JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner who is Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Pai, Tahsil Khaga, Fatehpur, has prayed for a writ of Certiorari quashing the order of suspension dated 13-7-1990 under Section 95 (1) (gg) of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short the Act), passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khaga, district Fatehpur. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was elected as Pradhan in 1988 and is working as such since then. A bare reading of the impugned order indicates that charge against him is that the petitioner, the Pradhan, through his family members, has occupied certain land of the Gaon Sabha and that he has executed certain fictitious lease deeds after obtaining illegal amounts from the residents of the village and that be has been threatening the Lekhpal of the village. On these allegations the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khaga, suspended the petitioner in exercise of his power under Section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Shashi Nandan urged that Section 95 (1) (ii) of the Act indicates that the order of suspension cannot be passed pending enquiry unless the State Government, the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist. As the prima facie satisfaction was not recorded, the impugned order was manifestly erroneous. 3. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged in support of the case on behalf of the State. He supported the impugned order. As the facts are almost admitted there is no necessity to grant time for filing counter affidavit. Both the learned counsel agreed that the petition can be decided on merits. 4. 3. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, urged in support of the case on behalf of the State. He supported the impugned order. As the facts are almost admitted there is no necessity to grant time for filing counter affidavit. Both the learned counsel agreed that the petition can be decided on merits. 4. The relevant statutory provisions, Ex Abundanti Cautela, are set out below : 95 (1) (gg):-The State Government may suspend a Pradhan or Up Pradhan or a member of a Gaon Panchayat or Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or a Panch, Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch of a Nyays Panchayat against whom proceeding under clause (g) are pending or contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending : Provided that- (i) no action shall be taken under clause (f), clause (g) or clause (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing clause against the action proposed ; (ii) no action shall be taken under clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist." The proviso carves out the general power of suspension under Section 95 (1) (gg). This power is not unconditional rather a particular mode for its exercise has been provided. There is a maxim "ACTUS LEG1TIMI NON RECEPIUNT MODUM" which connotes that when the doing of anything in a particular manner is sanctioned by law, then the thing cannot be done in a different way. 5. In State of U. P. v. Singhare Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 , It was held as follows : "The rule adopted in (1876) 1 Ch. 426, is well recognized and is founded on sound principles. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted." 6. In Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted." 6. In Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426, it was observed as follows j "When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a court and the mode of exercising it is pointed, it means that no other mode is to be adopted." In Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor, (1936) 36 Ind. Appeals, 372, it was held as follows : "The rule which applies is a different and not less well recognised rule viz, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden " 7. The provisions of Section 95 (1) (gg) along with its proviso is not susceptible of two meaning or interpretation. The prima facie satisfaction of the State Government or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is the condition precedent for exercising the power of suspension. In other words, for exercising power of suspension a particular mode has been provided. If that power of suspension has to be exercised it has to be exercised as the Legislature intends it to be exercised. Legislature wants that if power of suspension has to be exercised the prima facie satisfaction has to be indicated. 8. Just proceedings are pending or contemplated is not sufficient to pass an order of suspension, rather the Government or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate must be satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed, existed. In the instant case from the impugned order dated 13-7-1990 (Annexure-4 to the petition), it is abundantly clear that prima facie satisfaction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not been recorded rather just charges have been indicated and thereafter abruptly he has passed the order of suspension. It appears that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not take care to read Section 95 (1) (gg) along with the proviso added to it. In case he would have read it the impugned order would not have been passed. Under the circumstances there is no room for doubt that the impugned order has been passed without prima facie being satisfied and recording satisfaction. In case he would have read it the impugned order would not have been passed. Under the circumstances there is no room for doubt that the impugned order has been passed without prima facie being satisfied and recording satisfaction. I am accordingly of the considered opinion that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act along with its proviso. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-7-1990 is quashed. It is, however, made clear that it is open for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to pass another order of suspension in accordance with law and proceed with the enquiry at an early date. Petition allowed.