SHARMA, J- This order will decide Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1019/1989 and 1020/1989, by this common order. 2. The plaintiff non-petitioner had filed a suit for ejectment and injunction against the petitioner tenant. Issues were framed in the suit on August 1, 1984. The evidence of the plaintiff had also been completed. Five witnesses of the defendant also stood examined. However, cross-examination of the petitioner could not be completed on account of his illness. On May 3, 1989 the petitioner had filed an application supported by an affidavit under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC for amendment of the written statement. By this proposed amendment, the petitioner wanted to insert the alleged subsequent events tending to show that the plaintiff non-petitioner did not require the demised premises reasonably and bona-fide for his use and occupation. That amendment application was dismissed by the trial Court on June 1, 1989. Against that, the petitioner filed a revision petition bearing No. 569/1989, which was decided by this Court on August 1, 1989. This Court while dismissing the revision petition against the order dismissing the application of the defendant under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC about rejection of the amendment application, observed that it was undisputed that subsequent events arising after the institution of the suit can be considered by the Court. For the purpose, it was not necessary to disturb the order of rejection of the amendment application. It was pointed out that the plaintiff-non-petitioner could, if he so liked, file a reply along with a counter affidavit to the application filed by the petitioner and, it was also stated that the trial Court will consider the subsequent events. 3. Accordingly, the plaintiff-non-petitioner filed a reply to the application of the defendant for taking into consideration the subsequent evetns and, he also filed a counter-affidavit in support of the reply. In his reply, the plaintiff-non-petitioner in paras 1,2 and 3 of the additional pleas mentioned that similar application dated September 14, 1987 filed by the petitioner had been decided and dismissed by the trial Court on September 15, 1987 and, therefore, the subsequent application on the same matter was barred by the principle of res-judicata. In his reply, the plaintiff-non-petitioner in paras 1,2 and 3 of the additional pleas mentioned that similar application dated September 14, 1987 filed by the petitioner had been decided and dismissed by the trial Court on September 15, 1987 and, therefore, the subsequent application on the same matter was barred by the principle of res-judicata. The plaintiff- non-petitioner further stated in his reply that the petitioner in his application and also in his statement recorded on December 15,1987 had denied the title of the non-petitioner as his landlord and, on the ground of this disclaimer of title, the non- petitioner had also acquired a right to get a decree for ejectment against the petitioner. It was also stated that the petitioner had admitted the title of the non-petitioner as his landlord in a previous suit. Lastly, it was said in para 3 of additional plea that the non-petitioner will need the premises. 5. It is quite clear that this Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 569/1989 had rejected the application of the defendant-petitioner for amendment of his written statement. Thus, the alleged subsequent events could not form part of the written statement of the defendant petitioner. What this Court had directed was that the trial Court will take into consideration the subsequent events mentioned by the petitioner in his application. The plaintiff had not filed any reply to that application and, therefore, opportunity was given to the plaintiff to file a reply to the application along with a court- affidavit. Accordingly, the non- petitioner filed a reply to the defendants application dated August 18,1989. The petitioner requested the trial Court to strike out paras Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the additional pleas in the aforesaid reply of the non- petitioner. So far as para 1 of the additional plea is concerned, all that the non-petitioner has mentioned is that the trial Court had previously decided a similar application of the defendant on September 15, 1987 and had rejected the same and, therefore, his present application for taking subsequent events into consideration was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. So far as para 1 of the additional plea is concerned, all that the non-petitioner has mentioned is that the trial Court had previously decided a similar application of the defendant on September 15, 1987 and had rejected the same and, therefore, his present application for taking subsequent events into consideration was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. In this connection, it may be stated that although, this point was also taken by the non-petitioner before this Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 569/1989, but it was observed by this Court that it was not necessary to go into this plea and decide it, because this Court was of the view that the trial Court should take into consideration the subsequent events. In view of this Courts finding that the trial Court should take into consideration the subsequent events incorporated by the petitioner in his application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC despite the alleged earlier order dated September 15, 1987 of the trial Court, the non-petitioner is precluded from raising this objection and, therefore, para No. 1 of the additional plea becomes irrelevant and should have been struck out. 6. In para No. 2 of the additional pleas of reply, the plaintiff- non-petitioner inserted that the petitioner had denied the title of the non-petitioner as his landlord and, therefore, the non- petitioner had acquired a right to get ejectment decree against the petitioner on the ground of disclaimer of title. I may refer, in this connection to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. Subharao V. PVR Krishna Rao(l). Although, as a matter of interpretation of Sec. 10 (2) (vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, his Lordship Kania J., speaking for the Court, knocked out the contention that the denial of title must be enterior to the proceedings for eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act, but his Lordship observed in para 6 of the reported judgment, at page 2191, as under :- "It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that, in any event, the respondent failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do so in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. We agree that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, we find that the trial Court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenants denial of the landlords title to the schedule property including the said premises was bonafide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona-fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition." 7. In the present case, the tenant had immediately raised objection that without amendment of the plaint, the landlord cannot be allowed to raise the pea of disclaimer by way of reply to the application for taking subsequent events into consideration pertaining to the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the demised premises. The general principles would apply that without amendment of the plaint incorporating the amendment, the non-petitioner cannot be allowed to raise such a plea as a back-door plea. The plea of alleged disclaimer is, therefore, wholly irrelevant to the application filed by the defendant and, if it is allowed to remain, it would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. It deserves to be struck out and it is ordered to be struck out. 8. So far as the plea mentioned in para 3 of the additional plea of the reply is concerned, it cannot be said to be irrelevant to the application filed by the petitioner. 9. Coming to Civil Writ Petition No. 10-20/1989, it is quite clear that the application filed by the petitioner under Order 6 Rule, 17, CPC was not allowed and, therefore, the contents of that part of that application did not form part of written statement of the defendant. 9. Coming to Civil Writ Petition No. 10-20/1989, it is quite clear that the application filed by the petitioner under Order 6 Rule, 17, CPC was not allowed and, therefore, the contents of that part of that application did not form part of written statement of the defendant. No issue on this point could, therefore, be framed by the trial Court. The position therefore, was that there was an application of the petitioner mentioning certain subsequent events, and that application was supported by an affidavit. The plaintiff was permitted to file reply to that application with a counter-affidavit which the plaintiff had done. The subsequent events alleged by the petitioner were to be taken into consideration in view of this Courts order dated August 1, 1989, passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 569/1989. Since both the petitioners application as well as non-petitioners reply were respectively supported by an affidavit and a counter affidavit, the only requirement was that the adversaries should have been permitted to cross-examine each other on their respective affidavits. That is all which is required in the facts and circumstances mentioned above. 10. As a result of the above discussion, I partly allow Civil Revision Petition No. 1019/1989 and do hereby order that paras Nos. 1 and 2 of the additional pleas in the reply filed by the defendant petitioner on August 18, 1989 and the affidavit in support of these paras shall stand struck out and would not be taken into consideration for any purpose by the trial Court. The remaining relief claimed in this revision petition is not allowed. 1l. So far as Civil Revision Petition No. 1020/1989 is concerned, it is partly allowed in this manner that the trial Court will permit both the parties to cross-examine each other on the respective affidavit and counter-affidavit filed by them. The plaintiff-non-petitioner will have the first opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner on his affidavit. Thereafter, the defendant petitioner shall be permitted to cross-examine the non- petitioner on his counter affidavit.