This review petition is directed against the judgment of this Court dated July 12, 1988 in Civil Revision No. 307 of 1988. 2. The petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a suit for eviction of the defendants on the ground that they were defaulters and that the suit house was bona fide required by the plaintiff for his personal use. The trial Court held the defendants to be defaulters and decreed the suit for eviction. On appeal, the appellate Court came to a conclusion that the defendants were not defaulters and allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Against the judgment of the appellate Court, Civil Revision No. 307/88 was filed before this Court. In the revision petition, it was contended by the plaintiff that the finding arrived at by the learned appellate Court on the point of default in payment of rent, was perverse, and that it was not based on any evidence on record. This Court on perusal of the evidence on record held that the finding of fact arrived at by the appellate Court was based on materials on record and as such the same could not be interfered with. The revision petition was accordingly, dismissed. The plaintiff has now filed the present review petition. 3. I have heard Mr. P. N. Gaswami, learned counsel for the review petitioner. The submission of Mr. Goswami is that having refused to interfere with the finding of the appellate Court in regard to default in payment of rent, this Court should have examined whether the appellate Court could have sustained the decree for eviction on another ground specified in clause(f) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, hereinafter "the Act". The aforesaid clause permits eviction in a case where the tenant has built, acquired or been allotted a suitable residence. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel. I have also perused the revision petition. I do not find that any such case was pleaded by the petitioner in the revision petition. The learned counsel fairly conceded that such a ground was neither taken in the revision petition nor it was argued at the time of hearing. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel. I have also perused the revision petition. I do not find that any such case was pleaded by the petitioner in the revision petition. The learned counsel fairly conceded that such a ground was neither taken in the revision petition nor it was argued at the time of hearing. He, however, contended that there is no bar in allowing him to urge in the review petition a point which was neither taken in the revision petition nor argued at the time of hearing if it is necessary to do so to meet the ends of justice. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel, I, however, find it difficult to accept the legal proposition that in exercise of power of review the Court can re-hear the matter, allow the parties to argue on points not urged earlier in the revision petition or at the time of hearing, and to give a fresh decision. 4. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek review of a judgment delivered by the Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a subst­antial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. ( Sajan Singh ts. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 1 SCR 933 at p. 948, Northern India Caterers ts. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 , 677). It is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except 'where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility'. (Chandra Kanta vs. Sheikh Habib, (1975) 3 SCR 935 ; Northern India Caterers vs. Lt Governor, Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 . 678). 5. The learned counsel for the review petitioner also referred to the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in support of his submission that the power of review is very wide he placed reliance on the expression "or for any other sufficient reason” used therein. 678). 5. The learned counsel for the review petitioner also referred to the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in support of his submission that the power of review is very wide he placed reliance on the expression "or for any other sufficient reason” used therein. The submission, in my opinion, loses sight of the fact that the words "or for any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously", that is, excusable failure to bring to the notice of the Court new and important matters, or error apparent on the face of the record. Chajjuram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 ). Besides, as observed by the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (supra)whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court cannot be reconsidered except where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The interpreta­tion of Order 47 Rule 1 has to be in accordance with the law enunciated by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court: 6. Turning to the facts of the instant case, the admitted position is that the only point raised in the revision petition before this Court was whether the finding of the appellate Court that the tenant was not a defaulter, was perverse or not. This Court held the finding to be based on materials and evidence on record and refused to inter­fere with the same. No other point was urged. It appears that at no stage the eviction was sought for on the ground of fulfilment of conditions specified in clause (f) to section 5 (1) of the Act. The petitioner has thus not been able to make out a case for review of the judgment of this Court delivered on the revision petition. la fact, what the learned counsel for the review petitioner is seeking for is a rehearing on a point not urged earlier and a fresh decision' I am afraid it cannot be allowed by way of review. No glaring omission or patent mistake or grave error could be pointed out in the judgment delivered by this Court in the revision petition, 7. No glaring omission or patent mistake or grave error could be pointed out in the judgment delivered by this Court in the revision petition, 7. In view of the aforesaid, I am satisfied that no case has been made out for review and accordingly, the review petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.