Judgment :- The unfortunate plaintiff who lost in the courts below is the appellant herein. Both the courts have written unsustainable judgments negativing the claim of the plaintiff which is a public trust governed by a scheme framed under S. 92, C.P. Cin O.S. 59/1971 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai. 2. The suit is for recovery of possession of a house in Door No. 11, Visalam street, Andalpuram, Madurai. The property was leased out by the plaintiff to one Alagammal under Ex. A5 dated 10.11.1959 on a monthly rent of Rs. 10/-. As she was in arrears, a notice was issued to her on 29-8-1974 under Ex. A1 terminating her tenancy and calling upon her to hand over possession of the property. The notice was served on her on 30-8-1974 as evident from the postal acknowledgment marked as Ex. A2. She did not send the reply. She died in March 1975. The defendant claiming to be the legal heir of Alagammal entered into possession and resisted the claim of the plaintiff. Having no other go, the plaintiff resorted to court by filing the suit out of which this appeal arises. 3. Several contentions were raised by the defendant as follows:— The property that was leased to Alagammal was a vacant site and the superstructure was erected by her. The defendant being her brothers son was living with her and carrying on business along with her. After her death, the defendant has become entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. The suit has to fail as a notice under S.ll of the Act has not been issued. The suit is not maintainable even if the subject matt er of the lease was a building, as the plaintiff/trust is a private trust and not a public trust. The suit having been filed by the Managing Trustee alone without impleading the other trustees is not maintainable. 4. The trial court chose to accept the above contentions raised by the defendant and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the lower appellate court has confirmed the same. Hence the Second Appeal. 5. Unfortunately both the courts have not considered the relevant evidence on record and applied the correct principles of law to the facts of the case. 4. The trial court chose to accept the above contentions raised by the defendant and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the lower appellate court has confirmed the same. Hence the Second Appeal. 5. Unfortunately both the courts have not considered the relevant evidence on record and applied the correct principles of law to the facts of the case. On the question whether the subject matter of the lease was a vacant site or a superstructure, the courts below have proceeded on the footing that Alagammal was the owner of the superstructure as she had paid taxes therefor, Though reference has been made to Exs. A-1 and A-5, they have not been correctly understood by the courts below. Ex. A5 is a lease deed under which Alagammal became a tenant. That is the most important document in considering the question whether the subject matter of lease was a site or a building. Ex. A-5 expressly refers to house/shop. The Tamil words used are A reading ot the entire document shuws inai what was let out was the building in Door No. 11 in Visalam Street, Thirupparangundram Road, 11th Ward, Madurai Town. There was no protest by Alagammal at any time that the document did not describe the property correctly. No attempt was made by her to have the document rectified. If the property that was leased out was only a vacant site the parties would have certainly taken steps to describe the property correctly or at least rectified the document thereafter. The property that was dealt with was one belonging to a trust. Hence the parties to the document would have taken sufficient care to describe the property correctly and see that true recitals are made in the document. Ex. A1 is the notice of termination of tenancy issued by the plaintiff to Alagammal. That makes express reference to the house to be vacated by Alagammal on the termination of the tenancy. In three places, reference is made to the house. But yet the courts below have caught hold of an expression “place in the penultimate sentence in the notice and taken the view that the notice refers only to a place, i.e., a site and not a house, overlooking the references to house. In three places, reference is made to the house. But yet the courts below have caught hold of an expression “place in the penultimate sentence in the notice and taken the view that the notice refers only to a place, i.e., a site and not a house, overlooking the references to house. The reference to the place should undoubtedly be read along with the reference to the “house” and in the prior sentence and in the later sentence in the notice. The Tamil word meant the building in the context. There is no doubt whatever that the notice called upon Alagammal to vacate the housw. The notice proves that the subject matter of tenancy was the nouse itselt. It is significant that Alagammal lived for seven months after the receipt of the notice. Yet she did not send a reply. She did not make any claim under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. She did not say that the subject matter of lease was only a site and not a building. The defendant who claims to have been living with Alagammal and doing business could well have taken initiative and got issued a reply notice denying the averments contained in Ex A1. There is no explanation on the part of the defendant as to why a reply was not sent to Ex A1. Thus reading Exs. A-1 and A5 together, it is clear that the subject matter of lease was only a building and not a vacant site. 6. The mere fact that tax for the superstructure was paid by Alagammal would not prove her ownership of superstructure. No evidence has been produced to prove that she erected the superstructure. If she had constructed the building (sic) the defendant could have produced documents like bills for purchase of material, plan and permit for construction from the Municipality. The very fact that no such document has been produced by the defendant shows that his claim is false. 7. On the question whether the trust is a private trust or a public trust, the judgments of the courts below disclosed a deplorable state of affairs with regard to the understanding of the principles of law by the District Munsif as well as the Subordinate Judge. Neither of them has had a grasp of the fundamental of the law of trusts. Neither of them has had a grasp of the fundamental of the law of trusts. By a truncated reasoning, the courts below have held that the trust is a private trust. That view has been taken on the footing that the beneficiaries of the trust are the m embers of the Kasukara Chetty community, living in Madurai town. I wonder how such an idea was entertained by the courts below. Obviously neither of the courts has perused Schedule “B” to the scheme decree marked as Ex A4. Schedule B clearly sets out the objects of the trust The Schedule contains 21 items. All of them show that the beneficiaries are the members of the public. The trust that has to be performed comprises of Pooja and Mandagapadi in several temples. Several Kattalais are also founded. In the face of the recitals in Schedule B it is not at all possible to accept the contention of the defendant that the trust is a private trust. A perusal of the scheme decree and the various clauses thereof shows that the body of trustees shall be competent persons of Vysya Kasukara Chetty community bona fide residing in Madurai. Just because the trustees are to be selected from a particular community it would not mean that the beneficiaries of the trust are the members of the community. Even if it is so, the members of a particular community would certainly form part of a section of the public. So long as the benefit of the trust is not restricted to a particular family the trust is certainly a public trust as it gives benefit to the members or a community. As pointed out already this trust is for the benefit of the public at large and not to any family or particular community. Consequently, I hold that the plaint trust is a public trust 8. The defendant claims to be the nearest heir of Alagammal. Except his own ipsi dixit and the evidence of D.W. 2 who was working under him as a cooly, there is nothing on record to prove either the relationship of the defendant with Alagammal or his claim that he is the nearest heir of Alagammal. The defendant claims to be the nearest heir of Alagammal. Except his own ipsi dixit and the evidence of D.W. 2 who was working under him as a cooly, there is nothing on record to prove either the relationship of the defendant with Alagammal or his claim that he is the nearest heir of Alagammal. A Division Bench of this Court held in Rama Row v. Kttiya Goundou 1 that it is incumbent on a person seeking to succeed to property as an heir, affirmatively to establish the particular relationship which he puts forward and to satisfy the court that, to the best of his knowledge, there are no nearer heirs. The defendant has failed to discharge that burden. No doubt, in his evidence he asserted that he was the nearest heir of Alagammal. But, in the cross-examination he admitted that there was no document to prove that he was Alagamma Ps sisters son. He also admitted that he did not apply for a transfer of licence for the business in his name on Alagammals death. Nor did he pay sales-tax after the death of Alagammal for carrying on the business. The conduct of the defendant shows that he is not the heir of Alagammal. He is only a trespasser in the suit property. D.W. 2 admits that he is acquainted with the defendant for 20 years and that he was working under the defendant as a cooly. A perusal of the cross-examination of D.W. 2 shows that what he stated in his chief-examination has been contradicted by himself in the cross-examination. The evidence of D.W. 2 is not worthy of acceptance. Thus, there is nothing on record to prove that the defendant is the heir of Alagammal and entitled to continue as a tenant in the suit property. The finding of the courts below is unsustainable as there is no evidence to support the same. 9. As I have held that the subject matter of lease was a building, there is no question of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act being applied to this case. Consequently, the suit on the termina tion of the tenancy in favour of Alagammal, is maintainable. As regards the other trustees of the trust, by my order dated 5-10-1990, in C.R.P. No. 6695/90, I have impleaded them as par ties to the appeal. Consequently, the suit on the termina tion of the tenancy in favour of Alagammal, is maintainable. As regards the other trustees of the trust, by my order dated 5-10-1990, in C.R.P. No. 6695/90, I have impleaded them as par ties to the appeal. Hence the technical defect which was alleged to exist in the frame of suit has been rectified. Thus the suit is maintainable. 10. In the result, the appeal has to be allowed and the plaintiff has to succeed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit O.S. No. 188 of 1976 is decreed as prayed for. But, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.