Judgment :- Bellie, J: W.P.No.15495 of 1989 is by the wife of One Syed Hussain, W.P.No.l5496 of 1989 is by the mother of one Syed Zakir, W.P.No.15731 of 1989 is by the wife of one Syed Basheer and W.P.No.15803 of 1989 is by Mohamed Habib, all detained under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act. The detenus have been detained under Secs.3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act with a view to preventing them from smuggling goods and abetting the smuggling of goods. 2. The detenu Syed Hussain is said to have engaged Syed Zakir, Syed Basheer, Mohamed Habib, one Rafi and one Kaleel Ahamed from India at the instance of one Arumugam at Singapore to smuggle gold from Singapore to India. On 22. 1989 the detenues arrived at Madras Airport as passengers from Singapore by Singapore Airlines Flight SQ 042 with forged passports. On persistent questioning then admitted that they havebrought gold bars concealed in their chappals and wrist watches worn by them. Four gold bars weighing 10 tolas each were seized from Syed Hussain embedded and concealed in his chappals, two gold bars weighing 10 tolas each were seized from Syed Zakir which were also embedded in his chappals, two gold bars weighing 10 tolas each embedded and concealed in the chappals and also a gold piece of 25 grams concealed in the wrist watch were recovered from Syed Basheer, and two gold bars weighing 10 tolas each which had been concealed in the chappals and a gold piece of 27 grams concealed in the wrist watch were recovered from Mohamed Habib. Besides these detenus some gold bars were seized from one and Rafi Kaleel Ahamed who also had come with them in the same flight. Each of the detenu has given a confession statement to the customs officers to the effect that they had smuggled gold from Singapore and that Syed Hussain abetted the other detenus to smuggle gold bars. On the facts placed before the detaining authority viz., the State Government it was satisfied that it is necessary to detain the detenues under the COFEPOSA Act for preventing them from further smuggling and abetting smuggled foreign goods. Hence accordingly the orders of detention had been passed. 3. On the facts placed before the detaining authority viz., the State Government it was satisfied that it is necessary to detain the detenues under the COFEPOSA Act for preventing them from further smuggling and abetting smuggled foreign goods. Hence accordingly the orders of detention had been passed. 3. Since Syed Hussain himself, and abetted by him the other three detenus viz., Syed Zakir, Syed Basheer arid Mohamed Habib, are alleged to have smuggled goods, in the same flight and they were together dealt with by the Enforcement authorities, and since the points raised in these petitions against the detention are almost similar excepting a few, all the petitions can be dealt with in one order. We will first consider the common points raised in all these petitions, and deal with the other points raised in some petitions separately. 4. The first common point taken is that the date of incident is 22. 1989 but the order of detention was passed only on 20.7.1989 and thus there is inordinate delay and hence there was no nexus between the incident and the order, and hence the detention order is liable to be set aside. As to this the respondent in the counter affidavit, stating the circumstances in which the contrabands were recovered and that the detenus in false names brought the contra bands as per the instructions given by Arumugam in Singapore and that he arranged for their travel from Madras to Singapore and back and he gave each of the detenus a pair of chappals and wrist watches wherein gold bars were embedded and concealed and he promised to pay them remuneration for transporting gold bars, submitted that the Custom Officials took time to collect the materials and records about all the six persons involved in the transaction. It is further submitted that after collecting all the materials and records the sponsoring authority sent the proposal to the respondent State Government on 5. 1989 which was received by the respondent on 15. 1989 and was scrutinised on 25. 1989; the file was passed on 25. 1989; the file was then sent to the Law Department on 25. 1989 and the file was returned from there to the Additional Secretary on 6. 1989 and it was dealt with on 6. 1989; further documents were received from the sponsoring authority on 16. 1989 and was scrutinised on 25. 1989; the file was passed on 25. 1989; the file was then sent to the Law Department on 25. 1989 and the file was returned from there to the Additional Secretary on 6. 1989 and it was dealt with on 6. 1989; further documents were received from the sponsoring authority on 16. 1989 a note for circulation was submitted to the Additional Secretary on 20.6.1989 and he passed the file on 26. 1989; the Secretary, Public, passed the file on 26. 1989; the Additional Secretary, Law, passed the file on 26. 1989; the Minister for Law passed the file on 26. 1989; Then the file was sent to the Chief Minister; It was returned back to the Law Minister; the file was put up to the Law Department for opinion on 17. 1989; it was received from the Law Department on 17. 1989 and after fair copying the and translation the detention order was issued on 20.7.1989. For these reasons there is no deray in issuing the detention order. 5. From this narration in the counter it can been seen that the sponsoring authority has investigated the matter and collected all the materials and records and have sent the proposal on 5. 1989 i.e., in about 70 days. This certainly cannot be said to be a long delay in investigating the matter. Thereafter the file was dealt with by various departments in the secretariat almost continuously, and in between further documents were received from the sponsoring authority on 16. 1989. 6. Now, recently in Mohamed Ali v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, W.P.No.13875 of 1989 ordered on 28. 1990, we have dealt with a time gap of nearly ten months from the date of incident till the date of detention order. After referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts cited by both sides we have held that the said time gap is not an inordinate delay that vitiates the detention order. 1990, we have dealt with a time gap of nearly ten months from the date of incident till the date of detention order. After referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts cited by both sides we have held that the said time gap is not an inordinate delay that vitiates the detention order. We have held therein that a (1) Even in the case of long delay if the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for the delay that delay will not be fatal to the detention order; and (2) In the case of detention order made under the provisions of Acts like COFEPOSA, in considering whether the delay is fatal or not, various factors such as the complexities of the case and the magnitude of the operations and difficulties in securing sufficient evidence that would be believed in the Court have to be considered." 7. In the present case, on one incident, there are as many as six persons involved and from all of them contrabands were recovered and while others smuggled the contrabsnds one of them apart from himself smuggling goods abetted smuggling of goods, and the entire operation was done at the instance of one Arumugam who is a resident of Singapore. Even’from the copies of the documents supplied to the detenus which are more than 150 the enormity of the matter can be understood. Certainly it cannot at all be said that there was no nexus between the incident and the detention order. Hence we hold that there was no inordinate delay on account of which the detention order is vitiated as submitted. .8. The next point raised is that though the detention order was passed on 20.7.1989 the order was executed only on 111. 1989 and this shows that the order of detention is not genuine. This was countered by the respondent stating in the counter affidavits that the detention order was sent to the Commissioner of Police for execution on 20.7.1989 itself. The detenus were absconding and evading arrest and they were arrested only on 111. 1989. 9. It appears the detenus had filed bail applications and they had been ordered therein to appear before the Assistant Collector of Customs on the 10th, 20th and 30th of every month. The detenus were absconding and evading arrest and they were arrested only on 111. 1989. 9. It appears the detenus had filed bail applications and they had been ordered therein to appear before the Assistant Collector of Customs on the 10th, 20th and 30th of every month. It is stated in the affidavits filed in support of the petitions that the detenus were appearing before the Assistant Collector as they were directed in the bail order, but on behalf of the respondent it is stated that the detenus did not appear before the Assistant Collector as directed and they absconded. It is argued that though it is stated in the affidavits that the detenus were appearing before the Assistant Collector as directed, it has not been specifically denied in the counter affidavit. But in the counter affidavit it is clearly stated that they were absconding and evading arrest. 10. In support of this statement in the counter affidavits the learned Public Prosecutor places before us the concerned register (Accused Register) in the Customs Office where the detenus had been signing for some days as per the bail order, and the learned Public Prosecutor points out that there was signing in the case of three detenus viz., Syed Hussain, Syed Zakir and Syed Basheer till 4. 1989 and in the case of Mohamed Habib till 20.4.1989 only and thereafter they failed to sign and it is because they did not come to Customs Office and may be because hearing about the detention order being passed they have absconded and then evaded arrest. Now, even on the date of order itself the order has been sent to the Commissioner of Police for execution. This is a factor that militates against the contention that the detention order was not genuine. The detenus had been signing as per the bail order in the register before the Assistant Collector in the case of three detenus till 4. 1989 and in the case of one detenu till 20.4.1989 and thereafter they failed to do so. This register is a register maintained in the usual course of Official functions and this is a public document and we do not see any reason to suspect the contents therein. Certainly it gives rise to a legitimate inference that as contended by the Public Prosecutor the detenus must be absconding and evading arrest. .11. This register is a register maintained in the usual course of Official functions and this is a public document and we do not see any reason to suspect the contents therein. Certainly it gives rise to a legitimate inference that as contended by the Public Prosecutor the detenus must be absconding and evading arrest. .11. It is argued that the sponsoring authority has not filed any petition for cancellation of bail for non-complying of the conditions. That maybe so. But that will not by itself show that the detenus were not absconding. Perhaps the authorities might be hoping to get the detenus arrested soon in pursuance of the detention order. In these circumstances we do not think that four months’ time in arresting the detenus is long delay to say that the detention order is not genuine or stale or illusory or there is mala fide on the part of the detaining authority. 12. In this connection, though the delay dealt with was only 2 1/2 months in Abdul Salam alias Thiyyan v. Union of India and others, A.I.R 1990 S.C. 1446, an observation made by the Supreme Court is worth considering. It is stated that, “That apart there is no decision where a Court has gone to the extent of holding that a mere delay in arresting the accused rendered the detention invalid.” and that “In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only 2 1/2 months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasonable,” (underlining ours) In that case also the reason given for the delay was that the detenu made himself scaree. However on behalf of the detenus a decision in T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225, was relied on wherein dealing with a delay of three months in securing arrest of the detenu, it is stated that, “.........the detaining authority has failed to explain the long delay in securing the arrest of the detenu after three months from the date of the passing of the detention order and this non-explanation in our view throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority vitiating the validity of the order of detention.” But in this decision it has been clearly observed that no explanation at all has been given. In our case a contention is raised that the detenus were absconding or evading arrest. Therefore the facts of that case are not applicable to the facts of our case. A decision in Abdul @ Nazer @ M.Abdu @ M.Abdu Manhammattil v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 188, also was relied on behalf of the detenus wherein it was held that on account of delay the life and proximate lies between the grounds of detention and the avowed purpose of detention was snapped due to long and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of effecting arrest of the detenu. But the delay in that case as long as 2 1/2 years and the delay in our case is nowhere near that. Each case has to be decided on the facts of its own peculiar facts. Thus considering we hold that there is no merit in the submission that there was unexplained delay of four months in executing the order and that vitiates the detention order. 13. It is then argued for the detenus that the show cause notices were not placed before the detaining authority before passing the detention order and the records show that it was placed before him only subsequently and therefore the subjective satisfaction was not arrived at on full materials. In this connection it is stated that the date of show cause notice has been corrected in the detention order in paragraph 20 and the index Of documents served on the detenu show that the show cause notice has been written separately as document No. 152 and it was separately given in Volume II. In the detention order at paragraph 20 a show cause notice has been referred to. It is contended in the counter that the show cause notice dated 16. 1989 was placed before the detaining authority as document No. 152 along with other documents before passing the order of detention. 14. As regards the alleged correction of date it appears to us that it is only a mistake in that it was originally wrongly written as ‘2’ instead of ‘12’and that has been corrected. 1989 was placed before the detaining authority as document No. 152 along with other documents before passing the order of detention. 14. As regards the alleged correction of date it appears to us that it is only a mistake in that it was originally wrongly written as ‘2’ instead of ‘12’and that has been corrected. Only because the show case notice has been given separate number as 152 and it comes under Vol.11 it cannot at all be said that this show cause notice was not placed before the detaining authority for consideration before passing the detention order. Possibly the show cause notice was received by the detention authority subsequent to other documents and the other documents were already indexed but before the detention order was passed. In this connection it may be noted that in paragraph 5 of the counter it is stated that further documents were received from the sponsoring authority on 16. 1989. 15. Moreover it is not stated as to in what way if the show cause notice had been placed before the detaining authority it would have influenced his mind in a different way. It is not the case of the detenus that the show cause notice contains materials favourable to them. Therefore there is no merit in this content; on. .16. The further point is that translated copies in full form of the Custom Clearance Card, Customs Receipt and search warrants have not been given and this had deprived the detenus of making effective representation. As against this, it is stated in the counter affidavit that these are standard forms and free translation copies of these documents have been given. 17. As regards the search warrants it appears from the grounds of detention that in the house searches nothing incriminating from anybody’s house has been recovered. Therefore supply of copies of search warrants does not appear to be necessary. 18. It appears the material portion of the documents referred to (customs clearance card, customs receipt etc.) wherein the particulars are to be filled up have been translated and given to the detenus and only the portions containing the standard printed rules alone have not been supplied. Apparently there is nothing in those printed matters for the detaining authority to rely on, and if at all any of those documents were relied on that would be only the particulars noted in the columns. Apparently there is nothing in those printed matters for the detaining authority to rely on, and if at all any of those documents were relied on that would be only the particulars noted in the columns. Therefore in our view there is no merit in the submission that copies of these documents have not been given in full form. 19. It is then contendel that the detention order does not mention any compelling necessity to detain the detenus under the COFEPOSA Act apart from the Customs Law to prevent the alleged activities. This is not correct. As stated in the counter affidavit, in the grounds of detention it is specifically mentioned that the detaining authority is satisfied on the materials and facts placed before him that if the detenu is allowed to remain at large he will indulge in such activities and that further recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities. Thus this point is without substance. 20. It is then argued that most of the documents supplied are in minute letters and they are illegible and therefore the detenus could not read and understand them and thereby they were deprived of making an effective representation. In the counter statement it is contended that the documents supplied were legible and readable. We examined some documents which the learned counsel for the detenus showed us as illegible but we find they are, though in small letters, quite legible and readable. 21. It is argued that to the detenu’s representation that they may be supplied legible and readable copies, the detaining authority sent another set of copies but they are only identical copies and not different copies and this shows that the detaining authority was satisfied that the original copies were not legible and readable but inspite of it he has again sent the same copies. May be the detaining authority has against sent the same copies in different set but as we have said above, we are of the opinion that the copies originally supplied are legible and readable and as such the detenus cannot make any point out of it. Thus this point raised has to be rejected. 22. Just at the time arguments a new point was raised for the detenus. Thus this point raised has to be rejected. 22. Just at the time arguments a new point was raised for the detenus. The point is sought to be made out from the averments in the counter affidavits filed by the respondent. While explaining the time gap between the date of incident and the date of detention order the respondents have referred to certain date as follows: "The Additional Secretary, Law, passed the file on 26. 1989. The Minister for Law passed the file on 26. 1989. Then the file was sent to the Chief Minister. The file was returned by the Chief Minister’s Office stating that the Chief Minister has ordered that all the files relating to Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 except complicated ones, shall be circulated to the Minister for law. Standing order was issued on 17. 1989. The file was approved by Minister for law on 26. 1989. Hence, the file was put up to Law Department for opinion on 17. 1989. The file was received back from Law Department on 17. 1989. After fair copy and translation, the detention orders were issued on 20.7.1989." .23. From this it is argued that the Chief Minister only had been dealing with the file relating to COFEPOSA and only on 17. 1989 he has issued standing orders for non-complicated matters to be dealt by the Law Minister himself, but the Law Minister has passed the order on 26. 1989 itself and therefore the Law Minister has without authority passed the order and therefore the order is illegal. As stated above this point was raisedonly at the time of arguments, and it has not been raised as a point in the affidavits filed by the petitioners, and not even additional affidavits raising the point have been filed. If such a point had been taken in the affidavits or additional affidavits the respondent could have known the point and they would have been in a position to put forth the relevant facts and the circumstances to meet that point. Only from the facts stated in the counter statement it cannot at all be held that the Law Minister had nothing to do with the file relating to these cases. Normally in COFEPOSA matters the Law Ministry would be the concerned ministry. Only from the facts stated in the counter statement it cannot at all be held that the Law Minister had nothing to do with the file relating to these cases. Normally in COFEPOSA matters the Law Ministry would be the concerned ministry. The Chief Minister appears to have wanted to deal with complicated cases of COFEPOSA and since the files in question were not found to be complicated ones they were returned to the Law Minister. .24. It must be remembered that the Law Minister does not pass the order of detention. As per Art.166(1) of the Constitution all executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Therefore an order passed in the name of the Governor alone is an order of the Government and the orders of detention in the present cases have been rightly made in conformity with this Article. It is not correct to say that the Law Minister has passed the order. The Law Minister has only given his opinion approving the note placed before him as regards the detention of the detenus. In this connection an observation of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 395: (1962)3 S.C.R. (Supp.) 713, is worth noting: ."We may further observe that, constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, is to act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore, until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the Minister or the Council of Ministers may say in regard to a particular matter does not become the action of the State until the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to be accepted by the Head of the State." We therefore think that there is no merit in the point now raised by the detenus. .25. The above are the points argued in common for all the detenus. Now we will deal with one common point argued for the three detenus only viz., the detenus in W.P.Nos.15496, 15731 and 15803 of 1989. It is contended that the detention order relating to these detenus shows that the order has been passed under Secs.3(1) (i) and 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. Sec.3(1)(i) is for smuggling goods and Sec.3(1)(ii) if for abetment of smuggling goods. It is contended that the detention order relating to these detenus shows that the order has been passed under Secs.3(1) (i) and 3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act. Sec.3(1)(i) is for smuggling goods and Sec.3(1)(ii) if for abetment of smuggling goods. It is argued that a reading of the grounds of detention order will show that there is absolutely nothing to show that these detenus have in anyway abetted the smuggling of goods. Therefore it is manifest that there is clear non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority and hence this vitiates the detention order. A reading of the grounds of detention of course does not disclose anything to show that these detenus had in any way abetted the smuggling of goods and there are materials only to show that Syed Hussain, the detenu in W.P.No. 15495 of 1989 abetted the smuggling of goods. Therefore these detenus have not committed anything for which they can be detained under Sec.3(1)(ii). 26. But the question is whether for this reason the entire detention order can be held to be invalid and quashed. In our view Sec.5-A of COFEPOSA Act comes to the rescue of the respondent. Now, as far as these detenus are concerned the detention order appears to have been passed under two grounds. One is smuggling goods and the other is abetting the smuggling of goods. Now it is clear that there is no material to support the second ground and therefore the question is whether the detention order can be sustained on the first ground alone. .27. On a careful reading of Sec.5-A we are clearly of the view that though there is nonexistence of one of the ground i.e., the alleged ground of abetting smuggled goods, as stated in Sec.5-A(b) the Government shall be deemed to have made the order of detention after being satisfied with reference to the remaining ground i.e, the ground of smuggling goods. In this view of the matter the detention orders have to be sustained even though there is no material to show that these detenus had abetted the smuggling of goods. In this view of the matter the detention orders have to be sustained even though there is no material to show that these detenus had abetted the smuggling of goods. On the detenus’ side a decision in Vashist Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P. and another, 1990 S.C.C (Crl.) 372 (1990)2 S.C.C 629 , was cited in support of their contention, wherein it is stated, ."What Sec.5-A provides is that where there are two or more grounds covering various activities of the detenu, each activity is a separate ground by it self and if one of the ground is vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason or invalid for any other reason whatsoever, then that will not vitiate the order of detention." This decision in our view far from helping the detenus supports our view stated above. The Supreme Court say; that each of the activities of the detenu is a separate ground. Smuggling is one activity and abatement of smuggling is another activity. Hence we reject this point raised by the detenu. .28. Apart from the above points raised, on behalf of the detenu in W.P .No. 15803 of 1989 some more points were also raised. It is argued that copies of documents were given to the detenu in English and Tamil but he dees not know English or Tamil as he is an Urdu Muslim and his mother tongue is Urdu and therefore the copies should have been furnished to him in Urdu. But it is admitted that he is an illiterate and even Urdu he does not know to read and write. In the counter affidavit it is stated that a statement was recorded from the detenu in Tamil as deposed by him and it was read over to him by one Mr. V.Sankar and the detenu accepted it to be correct and this shows that the detenu was able to understand and talk in Tamil. It is not the case of the petitioner that the detenu is not able to talk in Tamil or understand Tamil. But the only argument appears to be that his mother tongue being Urdu he would understand Urdu better than Tamil. That may be so. But the point is whether he understands and he is able to talk in Tamil or not. But the only argument appears to be that his mother tongue being Urdu he would understand Urdu better than Tamil. That may be so. But the point is whether he understands and he is able to talk in Tamil or not. Admittedly, as the learned Public Prosecutor would submit, the detenu, is a person who was born and bred up in Tamil Nadu. Therefore it can be safely presumed that he must be knowing Tamil. According to the respondent, in any case, copies of documents have been given to the detenu in Urdu on 212. 1989. This is not denied. From these facts it is clear that there is no merit in this submission. 29. Secondly it is contended that the value of the contrabands seized from the detenu is only Rs.51,279 and for this there is no minimum sentence of more than one year under the Customs Act and therefore the detention for one year is unwarranted and unreasonable, and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the detaining authority. But as per the grounds of detention the value of the goods seized from the detenu is Rs.86,940. The law does not say anything about the value of the goods seized for detaining under the Preventive Detention Acts for preventing him from further committing the offence. It is not correct to say that for the detention of this detenu the value of the contrabands brought by other detenus were also taken into consideration, in our view this point is devoid of any merits. .30. Thirdly it is argued that the passport of this detenu has been seized and therefore there is no chance of this detenu going abroad and smuggling contrabands from there and therefore the detention order is unnecessary and this was not considered by the detaining authority. It is needless to say that for a smuggler a passport is not always necessary. There are cases and cases where people without any passport smuggled goods from abroad. For example it may be stated that according to respondent the other detenus have gone abroad under the passports obtained in different names. This point also in our view does not merit consideration. 31. It is next argued that one of the persons arrested along with the detenus viz., Kaleel Ahmed has sent a reply on 9. 1989 to the show cause notice dated 16. This point also in our view does not merit consideration. 31. It is next argued that one of the persons arrested along with the detenus viz., Kaleel Ahmed has sent a reply on 9. 1989 to the show cause notice dated 16. 1989 sent to him which is similar to the show cause notice sent to this detenu and other detenus and this reply even though it was received subsequent to the detention order has not been placed before the Advisory Board. This point has not been specifically taken in the affidavit of this detenu filed in support of the petition and therefore the respondent had no opportunity to answer it. Even otherwise it is not the case of the detenu that he has sent any reply at all. Non-placing of a reply sent by another person who was arrested along with the detenu is not vital as far as this detenu is concerned. We have recently in M.Abdul Hakim v. State by Government of Tamil Nadu and another, W.P.No.14562 of 1989 dated 9. 1990, held that any material which comes into being subsequent to the date of detention need not-be placed before the Advisory Board, and that if the detenu thinks that it is a vital document and if he thinks that it should be considered by the Advisory Board he can represent to the Advisory Board to call for that record. Therefore was find no merit in this point. 132. The result is that we do not find merits in any of the points raised by the petitioners. As such the petitions are dismissed.