JUDGMENT Amarendra Nath Varma, J. - This group of petitions is directed against the levy of tahbazari by the respondent Municipal Board of Ujhani, district Bhudan on the operators of buses, trucks, tempos, etc. for stopping at a public place or a public road or the roadside patri within the limits of the said municipality for the purpose of doing the business of picking up or setting down passengers or loading or unloading of goods under the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board on 1-4-1986 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned bye-laws'). As the issues raised are identical the petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. These are the essential facts. The petitioners are operators of buses and claim to hold permits for various routes in the course of which they pass through the limits of the respondent Municipal Board. The case set up by the petitioners is very simple. As operators they simply pass and repass through the limits of the municipality without stopping and occupying any land or street vesting in the respondent Board. The allegation is on account of corridor restrictions they cannot halt within the Board's limits. The others allege that no doubt they stop to pick up or set down passengers but they do so only on the public road or roadside patri which vests in the Government and not in the Municipal Board. They further assert that they do not enter the town nor occupy or use any public place or street vesting in the respondent Board. Consequently the latter cannot levy and collect any tahbazari from them for such use. 3. The Municipal Board emphatically denies the allegations made in the petitions and asserts that the petitioners do stop, use and occupy and do business over the bus adda (parking place) maintained by the Board. It is only when the petitioners use and occupy public land or street vesting in it and do business thereon that the Board charges tahbazari. Such a levy, it is contended, is perfectly valid and permissible under the U.P. Municipalities Act and impugned bye-laws. The clear stand taken by the Board is that fee is chargeable only if the operators stop and use public land or public road or roadside patri for the purpose of their business, namely, picking passengers or setting them down or loading or unloading goods carried by them. The clear stand taken by the Board is that fee is chargeable only if the operators stop and use public land or public road or roadside patri for the purpose of their business, namely, picking passengers or setting them down or loading or unloading goods carried by them. Shri A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the Municipal Board was very can did about it and submitted that the respondent Municipal Board is not, and indeed cannot charge any fee from the operators merely because they happen to be passing or passing through a public road. He further submitted that it is neither realising nor does it claim to realise tahbazari for use and occupation of any public read not vesting in, or the management of which may have been entrusted to the Municipal Board. 4. Having set out the pleas and stand taken by the parties, we take up the issue regarding the validity of the bye-laws first. The bye-laws, as mentioned above, provide for levy of tahbazari for the use and occupation of public road or public land or roadside patri for the purpose of or in connection with the business of these operators of setting down passengers or loading or unloading goods. Such a levy is clearly referable to Section 293 of the U.P. Municipalities Act which provides: 293. Fees for use otherwise than under a lease of municipal property- (1) The board may charge fees to be fixed by bye-law or by public auction or by agreement, for the use or occupation (otherwise than under a lease) of any immovable property vested in, or entrusted to the management of, the board, including any public street or place or which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise. (2) Such fees may either be levied along with the fee charged under Section 294 for the sanction of licence or permission or may be recovered in the manner provided by Chapter VI. 5. In the present case, the fee (Tahbazari) has been fixed under the impugned bye-laws. Section 298 of the Act vests bye-laws making on the Board. (2) Such fees may either be levied along with the fee charged under Section 294 for the sanction of licence or permission or may be recovered in the manner provided by Chapter VI. 5. In the present case, the fee (Tahbazari) has been fixed under the impugned bye-laws. Section 298 of the Act vests bye-laws making on the Board. In particular, Section 298(b) applies which reads: "permitting, prohibiting or regulating the use or occupation of any or all public streets or places by itinerant vendors or by any person for the sale of articles, or for the exercise of any calling or for the setting up any booth or stall, and providing for the levy of fees for such use or occupation. 6. Read together Sections 293 and 298(b) leave little room for doubt that Board had a clear right and power to levy the impugned fee. It is plain and simple fee for the use and occupation of immovable properties-public place or public road, roadside patri here-vested in or entrusted to the management of the Board. The power to frame the impugned bye-laws cannot hence be doubted. We must, however, qualify this by the observation that the right to levy tahbazari under the impugned bye-laws must be confined to the public places or public road or roadside patri which vest in or are entrusted to the management of the Board. As the power to levy the fee is derived by the Board under Section 293, it goes without saying that the bye-laws must be held to be confined only to the use of public land or public road or roadside patri which vests in or entrusted to the management of the Board. Sri A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent Municipal Board, very fairly stated before us that the bye-laws cannot enable the Board to levy tahbazari for the use and occupation of public roads or roadside patri or other public places which do not vest in the Board or which have not been entrusted to its management. Sri Sharma, again very fairly, conceded that the Municipal Board is not and indeed cannot claim to realise tahbazari from the operators if they stop to pick up or set down passengers on the road or roadside patri which belongs to the Government or which may have been entrusted to the Public Works Department. 7. Sri Sharma, again very fairly, conceded that the Municipal Board is not and indeed cannot claim to realise tahbazari from the operators if they stop to pick up or set down passengers on the road or roadside patri which belongs to the Government or which may have been entrusted to the Public Works Department. 7. Sri L.P. Naithani and Sri M. Katju also, on their part, equally fairly conceded that if the operators use and occupy the public land or public road or the roadside patri which vests in the Board or which has been entrusted to the Board's management they would be liable to pay tahbazari in terms of the impugned bye-laws. 8. We may also add that the challenge to the impugned bye-laws stands squarely covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Kusum v. Town Area, Babarpur and another, 1990 (16) ALR 787. In the case a bye-law analogous to that under review in the present case came up for consideration. The Bench considered various pronouncements, both of this Court and the Supreme Court, touching the controversy and on a survey of the same upheld the right of the Town Area to levy and realise tahbazari from the operators as the operators were using and occupying public road belonging to or managed by it. The Bench considered a decision of this Court and observed: In the case of Om Prakash v. Municipal Board, Debai, Bulandshahr, 1987 (13) ALR 732, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners themselves this Court while striking down the impugned bye-law hastened to clarify the position with regard to the right of the Local Bodies to realise Tahbazari for the use of its land in the following words: 'We wish to clarify at this place that the Board has a right to charge for the use of its land by arriving at agreements or otherwise from bus operators.' The Bench also placed reliance on another passage from the decision in Om Prakash's case (supra). The passage reads: "In Municipal Council Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd., 1973 SC 2420, it was held that a Municipal Board could not compel the persons plying the motor buses for hire to park buses at place specified by it but it was further said: 'However, if a municipality provides for a bus stand without compelling every body to use it, a fee can be charged on bus operators using it voluntarily.' Anyone who parks the bus the land belonging the Board, it can charge for its use like any other owner. In our case, the Board says that a regular bus stand has been provided, but assuming that not to be so, since disputed the charge can be still made for the use and occupation of land belonging to the Board. The Supreme Court has held in Municipal Council Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multi Purpose Co-operative Society Ltd., (supra); "No body has a fundamental right to use a land belonging to another without that person's permission of paying for it if necessary. While the Municipal Council has no power to compel persons plying motor buses for hire to use only the Municipal bus stand for the purpose of taking up and setting down passengers, there can be no objection to its providing a bus stand for anybody who chooses to use it voluntarily and to such person being required to pay for such use. In that sense propositions 2 and 3 put forward by Mr. Chagla are unexceptionable. If for this permission the formality of the issue of a permit is followed and a fee is charged it cannot be said to be objectionable. In that case the charges may be such as may be agreed upon between the parties, i.e. if the Municipality charges a certain rate only people who are prepared to pay at that rate would resort to that place. 9. Having quoted the relevant extracts from the decision in the case of Om Prakash (supra) the Bench in the case of Smt. Kusum (supra) summed up the law thus:-- "These observations fully apply to the present case. The impugned Tahbazari is being levied because the petitioners use and occupy public road and public land maintained by the Town Area. They park their vehicles and do business of selling tickets at the bus stand and on the roadside patri. The impugned Tahbazari is being levied because the petitioners use and occupy public road and public land maintained by the Town Area. They park their vehicles and do business of selling tickets at the bus stand and on the roadside patri. They even park their vehicles and stay overnight. These acts clearly attract the application of the impost. In the case of Town Area, Bhagaon v. KDGC (P) Ltd., Ghaziabad 1974 ALJ 231, the Bench examined the true character of the impost called tahbazari. After referring to various texts and legal dictionaries, the Bench held that tahbazari is an impost which is related to the occupation of some ground in a market or public place for the purpose of carrying on some trade and partakes the character of ground rent. The respondent Town Area claims that in substance it is doing no more than charging rent for the occupation of the public road or public land within its limits. The imposition of the tahbazari by the first respondent is thus clearly supported by law. (Emphasis added). 10. These observations clearly support the proposition that the tahbazari is a fee for the use and occupation of a land or road which belongs to the Local Body and that such a right inheres in the Local Body as it would do in any other owner or trustee of immovable property. What has been stressed is that the Town Area Committee was doing neither more nor less than charging Tahbazari for the use and occupation of the land belonging to it by the operators for the purpose of their business as transporters or stage carriages. 11. The provisions of the U.P. Town Area Act are in pari malaria with those of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The dictum of this Court in the case of Smt. Kusum (supra) is, therefore, clearly attracted to the controversy in hand. Learned counsel for the petitioners also did not dispute the proposition of law enunciated in that case. They did not question the right of the respondent Municipal Board to levy Tahbazari if the operators use and occupy for the purposes of their business any land or road or roadside patri vesting in or entrusted to the management of the Board. Learned counsel for the petitioners also did not dispute the proposition of law enunciated in that case. They did not question the right of the respondent Municipal Board to levy Tahbazari if the operators use and occupy for the purposes of their business any land or road or roadside patri vesting in or entrusted to the management of the Board. More specifically, they did not dispute the power of the respondent Board to levy and collect Tahbazari from the operators who park their vehicles over the bus Adda (Parking place) earmarked by the Board over plot No. 1008 belonging to the Municipal Board. 12. To sum up, the settled legal position seems to be that Tahbazari cannot be levied on the vehicles merely passing or repassing through National Highway or a road not vesting in the Local Authority nor entrusted to its management but falling within the limits of that Local Authority. Nor can the Municipal Board or the Legal Authority demand and collect Tahbazari from the operators even if they set down or pick up passengers or do any other business on a roadside patri which does not vest in or is not entrusted to the management of the Municipal Board or Local Authority as such a demand would travel beyond the scope of the bye-laws under consideration. The Municipal Board would, however, be entitled and is fully authorised to charge Tahbazari from the operators who stop, occupy and use a public place or public road or roadside patri for the purpose of picking up or setting down passengers or doing any other business such as loading or unloading goods, etc. if the public place or road or roadside patri belongs to or is entrusted to the management of the Municipal Board. Such a power clearly and undoubtedly flows from Sections 293 and 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The impugned levy is valid and proper and the challenge to the same must be rejected. 13. In view of what has been stated above the petitions are disposed of as follows:-- 1. Such a power clearly and undoubtedly flows from Sections 293 and 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The impugned levy is valid and proper and the challenge to the same must be rejected. 13. In view of what has been stated above the petitions are disposed of as follows:-- 1. The respondent Municipal Board was entitled and still is to levy and collect Tahbazari under the impugned by-laws from the operators, if they stop, use and occupy public land or public road or roadside patri in connection with its business if the public land or public road or roadside patri vests in or entrusted to the engagement of the Board. In particular, the levy of Tahbazari in respect of the bus stand over plot No. 1008 was and still is valid and proper. 2. The respondent Board is, however, not entitled to levy and collect Tahbazari from such of the petitioners who merely pass and repass through the limits of the municipality. The respondent Board is also not empowered to levy and collect Tahbazari from such petitioners, if any, who stop to set down or pickup passengers on a public road or roadside patri belonging to the State Government and/or managed by the Public Works Department. 14. The interim orders passed by this Court on these petitions staying the collection of Tahbazari from the petitioners are discharged. As a result, the Municipal Board shall be entitled to recover the Tahbazari dues from such petitioners who had used and occupied public land or road or roadside patri vesting in or entrusted to the management of the Board during the pendency of the petition. 15. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.