JUDGMENT M.M. Pareed Pillay, J. 1. Plaintiff who filed the suit for specific performance of Ext. A2 agreement is the appellant. The Sub Judge did not grant specific performance but directed the defendants to return the advance amount with 6% interest from the date of suit. The Sub Judge also found that the defendants have unnecessarily denied the execution of Ext. A2 and pleaded false discharge of the advance received by them. . 2. Contention of the counsel for the plaintiff (appellant) is that the Sub Judge did not exercise judicial discretion bestowed upon him under the Specific Relief Act and arbitrarily and fancifully directed the defendants to return the advance amount and this has caused serious prejudice and hardship to him. 3. Ext. A1 agreement is admitted by the defendants. As per Ext. A1 defendants agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 12,250/- and received Rs. 1,000/- as advance. The agreement was executed on 11-3-1977 As per Ext. A1 agreement the sale deed was to be executed by the defendants on payment of the balance sale consideration by the plaintiff on or before 11-9-1977. It is also admitted that subsequent to Ext. A1 plaintiff paid, Rs. 1, 500/- on 13-4-1977 and Rs. 500/- on 4-5-1977 towards the balance sale consideration. Those payments are acknowledged by the second defendant in Ext. A1. Plaintiff asserted that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement by paying the balance sale consideration but the defendants dodged performance of their part of the agreement. 4. In view of the pendency of land acquisition proceedings plaintiff and defendants entered into another agreement on 9-9-1977 (Ext. A2) extending the period to execute the sale deed by 15 days after the land acquisition proceedings were dropped. On knowing of the Government's decision that the land will not be acquired plaintiff demanded the defendants to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance sale consideration. As the defendants were not willing to do so, the plaintiff sent a lawyer notice on 23-9-1978 demanding execution of the sale deed. Defendants sent a reply notice denying the execution of Ext. A2 and contending that they had already paid back the advance amount received by them in the presence, of mediators. 5. As the defendants were not willing to do so, the plaintiff sent a lawyer notice on 23-9-1978 demanding execution of the sale deed. Defendants sent a reply notice denying the execution of Ext. A2 and contending that they had already paid back the advance amount received by them in the presence, of mediators. 5. On a consideration of the evidence the Sub Judge held that the evidence of D.W. 1 and 2 cannot be believed and accepting the evidence on the side of the plaintiff it was found that Ext. A2 was executed by the defendants on 9-9-1977. The contention of the defendants that they have paid back the entire advance amount received by them . was also rejected. 6. Having found so, the learned Sub Judge considered the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of the agreement. He considered the hardship that is likely to be suffered by the defendants and held that the plaintiff is only entitled to the return of the advance amount. This finding is challenged by the plaintiff on the ground that it is wholly arbitrary and whimsical. In view of the false denial of Ext.A2 and false plea of return of the advance amount received by the defendants they do not really deserve any equitable consideration by the Court. Approach of the Trial Court that defendants have no other property and so plaintiff is not entitled to the decree for specific performance is wrong. When there is a binding contract Court has to enforce it in the absence of special circumstances. The contention of the defendants that they have no other property is certainly not a special circumstance as they agreed to sell the same being hilly aware of it. 7. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Thus, though the Court is vested with discretion in decreeing specific performance the discretion cannot be arbitrary or whimsical. S.20 (2) enumerates the cases in which the Court may properly exercise . discretion not to decree specific performance. Thus, though the Court is vested with discretion in decreeing specific performance the discretion cannot be arbitrary or whimsical. S.20 (2) enumerates the cases in which the Court may properly exercise . discretion not to decree specific performance. In a case where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant the Court may exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. There is no, evidence in the case to hold that at the time of entering into Ext. A1 and Ext. A2 agreements the plaintiff was in a dominant position to influence the defendants or that he had taken any unfair advantage. It is in evidence that the plaintiff made efforts to see that the land acquisition proceedings were withdrawn. But for the efforts of the plaintiff the property would have been acquired by the State. From the evidence in the case it is clear that when the defendants became aware of the fact that the land acquisition proceedings were withdrawn they chose to retract from Ext.A2 agreement. In the back drop of the evidence it cannot be held that the performance of the contract would involve any hardship on the defendants which they could not foresee. Defendants could not establish that the performance of the contract would cause hardship to them which they could not foresee at the time of agreement. On the other hand, non performance of the agreement would cause hardship upon the plaintiff who strived hard to have the land acquisition proceedings withdrawn. 8. Defendants cannot contend that after Exts. A1 and A2 the value of the property has gone high and so it will be inequitable to grant decree of specific performance. Explanation.1 to S.20 makes it clear that mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to defendants or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). 9. Mere hardship on the defendants will not be sufficient to refuse specific performance. There must be evidence of such hardship being caused to the defendants which they did not foresee at the time of contract. 9. Mere hardship on the defendants will not be sufficient to refuse specific performance. There must be evidence of such hardship being caused to the defendants which they did not foresee at the time of contract. It is equally important that the non performance should not involve hardship on the plaintiff. S.20(3) stipulates that the Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. 10. False allegations in the plaint would disentitle the "plaintiff to get relief of specific performance. Equally so, false defence contentions disentitle the defendants to plead that discretion may be exercised in their behalf. As the contentions of the defendants are found to be mendacious, the Sub Judge ought not have denied the plaintiff the decree of specific performance. In Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal ( AIR 1979 SC 1241 = 1979 (4) SCC 393 ) the Supreme Court held that the ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted and that it ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute inadequate relief. As there is unassailable evidence that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, specific performance should not have been denied on the ground of commiseration. The Sub Judge refused to grant decree for specific performance on the ground that the defendants have no other property. This is hardly a ground to refuse specific performance particularly because the defendants were aware of the impending land acquisition proceedings. Moreover, there is no evidence that they do not have any other property. D.W. 1 and 2 in their evidence did not say a word that there was any difficulty for them to purchase any other property. In the original written statement defendants denied g execution of Ext. A2 and raised no contention that grant of specific performance would be onerous or inequitable to them. Only in the additional written statement filed after the examination of DW. 1 and 2 that they contended that they have no other property. By merely filing an additional written statement and without adducing any evidence in support of the pleadings they cannot be heard to say that they have no other property. Only in the additional written statement filed after the examination of DW. 1 and 2 that they contended that they have no other property. By merely filing an additional written statement and without adducing any evidence in support of the pleadings they cannot be heard to say that they have no other property. Even if they have no other property, they cannot retract from the agreement. 11. Hardly there is any circumstance or material to deny decree of f specific performance to the plaintiff. Meticulously considering all facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be held that the suit has been filed by the plaintiff to gain any unfair advantage over the defendants. For the reasons stated above, I hold that plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance. Judgment and decree of the Trial Court are set aside and the suit is decreed in terms of the plaint for specific performance. The appeal stands allowed with costs.