Judgment B.N. Agrawal, J. This application has been filed for quashing the prosecution of the petitioner under section 13 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act No. 20 of 1946) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The private opposite party, who is Labour Superintendent, filed a petition of complaint in the court of learned Magistrate for prosecution of the petitioner and one K.C.P. Menon under section 13 of the Act, stating therein that the petitioner was Managing Director of M/s Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. and accused K.C.P. Menon was its Manager. It was stated in the complaint that the Act, was applicable to the establishment in question as such, the establishment was required to submit draft Standing Order before appropriate authority for certification thereof, bat the same was not submitted before appropriate authority for its certification within the time required under law. Upon petition of complaint, learned Magistrate took cognizance and summoned the aforesaid persons and transferred the case for trial. Hence this application for quashing. 3. Mr. R.P. Katriar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that under section 13 of the Act, liability is upon employer and employer alone and upon no body else, and employer has been defined under section 2 (d) of the Act. It is said that another accused, who is Manager of the industrial establishment comes within the expression 'employer' as defined under section 2 (d) of the Act, but the petitioner who is only Managing Director of the aforesaid industrial establishment cannot be held liable as he is not an employer within the meaning of section 2 (d) of the Act. 4. For appreciating the contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, it will be useful to quote the relevant provisions of sections 13, 2 (d) and 2 (e) of the Act, and Section 7 (1) (f) of the Factories Act, 1948, which are as follows: "13. 4. For appreciating the contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, it will be useful to quote the relevant provisions of sections 13, 2 (d) and 2 (e) of the Act, and Section 7 (1) (f) of the Factories Act, 1948, which are as follows: "13. Penalties and procedure-(1) An employer who fails to submit draft standing orders as required by section 3, or who modifies his standing orders otherwise than in a8cordance with section to, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, and in the case of a continuing offence with a further fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees for every day after the first during which the offence continues." "2 (d) 'employer' means the owner of an industrial establishment to which this Act, for the time being applies, and includes- (i) in a factory any person named under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948) as Manager of the factory; (ii) in any industrial establishment under the control of any department of any Government in India, the authority appointed by such Government in this behalf, or where no authority is so appointed, the Head of the department; (iii) in any other industrial establishment, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the industrial establishment." "2 (e) 'industrial establishment' means (i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), or (ii) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1945)." "7. Notice by occupier-(1) The occupier shall, at least fifteen days before he begins to occupy or use any premises as a factory, send to the Chief Inspector a written notice containing xx xx xx xx (f) the name of the manager of the factory for the purposes of this Act." 5. Form a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it would appear that the liability under the provisions of the Act, is upon the employer alone and upon no body else. Now the of the expression 'employer' within the meaning of the Act, Under Section 2 (d) of the Act, 'employer' means owner of an industrial establishment. Form a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it would appear that the liability under the provisions of the Act, is upon the employer alone and upon no body else. Now the of the expression 'employer' within the meaning of the Act, Under Section 2 (d) of the Act, 'employer' means owner of an industrial establishment. There is no allegation in the petition of complaint anywhere that the petitioner is owner of the industrial establishment in question. The definition of the expression 'employer' is inclusive and it further says that Manager of a factory named as such under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Factories Act, shall be deemed to be an employer within the meaning of the Act. The petitioner cannot come within the mischief of sub-clause (i) of sub-section (d) of section 2 of the Act, especially in view of the fact that accused K.C.P. Menon has been described specifically as Manager of the industrial establishment in question. 6. Now the question arises whether the case of the petitioner will be covered under clause (ii) of section 2 (d) of the Act, which refers to an industrial establishment under the control of any department of Government of India. The petitioner's case also does not come under clause (ii) of section 2 (d) of the Act, because the establishment in question is not under the control of any department of Government of India. 7. Now the question that arises is whether the petitioner's case will be covered by clause (iii) of section 2 (d) of the Act. This clause refers to any other establishment, meaning thereby which is neither covered by clause (i) or clause (ii). If the petitioner's case would not have been covered by clause (i) of section 2 (d) of the Act, then surely it could have been said that this case was covered by clause (iii) of section 2 (d) of the Act. Clause (iii), referred to above, lays down that any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the industrial establishment shall be deemed to be an employer within the meaning of section 2 (d) of the Act. Clause (iii), referred to above, lays down that any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the industrial establishment shall be deemed to be an employer within the meaning of section 2 (d) of the Act. Industrial establishment has been also defined as stated above, under section 2 (e) of the Act, Section 2 (e) of the Act, refers to various types of industrial establishments and one of them is factory which has been referred to in clause (ii) of section 2 (e) of the Act. Since the establishment in question is a factory, this case is covered by clause (ii) of section 2 (e) of the Act. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and private opposite party tried to persuade me that since the petitioner is a Managing Director and he being responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the industrial establishment in question, he should be held to be employer within the meaning of the Act. For the reason set forth above, it is not possible to accept the submission of learned counsel for the opposite party. This being the position, I have no option but to hold that the petitioner is not an employer within the meaning of section 2 (d) of the Act. As such, no offence whatsoever is disclosed under the provisions of the Act, so far the petitioner is concerned, and therefore, his prosecution has got to be quashed as continuance thereof would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. 9. In the result, this application is allowed and the prosecution of the petitioner is hereby quashed. Application allowed.