JUDGMENT S.K. Seth, J. 1. Pursuant to an advertisement issued by the M.P. Public Service Commission, the petitioner Rudra Pratap Singh applied for the post of Civil Judge Class II as a Scheduled Tribe candidate and after appearing in the written examination was selected and recommended for appointment under the Scheduled Tribe quota vide intimation dated 8th May, 1987 sent to him by the Commission. Thereafter, since the petitioner's birth place and permanent residence were stated to be at Murar in Gwalior District, on an enquiry made by the State Government from the District authority concerned it was confirmed by the Additional Collector and District Magistrate, Gwalior vide his letter dated 2nd September, 1987 that the petitioner belonged to a Scheduled Tribe and was eligible to receive all facilities granted by the government to the candidates of such tribes. It was also confirmed vide the said letter that the requisite certificate to the above said effect had already been issued by the Scheduled Tribe Welfare Branch of the office of Collectorate, Gwalior in favour of the petitioner on 6th December, 1984. In the said certificate, it had been certified that the petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Tribe of "Gond" in Gwalior District. 2. After the abovesaid enquiry and verification had been made, the petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge Class II vide order dated 12th November, 1987 issued by the State Government. Under the terms of his appointment, the petitioner worked as a trainee Judge at Guna for a period of six months w.e.f. 12th November, 1987. Thereafter, after completion of his training, he was posted as Civil Judge Class II at Raigarh on probation for a period of two years. It was while he was so working as Civil Judge Class II at Raigarh that vide the impugned order dated 1st October, 1988 (Annexure-K) issued by the State Government his appointment order dated 12th November, 1987 was revoked with retrospective effect on the ground that on making further investigations pursuant to a complaint received against him it was found that the petitioner did not belong to any Scheduled Tribe and that the appointment order dated 12th November, 1987 had been issued to him on the basis of wrong facts and a false certificate. It is being aggrieved by the said order that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in this court. 3. It is being aggrieved by the said order that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in this court. 3. Now, in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, we need not go into the merits of the question whether as alleged by the petitioner he belonged to the Scheduled Tribe of 'Gond' in Gwalior District and as such his appointment as Civil Judge Class II under the Scheduled Tribe quota was legal and valid or whether as alleged by the State Government respondent No. 1 the petitioner had obtained a false certificate as regards belonging to a Scheduled Tribe and as such his appointment under the said quota was null and void. In fact, in our opinion, this is not the proper forum for determination of any such question. The limited questions with which we are concerned in this writ petition are whether the impugned action taken by the State Government- respondent No. 1 against the petitioner vide Annexure-K dated 1st October, 1988 was punitive in nature and if so whether the same was vitiated and invalid on account of the petitioner having not been afforded proper and fair opportunity to defend himself. Again, while proceeding to answer the abovesaid limited questions, we are also concerned with the further ancillary question as to whether in view of Article 235 of the Constitution it was for the High Court and not the State Government to hold an enquiry into the relevant conduct of the petitioner and thereafter recommend taking of suitable action against him to the State Government and if so the said course having not been adopted the impugned order of revocation of the appointment of the petitioner issued by the State Government was illegal and invalid for that reason. 4. We may point out that it is common ground that the appointment in question of the petitioner as Civil Judge Class II was governed by the M.P. Judicial Service (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1955(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1955 Rules' These rules were made by the Governor of the Madhya Pradesh in pursuance of the provisions contained in the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. There was earlier a controversy as regards the question whether the said rules continue to apply after the reorganisation of the States. There was earlier a controversy as regards the question whether the said rules continue to apply after the reorganisation of the States. But, then the said controversy has since been set at rest by the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Anant Kumar Polekar v. State of M.P. and Ors. 1975 MPLJ 624 and Jayant Kumar v. Public Service Commission M.P., 1978 MPLJ 674. 5. Now, it is Rule 29 of the 1955 Rules which is relevant to our purpose in the present case. The said rule is in the following terms. "Should any of the particulars furnished by a candidate be found to be false to his knowledge or should a candidate be found to have wilfully suppressed any material fact, he shall, if appointed, be liable to be dismissed from service". In our opinion, there could be no doubt regarding the position that in case the petitioner had obtained his appointment as Civil Judge Class II under the Scheduled Tribe quota by furnishing false particulars as regards his belonging to a Schedule Tribe, it would be Rule 29 which would get attracted in the matter. It means that in case the petitioner had procured his appointment by furnishing false particulars as alleged he would become liable to be dismissed from service under Rule 29. In the said connection, in our opinion, there is no reason to think that the term 'dismissal' as used in Rule 29 is not so used in its ordinary sense of an act following a punitive action. If that be so, it is clear that the passing of any order of dismissal under the said rule has to be preceded by holding of a departmental enquiry into the alleged misconduct of furnishing false particulars by the judicial officer concerned. 6. In our opinion, the abovesaid position holds good even independently of Rule 29 of the 1955 Rules. If that be so, it is clear that the passing of any order of dismissal under the said rule has to be preceded by holding of a departmental enquiry into the alleged misconduct of furnishing false particulars by the judicial officer concerned. 6. In our opinion, the abovesaid position holds good even independently of Rule 29 of the 1955 Rules. In a case in which a candidate is selected to a particular post subject to verification, of relevant particulars furnished by him in his application and he is appointed to the said post after such verification, the subsequent action, if any, taken against him for having secured his appointment by furnishing false particulars can no longer be treated as falling within the realm of 'verification of particulars and antecedents" so as to make it competent for the appointing authority to carry out investigation into the said matter unilaterally without reference to the appointee and put an end to his service on the basis of result of investigation. In such a situation, the matter moves into the realm of 'taking of disciplinary action' against the appointee concerned for the alleged misconduct, making it obligatory for the competent authority to hold a departmental enquiry into the said misconduct so as to give a proper and fair opportunity to the said appointee to defend himself before any order of dismissal is passed against him. 7. Thus, from the abovesaid discussion, it follows that once after the verification of particulars furnished by the petitioner in his application that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe and was as such eligible for appointment as Civil Judge Class II against the quota reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Tribes the petitioner was appointed by the State Government as Civil Judge Class II against the said quota, the subsequent action taken by the petitioner for having procured his appointment by furnishing false particulars in the said regard fell within the realm of 'taking disciplinary action' against him for an alleged misconduct making it obligatory for the competent authority to hold a departmental enquiry into the said misconduct so as to afford a proper and fair opportunity to defend himself. The abovesaid conclusion was inescapable whether the matter was viewed as governed by Rule 29 of the 1955 Rules or independently of the said Rules. 8. The abovesaid conclusion was inescapable whether the matter was viewed as governed by Rule 29 of the 1955 Rules or independently of the said Rules. 8. That takes us to the next question as to whether in view of Article 235 of the Constitution it was for the High Court and not for the State Government to take the requisite disciplinary action in the matter against the petitioner by holding a departmental enquiry against him in the matter and thereafter to recommend taking of suitable action, if any, against him to the State Government on the basis of result of such enquiry. 9. Article 235 of the Constitution lays down that the control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and grant of leave to, persons belonging to the Judicial Service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in the said Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of service prescribed in such law. The scope of the said Article has been the subject matter of quite a few decisions of the Supreme Court. It is to be regarded as settled law that the word 'control' as used in Article 235 includes some thing in addition to the mere superintendence of these Courts. The 'control' is over the conduct and discipline of Judges. The High Court alone can make enquiry into disciplinary conduct. The control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. It comprehends wide variety of matters. The word 'control' is accompanied by the word 'vest' which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. The control vested in the High Court being exclusive and not dual, any enquiry into the conduct of a member of the judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority. The control vested in the High Court being exclusive and not dual, any enquiry into the conduct of a member of the judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority. The entire scheme of Chapters 5 and 6 in Part VI epitomised in Articles 229 and 235 has been assiduously designed by the Founding Fathers to ensure independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciary. See: High Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar, (AIR) 1962 S.C. 1704, State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath (1968-I-LLJ-270), High Court of Punjab v. State of Haryana, (AIR) 1975 S.C. 613 B. Mishra v. Orissa High Court, (AIR) 1976 S.C. 1899, and Chief Justice Andhra Pradesh v. L. V. A. Dikshitulu, (AIR) 1979 S.C. 193. 10. In view of the abovesaid legal position, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was for the High Court and not the State Government to take the requisite disciplinary action against the petitioner by holding a departmental enquiry in the matter and thereafter to recommend taking of suitable action, if any, against him to the State Government on the basis of result of such enquiry. In the said connection, in our opinion, once it is clear that the High Court alone was made the sole custodian of the control over the subordinate judiciary, such control vested in it being exclusive, it was immaterial whether the disciplinary action proposed to be taken against the judicial officer was in respect of anything done by him during the period of performance of his duties as a judicial officer or was in respect of false particulars furnished by him in the application which led to his appointment as such judicial officer. 11. In the present case, we are sorry to note that nobody in the State Government respondent No. 1 tried to apply his mind to the abovesaid implications inherent in the action proposed to be taken against the petitioner for having allegedly furnished false particulars for procuring his appointment as Civil Judge Class II under quota reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Tribes. In fact, it is surprising that even assuming that while proceeding against the petitioner the State-Government was under a bona fide misapprehension that it had the requisite jurisdiction to do so, it at no stage thought it proper to give a plain and simple notice to the petitioner to show cause why in view of he having allegedly furnished false particulars regarding his belonging to a Scheduled Tribe the appointment order dated 12th November, 1987 issued in his favour as Civil Judge Class II be not revoked. In our opinion, the issue of such a show cause notice, seeking the explanation of the petitioner in the matter, was the minimum requirement under the principles of natural justice even if there was no such requirement under any statutory rules. It is surprising that instead of following such a procedure the State Government-respondent No. 1 allowed devious and indirect enquiries to be made against a judicial officer through its police and other agencies. 12. It is no doubt true that the District Judge concerned, after reading a news item published in a newspaper, and after receiving a written complaint from one Rustam Singh, addressed a demi-official letter dated 16th March, 1988 to the petitioner asking him that in case he so desired he might come to his office and inspect the said documents and that he would expect his reply in respect of the said matter within a week. But, then, in our opinion, the issue of such a demi-official letter by the District Judge to the petitioner could hardly be regarded as a substitute for the initiation of the requisite disciplinary action against the petitioner in the matter. Moreover, as already explained earlier, in the circumstances of the case, it was neither for the State Government respondent No. 1 nor for District Judge to have taken the requisite disciplinary action against the petitioner in the matter. In view of Article 235 of the Constitution, it was for the High Court to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner by holding an inquiry into the relevant conduct of the petitioner and thereafter to recommend taking of suitable action, if any against him on the basis of result of such enquiry. In view of Article 235 of the Constitution, it was for the High Court to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner by holding an inquiry into the relevant conduct of the petitioner and thereafter to recommend taking of suitable action, if any against him on the basis of result of such enquiry. Thus, it is not possible to sustain the impugned order dated 1st October, 1988 passed by the State Government respondent No. 1 against the petitioner on the basis of any alleged enquiry said to have been made by the District Judge. 13. In the result, the petition is allowed. For the reasons stated above, it is held that the impugned order dated 1st October, 1988 (Annexure- K) passed by the State Government-respondent No. 1, revoking the appointment order dated 12th November, 1987 of the petitioner as Civil Judge Class II, is punitive in nature and having been passed without holding an enquiry by the competent authority and without giving proper and fair opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself against the charge, is illegal and invalid and is, therefore, liable to be quashed. The said order dated 1st October, 1988 (Annexure-K) is accordingly quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to receive all consequential benefits flowing from the quashing of the said order. 14. We may add that in case the petitioner really does not belong to any Scheduled Tribe and has obtained his appointment as Civil Judge Class II under the Scheduled Tribe quota on the basis of false particulars and a false certificate, it is really a very serious matter. In such a situation, it would be impossible to condone the misconduct committed by him and the only course open would be to dismiss him from service. Accordingly, it is made clear, that if the competent authority i.e. the High Court on its administrative side is satisfied from the material available to it that there exists prima facie case for holding an enquiry against the petitioner for the misconduct alleged against him, nothing contained in our order shall preclude the said authority from holding such an enquiry and taking disciplinary action against him according to law. 15. There shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.