JUDGMENT P. C. Balakrishoa Menon, C. J.—This appeal by the third respondent is against the judgment of a learned single Judge quashing the impugned order of Government, Annexure PL, and thereby reviving Annexure PE, order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, resulting in his dismissal from the service of the petitioner society, namely, the Bilaspur District Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited, Bilaspur (hereinafter to be referred as the society). 2. The petitioner was appointed as the Accountant of the society on April 18, 1959. Annexure PA/1, produced alongwith the writ petition is the order of appointment He was promoted as officiating Secretary-cum- Manager of the society on April 20,1960. While in service as Secretary- cum-Manager a charge-sheet, Annexure PC9 was served on him on September 6^ 1969. He had been even earlier placed under suspension pending investigation into the charges as per Annexure PB order of the society dated August 7, 1969, His services were terminated on November 6, 1969. The order of termination is not produced alongwith the writ petition but it is Annexure 6V in an earlier writ petition No I of 1972 filed by the present appellant. The order reads : "In perusal to resolution No. 11 dated 3rd November, 1969, duly passed by the Board of Directors of the Bilaspur District Co-operative Marketing and Supply Federation Limited, Bilaspur H. P. in the departmental proceedings against Sim V. D. Kalia, Secretary of the Federation who was placed under suspension vide this office order No. BCF/68-69/206, dated 7th August, 1969 and charge sheeted vide memo No. BCF/68-69/282, dated 6th September, 1969 the following punishments have been imposed on the said Shri V. D. Kalia. 1. The services of Shri V. D. Kalia are hereby terminated w. e. f. 3rd November, 1969. 2. Shri V. D. Kalia, shall not be entitled to draw any emoluments more than the subsistence allowance i.e he has already drawn or may be entitled to draw according to the existing orders for the period of suspension and the period of suspension will be counted towards period spent on duty. 3. The amount of dues against Shri V. D. Kalia, shall be recovered immediately." 3. 3. The amount of dues against Shri V. D. Kalia, shall be recovered immediately." 3. The appellant challenged the order of termination by way of an appeal before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 129 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Rules, I960, framed under section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1956 The appeal was disposed of by the Deputy Registrar (Development) who had been entrusted with the powers of the Registrar by virtue of a notification issued by the Government on December 22, 1966. An extract of the notification is at page 85 of the paper book. The appellate authority set aside the order of termination by his order Annexure PD dated February 16, 1970 and directed the society to institute a proper inquiry into the charges framed against the appellant. The relevant part of Annexure PD order is extracted below— "Shri V. D. Kalia appellant has put in about 12 years service in the Federation and his services were terminated while he was functioning as a Secretary-cum-Manager of the Federation. The manner in which his services were terminated revealed that he was not afforded full opportunity to defend him as I was told there are no service rules of the Federation. But still a proper procedure was absolutely necessary to be followed in the matter of termination of the services of the appellant. He was afforded no opportunity to see the entire record especially that part of the record which also has been admitted by the Chairman of the Federation. After affording him full opportunity to see the record his reply to the charges should have been considered and a proper enquiry instituted against the appellant. But in the instant case no enquiry was instituted after framing the charges against the appellant. This i§ a gross irregularity. In view of the above discussion, the Board of Directors of the Federation have failed to observe proper procedure to terminate the services of the appellant and this being so the order of termination dated 6th November, 1969, is set aside. The management is directed to institute proper enquiry against the appellant after affording him proper opportunity to see the record and also after considering his explanation to the charges. 4. The management is directed to institute proper enquiry against the appellant after affording him proper opportunity to see the record and also after considering his explanation to the charges. 4. The society filed a revision petition against the appellate order Annexure PD under section 1.4 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1956 corresponding to section 94 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1968. The fourth respondent Registrar by Annexure PE order dated September 21, 1971 set aside the appellate order of the Dy. Registrar and restored the order of dismissal of the appellant from service of the society. According to the Registrar there was no need of an enquiry into the charges framed against the appellant and he can be sum marily dismissed even without affording him an opportunity to meet the charges levelled against him. The operative part of the revisional order of the Registrar is extracted below :— "…..For a person holding a responsible position even proof of one or two charges, as serious as order of readymade goods and the advance not being returned are enough to warrant the most drastic punishment. Even if the point of view of Shri Kalia is conceded and it is admitted that he was not able to reply to some of the charges, it does not vitiate to prove with regard to other charges. I would go a step further and say that the Board of Directors could have summarily terminated the services of Shri Kalia without holding an enquiry, as there is no contract of service between him and the said federation nor he is governed by a set of rules in this regard. Furthermore, the appointment of Shri Kalia can best be considered to be of an ad hoc nature as approval of his appointment has not been accorded by the Registrar Co-operative Societies as is mandatory under the bye-laws." 5. The appellant challenged the revisional order of the Registrar before this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1 of 1972. Furthermore, the appointment of Shri Kalia can best be considered to be of an ad hoc nature as approval of his appointment has not been accorded by the Registrar Co-operative Societies as is mandatory under the bye-laws." 5. The appellant challenged the revisional order of the Registrar before this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1 of 1972. Pending that writ petition, the Government in suo motu exercise of its revisional powers under section 94 of the Iv68 Act set aside the order of the Registrar and restored the appellate order Annexure PD Annexure PL dated August 8, 1978 is the revisional order of the Government, the operative part of which reads as under : — "I am sorry I do not agree with the view of the Registrar Co-operative Societies that even if full documents were not shown to Shri Kalia, he should have replied to the charges in respect of which documents were made available to him I hold that to extent reasonable opportunity was not afforded to Shri Kalia and set aside the order passed by the Registrar Co-operative Societies in the appeal The Federation would be free to take disciplinary proceedings afresh after following the prescribed procedure and affording reasonable opportunity to Shri Kalia." In the light of the revisional order of the Government, the appellant on September 5, 1978 withdrew Civil Writ Petition No. 1 of 1972 as it had become infructuous and got it dismissed as withdrawn. The society filed the present Writ Petition No. \4% of 1978 to quash the Government order Annexure PL, A learned single Judge of this Court by judgment dated May 11, 1990, allowed the writ petition quashing Annexure PL order of the Government on the sole ground that the Government had exercised the suo motu power of revision under section 94 of the 196s Act after a period of about eight years far beyond a reasonable time for the exercise of the suo motu power of revision. 6. The only ground on which the learned single Judge has set aside Annexure PL order of the Government is that it has been passed about eight years after the revisional order of the Registrar Annexure PE. 6. The only ground on which the learned single Judge has set aside Annexure PL order of the Government is that it has been passed about eight years after the revisional order of the Registrar Annexure PE. The learned single Judge, however, has overlooked an important fact that Annexure PE order was challenged by the appellant before this Court in time by filing civil writ petition No. 1 of 1972 and that writ petition was rendered infructuous for the reason of Annexure PL order of Government passed in exercise of its suo motu power of revision under section 94 of the 1968 Act. Apparently, the Government exercised its revisional jurisdiction at a time when the order of Registrar impugned in Civil Writ Petition No. 1 of 1972 was brought to its notice and on its satisfaction that the view of the Registrar that the Secretary of the Society can be dismissed from service even without an enquiry could not be sustained in law. The mere fact that the Government had exercised its revisional jurisdiction after a considerable lapse of time cannot be a ground to interfere with the order of Government in a case like this where the employee will be put to great prejudice as his writ petition had been dismissed as infructuous for the reason of the Government order. 7. The fact that no enquiry was held against the appellant is not in dispute. Annexure PD order of the appellate authority shows that even the proceedings book and the files relating to the case were not made available for his perusal. It is also clear from Annexure PD, PE and PL orders that the relevant documents relating to the charges framed against the appellant had not been disclosed to him. The order of termination of service of the appellant passed by the society was, therefore, in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Such an order was for good and valid reasons set aside by the appellate authority by its order Annexure PD. The Registrar was clearly wrong in his view that the services of the appellant can be summarily dispensed with without notice and without affording him an opportunity to defend his case. To say the least, these observations do not fit in with the basic principles of the rule of law and cannot be accepted as a sound proposition of law. The Registrar was clearly wrong in his view that the services of the appellant can be summarily dispensed with without notice and without affording him an opportunity to defend his case. To say the least, these observations do not fit in with the basic principles of the rule of law and cannot be accepted as a sound proposition of law. Even if, it is to be held that the Government had exercised its suo motu power of revision long after a reasonable period of time, the effect of setting aside the order of Government will be to revive an illegal order Annexure PE passed by the Registrar in revision. This Court in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the order to bring about such a result. This proposition of law is well settled by the following decisions, A M. Allision and another v. B. L. Sen and others, AIR 1957 SC 227 (paragraph 17), Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others AIR 1966 SC 828 (paragraph 17), A. M Maniv. Kerala State Electricity Board represented by its Secretary, Trivandrum and others, AIR 1968 Ker 76 (paragraph 8) and The Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Shri G.K. Patankar and another, (1976) 1 SCC 810 We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the learned single Judge has erred in interfering with the revisional order passed by the Government and reviving a totally illegal order passed by the Registrar sustaining the dismissal of the appellant from service without any enquiry and without affording him any opportunity to defend his case. 8. We would like to make one aspect of the matter clear at this stage. The Registrar in his order, Annexure PE, had stated that the appointment of Shri Kalia can be considered to be of an ad hoc nature as approval of his appointment had not been accorded by the Registrar as required under the bye-laws. Shri Kalia was holding a substantive post as Accountant from April 18, 19:59 onwards. The order of appointment is produced as Annexure PA-I. He was promoted as officiating Secretary-cum-Manager on April 20, i960. The termination of his service affects not merely his officiating post but also the substantive post that he was holding. Shri Kalia was holding a substantive post as Accountant from April 18, 19:59 onwards. The order of appointment is produced as Annexure PA-I. He was promoted as officiating Secretary-cum-Manager on April 20, i960. The termination of his service affects not merely his officiating post but also the substantive post that he was holding. That apart, in the rejoinder filed by the society at page 113 of the paper-book it is stated that the services of Shri Kalia had been regularised. The reason stated by the Registrar that Shri Kalia should be considered to be only an ad-hoc appointee is, therefore, clearly unsustainable. 9. Shri Mandhotra, learned Counsel for the society, has strongly urged that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the Government under section 94 of the 1968 Act is to be exercised only within a reasonable time ; and the exercise of such jurisdiction in the present case after the lapse of about eight years cannot be sustained in law. We have already dealt with this aspect of the matter in the earlier part of the judgment. Merely for the reason of delay in the exercise of the revisional power, it was wrong on the part of the learned single Judge to have interfered with the revisional order of Government in the light of the fact that the appellant had in proper time approached this Court by filing Civil Writ Petition No. I of 1972, challenging the validity of Annexure PE order of the Registrar which we have found is illegal and unsustainable in law. The learned Judge has lost sight of the well known principle stated in the Latin maxim (Actus curiae neminem gravabit. That apart, once this Court finds that the effect of setting aside the revisional order is to revive an illegal order, this Court will not issue a writ to perpetuate an illegality. 10. Shri Mandhotra has also raised a question that under the bye-laws of the society, it is open to the Board of Directors to terminate the services of the Secretary without an enquiry and without any notice to him. Bye- law 67 at page 147 of the paper-book reads :— "67. 10. Shri Mandhotra has also raised a question that under the bye-laws of the society, it is open to the Board of Directors to terminate the services of the Secretary without an enquiry and without any notice to him. Bye- law 67 at page 147 of the paper-book reads :— "67. The Board of Directors shall frame rules for the recruitment and conditions of service, punishment and appeals for their paid employees which shall come into force on the approval of the Registrar." The Board of Directors has framed the service rules as authorised by the Bye-laws and the service rules are at pages 149 to 159 of the paper-book. Rule 17 at page 152 reads s— "17. Termination of Service—After the expiry of the period of probation if the services of any employee are required to be terminated on administrative grounds etc The Federation should give one calendar months notice in writing or in lieu thereof to pay such an employee a sum equal to his one months basic pay. Nothing in this rule will effect the right of the appointing authority to dismiss any employee for grave misconduct, insubordination, fraud and misappropriation of Federations fund or goods without notice. 11. Rule 17 quoted above framed by the Board of Directors of the society if read as authorising the Board to summarily dismiss a paid employee without notice or enquiry is quite arbitrary and will be opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution. The rule, however, requires that dismissal can only be on the grounds mentioned in the rule, namely, grave mis conduct, insubordination, fraud and mis-appropriation of Federations fund or goods. Unless there is a finding in regard to any of these grounds, it will not be within the jurisdiction of the appointing authority to dismiss a paid employee of the society. A finding on any of these questions can only be after a proper enquiry affording the person concerned a fair and reasonable opportunity to deny the charges and to prove his case. The rule does not dispense with the requirements of natural justice before the appointing authority comes to a finding in regard to any of those grounds mentioned therein. A finding on any of these questions can only be after a proper enquiry affording the person concerned a fair and reasonable opportunity to deny the charges and to prove his case. The rule does not dispense with the requirements of natural justice before the appointing authority comes to a finding in regard to any of those grounds mentioned therein. The Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 1271, observed at page 1284:— “…….We do not think that it is permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice, unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the Court. Procedural fairness embodying natural justice is to be implied whenever action is taken affecting the rights of parties ." 12. The rule framed under the bye-laws will not, according to us. dispense with the requirements of natural justice before a finding is arrived at in regard to grave misconduct, insubordination, fraud etc entailing the dismissal of a paid employee of the society. We, therefore, see no merit in the submission that the dismissal or termination of service can be sustained on the basis of the rule framed under the bye-laws of the society. It is also doubtful whether these rules were in force at the time when the services of the appellant were terminated. Annexure PE order of the Registrar makes mention of the absence of any rule in regard to disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the society. 13. The learned Counsel for the society has raised a further question that the revisional jurisdiction of the Government under section 94 of the 196o Act does not extend against orders passed by the Registrar, and the jurisdiction is confined only to examine the record of any enquiry held or made under the Act or any proceedings of the Registrar or of any person subordinate to him acting on his authority An order passed by the Registrar in revision, according to the learned Counsel is not a proceeding under the Act and cannot be interferred with in further revision under section 94 of the Act. Shri A. K. Goel, Counsel for the appellant points out that this argument if accepted would invalidate also the revisional order of the Registrar Annexure PE. The 1968 Act came into force on January 14, 1971. Shri A. K. Goel, Counsel for the appellant points out that this argument if accepted would invalidate also the revisional order of the Registrar Annexure PE. The 1968 Act came into force on January 14, 1971. The Registrar passed the revisional order Annexure PE on September 21, 1971, in exercise of his powers under section 94 of the Act. If the appellate order of the Deputy Registrar (Development), who is also a Registrar for the purpose of this Act by virtue of the notification referred to in the earlier part of this judgment, is not a proceeding under the Act, the Registrar also will have no jurisdiction to interfere with the same That apart, the proceedings referred to in section 94 of the Act would take in also the disciplinary proceedings initiated against an officer of the society and the order terminating his services is the culmination of the proceedings which can very well be the subject of revision under section 94 of the 1968 Act Learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Sri Nirmal Das Khattooria v. State Transport Authority {Tribunal) Lucknow and others, AIR 196! All 5!1, wherein it was held, with reference to section 134 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, at page 514:— "…….We therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the word proceedings used in the sub-section covers the actual decision of the Regional Transport Authority also and does not mean procedure1 only " 14. That interpretation was based on the language of sub-section (2) of section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which reads:— "No order made by a competent authority under this Act shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings, unless it appears to the prescribed appellate authority or revisional authority, as the case may be, that such error, omission or irregularity has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice". 15. The decision is no authority for the proposition that a final order passed by a subordinate authority cannot be interfered with in revision by the revisional authority under section 94 of the 1968 Act. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the Civil Writ Petition No. 148 of 1978 is dismissed. The appeal is allowed. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the Civil Writ Petition No. 148 of 1978 is dismissed. The appeal is allowed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.