ORDER 1. In the present writ application, the petitioner has challenged the Order No. 20 dated December 20, 1989 passed by the District Registrar at Alipore, District 24 Parganas (South) in Case No. 2 of 1988. 2. The facts of the case inter alia, are that one Sri Debesh Chandra Ghosh, since deceased, died on or about February 10, 1962 leaving behind him his two sons, namely, Shri Subroto Ghosh and Shri Satyabroto Ghosh, who are the respondent no.3 and 5 respectively, and two daughters namely, Smt. Manjula Roy and Smt. Sheuli Ghosh. The said Debesh Chandra Ghosh as the settler created a Trust in respect of premises no.7, Burdwan Road, Calcutta-27 by a deed dated June 2, 1950 under which, the sons' of the settler would hold the said property according to their shares during their life time as beneficiaries, and after their death the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 7 and 8 would get the said property absolutely. According to the said Trust Deed, the settler was the original trustee, and after his death, his wife Smt. Gita Ghosh, since deceased and his brother Bhakta Kumar Ghosh, since deceased, became the trustees and after them, the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 became the trustees of the said trustee estate. In the year 1987, disputes and differences arose between the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 regarding the partition of their joint properties, and they by an alleged agreement dated May, 27, 1987, referred their disputes to an arbitrator selected by them, being Sri Himadri Narayan Roy, the sister's husband of the respondent Nos. 3 and 5, for effecting the partition. During the pendency of the said arbitration proceeding, the respondent Nos. 3 and u agreed to bring the above trust property, namely, 7, Burdwan Road, Calcutta-27 within the said proceeding and as such entered into two agreements on January 1, 1988 for the said purpose. The said agreements dated January 1, 1988 were signed by the respondent No. u as the natural guardian farther of the writ petitioner who was a minor at that time. The writ petitioner, ultimately attained majority on or about January 14, 1989. The said agreements contained inter alia, a stipulation, that the respondent Nos. The said agreements dated January 1, 1988 were signed by the respondent No. u as the natural guardian farther of the writ petitioner who was a minor at that time. The writ petitioner, ultimately attained majority on or about January 14, 1989. The said agreements contained inter alia, a stipulation, that the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 would execute a registered deed of revocation of trust created by the aforesaid deed of settlement dated June 2, 1950 in respect of the premises no.7, Burdwan Road, Calcutta-27 and the said deed would be executed on behalf of the writ petitioner by the respondent no.5 after obtaining necessary permission from the Court and the respondent no.5 consequently, on or about February 12, 1988, filed 'an application before the learned district judge at Alipore, district 24-Parganas (South), inter alia, for permission to execute and register of Deed of Modification and/or Revocation of the aforesaid Trust Deed dated June 2, 1950 which gave rise to Misc. Judicial Case No. 39 of 1988 and the learned district judge by his Order No.2 dated February 19, 1988, allowed the said Misc. Judicial Case, inter alia, by passing the following order:- Ordered "That the Misc. Case be allowed. Sri Satyabroto Ghosh is permitted to execute and register the proposed deed of modification and/or revocation of the trust deed dated 2.6.1950, give consent to such modification and revocation and distribution of the properties in terms of the deed of partition and family arrangement and do such act or acts in connection therewith for and on behalf of his minor son Subhojit Ghosh and also to represent the said minor before the Arbitrator according to law." 3. On or about May 23, 1988 the proposed Deed of Modification of the Trust Deed dated June 2, 1950 was alleged to have been executed and the same was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar at Alipore, district 24-Parganas (South) on May 25, 1988. In the meantime, on May 24, 1988, the said arbitrator, Sri Himadri Narayan Roy made and published his award dealing with all the family properties of the parties including the aforesaid trust property, namely, 7, Burdwan Road, Calcutta-27. In the meantime, on May 24, 1988, the said arbitrator, Sri Himadri Narayan Roy made and published his award dealing with all the family properties of the parties including the aforesaid trust property, namely, 7, Burdwan Road, Calcutta-27. Subsequently, having come to know of the said acts on the part of the said trustees, the writ petitioner filed an application under the Indian Trust Act and the Guardians and Wards Act before the learned district judge at Alipore, district 24-Parganas (South) for recalling the aforesaid Order No. 2 dated February 19, 1988 passed in Misc. Judicial Case No. 39 of 1988 and the said application is still pending. The respondent no. 3 also filed the said award made by the petitioner dated 24th May, 1988 in this Hon'ble Court upon which Award Case No. 365 of 1988 was started and in the said case the writ petitioner had filed an application under S. 30 read with S. 33 of the Arbitration Act and obtained an interim order. The aforesaid award case and the application filed therein as stated above still pending. 4. As the sub-Registrar at Alipore refused to register the alleged Deed of Revocation of Trust, the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had initiated a proceeding before the respondent no. 2 purporting to be one under S. 73 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and the same was registered as Case No. 2 or 1988. The writ petitioner also filed an application in the said Case No. 2 of 1988 praying for setting aside the above Misc. Case No. 2 of 1988 and also praying for setting aside the Order dated February 19, 1988 passed in the aforesaid Misc. Judicial Case No. 39 of 1988 inter alia, on the grounds that the learned district judge at Alipore, district 24-Parganas (South) had acted without jurisdiction in granting permission to the respondent no. 5 to execute and register the proposed Deed of Modification and/or Revocation of the Trust dated June 2, 1950 and the said application of the writ petitioner was contested by the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 by filing; their written objection denying and disputing the material allegations of the petitioner. 5 to execute and register the proposed Deed of Modification and/or Revocation of the Trust dated June 2, 1950 and the said application of the writ petitioner was contested by the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 by filing; their written objection denying and disputing the material allegations of the petitioner. The writ petitioner also filed an application for stay of all further proceedings in the said Case No. 2 of 1988 till the disposal of his application for dismissal of the said case which was also opposed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 by filing their written objection and the respondent no. 2 by his Order No. 20 dated December 20, 1989, which is the impugned order, rejected the writ petitioner's said application for stay observing inter alia, that he was not competent to go into the points as raised by the writ petitioner in the said application. 5. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has attacked the impugned order inter alia, on the grounds that since the learned district judge at Alipore, South 24-Pargana, had acted illegally in granting permission to the respondent no. 3 to execute and register the Deed of Modification and/or Revocation of the Trust Deed dated June 2, 1950, by his order No.2 dated February 19, 1988 passed in Misc. Judicial Case No. 39 of 1988, inasmuch as, a trustee under the trust deed has no such right, the impugned order also cannot be sustained in law having a nexus with the said illegal order of the learned district judge. Mr. Mukherjee also has sought to explain the word jurisdiction by referring of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Official Trustee, West Bengal & other vs. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee & another, AIR 1969 SC 823 , wherein the well known Full Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Hirday Nath Roy vs. Ramchandra Barua Sarma (F.B.) ILR 48 Cal. 138; AIR 1921 Cal. 34, was referred to. 6. 138; AIR 1921 Cal. 34, was referred to. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Official Trustee, West Bengal and others (supra), was called upon to decide the legality and/or validity of the order of this Hon'ble Court, by which, this Hon'ble Court had ordered inter alia, permitting the settlor to the trust in question, to revoke the original clause in the trust deed, empowering the settler to alter quantum of interest given to each of the beneficiaries by will alone and to permit the said alteration being done by a deed inter vivos, and held that under S. 34 of the Trust Act (1882) the Court could have only given opinion, advice or direction on any presented question regarding the management or administration of the trust property and not on any other matters. The jurisdiction conferred on the Court under S. 34 is a limited jurisdiction and as such the order of this Hon'ble Court permitting the settlor to revoke the aforesaid clause in the trust deed and in its place to confer upon him the right to make the said alteration by deed inter vivos, was without jurisdiction of the Court. It was not merely a wrong order, or an illegal order, it was an order which the Court had no competence to make. It was not merely an order, that the Court should not have passed, but it was an order which the Court could not have passed, and therefore a void order. In the said decision the Supreme Court explained the meaning of the word jurisdiction referring to the observations made by Sir Asutosh Mookherjee, Acting Chief. justice, speaking for the Full Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Hirday Nath Roy (supra) and I also, cannot check the temptation to quote paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 at pages 827-28 of the said decision of the Supreme Court, wherein the classic observations of Sir Asutosh Mookherjee, Acting Chief justice, were quoted, giving fitting tribute to His Lordship, though the same are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case, which are as follows:- "13. What is meant by jurisdiction? This question is answered by Mukherjee, Acting Chief justice, speaking for the full bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hirday Nath Roy vs. Ramchandra Barua Sarma (F.B.) ILR 48 Cal. 138; AIR 1921 Cal. What is meant by jurisdiction? This question is answered by Mukherjee, Acting Chief justice, speaking for the full bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hirday Nath Roy vs. Ramchandra Barua Sarma (F.B.) ILR 48 Cal. 138; AIR 1921 Cal. 34, the learned judge explained what exactly is meant by jurisdiction. We can do no better than to quote his word. "In the order of Reference to a Full Bench in the case of Sukhlal vs. Tara Chand, (1905) ILR 33 Cal 68 (FB), it was stated that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a Court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it in other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance or matters presented in a formal way for its decision. An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact the authority by which the judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes, the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy, the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over the, the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the issues before the Court, the power or authority which is conferred upon a Court by the Legislature to hear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into effect, the power to enquire into the facts to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution. (Emphasis herein supplied) Proceeding further the learned Judge observed:- "This jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances. Thus, the jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, value and nature of the subject matter. The power of a tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject matters of prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial causes, acquisition of lands for public purposes, record of rights as between landlords and tenants. The power of a tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject matters of prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial causes, acquisition of lands for public purposes, record of rights as between landlords and tenants. This classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject-matter is obviously or a fundamental character. Given such jurisdiction, we must be careful to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction from existence of jurisdiction for fundamentally different are the consequences of failure to comply with statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The extent to which the conditions essential for creating and raising the jurisdiction of a Court or the restraints attaching to the mode of exercise of that jurisdiction, should be included in the conception of jurisdiction itself, is sometimes a question of great nicety, as is illustrated by the decisions reviewed in the order of reference in (1905) ILR 33 Cal 68 (FB) and Khosh Mohamed vs. Nazir Mahomed, (1905) ILR 33 Cal 352 (FB); See also the observation of Lord Parker in Raghunath vs. Sundar Das, ILR 42 Cal 72 = (AIR 1914 PC 129). We must not thus overlook the cardinal position that in order that jurisdiction may be exercised, there must be a case legally before the Court and a hearing as well as a determination. A judgment pronounced by Court without jurisdiction is void, subject to the well-known reservation that, when the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, the Court is competent to determine the question of jurisdiction, though the result of the enquiry may be that it has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter brought before it, Rashmoni Dasi vs. Gunada Sundari Dasi, 20 Cal LJ 218 = (AIR 1915 Cal. 49)." (Emphasis herein supplied). 14. 49)." (Emphasis herein supplied). 14. Finally the learned Judge quoted with approval the decision of Srinivas Aiyangar, J., in Thulijarma vs. Gopal, 32 Mad LJ 434 = (AIR 1918 Mad 1093) wherein Aiyangar, J., laid down that if a Court has jurisdiction to try a suit and has authority to pass orders of a particular kind, the fact that it has passed an order which it should not have made in the circumstances of the litigation does not indicate total want or loss of jurisdiction so as to render the order a nullity. (Emphasis herein supplied). 15. From the above discussion it is clear that before a Court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders sought of. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of the suit. Its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties." 7. The aforesaid two decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee are definitely authorities so far as the points at issue before the said Courts were concerned, but neither of the said judgments can be of any help to the petitioner, so far as the present case is concerned, inasmuch as, Supreme Court in its aforesaid decision, dealt with the scope and ambit of S. 34 of the Trusts Act, while the Full Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court as referred to above, dealt with the scope and ambit of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but none of the said decisions dealt with any provisions of the Indian Registration Act, particularly, regarding the registration of document under the said Act, or any order connected therewith like the present revisional application. According to me therefore, the judgments cited by Mr. Mukherjee as referred to above, are clearly distinguishable both on facts and law. 8. Mr. According to me therefore, the judgments cited by Mr. Mukherjee as referred to above, are clearly distinguishable both on facts and law. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has also contended, referring to S. 78 of the Indian Trust Act, that a trust can only be revoked where all the beneficiaries are competent to contract by their consent, and since at the time of the alleged revocation of the trust deed dated June 2, 1950, the petitioner, who was a beneficiary under the same, admittedly was a minor, he could not be said to be competent to contract for such revocation by giving his consent at. the material time, as he had attained majority only in January 1989 and the alleged Deed of Modification and/or Revocation was executed prior to his attainment of majority. According to Mr. Mukherjee, execution under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 means execution by a person entitled to execute or capable of executing any deed. Thus, Mr. Mukherjee contends, that the respondent no.2 ought to have stayed all further proceedings in Case No. 2 of 1988 pending before him, till the disposal of the .writ petitioner's application made before the learned district Judge, for setting aside his earlier order of granting permission to revoke the trust deed as referred to above. 9. Mr. Mitra, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent no.3, however, has contended inter alia, that the Registrar concerned namely, the respondent no.2 has no jurisdiction to go into the question as to the validity of the order of the learned district judge at Alipore, district South 24-Parganas, passed in the aforesaid Misc. Judicial Case No. 39 of 1988 granting permission to the respondent no.3 to modify or revoke the Deed of Trust in question, while dealing with an application under s. 73 of the Indian Registration Act, as the respondent no.2 is to act according to the provisions of the Indian Registration Act only, and not according to the provisions of the Trust Act, and his powers are confined solely within the provisions of the Registration Act and he cannot travel beyond the same. Mr. Mr. Mitra also refers to Section 74 of the Registration Act and submits, that the scope of enquiry by a Registrar, while dealing with an application under S. 73 of the Act is also limited to S. 74 of the said Act, inasmuch as, he can only enquire as to whether the document, presented for registration, has been executed, and whether the requirements of law for the time being in force, have been complied with by the person presenting the document for registration. 10. Mr. Mitra contends further that in the case of registration of a document under the Indian Registration Act, the Registering Authority cannot go into any matter affecting the order of a court of law, consequent to which, such registration is to be made, nor can the authority look into the genuineness of the document sought to be registered and the question as to the validity of the document, or the legality of the order, under which the document is being registered, has to be determined in an appropriate suit or proceeding properly framed for that purpose, and in support of his contentions, Mr. Mitra refers to several decisions of different High Courts including this Hon'ble Court, namely, the Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Rajlakhi Ghosh vs. Debendra Chandra Majumdar, ILR 22 Cal. 668; W.W. Broucke vs. Rojah Shaheb Bikram Shah, 14 CWN 12 and Nava Goundar vs. Krishnaswami Naicker, AIR 1945 Madras 465. 11. Mr. Mitra also refers to the provisions of Ss. 34 and 35 of the Registration Act regarding the scope of an enquiry to be made by the Registering Officer for registering a document and/or for its refusal, and contends that the scope of such enquiry before registration by the Registering Authority is quite limited, and the Registering Authority cannot travel beyond the ambits of the said Sections while making the enquiry, and the question regarding the validity or legality of as document does not fall within the purview of the said sections at all. 12. Lastly, Mr. 12. Lastly, Mr. Mitra also refers to S. 11 of the Trust Act and submits that the trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust and to obey the direction of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation, except as modified by the consent of all the beneficiaries being competent to contract, which consent may, for the purpose of S. 11, be given by a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, and contends further that since the revocation was made in the interest of the beneficiaries under the trust deed in question, and as the district judge at Alipore, district South 24-Parganas, judging the whole facts, gave consent or permission to the respondent no.3 to act as the guardian of the writ petitioner, who was a minor beneficiary under the said Trust at the relevant time, it could not be said that the alleged revocation was sought to be made for jeopardising or affecting the interest of the writ petitioner adversely. 13. Considering the submissions of the respective Counsel and going through the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, the contentions of Mr. Mitra are well founded. Before registering a document, the Registering Authority is to make an enquiry as per the provisions of S. 34 read with S. 35 of the Indian Registration Act, and the Registration Act does not give any power to the Registering Authority to go into the question of validity or legality of the document sought to be registered, which can only be gone into in an appropriate proceeding or suit but not in a proceeding under the Registration Act, and the Registering Authority, under the Indian Registration Act, is to act within the four corners of the said Act only, and cannot travel beyond the same. Moreover, in the case of W.W. Broucke (supra), in which the decision in Rajlakhi Ghosh (supra) was also referred to, it was clearly held inter alia, that the enquiry before the Registrar under S. 74 of the Indian Registration Act and the subsequent enquiry in Court are to be directed to two points only – (a) whether the document has been executed; and (b) whether certain requirements of the law for the time being have been complied with by the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, and in the case of Nail Goundar (supra) referring to the decision of this Hon'ble Court in 14 CWN 12, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Nail Goundar (supra) held inter alia, that the requirements of the law for the time being in force, as mentioned in clause (b) of S. 74 of the Registration Act, must be the requirements of the law relating to the registration or in other words it means the requirements under the Reistration Act. According to me, therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions clearly apply to the facts of the present case. 14. Thus, I hold, that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity and I find no reason to interfere with the same. 15. The writ application is, therefore, rejected without any order as to costs. Writ petition rejected.