Prem Mohan Gupta v. State of U. P — 1990 DIGILAW 901 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - In the heart of the town, there is it site No. 26 Civil Station comprising two Hotels and some residential houses belonging to the petitioners besides 32 to 35 dwelling untis in possession of the petitioners tenants. Two notifications issued by the State Government under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of this site for the construction of it Market Complex in the posh locality of Civil Lines, Allahabad, have led to the filing of this petition with the prayer that the same (notifications) be quashed. 2. The essential facts lie within a narrow compass. So does the controversy raised in the petition which substantially covered by two or three decisions of the Supreme Court to which we will revert a little later. First the essential facts : The Allahabad Development Authority the ADA hereafter for short) appears to have been in the lookout of a suitable site for the construction of a Market Complex at Civil Lines, Allahabad. It finally appears to have set its sight on the disputed premises. The axe thereafter fell on the petitioners with the issue of a notification dated 22-1-1986 under Section 4(1) of the said Act stating that the disputed land is needed for the purpose of the establishment of "Commercial District Centre" under the Planned Development, Scheme in the district of Allahabad by the ADA. The notification also contained a declaration that inasmuch as there was a pressing urgency for the establishment of Commercial District Centre under the Planned Development Scheme in district Allahabad it was necessary to eliminate the delay likely to he caused by an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act and that consequently it is being further directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply. This notification was published in the extraordinary Gazette of Uttar Pradesh on the same date viz. 22-1-1986. This notification was published in the extraordinary Gazette of Uttar Pradesh on the same date viz. 22-1-1986. The above notification was followed by another notification dated 24-1-1986 published in the extraordinary Gazette of Uttar Pradesh of the same date stating that in continuation of the notification referred to above the Governor was pleased to declare under Section 6 of the Act that he was satisfied that the land in question was needed for a public purpose, namely, the establishment of Commercial District Centre under the planned development scheme in district Allahabad by the ADA. It was further stated that in view of the urgency the Governor has directed that the Collector of Allahabad may on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) take possession of the land though no award under Section 11 has been made. Immediately on coming to know of these notifications the petitioners rushed to this court and presented this petition on 6-3-1986. The notifications were initially assailed on diverse grounds which need not be elaborated here in view of the fact that the petition is entitled to succeed on some preliminary points arising out of subsequent developments. Entertaining the petition, this Court issued an interim order on the same date viz. 6-3-1986 restraining the respondents from taking further act ion, consequent upon the impugned notifications. The case remained pending here for some time during which affidavits were exchanged between the parties. In November 1989, the petitioner moved an application for he amendment of the petition attacking the notification on additional grounds the chief among which was that mandatory provisions of sub-section III of Section 4 had not been followed by the ADA publishing the notification in two daily newspapers or by causing public notice by the Collector of the substance of the notification to he given at any convenient place in the locality as a consequence of which the entire exercise for acquisition was rendered void and ineffectual. The second ground of attack was that the declaration under S. 6 having been made on 24-1-1986 before the date of publication of the notification under Sec. 4(1), there was a patent breach of Section 17(4), after hearing counsel for the parties, the amendment application was allowed on 22-2-1990. The second ground of attack was that the declaration under S. 6 having been made on 24-1-1986 before the date of publication of the notification under Sec. 4(1), there was a patent breach of Section 17(4), after hearing counsel for the parties, the amendment application was allowed on 22-2-1990. It seems as a consequence of the objection raised by the petitioners in the amendment application the ADA made a belated attempt to fill in the lacunae. It published the notification dated 22-1-1986 under Section 4(1) in two newspapers on 22-2-1990 and on the same date public notice of the substance of the notification was alleged to have been caused to be given by the Collector. Likewise, the declaration dated 24-2-1990 under Section NO was published in two newspapers on 28-2-1990 and the public notice of the substance thereof was alleged to have been caused to be given on the same date. 3. This is the backdrop in which we have to examine the merits of tie challenge to the impugned notifications. The stain ground of attack urged by Sri B.D. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, may he briefly summarised thus:- Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) mandates that a declaration under Section 6 can he made only after "the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4. sub-section (1)." The words "the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1)" have been explained in Section 4(1) as amended. Section 4(1) lays down three modes of the publication of the notification. There are publication in the Gazette and two newspapers and giving of public notice of the substance of the notification by the Collector in the concerned locality. Section 4(1) then states that "the last of the dates of such publication and giving of such public notice shall hereafter he referred to as the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). That being so, the argument went on the words "the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1)" occurring in Section 17(4) must be taken to be the last of the dates of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). It was urged that the combined effect of the amendment made in Ss. 4(1), 6 and 17(4) is that the declaration under Ss. It was urged that the combined effect of the amendment made in Ss. 4(1), 6 and 17(4) is that the declaration under Ss. 4 and 6 cannot be made until after all the modes of publication set out in S. 4(1) have been exhausted. 4. The submission is clearly right and must be sustained. It is indeed supported by several decisions which are directly in point. These are reported in AIR 1987 Allahabad 113, Kashmir Singh v. State of U.P. and 1988 Allahabad 177 at page 181 (paragraphs 11 and 12) Satbir Singh v. State of U.P. The former of these has been approved and affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of 1989 (1) Supreme Court Cases 591 : AIR 1989 SC 682 , State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kashmir Singh. These decisions squarely apply and conclude the controversy. 5. In the case of Kashmir Singh (supra) the notification under S. 4(1) was issued on 6-5-1985. The notification also contained it declaration under S. 17(4) that in view of the urgency of the matter the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply. On the same date another notification was issued under S.6(1) containing it declaration as contemplated another (under that) provision. It was contended before this Court that the declaration under S. 6(1) could he made only "after the date of publication of the notification under S. 4(1)". The contention was upheld by this Court and it was held that prior to the amendment of Sections 41 hand 17(4) by the amendment Act 68 of 1984 a declaration under S. 6 as contemplated by S. 6 could be made simultaneously with the publication of the notification under S. 4 of the Act. But after the amendment of Ss. 4(1) and 17(4) a declaration as contemplated by Section 6 could he made only "after the date of publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-section (1)". Speaking for this Court his Lordship K. N. Singh, J. (as he then was) stated the law thus : "The expression "after the date of publication of the notification" as added to sub-s. (4) of Section 17 of the Act contemplates the issue of notification under S. 6 of the Act, only after the publication of the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act. Prior to the amendment the declaration under S. 6 of the Act could be made simultaneous) with the publication of the notification under S.44(1) of the Act, but now after amendment a declaration can be made only after the date of publication, of the notification under S. of the Act. This means that there must be difference of dates between the date of publication of the notification under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act. Now after the amendment both the notifications cannot be published on the same date. This publication of the notification would be contrary to sub-s. (4) of S. 17 of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984, which would render the notification of 1984, which would render the notification under S. 6 of the Act invalid. In the instant case, the notification under S. 6 of the Act containing declaration that the land in dispute was needed for a public purpose was issued on 6-5-1985 and published simultaneously along with notification under S. 4(1) of the Act on the same date, namely, May 22, 1985. This is in clear violation of S. 17(4) of the Act. In this view the impugned notification issued under S. 6 is rendered illegal and as such the respondents are not entitled to take possession of the petitioners land." (Emphasis added) 6. This decision was affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1989 (1) Supreme Court Cases 591 (supra). Their Lordships repelled the submission of late Sri S.N. Kakkar that the change in the language of sub-section (4) of S. 17 was merely verbal without bringing about any material change in the legal position as spelled out by the Supreme Court in its various decisions on the question whether or not simultaneous publication of the notifications under Ss. 4(1) and 6 was permissible. Their Lordships further ruled that the insertion of the words "after the date" in Section 17 (4) cannot be explained away as having been necessitated because of the change of the language of S. 4(1). 7. 4(1) and 6 was permissible. Their Lordships further ruled that the insertion of the words "after the date" in Section 17 (4) cannot be explained away as having been necessitated because of the change of the language of S. 4(1). 7. In order to appreciate the ratio it will be convenient to have a look at the corresponding relevant unamended and amended provisions side by side : "Unamended Section 4(1) "Amended Section 4(l) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient place in the said locality." Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification." "Unamended Section 17(4) "Amended Section 17(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub- section (1)". In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate government the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)." 8. Referring to these provisions, Hon'ble Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) the learned Chief Justice summed up the law in paragraph 14 of the judgment. It reads : "It is true that the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" introduced in S. 17(4) can be explained away as making no change from the provisions of law by reading it along with the amendment made in S. 4 whereby in different situation in Section 4, the last date of publication of the notice has been determined as the date of the publication of the notification and similarly in S. 6 a date of the publication of the notice has been provided for. But the words "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub-section (4) of S. 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that declaration under S. 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification it appears to us that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which militates against such a construction. At times were emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act." (Emphasis added) 9. It will be instructive to quote yet another passage (paragraph 15) of the judgment. In this His Lordship analysed and explained the signification of the relevant words added by the Amending Act of 1984. It was said : "The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification. If that be so, then the legislature must have had some intention in choosing the expression 'after' before "date of publication of the notification" in sub-section (4) of S. 17 of the Act while making amendment by Amending Act 68 of 1984. It is true that there were some changes giving the meaning of the date of the publication in Section 4(1) and (2) as well as S. 6(2) of the Act. But for that, there was no need for the use of the expression 'after the date'. It is true that there were some changes giving the meaning of the date of the publication in Section 4(1) and (2) as well as S. 6(2) of the Act. But for that, there was no need for the use of the expression 'after the date'. If that be the position, then we must accept the interpretation put upon the amended clause by the High Court in the judgment under appeal It will, however, be up to the appellants to issue a fresh declaration under S. 6, if so advised, within the period contemplated in the proviso to S. 6(1) of the Act read with its first explanation." 10. Two things emerge out of this decision : First, that a declaration under Section 6 can be made only after the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1) and for that purpose "the date of publication of the notification" appearing in S. 17(4) shall have the same meaning which has been assigned to it under the amended S.4(1) of the Act, and, second, that the amendment inserted in Ss. 4(1) and 17(4) by the Amending Act 68 of 1984 were applicable to the acquisitions made under the Land Acquisition Act in this State. 11. The above decision completely concludes the controversy in favour of the petitioner. The date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1), as already found, was 22-2-1990 being the date on which the Collector caused public notice of the substance of the notification under S. 4(1) to be given. The declaration under S. 6, however, had already taken place on 24-1-1986. The notification under S. 6 is dated 24-1-1986. It was published in the Gazette of the same date. The result is that in the present case the declaration under Section 6 was complete and had taken place even before the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1) and consequently, in view of the clear and categorical mandate of S. 17(4) the declaration under S. 6 must be held to be wholly void and ineffectual in law. 12. 12. While at this point, we may add that some arguments were addressed by the learned counsel on whether the declaration took place on the date on which the order of the Government under S. 6 was signed by the Secretary or on the date on which the order was notified in the manner laid down under Section 6(2). Fortunately, this aspect has already received the attention of and commented on extensively by the Supreme Court in the case of Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 417 (Para 25 at p. 423). Their Lordships stressed the distinction between the declaration mentioned in S. 6(1) land its notification under S. 6(2). It was said that the declaration is in the form of an order. The notification is the publication and proof of its existence. The declaration operates as conclusive evidence that the Government is duly satisfied that the land under consideration is really needed for a public purpose. Thus the order of the Government when signed by a Secretary or other officer duly authorised tantamounts to a declaration under S. 6. So construed the declaration under S. 6 in the present case had undoubtedly taken place on 24th January 1986. 13. Having said this we turn to a submission urged on behalf of the ADA by Sri S.S. Bhatnagar which calls for some comments as it was dwelt at some length by the learned counsel. The contention was that in its application to this State only such amendments of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 shall apply as have been specifically incorporated in the Schedule to the Land Acquisition Act (U.P. Amendment) Act 1954 (U.P. Act No. XII of 1954). It was urged that as the 1984 amendment have not been incorporated in that Schedule the amendments introduced by the Central Act 68 of 1984 shall not apply to the acquisitions made by the State Government. The contention proceeds on the assumption that it was a case of incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act in the U.P. Act XII of 1964 by reference and consequently the 1984 amendment unless incorporated would not be automatically attracted. 14. The argument though persuasive on its face cannot he sustained for the reasons we will presently state. The contention proceeds on the assumption that it was a case of incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act in the U.P. Act XII of 1964 by reference and consequently the 1984 amendment unless incorporated would not be automatically attracted. 14. The argument though persuasive on its face cannot he sustained for the reasons we will presently state. In the fire lace the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Radhey Shyam (supra) is a precedent of binding nature being a direct authority for the proposition that the declaration under S. 6 can be made only after the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act in view of the clear mandate of S. 17(4) as amended. The Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of this Court in Kashmir Singh's case (supra) only by applying the amendments incorporated in Section 4(1) and Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984. 15. Implicit in this decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is the finding that the amendments incorporated by the Central Act 68 of 1984 were fully applicable to the acquisitions made by the State Government for its purposes. The issue, therefore, whether the declaration under S. 6 can be made simultaneously, or, prior to the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1) as amended in 1984 is hence no longer res Integra. 16. We are, however, not resting our judgment only on the assumption that such a statement of law is implicit in the above decision as there is yet another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1990 SC 761 which is more directly in point. Indeed this decision seals the controversy against the ADA. In this case, the question was whether the Kerala Land Acquisition Act 1961 could survive after the introduction of the amendments in the land Acquisition Act by the Central Act 68 of 1984. The observations made by their Lordships in para 3 of the judgment have great significance and indeed furnish a complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel for the ADA. The observations made by their Lordships in para 3 of the judgment have great significance and indeed furnish a complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel for the ADA. His Lordship Ranganath Misra, J. spoke for the Court and said : at Page SC 762; AIR 1990: "The Legislative Entry for acquisition and requisitioning of property in 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule. Previously, Entry 33 in List Land Entry 38 in List II of the Seventh Schedule dealt with acquisition and requisitioning in the respective fields. But by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution in 1956 those two entries from Lists I and II were omitted and Entry 42 in the Concurrent List was inserted. The amending Act of 1984 has been made in exercise of legislative power vested in the Centre by Entry 42 in the concurrent List. There was a State Act in Kerala known as the Kerala Land Acquisition Act of 1961 which dealt with acquisition and that had been legislated on the basis of the same Entry 42. Under the Amendment Act of 1984, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was subsequently amended. Five new provisions were inserted, twenty-one sections were substantially altered, one section was substituted and another was omitted. The Act of 1984 extended the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 to the whole of India excepting the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The provisions were substantially different from the provisions in the Kerala Act. In view of the fact that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was extended to the whole of India excepting one State, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 became applicable to the State of Kerala and in view of the repugnant provisions, in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution the Kerala Act stood repealed. There is no provision made in the Amending Act to indicate repeal of the State Law but application of Article 254 is automatic to situations where it is applicable and by the operation of the Article the State Act stood repealed and the Central Act became applicable. That such is the actual position is not challenged by counsel for the appellant. In fact, in the notes submitted to this Court that position appears to have been accepted." 17. That such is the actual position is not challenged by counsel for the appellant. In fact, in the notes submitted to this Court that position appears to have been accepted." 17. The ratio is explicit and unambiguous and it is that inasmuch as by the 1984 Amendment Act, the Land Acquisition Act has been extended to apply to the whole of India, (save for one State), the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1984 would become applicable to all the States (except one) and further that if there is any earlier local law dealing with acquisitions by their State which is repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act as amended in 1984, the local law shall stand automatically repealed in view of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. 18. That brings in the question whether there is any repugnancy between the State Law and the Central Law. We will presently demonstrate that repugnancy between the two Laws is patent and direct and that the two cannot co-exist. We start with a look at S. 4(1) of the Central Law as amended. Two significant changes have been introduced by the 1984 Amendment in the Central Law : (i) third mode of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) has been prescribed, namely, publication in two newspapers; (ii) the insertion of the words "the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification" in Section 4(1). 19. In contrast the State Law (as it stands after its amendment by U.P. Act No. VIII of 1974) neither requires publication in newspapers nor does it define the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In Section 17(4) again by the Amendment of 1984 in the Central Law for the first time it has been provided that a declaration under S. 6 can be made only after the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). In Section 17(4) again by the Amendment of 1984 in the Central Law for the first time it has been provided that a declaration under S. 6 can be made only after the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). Section 17(4) of the State Law, however, continues to be expressed in the same language as before, namely, that a declaration can be made under S. 6 after the publication of the notification under S. 4(1), which expression has been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court as permitting simultaneous publication of the notification under S. 4(1) as well as the declaration under S. 6 of the Act. 20. The legislative changes made in S. 4(1) of the Central Law, therefore, clearly lead to the conclusion that all the three modes of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) are mandatory. This is apparent from the insertion of the words to the effect that the last of the dates of such publication shall be deemed hereafter to be the date of the publication under S.4(1). The clear implication by the insertion of the words quoted above in Section 4(1), in our opinion, is that the date of the publication of the notification shall stand determined only after all the three modes of publication have taken place. This aspect have a direct impact on Section 17(4) inasmuch as that provision uses the words "the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-section (1)" which shall obviously have the same meaning and significance as that assigning to them under S. 4(1) of the Central Law as amended in 1984. 21. The upshot is under the Central Law a declaration under S. 6 cannot be made until after all the three modes of publication under S. 4(1) have been exhausted. Under the State Law, on the other hand, a declaration can be made simultaneously with the publication of the notification under Sec. 4(1) in the Gazette and by giving public notice of the substance of the notification under that provision. And there is, of course, no provision in the State Law for publication of the notification in the newspapers. 22. Again under the State Law the giving of public notice in a case where S. 5A procedure has been eliminated is optional after U.P. Act No. VIII of 1974. And there is, of course, no provision in the State Law for publication of the notification in the newspapers. 22. Again under the State Law the giving of public notice in a case where S. 5A procedure has been eliminated is optional after U.P. Act No. VIII of 1974. Under the Central Law, on the other hand, even prior to the amendment of 1984 public notice by the Collector of the substance of the notification under S. 4(1) was consistently held to be mandatory. It has been further ruled by the Supreme Court that it is wrong to suppose that such a notice is required only and for the sole purpose of inviting objection under S. 5(a). See State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib ( AIR 1973 SC 2361 ); Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1967 SC 1074 at P. 1077); Collector of Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal( AIR 1985 SC 1622 para 13) : 1985 All LJ 887. 23. It is, therefore, apparent the two Laws in respect of the provisions under S.4(1) examination are wholly irreconcilable and cannot co-exist That being so, the Central Law enacted in the shape of S. 17(4) read with S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (as it stands after the 1984 amendment) must prevail over the State Law. The view we are disposed to take is completely in fine with another decision of this Court viz., Satvir Singh v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1988 All 177 . The Bench in that case was concerned precisely with this controversy and on a comparison of the two Laws it ruled that the State Law being repugnant to the Central Law must yield to the latter in view of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution and that to the extent of such repugnancy the State Law shall be deemed to have been repealed by the Central Law. 24. The upshot is that the declaration made in the present case under S. 6 vide notification dated 24-1-86 being prior to the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). the same must be held to be completely null and void, liable to be quashed. 25. 24. The upshot is that the declaration made in the present case under S. 6 vide notification dated 24-1-86 being prior to the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). the same must be held to be completely null and void, liable to be quashed. 25. Before, however, we pass to the next ground of attack against the impugned notification, we may briefly comment on a submission of Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, the learned counsel for the ADA. The contention was that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is an existing law within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution. Its repeal must, therefore, be express. 26. We are afraid, we cannot agree with the contention. That there can be a repeal of an earlier State Law amending the Land Acquisition Act, 1824 even by implication has already been accepted by the Supreme Court in its recent pronouncement in the case of Kanthimathy Plantation (P) Ltd. (supra). Further if amendments are made both by the State Legislature as well as by Parliament with respect to a matter falling in the concurrent list in an existing law saved under Article 372 and, if there is repugnancy between the two Amending Laws, Articles 254(2) would at once be attracted. Indeed Article 254(2) would be the only relevant provision for resolving the conflict between the two Laws. And repeal of an earlier State Law under the proviso to Article 254(2) by a Central Law may be either express or implied. Such a premise is firmly rooted in authority having been accepted by the Supreme Court by a long line of decisions beginning with Zaverbhai Amidas v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1954 SC 752 ) : 1954 Cri LJ 1822; Ch Tika Ram v. The State of U.P. ( AIR 1956 SC 676 ) and T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe ( AIR 1983 SC 150 para 15) and so forth. 27. That answers the contention raised by learned counsel for ADA. We now take up the next ground of attack urged in support of the petition. 27. That answers the contention raised by learned counsel for ADA. We now take up the next ground of attack urged in support of the petition. Sri B.D. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the gap between the publication of the notification under S. 4(1) in the gazette on the one hand and the publication in two newspapers or the giving of public notice by a Collector under S. 4(1) on the other was so large that the continuity or the link between one or the other of the three modes of the publication prescribed under S. 4(1) was completely broken and destroyed. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the decision in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in AIR 1984 SC 1721 . 28. The contention must be accepted. The notification under S. 4(1) in the present case was published in the Gazette on 22-1-1986 whereas the same was published in two newspapers only on 24-2-1990. The public notice was also caused to be given by the Collector on the same date. There was thus a gap of more than four years between the publication in the Gazette and the other modes of publication. The two sets of notifications were so far removed from one another that any semblance of continuity or connection was totally destroyed. A gap of four years is far too big to be ignored. In Deepak Pahwa's case his Lordship Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court had occasion to consider the effect of time lag between the publication in the Gazette and public notice. He examined the question in considerable depth and on a survey of the authorities bearing on the subject, he ruled that every time gap between the publication in the Gazette and the public notice in the locality is not fatal to the acquisition. But at the same time, the two modes of publication cannot be separated by a length of interval which breaks the continuity of action. His Lordship observed that while Section 4(1) does not prescribe that the public notice of the substance of the notification under S.4(1) should be given simultaneously with the publication in the Gazette, it is implicit in that provision that the public notice must be contemporaneous. His Lordship observed that while Section 4(1) does not prescribe that the public notice of the substance of the notification under S.4(1) should be given simultaneously with the publication in the Gazette, it is implicit in that provision that the public notice must be contemporaneous. His Lordship said contemporaneity may involve a gap of time but the gap should not be so deep that the continuity of the action is lost. 29. The dictum of the Supreme Court fully applies to the present case. The continuity of the action under Section 4(1) in the present case was completely broken. The impugned notification under S. 4(1) is hence also liable to be quashed. 30. In the view this Court is taking on the above contentions, it is unnecessary to examine the other contentions raised in the petition. 31. In the result that petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notifications dated 22-1-1986 issued under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act as well as that dated 24-1-1986 issued under Section 6(1) of Land Acquisition Act are quashed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.