JUDGMENT S. K. Dhaon, J. 1. Proceedings were initiated by the petitioners for permission to raise certain constructions over a certain piece of land. An application accompanied by the site plan etc. was given. No orders either rejecting the application or granting permission were passed despite notice given by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, a valid permission came into existence on account of the operation of a legal fiction. Hence the prayer is that the respondents should be commanded to tread the petitioners as the grantees of a valid permission. 2. The two respondents to the writ petition, namely, the Prescribed Authority and the State of Uttar Pradesh are represented by the Standing Counsel. Affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. The petition, though not formally admitted, is ripe for hearing. Hence it is being disposed of finally with the consent of the counsel for the parties. The Statute involved in this petition is the U. P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules frame thereunder. According to its preamble the Act is to provide for the regulation of buildings with a view to prevent haphazard development of urban and rural areas. The State Government is empowered to declare a "regulated area" (Section 3). "Prescribed Authority" means a person or body of persons appointed as such by the State Government in respect of a regulated area by notification in the Official Gazette (Section 2 (g) There is a prohibition to erect, erect or make any material change in any building without previous permission of the Prescribed Authority in writing (Section 6). An application for permission shall be made in writing to the Prescribed Authority in such form and containing such information as may be prescribed. The relevant Rule lays down that the application for permission should be accompanied by a site plan. The Prescribed Authority is enjoined to pass an order in writing either granting or refusing permission. The grounds on which the permission may be refused are enumerated. The Prescribed Authority is empowered to return the application for making it in conformity with the relevant Rules and Regulations. Permission, if refused, the grounds for such refusal shall be communicated to the applicant within 99 days of the receipt of an application. The grounds on which the permission may be refused are enumerated. The Prescribed Authority is empowered to return the application for making it in conformity with the relevant Rules and Regulations. Permission, if refused, the grounds for such refusal shall be communicated to the applicant within 99 days of the receipt of an application. If no orders are communicated within ?-0 days granting or refusing the permission, the applicant may invite the attention of the Prescribed Authority to the said fact by a written communication and if no action is taken by the Prescribed Authority for a further period of 30 days a permission shall be deemed to have come into existence (Section 7). 3. The petitioners sought permission to raise a certain construction over a piece of land measuring 120' x 43.' On 29th November, 983, the application was rejected. The appeal preferred before the Controlling Authority by the petitioners was withdrawn. Another application was given on 18th December, 1984. A communication dated 15th March, 1985, was served upon the petitioners on 31st March, 1985. In this communication the Prescribed Authority points out that according to the site plan the proposed constructions will take place over a drain, the ownership of which vests in the City Board and if permission is granted municipal land will be encroached upon. The Municipal Board has refused to issue a no objection certificate. On 6th April, 1985, the petitioners served a notice on the Prescribed Authority calling upon it to grant permission within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. The Prescribed Authority took no action upon the said notice. Therefore, this petition was presented on 29th October, 1986. 4. We may now extract sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7 :- 7. Application for permission. (1)....... (2)......... (2A)......... (2-B)......... (2-D)......... (3) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be communicated to the applicant in such manner as may be prescribed within ninety days of the receipt of such application. 4. We may now extract sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7 :- 7. Application for permission. (1)....... (2)......... (2A)......... (2-B)......... (2-D)......... (3) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be communicated to the applicant in such manner as may be prescribed within ninety days of the receipt of such application. (4) Where no orders are communicated within the period mentioned in sub-section (3), granting or refusing the permission, the applicant may by a written communication call the attention of the prescribed authority to the omission or neglect, and if such omission or neglect continues for a further period of thirty days the prescribed authority shall be deemed to have permitted the proposed work Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of the regulations issued under this Act." The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as stated in the Bill giving rise to the Act, as relevant to the present controversy is "It has been observed that there is a tendency of haphazard building construction round about growing towns and ultimately such constructions with no proper means of drainage, water supply, communication and no proper sanitation affect adversely the town besides being themselves a source of anxiety to the authorities concerned......". In sub-section (2-A) of Section 7 the grounds on which permission may be refused are enumerated. They are seven in number. One of them is that the proposed building would be an encroachment upon any public premises as defined in the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 Section 7 (2-A) (d). Section 2 (e) of the said Act defines "public premises" to mean "any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority." In Section 4 (25) of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 "local authority" is, inter alia, defined to mean a Municipal Board or Nagar Palika. Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the land and the drain over it, of which the Municipal Board concerned claims to be the owner is "public premises". It follows that the proposed building of the petitioners would be an encroachment upon public premises. Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the land and the drain over it, of which the Municipal Board concerned claims to be the owner is "public premises". It follows that the proposed building of the petitioners would be an encroachment upon public premises. The preamble of the Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons aforequoted and the various provisions of the Act and Section 7 (2-A) in particular, amply demonstrate that public interested is the pivot around which the machinery of the Act and the Rules and the Regulations framed thereunder rotate. The grounds as mentioned in Section 7 (2-A) on which permission may be refused have nexus with public interest. The crucial words in sub-section (4) are : "if such omission or neglect continues for a further period of thirty days the Prescribed Authority shall be deemed to have permitted the proposed work." The emphasis of the Legislature is that there should be an expeditious disposal of the application for the grant of permission. The Prescribed Authority should not sit with folded hands without taking any initiative to take a decision. Last but not the least, there should not be an omission or neglect on the part of the Prescribed Authority. While judging the conduct of the Prescribed Authority to bring home the charge of neglect or omission the primary question to be answered is whether the anxiety of the Prescribed Authority is to protect public interest or to prevent injury to a large section of the people or to prevent injustice being caused to others. It the action of the Prescribed Authority passes through these touchstones, there will neither be acts of omission nor neglect and the legal fiction will not come into play. 5. According to The Concise Law Distionary by Osborn (Fourth Edition) legal fictions may be said to be statement or suppositions which are known to be untrue, but which are not allowed to be denied, in order that some defect may be overcome, and substantial justice secured. It is apparent that justice is to be secured by employing a legal fiction to all concerned and not to a particular person or party. There is exemplified by the maxim Ficto legis non operatur domum vel injuriam (a legal fiction does not work loss or injustice). It is apparent that justice is to be secured by employing a legal fiction to all concerned and not to a particular person or party. There is exemplified by the maxim Ficto legis non operatur domum vel injuriam (a legal fiction does not work loss or injustice). Therefore, once it is found that the Prescribed Authority is anxious to prevent the encroachment upon the property of a local body, which has been created to subserve the interest of the public at large, the legal fiction as created in the statute under reference should not be allowed to operate if, permissible. 6. In Broom's Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition) the maxim IN Fiction juris semper acquit-as exist it (equity is the life of a legal fiction) is included under the heading "The Mode of Administering Justice." It is emphasised at page 80 that since equity is the life of legal fiction, where substantial justice does not require its interference, still more where It would suffer from its operation, fiction has no place. Fictions are, therefore, only to be made for necessity, and to avoid mischief, and must never be allowed to work prejudice or injury to an innocent party. IN the instant case it is to be emphasised again that if petitioners are given the benefit of the legal fiction prejudice or injury is bound to be caused to the inhabitants of the locality wherein the petitioners desire to raise the constructions. We have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the Legislature, white enacting the legal fiction in the provision under consideration, designedly used the words omission or neglect, in which the principles upon which a legal fiction should be allowed to operate find their echo. A legal fiction presupposes the correctness of the State of facts upon Which it is based. Omission is a colourless word which merely refers to rot doing something. An omission to perform a duty involves an idea that the person to act is clear that performance is required or needed. The facts and circumstances of the instant case, as indicated above, do not indicate that the Prescribed Authority was absolutely inactive. On the contrary, it is established that it was aware of the fact that some order granting or refusing permission had to be passed by it. The facts and circumstances of the instant case, as indicated above, do not indicate that the Prescribed Authority was absolutely inactive. On the contrary, it is established that it was aware of the fact that some order granting or refusing permission had to be passed by it. In fact, it was moving in that direction by informing the petitioners that the Municipal Board was objecting to its land being encroached upon Neglect implies a conscious act of volition. Neglect does not cover every case of failure to act but only that case where a person acting consciously omits to do that which he ought to do. 7. In Re London and Paris Banking Corporation, (1874) LR 19 Eq 444 Section 80 of the Companies Act, 1862 came up for interpretation. This provision provided that whenever a creditor to whom the Company was indebted in a sum exceeding F-50 had served on such company a demand for payment, and the company for the succeeding period of three weeks "neglected to pay", etc, such demand, then the Company should be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. Held s "It is very obvious on reading that enactment, that the word neglected, is not necessarily equivalent to the word 'omitted.' Negligence is a team which is well-known to the law. Negligence in paying a debt on demand, as 1 understand it, is omitting to pay without any reasonable excuse. MRE omission by itself does not amount to negligence. Therefore, I should hold, upon the words of the statute, that Where a debt is bona fide disputed by the debtor, and the debtor alleges, for example, that the demand for goods sold and delivered is excessive, and says that he, the debtor, is willing to pay -such sum as he is either advised by the competent valuers to pay, or as he himself considers a fair sum for the goods, then in that case he has not neglected to pay, and is not within the wordings of the statute." 8. The foregoing discussion has driven us to the conclusion that on principle, on the language employed by the Legislature and on authority, the petitioners cannot invoke the legal fiction as envisaged in the provision in question. We are satisfied that the Prescribed Authority neither omitted nor neglected to act upon the application made by the petitioners. The foregoing discussion has driven us to the conclusion that on principle, on the language employed by the Legislature and on authority, the petitioners cannot invoke the legal fiction as envisaged in the provision in question. We are satisfied that the Prescribed Authority neither omitted nor neglected to act upon the application made by the petitioners. On the other hand, it acted bona fide in informing the petitioners that in the absence of a no objection certificate from the Municipal Board concerned it could not permit an encroachment upon public premises. By the communication dated J 5th March, 1989, the Prescribed Authority did not purport to reject the application of the petitioners. This Court, it appears, did not accede to the prayer made by the petitioners for staying the proceedings in Case No. 520 of 1984. If so far no orders have been passed finally disposing of the application, that shall be done now as expeditiously as possible. It goes without saying that the Prescribed Authority shall examine the case of the petitioners that they are the owners of the plot in question situated on the Delhi-Mussorie road in the city of Muzaffarnagar. 9. The petition fails and is dismissed; but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.