JUDGMENT B.L.Yadav 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugned order dt. 22-8-90 (Annexure-10 to the petition) and order dated 21-8-90 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) passed by District Inspector of Schools Mau recalling the order dated 17-8-1990 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) attesting the signature of Sri Raghvendra Bahadur Singh as Manager ' of Sidhnath Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalay Sidhwal Mau are sought to be quashed by issuing a writ of Certiorari. 2. Election Committee of Management Sri Sid ha Nath Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya Sidhawal was held on 15-7-1990. Sri Raghvendra Bahadur Singh was elected its Manager and his signature was attested on 17-8-1990 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) by the District Inspector of Schools. There was some dispute in respect of committee of management and no confidence motion was brought. He, however, referred the dispute under Section 16-A (7) of U. P. Intermediate Education Act 1921 (for short the Act) to the Deputy Director of Education. By his order dated 21-8-1990 (Annexure 9) District Inspector of Schools recalled his earlier order dated 17-8-1990 attesting signature of Raghvendra Bahadur Singh as Manager. By another order dated 22-8-1990 the District Inspector of Schools passed order for single operation of the institution in view of Section 5 (i) of U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salary of Teachers and other Employees) Act 1971. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was no justification to make the reference of the dispute to the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) of the Act as Raghvendra Bahadur Singh was elected as Manager in the election dated 13-7-1.90 and as his signature was attested on 17-8-90 (Annexure 7), same cannot be cancelled by impugned order dated 21-8-1990 (Annexure-9) without affording him opportunity of being heard. The order dated 22-8-90 (Annexure-10) directing single operation of the accounts was also erroneous. 3. Sri B. N. Misra has filed caveat. He was also heard in support of the impugned order. 4. As regards the first submission that reference of dispute to the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-A (7) of the Act, as the petitioner no. 2 was already elected on 15-7-90 was erroneous, in as much as there was no other election. Ex abundanti cautela provisions of Section 16-A (7) of the Act are set out below : "16-A (7). 2 was already elected on 15-7-90 was erroneous, in as much as there was no other election. Ex abundanti cautela provisions of Section 16-A (7) of the Act are set out below : "16-A (7). Whenever there is 'dispute with respect to the Management of an institution', persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education upon such enquiry as is deemed fit to be in actual control of its affair may, for purposes of this Act, be recognised to constitute the Committee of Management of such institution until a Court of competent jurisdiction direct otherwise ; Provided that the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall, before making an order under this sub-section, afford reasonable opportunity to the rival claimant!) to make representations in writing. Explanation ; In determining the question as to who is in actual control of the affairs. of the institution, the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall have regard to the control over funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the Scheme of Administration approved under sub-section (5) and other relevant circumstances". The Legislative intendment is that whenever there is a dispute with respect to the Committee of Management, the matter can be referred to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. The word 'dispute' is neither statutorily defined nor judicially interpreted. In such situation we can refer some Dictionary meaning of word dispute, but to rely upon Dictionary wearing is not always safe. 5. In State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., (AIR 1985 SC 1296 at page 1328, para 89) it was held : "It is now well settled that the dictionary meaning of a word cannot be looked at where that word has been statutorily defined or judicially interpreted but where there is no such definition or interpretation, the court may take the aid of dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of a word in common parlance. IN doing so the court must bear in mind that a word is used in different senses according to its context and a dictionary gives all the meanings of a word and the court would, therefore, have to select the particular meaning which would be relevant to the context in which it has to interpret that word". 6. IN doing so the court must bear in mind that a word is used in different senses according to its context and a dictionary gives all the meanings of a word and the court would, therefore, have to select the particular meaning which would be relevant to the context in which it has to interpret that word". 6. According to New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, the word 'Dispute' connotes to quarrel, to argue, to question the truth of, to fight hard. In view of wide connotation of word 'dispute' there could be any matter where any individual can quarrel or question the rights or legality of a person as Manager or Committee of Management, in that event the matter may be referred to the Director by District Inspector of Schools In view of the wide sweap of the Language employed by the Legislature, it could not be said that the matter can be referred only when there are two parallel committees of management. The word 'dispute' has been designedly used by the Legislature and the consequence or the meaning of the same cannot be either underestimated or over looked. As regards the second submission about the violation of principles of natural justice. It is well settled that during the pendency of the reference before the Deputy Director of Education, there is no justification on the part of the District Inspector of Schools to pass any interim order or to pass any other order so as to effect interest of any party. It is for the Deputy Director of Education to consider the said or similar application consequently under the circumstances of present case the order attesting signature was passed during pendency of the reference, it was accordingly without authority. If any order has been passed without power or authority, or by cencealment of some material fact, such order can be withdrawn. The District Inspector of Schools inherently lacked the authority in passing an order attesting the signature of the petitioner when the matter was pending before the Director. Under these circumstances if an order has been passed, it would be proper on the part of that officer to correct his mistake. For such matters opportunity of hearing is not necessary. In every situation personal hearing is not necessary. Impugned orders are correct and there is no error much less an error apparent on the fact of record. Under these circumstances if an order has been passed, it would be proper on the part of that officer to correct his mistake. For such matters opportunity of hearing is not necessary. In every situation personal hearing is not necessary. Impugned orders are correct and there is no error much less an error apparent on the fact of record. By the impugned order substantial justice has been done. 7. In view of the premises aforesaid the petition fails and is dismissed. But the reference shall be decided by the Deputy Director of Education within a period of 90 days from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.