Judgment S.C. MOOKHERJI, J. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order of his detention dated 9.8.1989 passed against him by the detaining authority (District Magistrate of Vaishali) in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 12 of the Bihar Crime Control Order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the district of Vaishali for the period of one year. For reaching the subjective satisfaction as to the necessity of making this order the detaining authority has reliance upon 10 criminal cases, in which the detenu is said to have been involved and he has also mentioned about the background of the detenu where, on being involved in 15 cases he was detained for the period of one year with effect from 1.8.84 to 1.8.85 and thereby, according to the detaining authority the petitioner has created an atmosphere of insecurity in the areas of Vaishali district, which activities of the detenu adversely affected the maintenance of public order. 2. The argument advanced by Mr. Ganesh Pd. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner is two fold. In the first instance, it has been submitted that the detaining authority has taken into consideration some of the grounds of an earlier detention order passed against this detenu in the year 1984 for subjective satisfaction and therefore, the impugned order of detention is invalid. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1181 (Ramesh vs. State of Gujrat and others) and A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2274 (Ahmad Hussain Sk. Hassan alias Ahmad Kailu Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmadabad and another). 3. The second branch of the argument is that the ground of detention having not been served upon the petitioner, the order is bad in law. Hassan alias Ahmad Kailu Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmadabad and another). 3. The second branch of the argument is that the ground of detention having not been served upon the petitioner, the order is bad in law. It has also been argued that mere reference to a case under the provisions of the Arms Act, in the order of detention would not suffice the purpose even if a charge-sheet has been submitted in that case, because a case under the provisions of the Arms Act, can only be taken into consideration if there has been an Order of conviction and therefore, on this ground alone, the order is bound to fail. 4. The learned counsel for the State on the other hand strongly opposed the above argument by drawing my attention to the paragraph, wherein the casts in which the petitioner is involved have been taken to be the ground of detention order. The learned counsel further submits that the other cases mentioned in the order is just by way of background as no where in the order there is any indication that the detaining authority had taken into consideration all the grounds of an earlier detention order passed against him in August. 1984 and therefore, it can not be said that the detention suffers from vice of non application of mind of the detaining authority rendering the order of detention invalid. 5. There is no controversy, in view of a large number of decisions of Supreme Court as also various High Courts, that once the old detention comes to an end either by the expiry of the period of detention or by the cancellation of the order of detention a fresh order of detention can not be passed by taking into consideration of some of the grounds of earlier detention order. But at the same an time detention order can be passed if there are additional or fresh facts against the detenu. 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State no where, there is any statement that the detaining authority took into consideration the previous ground of detention also to establish that the acts of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 7. 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State no where, there is any statement that the detaining authority took into consideration the previous ground of detention also to establish that the acts of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 7. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the detention order has been passed by the District Magistrate on valid ground and the Advisory Board has also given opinion in favour of the detention. The detention order was passed by the District Magistrate on 9.8.89 and the same was approved by the Govt. on 16.8.89 on me it was communicated to the detenu vide this Departments letter no. 8137 dated 18.8.89 and the same was served upon him on 21.8.89 and the matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 28.8 89 The majority opinion of the Board was given on 15.9.89 which was received on 21.1.89. The confirmation order was passed by the Govt. on 29.9.89 on file and the same was communicated to the detenu vide letter no. 9019 dated 30.9.89. 8. A separate counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the detaining authority wherein also, there is no indication that he had taken into consideration the previous grounds of detention also in passing the impugned order. On the other hand, a clear averment has been made that the detenus criminal activities for the public peace was serious which created panic in the locality and hazardous to the society and the same satisfied the detaining authority for passing the detention order. It has also been stated that for substantive offences under the Indian Penal Code the detenu will face separate trial and is also facing remaining trials for which the legal procedure will follow and he will be produced on dates in courts. 9. In Gulam Nabi Jaki vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, reported in 1979 (3) S.C.R. 36 the Supreme Court observed that: “The matter is not res integra. In a number of decisions of this Court to which reference will be made presently, this point has been considered and it has been held that once an order of revocation is made, another order detaining the same person can only be passed if some additional or fresh material is in the possession of the State Govt. on which, action can be passed. on which, action can be passed. It has also been observed that : "In other words, the revocation or expiry of the previous order can not lead ipso facto to a revival of the detention by the passing of a fresh order, because a person, who is entitled to his liberty can only be put in a second jeopardy when there are additional or fresh facts against him…" "As pointed out in the A.I.R. Hadi Bandhu case, the inference is very compulsive that fresh facts must be found far law orders, otherwise, once the old detention comes to an end either by the expiry of the period of detention or by the cancellation of the order of detention, the fresh detention can not be ordered." 10. In another decision Harjasdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2469) the Supreme Court while examining the question with regard to the validity of second detention order passed under section 14 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, on identical ground of the earlier order expressed his view that "In these circumstances, after the date on which the order cases to be in force unless fresh facts have arisen on the basis of which the Central Government or State Government or an officer as the case may be, was satisfied that such an order should be made, the subsequent detention on the very ground would be invalid" 11. It thus emerges from the above authorities that if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention, there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order. 12. In the instant case no doubt the detaining authority has referred to the earlier cases in the detention order but the same was by way of back ground and has not been used or relied upon for the purpose of passing the impugned order. The purpose of giving the back ground may be for showing that the detenu in spite of the earlier detention order continued with his anti social activities. 13. The purpose of giving the back ground may be for showing that the detenu in spite of the earlier detention order continued with his anti social activities. 13. It has already been pointed out that in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Bihar and also on behalf of the detaining authority, there is no averment to the effect that the detaining authority took into consideration the previous grounds or any of the grounds of detention also for his conclusion that the detenu was engaged in anti social activities of higher order and therefore, it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Vaishali district. It is thus, manifest that the detaining authority is thus, manifest that the detaining authority has not taken into consideration the earlier ground of detention passed in the year 1984. It is not in controversy that the expiry or revocation of an earlier detention order is not a bar for making a subsequent detention order against the same person. Therefore, the earlier ground of detention of the order 1984 having been not taken into consideration while passing the instant order of detention, the first apart of the argument taken on behalf of the petitioner must fail. 14. The second argument that the ground of detention has not been served on the petitioner in spite of the fact that this was brought to the notice of the authorities on several occasions. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, clear averments have been made that along with the order of detention, the grounds therein have been served upon the petitioner and in evidence of the same, he put his signature on each page of the grounds. This statement has not been contradicted or rebutted on behalf of the petitioner and therefore, this part of the argument also must fail. 15. But still then, this application has to be allowed, in view of the legal position raised on behalf of the petitioner. It has been submitted that if any one of the grounds of detention fans or not accepted by the court, that is sufficient to set aside the order of detention. 15. But still then, this application has to be allowed, in view of the legal position raised on behalf of the petitioner. It has been submitted that if any one of the grounds of detention fans or not accepted by the court, that is sufficient to set aside the order of detention. Elaborating this part of the argument, the learned Counsel has submitted that three of the grounds of detention are reference to there cases against the petitioner under the provision of Arms Act. These cases can not be taken to be the grounds of detention unless there is/are an order (s) of conviction under any of the sections 25 to 29 of the Arms Act. Accordingly, it is contended that the requirements of law as provided in clause (v) to section 2 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, has not been fulfilled. In this connection, a decision of this Court in Cr. W. J. C. no. 148/86 decided on 19.11.86 (Pappu Yadav alias Rajesh Kumar Ranjan Vs. The State of Bihar and others) reported in 1987 P.L.J.R. at page 58 has been referred to wherein, it has been observed that detenu, not convicted of an offence under any of the sections 25 to 29 of the Arms Act, 1957, merely registration of a police case under section 25A and 26 of the Arms Act, cannot be said to be sufficient to call a person an anti social element. 16. It is not in controversy that three of the grounds of detention are of cases registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the Arms Act. The learned counsel for the State has not disputed the position of law in this regard and that being so, the order of detention can not be sustained. Since the order of detention has been set aside on technical ground, it will be open to the authorities concerned to resort to the provisions of the National Security Act, against the petitioner on these very grounds. 17. The result is that the application is allowed, and the detention order passed on 9.8.89 is accordingly quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. HP. Application allowed.