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1990 DIGILAW 87 (ORI)

KAILASH CHANDRA MAHANTA v. GANESHWAR AMANTA, OFFICER-IN CHARGE OF BARIA POLICE STATION

1990-03-14

ARIJIT PASAYAT

body1990
JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The Petitioner has assailed the revisional order dated 4-3-1986 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar holding that the cognizance taken against the opposite party by the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Champua was illicit on account of absence of sanction u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'). 2. A brief narration of the factual position is necessary to highlight the various features of tbis case. The Petitioner filed a complaint in tbe Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Champua, alleging certain illegal acts to have been committed by the opposite party, who was at the relevant time the officer-in-charge of Baria Police Station in Keonjhar district. The allegations as contained in the complaint petition were in essence that the aforesaid Police Officer demanded bribe from the Petitioner, illegally restrained a relative of the Petitioner and unlawfully took possession of a cycle and certain other articles without authority of law. In support of the complaint, the Petitioner examined himself, and three other witnesses were also examined to corroborate the complainant's stand. On being satisfied about existence of a prima facie case, the learned S.D.J.M. took cognizance under Sections 343, 379 and 506, Indian Penal Code (for short 'I.P.C.') and summoned the opposite party to appear in Court. The aforesaid order taking cognizance was challenged by the opposite party in Criminal Revision No. 9 of 1985 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar. The revisional Court was of the view that the cognizance was improper in the absence of sanction u/s 197 of the Code. It was observed that the acts complained of had sufficient nexus with the official duty of the opposite party and therefore, in the absence of a sanction the matter could not have proceeded. The judgment in revision as passed by the learned Sessions Judge has been assailed in this revision appplication. 3. Mr. S.N. Satpathy, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, strenuously urged that the acts complained of had absolutely no nexus with the official duty of the opposite party and therefore, the absence of sanction did not vitiate the proceeding at all. The judgment in revision as passed by the learned Sessions Judge has been assailed in this revision appplication. 3. Mr. S.N. Satpathy, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, strenuously urged that the acts complained of had absolutely no nexus with the official duty of the opposite party and therefore, the absence of sanction did not vitiate the proceeding at all. The revisional Court has based its conclusions about the link between the acts alleged of and the official duty of the opposite party by observing that even though the cycle and the other articles were taken from the Petitioner or his relative, were subsequently returned and they may have been taken for the purpose of investigation. It has also taken into consideration an alleged contemporaneous initiation of a proceeding against the Petitioner and some of his relatives to conclude that the filing of complaint was a retaliatory act. These seem to have weighed in the niind of the revisional Court while dealing with the aspect of link between the alleged act and the official duty. In spite of notice, the opposite party has not chosen to appear. On consideration of the submissions made and the material on record, I feel the impugned order is defeasible. It would be relevant to mention here that the revisional Court did not take pains to find out that the detailed circumstances pertaining to the case which was instituted against the Petitioner and his relatives. The same is the subject-matter of G.R. Case No. 44 of 1985. The order dated 15-2-1985 passed therein goes to show that the original F.I.R. which was supposed to have been lodged on 10-2-1985 was not transmitted to the Court till 15-2-1985. The learned S.D.J.M. called for an explanation from the officer-in-charge (present opposite party) to explain this lapse. It appears from the order dated 27-3-1985 that the explanation given did not find favour with the learned S.D.J.M. Therefore, the conclusion, as has been made by the revisional Court, that the complaint was a device to settle score with the opp. party is hardly acceptable. In any event, the same is inconsequential. It is not borne out from record that while taking the cycle and other articles any seizure list was prepared. At least there is nothing on the record to suggest that siIch a seizure list was prepared though it is a legally mandatory requirement. party is hardly acceptable. In any event, the same is inconsequential. It is not borne out from record that while taking the cycle and other articles any seizure list was prepared. At least there is nothing on the record to suggest that siIch a seizure list was prepared though it is a legally mandatory requirement. Therefore, the very presumption that the opp. party may have taken those articles for the purpose of investigation hardly stands to reason. It is not an absolute requirement in law that wherever any of the named categories of authorities or officers are proceeded against, sanction u/s 197 is imperative. The object of the section is no doubt to guard against vexatious proceedings against certain categories of authorities and ofiicials. At the same time it is no part of the requirement of law to set any of them above the common law. If he commits an offence, he has no peculiar privilege. It is only when one of his. official acts is alleged to be an offence, the State will not allow him to be prosecuted without its sanction. Section 197 embodies one of the exceptions to the general rule laid down in Section 190 that cognizance of any offence may be taken by the Magistrates enumerated therein. The basic requirement of Section 197, therefore, is that the delinquent officer must be discharging an official duty and the act complained of was a part thereof and, therefore, had dose nexus or link with the same. No straight jacket formula can be laid down as to the tests Vol. 69 to be applied in such a case. But one thing is crystal clear official position should not be used as a cloak to defend the act complained of. There must be a reasonable link and not a fanciful one. Demand or receipt of bribe by an official is by no stretch of imagination an act in discharge of official duty (See AIR 1948 128 (Privy Council) and AIR 1939 43 (Federal Court) . The view of the Federal Court was echoed in the case of Baijnath Gupta and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, . In my view, the use of the expression "while acting" determines the nature of the act complained of. The view of the Federal Court was echoed in the case of Baijnath Gupta and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, . In my view, the use of the expression "while acting" determines the nature of the act complained of. Each case has to be examined in the light of the offence alleged against the accused in order to ascertain whether Section 197 is applicable or not and as to whether he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The privilege of immunity from prosecution without sanction is only extended to acts which can be shown to have been done in the discharge of official duty, or in purported exercise of such power. An offence arising cut of official position but not purported to be a part there of, does not require any sanction u/s 197. The section is neither to be too narrowly construed nor too widely. It is not the "duty" which requires examination so much as the "act" because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. (See Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava Vs. N.P. Mishra, ). As held by the apex Court in the case of Pukhraj Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another the question whether sanction was necessary might have to depend upon from stage to stage having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. At the cognizance stage, the trial Court was concerned withonly point, viz., whether on the facts alleged in the complaint, " it could be said that the acts were done in purported exercise of his duties. It is always open to a Court to consider the necessity of a sanction on the basis offactssubsequently coming to light during the course of judicial enquiry, or, during the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial. At those stages it is open to the accused to place materials on record to show that his official duties and the acts complained of were inter-related, so as to attract the protection Afforded by Section 197. (See Bakhshish Singh Brar Vs. Gurmej Kaur and Another, ). Judged in this background, cognizance taken cannot be faulted in the absence of sanction. (See Bakhshish Singh Brar Vs. Gurmej Kaur and Another, ). Judged in this background, cognizance taken cannot be faulted in the absence of sanction. No material was pleaded before the revisional Court to show that the alleged act was in purported exercise of the official duty of the accused-opposite party. In the instant case that stage had not arrived and therefore, the revisional Court acted with material illegality and irregularity in setting aside the order passed by the learned S.D.J.M. taking cognizance against the opposite party. It was not available to the revisional Court to draw inferences from presumptions, which, as indicated above, were not supported by any material in that regard. Any observation made herein should not weigh with the trial Court while dealing with the case on merits. In the result, the revision application is allowed. Application allowed. Final Result : Allowed