ORDER Abdul Hadi, J. 1. C.M.P.No. 9708 of 1987 by defendants 2 to 4 and 7 prays for granting leave to the petitioners to file the appeal A.S.R.No. 52986 of 1986 as indigent persons. The suit, out of which the said appeal arises, viz., O.S.No. 262 of 1983 on the file of Sub Court, Vellore was filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein against the 3rd respondent-trust and other respondents and the petitioners herein, seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 9.8.1979 to sell the plaint schedule trust-properties. The suit was decreed. There are 9 trustees to the above said trust and after the disposal of the suit, a meeting of the trustees was convened, in which 7 trustees attended, and in the said meeting it was resolved by 4:3 majority not to prefer an appeal. The court-fee payable on the appeal comes to about Rs. 16,000. Now, the above said 3 trustees who voted against the said resolution along with another trustee have filed this petition to prefer the said appeal as indigent persons on the ground that the other trustees have refused to provide necessary fund for payment of court-fee for the appeal, despite request made to them by the petitioners. No doubt, initially a report was called for from the Government. That report no doubt shows that individually, the petitioners have substantial means. 2. But, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that since they are preferring this appeal, representing the trust, their individual possession of sufficient means for payment of court-fee should not be looked into. The learned Counsel cited Explanation III to Order 33, Rule 1, C.P.C. which runs as follows: Where the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity, the question whether he is an indigent person shall be determined with reference to the means possessed by him in such capacity. So, it is correct to say that the means possessed individually by the petitioners in their respective individual capacities should not be take into account if the appeal is preferred in a representative capacity, representing the trust in question. The trust admittedly has funds. So, it is correct to say that the means possessed individually by the petitioners in their respective individual capacities should not be take into account if the appeal is preferred in a representative capacity, representing the trust in question. The trust admittedly has funds. But the respondents 4 to 7 herein who are the other trustees of the trust and who were defendants 5, 6, 8 and 9 in the suit contend that after getting legal opinion, the Board of trustees had resolved that it was not worthwhile to prefer the appeal and that in such a situation the petitioners cannot be allowed to prefer the appeal representing the trust as indigent persons and that if the appeal is ultimately dismissed with costs, the trust could not be burdened with the said cost. The trust deed in question, viz., the document dated 20.11.1960 which was shown to me, specifically provides that if there is any disagreement among the trustees, the majority decision among them shall prevail and that the Managing Trustee has a casting vote. 3. However, while these petitions were argued before me, the said respondents made a reasonable offer to the petitioners stating that the trust would provide necessary funds to the petitioners for paying the abovesaid court-fee and that if the appeal ends in success, the petitioners need not pay back the said sum to the trust,' but that if the appeal fails, the petitioners should pay back the said sum with interest to the trust. On this suggestion the learned Counsel for the petitioners took time for consulting his clients. But subsequently, he reported to the Court that his clients were not agreeable to the said suggestion and so once again the petitions were argued on merits. 4. Now two questions arise for consideration. One is whether the petitioners, could sue, and are suing, in a representative capacity. The other is, in view of the above said offer made by the above said respondents and the refusal of the petitioners to accept the said offer, can the petitioners be allowed to prefer the appeal as indigent persons. The cause title of the memorandum of grounds of appeal sought to be filed does not show that the petitioners-appellants are preferring the appeal in a representative capacity, representing the above said trust. The cause title of the memorandum of grounds of appeal sought to be filed does not show that the petitioners-appellants are preferring the appeal in a representative capacity, representing the above said trust. Anyway, in view of the abovesaid resolution passed, the petitioners cannot prefer the appeal in such representative capacity within the meaning of the above said Explanation 3 of O. 33, R. 1, C.P.C. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited Janakirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer. But, even there, referring to the relevant clause in the trust deed in question, it was only held as follows: The clause recognises that in some matters decision may be by majority. But nevertheless it requires that once decision is reached either by unanimity or by majority, in giving effect to the decision and in conducting any given action in the execution of the trust, all the three must not. However, the petitioners can no doubt prefer the appeal in their individual capacities and also take action separately for damages against the other trustees for any alleged breach of trust committed by them in having executed the abovesaid agreement for alleged low price or otherwise or in having passed the abovesaid resolution not to file the appeal. In such a case, no doubt, they have to pay the court fee since they, in their individual capacities, have means. But, subsequently, if they succeed in the appeal and restore the property to the trust they can also claim from the trust the cost incurred by them for prosecuting the appeal. Further, the very fact that the said trust itself is one of the respondents in the proposed appeal shows that the petitioners cannot figure as appellants, representing the very same trust, in the proposed appeal Further, this Court held in Thunoli Kelu Nair v. Nambron Chirutheyi Amma and Ors. that in the suit by a member of Tavazhi on behalf of other members, the plaintiff cannot sue as a pauper since the Tavazhi was possessed of ample properties. It was so held despite the fact that the other members declined to provide funds for payment of court-fee. The said decision is also relied on in Vellingiri Naicken v. Patteswaraswami Devasthanam A.I.R.1949 Mad.714 and Pachamuthu Nadar v. Naga Pillai . 5. It was so held despite the fact that the other members declined to provide funds for payment of court-fee. The said decision is also relied on in Vellingiri Naicken v. Patteswaraswami Devasthanam A.I.R.1949 Mad.714 and Pachamuthu Nadar v. Naga Pillai . 5. Even assuming that the petitioners have right to prefer the appeal in a representative capacity, representing the trust, they cannot be allowed to prefer the appeal as indigent persons, in view of the above said offer by the other trustees to provide the petitioners necessary funds for payment of the court-fee. If the petitioners are of the opinion that the decree of the Court below was wrong and it should be reversed and if they are sure of success in the appeal, they do not stand to suffer at all since other trustees are ready to provide the necessary funds and in the event of success in the appeal, they would not call upon the petitioners to pay the funds provided. Since the said offer has not been availed of by the petitioners, it is not proper to allow them to prefer the appeal as indigent persons. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also cited Shri Ram Pershad v. Chhano Devi and Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Suhramanya Pillai (1942)1 M.L.J.272. In the decision first referred to above it was only held that a suit by a trustee against the other co-trustees for rendition of accounts was maintainable. It has no application to the present case since the present appeal is against the specific performance decree given in favour of the purchaser from the trust, even though he may be incidentally one of the said other trustees. Likewise, the decision second referred to above also has no application to the question in hand. 7. Hence C.M.P.No. 9708 of 1987 is dismissed. However, 6 weeks' time is given for payment of court-fee. In view of the above said order, C.M.P.Nos. 9709 and 11464 of 1987 are also dismissed.