1979, (December 6, 1978), or not. The reply further says that a confidential letter dated November 28, 1980, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, was received from the Deputy Registrar-cum-Secretary to the Chief Justice enquiring whether the matter had been decided in terms of the order of the High Court dated November 7, 1979, (December 6, 1978), or not. The appellant says that he marked this letter to the Head Vernacular Clerk on November 28, 1980 as "urgent but it was thereafter not put up before him. However, a reminder was received from the Deputy Registrar-cum-Secretary whereafter the necessary information was sent to him through letter dated December 29, 1980, saying that the case in question had been remanded to the Sub- Divisional Officer (C), Theog for considering the matter on the merit of the case. A copy of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on December 11, 1980 in that regard was also sent along with the letter dated December 29, 1980, to the Deputy Registrar-cum-Secretary to the Chief Justice. 18. The order dated December 11, 1980, details the antecedent facts and says, in the last paragraph, that : "In view of what has been stated above the impugned order vide which land has been granted to Dr. Hari Dev needs to be reviewed. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) Theog for considering the matter afresh on merit of the case. The order shall not be reversed in review without affording a reasonable opportunity to Dr. Hari Dev the grantee. However, it is directed that the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) may keep in mind the definition of the resident as spelled out by the Honble High Court be faithfully complied with." 19. It is after this order that Dr. Hari Dev filed a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act for dealing with the respondents, namely, Shri Mohindra Lal (Appellant), the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, and Shri M. C. Chauhan, S D. O. (C) Theog. The learned Chief Justice, as has been noticed earlier, passed an order on November 5, 1981, holding that the first respondent (appellant-Mohindra Lal) was guilty of having committed civil contempt of the Court. 20. The learned Chief Justice, as has been noticed earlier, passed an order on November 5, 1981, holding that the first respondent (appellant-Mohindra Lal) was guilty of having committed civil contempt of the Court. 20. It was urged with some emphasis by the learned Counsel, appearing for appellant-Mohindra Lai, that there was compliance with the order of this Court dated November 7, 1979, by the Deputy Commissioner when he passed the order dated December 11, 1980, remanding the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Theog, for considering the matter afresh on the merits of the case keeping in mind the definition of "resident" as held by the High Court By doing so, according to the learned Counsel, the appellant cannot be said to have committed contempt of this Court. We have noticed earlier the direction made by the Division Bench on December 6, 1978, in its judgment in L P. A. No. 44 of 1975. To recapitulate, this Court had asked the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla to consider the question whether the appellant (Dr. Hari Dev) is covered by the definition of resident or not in the light of the observation made by us in the common judgment……." The statement which the Advocate General made before another Division Bench, which decided the subsequent civil writ petition (C W. P. No 266 of 1979) filed by Dr. Hari Dev, was that the matter would be decided as expeditiously as possible. The petition was dismissed as infructuous on the basis of this statement. 21. The order dated December 6, 1978, was clear. All that the Deputy Commissioner was to do was to consider the question whether Dr. Hari Dev was covered by the definition of resident or not as laid down in the common judgment. Nothing more was to be done. Yet, what the Deputy Commissioner did was that instead of deciding the matter, as directed by this Court, he reopened the whole case and asked the Sub- Divisional Officer to decide it afresh. That too, after a lapse of consider able time from the date when the Advocate General had made a statement on his behalf that the matter would be decided expeditiously. The learned Chief Justice has, on these facts, held the appellant guilty of having committed civil contempt of this Court We feel, rightly so. That too, after a lapse of consider able time from the date when the Advocate General had made a statement on his behalf that the matter would be decided expeditiously. The learned Chief Justice has, on these facts, held the appellant guilty of having committed civil contempt of this Court We feel, rightly so. We agree with the learned Chief Justice that the reason given by the appellant for not deciding the question referred to him by the Court could not be accepted. We also endorse the view that if certain new facts had come to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner requiring further probe in the matter, clarification in that respect and permission therefor could have been obtained by moving this Court. But, without doing so, it was not open to the Deputy Commissioner to have passed on the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer (C). In doing so the appellant, as Deputy Commissioner, clearly violated the direction of this Court. 22. If one reads the decision dated May 3O3 1975, of C. R. Thakur J. in C W P No. 183 of 1974, together with that of the Division Bench dated December 6, 1978, in L. P A. No 44 of 1975, the only reasonable conclusion would be that all that was left to the Deputy Commissioner to decide was the question whether the appellant for, Hari Dev) was covered by the definition of resident in the light of the decision made in the common judgment in Percy Chauhan v. State and another, ILR 1979 HP 35. In failing to do so himself and, instead, by sending the matter for further determination to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Theog, the Deputy Com missioner clearly transgressed the limits set by this Court for him. He obviously disobeyed the directions of this Court. 23. The submission next made by the learned Counsel for the appellant before us was that the order passed by the learned Chief Justice could not be upheld inasmuch as, he had not found that appellant-Mohindra Lal was guilty of wilful disobedience of the order of this Court. A specific ground (No. 13) has been raised in the memorandum of appeal saying \ “13. A specific ground (No. 13) has been raised in the memorandum of appeal saying \ “13. That in view of the fact that the Honble single Judge has not recorded any finding that the appellant has wilfully disobeyed any order of this Court, holding the appellant guilty is bad and liable to be set aside.. ..." 24. Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon some decision in support of his plea that for being wilful, there should be intentional or deliberate disobedience of the order of the High Court For example in B K Kar v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court and another, AIR 1961 SC 1367, it was said (in paragraph 7) that : "Before a subordinate Court can be found guilty of disobeying the order of the superior Court and thus to have committed contempt of Court, it is necessary to show that the disobedience was intentional.... " 25. In Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1701, it was said in the context of section 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 18 8, that the Legislature had used the word "wilful" to mean only such detention which was deliberate and with some purpose and not merely occasioned by inadvertence, carelessness or negligence : In Kedar Hath Sinha v. Sahdeo Jha and others. 1977 Cr. LJ 1174, a single Judge of the Patna High Court took the view (in paragraph 8) that : ".…..the essential ingredient for a civil contempt is wilful disobedience, and not any and every disobedience, due to various reasons. That the disobedience was wilful has to be proved which expression connotes "purposeful" and "clear intention to flout". 26. In Kuldip Rastogi and another v. Vishya Nath Khanna, AIR 1979 Del 202, a Division Bench said, in the context of civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, that: "……wilful has the same meaning in the law of contempt as in other branches of the law" and that the disobedience should not be casual or accidental or unintentional nor should it be the result of inadvertence or negligence. It has to be a calculated and deliberate action: 27. And, in Darshan Singh and another v. Lt Governor Delhi and others, 1981 Cri. It has to be a calculated and deliberate action: 27. And, in Darshan Singh and another v. Lt Governor Delhi and others, 1981 Cri. LJ 820, another Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, reiterated (in paragraph 9) that: ".....Before the court would take any action against any alleged contemner it must be reasonably satisfied that the alleged contemner was deliberately disobeying the order of the Court." 28. The principle is clear. The disobedience, for constituting civil contempt, has to be wilful’ which means that it is deliberate and intentional and not occasioned by inadvertence, or negligence nor is it casual, accidental or unintentional. 29. The facts of the present case establish beyond doubt that the disobedience by appellant Mobinder Lai of the direction of this Court was intentional and deliberate. It was not unintentional, inadvertent or casual. After the decision of the Division Bench dated December 6, 1978, in L.P A. No. 44 of 1975 it could not be said that enquiry into any matter other than the fact whether Dr Hari Dev fell within the definition of resident within the meaning of that term as laid down by this Court, was open to the Deputy Commissioner. If he entertained any doubt about the eligibility of Dr Hari Dev for grant of Nautor land on any other ground, or about the propriety of the grant having been made in the circumstances brought to his notice, the only course open to him was to seek necessary clarification and direction from this Court. It was not open to him, on his own, to have adopted the course that he did, namely, of sending the matter for further enquiry and decision by the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) Theog By doing so he deliberately and intentionally disobeyed the direction of this Court contained in its decision in L, PA. No 44 of 1979 which he was to carry out expeditiously in terms of the statement made by the Advocate General before this Court in C.W.P. No. 266 of 1979. 30. No 44 of 1979 which he was to carry out expeditiously in terms of the statement made by the Advocate General before this Court in C.W.P. No. 266 of 1979. 30. Even though the learned Chief Justice has not mentioned the words wilful disobedience in his order under appeal, while holding that appellant Mohinder Lal was guilty of having committed civil contempt of the Court, his order unmistakably shows that he was satisfied that the appellant had wilfully disobeyed the direction made by this Court in the L P A. We may only extract some of the observations of the learned Chief Justice, made in the order under appeal, to show that he was satisfied that there was wilful disobedience by the appellant of the direction made by this Court. The learned Chief Justice, inter alia, said: "……The orders were simple indeed. The Deputy Commissioner was directed to decide the question of the petitioner being a resident in the light of the judgment. Instead of deciding this question respondent No. 1 just transferred the whole case to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Theog It is no excuse for respondent No. I that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Theog, has been directed by him to decide the question according to the directions given by this Court Once the Court had directed to Deputy Commissioner to do a particular thing, it was the bounden duty of the Deputy Commissioner to do it and not to pass on the matter for decision to his subordinates. The reason given by respondent No. 1 for not deciding the question referred to him by the Court cannot be accepted. If certain new facts had come to his notice requiring further probe in the matter, then proper proceedings under the law could have been taken against the petitioner. But that did not mean that he could refuse to decide the question which was specifically referred to him by this Court and in respect of which an assurance was given to the Court in the subsequent writ petition I must hold that respondent No 1 is guilty of having committed civil contempt of the court" 31. These observations clearly rule out acceptance of the submission that no finding has been recorded by the learned Chief Justice that there was wilful disobedience on the part of appellant Mohinder Lal of the direction given by this Court. 32. These observations clearly rule out acceptance of the submission that no finding has been recorded by the learned Chief Justice that there was wilful disobedience on the part of appellant Mohinder Lal of the direction given by this Court. 32. It was urged that in recording a conclusion about commission of contempt of court, the court should act with circumspection. Our attention was invited to the observations of the Supreme Court in Debabrata Bandopodhyay and others v. The State of West Bengal and another, AIR 1979 SC 189. It was observed (in paragraph 9) that: "A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation, it behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemner must be punished Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of ones duty,... " 33. And, to those made by the Supreme Court in connection with a criminal contempt by a Judicial Officer in S Abdul Karim v. M. K. Prakash and others, AIR 1976 SC 859, where, following the decision in Debabrata, it was observed (in paragraph 23) that : "…….The broad test to be applied in such cases is, whether the act complained of was calculated to obstruct or had an intrinsic tendency to interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of law.. Wrong order or even an act of usurpation of jurisdiction committed by a judicial officer, owing to an error of judgment or to a misapprehension of the correct legal position does not fall within the mischief of "criminal contempt" so long as a judicial officer in the discharge of his official duties, acts in good faith and without any motive to defeat, obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice, the courts will not, as a rule punish him for a "criminal contempt". Even if it could be urged that mens rea as such, is not an indispensable ingredient of the offence of contempt, the courts are loath to punish a contemner. Even if it could be urged that mens rea as such, is not an indispensable ingredient of the offence of contempt, the courts are loath to punish a contemner. If the act or omission complained of, was not wilful." 34. There is hardly any doubt about the cautious approach indicated by the observations of the Supreme Court in these two decisions. However, where, as in the present case, it has been found that the action of appellant Mohinder Lal was deliberate and not casual or unintentional, the majesty of law must be upheld by upholding the judgment of the learned Chief , Justice. 35. No other submission was made before us on behalf of the appellant. 36. We are of opinion that the appeal has no merit. It is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.