JUDGMENT (Per T. D. Sugla, J.) Assessee is a Company. Its assessment for the assessment year 1980-81 was completed under section 143(3) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, on a total income of Rs. 5,286/- on 16th September, 1982. It is pertinent to mention that in February 1981 there was an income-tax raid in the assessee's premises and the above assessment was completed about 1 1/5 years thereafter. By a notice issued on 20th September, 1984 under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, the Income-Tax Officer required the assessee to file a return in response to the said notice. The Assessee requested the Income-Tax Officer to give the reasons for his seeking to reopen the assessment and also the provisions under which the assessment was being reopened. By his letter dated 11th January, 1985, the Income-Tax Officers informed the assessee that the assessment was reopened under section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, and that the reason for reopening the assessment was that the assessee had disclosed during the course of the original assessment proceedings purchases of cloth mainly from Vardhman Trading Co. and Bajrang Overseas. Its sales were mainly to M/s. Chordia International. Both the parties from whom the purchases were made and also the party to whom the sales were made were found to be non-genuine parties and were known to have indulged in bogus Hawala transactions. Thereafter the assessee filed the present Writ Petition. It is contended by Shri Jagdish Prem, the learned counsel for the assessee, that the issue of notice under section 148 read with section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act was bad and illegal, in as much as the condition precedent for the issue of it was not satisfied. For this purpose, it was stated that the notice was issued not by the same Income-Tax Officer, who made the assessment but by his successor in office who could not possibly know as to whether the information said to have come in his possession subsequently was available at the time of the original assessment proceedings. Placing then reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, 103 ITR 437, Shri Jagdish Prem stated that the information indicated by the Income-Tax Officer in his letter dated 11th January, 1985, to say the least, was vague and general. Placing then reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, 103 ITR 437, Shri Jagdish Prem stated that the information indicated by the Income-Tax Officer in his letter dated 11th January, 1985, to say the least, was vague and general. It did not have any direct nexus or live link with the formation of belief that the assessee's income had escaped assessment. Accordingly, he contended that the notice issued was without jurisdiction. Dr. Balasubramaniam, the learned counsel appearing for the Income-Tax Department, on the other hand, stated that when the assessment was completed originally, the statements of purchases and sales furnished, by the assessee were accepted without investigation. Subsequently, information was received that the assessee's purchasers as well as the sellers were bogus and were indulging in bogus Hawala transactions. This was, according to him, a piece of information received subsequent to the completion of the assessment. As to the question of direct nexus between the information and the formation of belief, it was the case of Dr. Balasubramaniam that the provisions of section 147(a) were involved before the Supreme Court in 103 ITR 437. The observations were made in the context of whether the assessee had made a full and true disclosure of relevant material and not in the context of formation of belief. Moreover, according to Dr. Balasubramaniam, it was always open to the assessee to agitate all that he wanted to say before this Court, before the Income-Tax authorities. Mere issue of notice did not mean that the assessment would be made on the assessee. On a proper explanation given, the proceedings could as well be dropped. It is evident from the plain reading of section 147 of the Income-Tax Act that the expression "reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" is common both to sub-section (a) and sub-section (b) of section 147. The only difference between the two provisions is whereas sub-section (a) requires that the income chargeable to tax must have escaped assessment by reason of (i) omission or failure to make a return or (ii) nondisclosure of all material facts necessary for the assessment fully and truly, sub-section (b) requires that the belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment must have been in consequence of information in his possession. Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in 103 ITR 437, according to my judgment, will apply both while examining the reopening of assessment under sub-section (a) or sub-section (b) of section 147. This is what has been held in another Supreme Court decision in Chhugamal Raipal v. S. P. Ghaliha, 79 ITR 603. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to examine, assuming for the present that the Income-Tax Officer had in his possession some information, whether that information had a direct nexus or live link with the formation of belief that the assessee's income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. For this purpose, reference may once again be made to the reasons given by the Income-Tax Officer in his letter dated 11th January, 1985 to the assessee, namely, "Both the parties from whom purchases are made and also the party to whom sales are made are found to be non-genuine parties and are known to have indulged in bogus Hawala transactions". There is no indication as to whether and in what context these parties were found to be non-genuine parties and how they were known to have indulged in bogus Hawala transactions. There is also no indication available from the information that those parties had stated that their transactions with the assessee were bogus. The Supreme Court decision, thus, is squarely applicable. It is not possible to say that the formation of belief that income had escaped assessment had any sound basis. Accordingly, it will have to be held that the notice was issued without satisfying the condition precedent for its issue. The notice is accordingly quashed. In the result, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs.