ORDER B.C. Varma, J. 1. The petitioner, Dr. N. G. Rathi, was, at the relevant time in the year 1981, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Chemistry in the Government Science College, Raipur. For the University examination in March-April 1981, he was appointed a paper-setter and valuer of answer books, for the examination of B. Sc. (Final), Chemistry Paper-I. Earlier, he was likewise appointed paper-setter and examiner for various examinations held by other Universities, such as, Sagar University, Vikram University and Nagpur University. Certain newspapers complained (Annexures P-2A to P-2C) that a question paper has leaked out during the examination held by Ravi Shankar University in March-April 1981. Grievances of other kinds of malpractices during that examination were also published. This led the University authorities to make some enquiry into the matter. The petitioner was one of the persons, who was suspected of being involved in such malpractices and leakage of question papers. Shri Shivramdas Gupta, Shri S. M. Agarwal and the Principal, Government Girls' Degree College, Raipur, interrogated the petitioner on the subject of leakage of question papers. On 29-6-1981, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice and was asked to show cause why he be not debarred from being appointed paper-setter, examiner, etc. as- he failed to maintain due secrecy in that behalf. The notice also indicated that the report submitted by the committee appointed by the Executive Council of the. University, holding the petitioner liable for not maintaining the secrecy in respect of the question papers, was accepted by the University. By application dated 2-7-1981 (Annexure-P4), the petitioner requested the University to let him have a copy of that report. The University declined to make any such copy available to the petitioner and informed him accordingly by letter dated 14-8-1981 (Annexure P-5). The petitioner, nevertheless, submitted reply to the show cause notice (vide Annexure P-7), denying the charges. He, however, reiterated that in the absence of the report, it was difficult for him to make a full and complete defence. The Executive Council of the University, in its meeting held on 2-1-1982, resolved that the petitioner be debarred from all appointments as examiner, moderator, valuer of question papers, etc., carrying remuneration, for a period of five years. A communication (Annexure P-10) was sent to the petitioner. The petitioner challenges this order (Annexure P-10), by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A communication (Annexure P-10) was sent to the petitioner. The petitioner challenges this order (Annexure P-10), by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. His main attack is that apart from violation of the provisions contained in certain statutes of the University, rules of natural justice have been utterly violated in taking such an action, which as of necessity, casts a stigma upon his career and may even be an impediment in securing future promotions. 2. The activities of the Universities of the State, including Ravi Shankar University, Raipur, are governed and controlled by more documents than one, i.e. Ravi Shankar University Act, M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, its statutes, ordinances and regulations. The Vice-Chaneellor derives his power to appoint examiners from Section 44(1) of the Adhiniyam. The exercise of that power is subject to Statute 29. Clause 2 of that statute requires preparation of institutionwise list of names of persons qualified for appointment as examiners. According to clause 6 of that statute, the examination committee is to make recommendation to the Vice-Chancellor for appointment of examiners, including paper-setters and as per clause 12 of that statute, examiners are ordinarily to be appointed for one year and may be continued for three years, and may further be reappointed after the lapse of one year. Sub-clause (3) of clause 12 of Statute 29, provides for discontinuance of an examiner to act as such and reads - "(3) An examiner may be discontinued any time even before the expiry of the three years' period if his work is found unsatisfactory. An examiner's work shall be deemed to be unsatisfactory if (i) mistakes of such nature are found in his work in the course of checking and scrutiny which affect the result, or (ii) he is found by the Executive Council to have delayed the work without good cause, or (iii) there is an adverse report from the Head Examiner or (iv) in the opinion of the Executive Council there are reasonable doubts about his integrity or suspicion that he is accessible to examinees or their relations and (v) if there are serious complaints against his paper, e.g. that his paper was much above or below the standard or contained questions outside the prescribed course." 3. Universities in our State are mostly created by Statutes and Acts of Parliament or of State Legislature. Universities in our State are mostly created by Statutes and Acts of Parliament or of State Legislature. It has been noticed in O-Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law (Sixth Edition-Sweet and Maxwell) that disciplinary powers of University authorities have been judicially described as 'judicial' or 'quasi-judicial' and the University disciplinary bodies or committees must observe the principles of natural justice as a matter of implied contract. The decided cases indicate that apart from the remedies of damages, declaration and injunction, a writ of certiorari may be issued against the University disciplinary authorities. This, however, may not be true where an educational institution is not a statutory body. The matter in regard to educational institutions has been considered mostly involving the rights of the students against actions taken by the University authorities. If such a right arises from a contract, then the remedies may be an injunction, declaration or damages and not a writ of certiorari or mandamus. This was expressed by Prof. Wade in his work on Administrative Law (Fifth Edn.). The learned author, at page 503, says, - "In cases of universities and colleges, the courts often fail to explain whether the duty to observe natural justice is based upon statute or upon contract. This may make little difference to the procedure required by law, but it may make a great difference to the remedies available. If the University or College is established by statute, it may be treated as a statutory public authority, subject to remedies such as certiorari and mandamus. If it is merely incorporated by charter or privately, rights against it will depend upon contract, so that the natural remedies will be injunction, declaration or damages." This view is also shared by O-Hood Phillips, as expressed in his work on Constitutional and Administrative Law (Sixth Edn.-Sweet and Maxwell). The author says, 'a college prospectus containing the outline syllabus of a course of study forms part of a contract between the college and its students.' Another view expressed by Kindersley V. C. in Thomson v. University of London, (1964) 33 L.J. Ch. 625, 638, is that it was a misnomer to describe the relationship between a University and student as one of contract. The view is that even if there is originally a contract between a student and an educational institution, that is not inconsistent with the existence of a status. 625, 638, is that it was a misnomer to describe the relationship between a University and student as one of contract. The view is that even if there is originally a contract between a student and an educational institution, that is not inconsistent with the existence of a status. A contract may give rise to a status. Stretching the view, it was observed that it does not follow that a contract exists whenever one person provides services for another, whether for payment or on other terms. There is, for example, no contract between the sender of a letter and the Post Office. (See Modern Legal Studies-Natural Justice, edited by Prof. P. W. B. MacAuslan, at page 167). What is true of the relationship between the University authorities and the students may also be true of the University authorities ana the associate academic staff, concerned with carrying out the functions of the University, including the conduct of examination and assessment of the works of the examinees. The above discussion, however, leaves no room for doubt that where the University or any other educational institution is incorporated under some statute or is governed by Acts, Statutes or Statutory Regulations, it partakes the character of a staturoy public authority and its actions can be remedied by issuance of prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus. We may usefully quote Lloyd L.J.'s speech in Thomas v. University of Gradford, (1986) I All E.R. 217 at page 233 :- "The mere existence of the Visitor's jurisdiction does not seem an adequate reason for treating as ousted the ordinary and prima facie all embracing authority of the Courts of general jurisdiction over justiciable disputes. Especially so in a society such as ours, where the Universities are large publicly-funded institutions, constituted by Acts of Parliament and discharging by delegation an acknowledged responsibility of the State." 4. The rule of natural justice is the most important feature of all the most systems of law. It is a- constant reminder of rule of law, which ought to be the guiding principle of all laws. The two important features of this rule are that no man may be a Judge of his own cause and that no man may be condemned unheard. In cases of Universities and Colleges, the duty to observe rule of natural justice may be based upon a statute or on contract. The two important features of this rule are that no man may be a Judge of his own cause and that no man may be condemned unheard. In cases of Universities and Colleges, the duty to observe rule of natural justice may be based upon a statute or on contract. This howerver, will make little difference as to the procedure required by law. The difference, as noted above, may, however, be as to the remedies available. While examining disciplinary functions, the University authorities must observe the rules of natural justice. This may be so even where a University or an educational institution may be a non:statutory body, for, in that event, the principles of natural justice must be oserved as a matter of implied contract. All the same, while invoking the rule of natural justice in the context of an educational society, it is always' necessary to consider the distinction between academic and non-academic matters. Reference may be made also to a passage quoted from the decision in Duryayappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 All E.R. 152, quoted in Glynn v. Keele University, (1971) 2 All E.R. 89, to the following effect : - "In their Lordships' opinion there are three matters which must always be borne in mind when considering whether the principle should be applied or not. These three matters are: first what is the nature of the property, the office held, status enjoyed or service to be performed by the complainant of injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or on what occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the measure of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to intervene is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to impose on the other. It is only on a consideration of all these matters that the question of the application of the principle can properly be determined." Although this rule has been stated while addressing on the principle audi alterant partem. yet, it is equally applicable to find out if the body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and is thus under a duty to comply with the requirements of natural justice. Where a disability is created by action, the relevant authority has to breach an objective satisfaction and the observance of rules of natural justice is a must. yet, it is equally applicable to find out if the body is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and is thus under a duty to comply with the requirements of natural justice. Where a disability is created by action, the relevant authority has to breach an objective satisfaction and the observance of rules of natural justice is a must. At the same time, Courts have put a caution upon the applicability of the rule of natural justice. The application of rules of natural justice depends upon the situation of the circumstances existing at the time when this application is called for. It has been observed in the work by Prof. MacAuslan on Modern Legal Studies - Natural Justice, at page 165, that only in exceptional cases does natural justice require an oral hearing in case of a student- affected by any action of the University. Although written submission would ordinarily do. it is emphasised that each case must depend upon its own facts. All the same, the duty to act fairly in taking a decision on a matter has always been said to be a guiding factor. In the case of U. P. Singh v. Board of Governors, Maulana Azad College, 1982 M.P.L.J. 75. the learned Chief Justice Shri G. P. Singh, observed that what is to be seen is whether the action taken is fair and honest. The learned Chief Justice quoted the following passage from Krishna Iyer, J.'s decision in Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 665 : - "Natural justice is no unruly horse, no larking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditional by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating." In R. v. Secretary of State, (1973) 3 All. E.R. 796 Lord Denning M. R., said that the rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far, for, only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. E.R. 796 Lord Denning M. R., said that the rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far, for, only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. In U. P. Singh's case (supra), the finding has been that the power of expulsion of the student was fairly and honestly exercised and, therefore, the Court declined to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. So also in Glynn's case (supra), the Court found that failure to hear Glynn before deciding to punish him was clearly breach of natural justice, yet, it declined to interfere with the punishment to Mr. Glynn expelling him from the campus for, he appeared naked in the area of students' union and the offence merited a severe penalty according to any standard. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor was held to be 'intrinsically proper one'. It is also now well-settled that where the order in question casts slur and may involve civil consequences, the person adversely affected is entitled to a hearing before the action is taken. 5. The question whether the rules of natural justice have been violated in taking the impugned action against the petitioner discontinuing him as an examiner on the finding that his work was found unsatisfactory may now be examined in the light of the state of law, as above. We have earlier quoted the relevant provisions of Statute 29, relating to appointment of examiners in the University. We may only add that the qualifications of paper-setters and co-examiners are set out in clauses (8) and (9) of that statute. It appears to us from the scheme that it has been left to the absolute will and wisdom of the examination committee to recommend a panel of 3 persons for appointment of paper-setters and co-examiners. The Kulpati then shall appoint paper-setter, co-examiners, practical/viva voce examiners ordinarily from amongst persons recommended" by the Examination Committee. He may even add to that list names not recommended by the Examination Committee, if he is satisfied that the person in question possesses the minimum qualifications and his appointment will not be contrary to the provisions of the Statute. It thus appears that till this stage of appointment of examiners or the paperrsetters, the function is academic. He may even add to that list names not recommended by the Examination Committee, if he is satisfied that the person in question possesses the minimum qualifications and his appointment will not be contrary to the provisions of the Statute. It thus appears that till this stage of appointment of examiners or the paperrsetters, the function is academic. However, when a person is so appointed as an examiner by the Kulpati, his continuance or otherwise may not, be judged from the standard. An examiner, once appointed, although for one year only, may be continued for three consecutive years and after a gap of one year thereafter, may again be similarly appointed. This termination of appointment is statutory and automatic and, therefore, visits the examiner with no other consequences, nor does it cast any slur or stigma upon his character as such. However, when his appointment as examiner is discontinued in terms of sub-clause (3). of clause 12, for any one or more of the reasons stated thereunder, obviously and necessarily, it casts a alur upon his character and puts his integrity and honesty in jeopardy. That action certainly adversely affects his status as a teacher/examiner. We have little doubt that before taking any action in terms of sub-clause (3) of clause 12, the authority of the University is required to reach an objective satisfaction as to the examiner's work being unsatisfactory. At that stage, participation of the examiner concerned is necessary, as he is entitled to show cause and defend himself against the action. The University authorities in that event are bound to follow the rules of natural justice allowing the affected person an opportunity of a hearing. What such an opportunity would include, as we have seen above, may depend upon the circumstances of a given case and the charges levelled. In the instant case, the petitioner was charged with leakage of the question paper set by him. The charge was serious and the minimum that was required of the University was to apprise the petitioner of the material upon which the charge was framed, so that he could make an effective reply. The Statute is absolutely silent in this regard. It makes no provision for hearing before action under sub-clause (3) of Clause 12 is taken. We would, therefore, hold that the petitioner and any other person similarly placed, is at least entitled to make oral submissions. The Statute is absolutely silent in this regard. It makes no provision for hearing before action under sub-clause (3) of Clause 12 is taken. We would, therefore, hold that the petitioner and any other person similarly placed, is at least entitled to make oral submissions. We, however, feel that it is not necessary in such cases, to afford oral hearing, which may include right to cross-examine the witnesses. Written submissions alone may be sufficient. This right of written submission, as a part of the requirements of the rules of natural justice, must nevertheless be effective and the person affected must be permitted to exercise that right fully and effectively. For that purpose, it will be necessary that he is apprised of all the material available with the authorities and sought to be used against him. It is then and then alone that the requirement of the opportunity of written submissions can be made effective. Thereafter, the University authorities should only be required to act fairly and justly, while considering the written submissions vis-a-vis the relevant material before taking any decision. If all this is done, the requirements of rules of natural justice must be held as duly observed. 6. In the instant case, from the averments made in the petition and the relevant documents filed, it is clear that the petitioner was orally interrogated, a report was then submitted and vide Annexure P-3, the University took a decision that the petitioner has been responsible for leakage of certain question paper (B. Sc. Chemistry Part I). That document required the petitioner to show cause why he be not punished for that lapse on his part. It is obvious from this notice that the petitioner could not make any full and effective submissions in response to the show cause notice, without possessing that report. He did make a demand for a copy of that report, but vide Annexure P-5, the same was denied to him. We are of opinion that under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity of hearing and defending himself against the action, discontinuing his appointment as examiner, on the finding that his work was not satisfactory, inasmuch as he was found guilty of leakag of certain question paper. We are of opinion that under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity of hearing and defending himself against the action, discontinuing his appointment as examiner, on the finding that his work was not satisfactory, inasmuch as he was found guilty of leakag of certain question paper. Obviously, this order has cast a stigma upon his character and may even work as an impediment in seeking future promotions and even subsequent appointment as examiner in any other University whatever. The impugned action, therefore, is in violation of the rules of natural justice. 7. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 6-3-1982 (Annexure P-10) is hereby quashed. Under the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner.