Judgment : The petitioner (M.A. Raza & Mohammad Ali Raza - in Crl.M.P.No.2514 of 1987) is the Managing partner of “Manashila Plastic Industries” situated at No.43. Mambalam High Road. There came into existence three agreements dated 212. 1983, 4. 1984 and 25. 1984 between the petitioner as Managing partner of the aforesaid plastic Industries and M/s.Interfirst Investment (P) Ltd., represented by its Chief Manager, V.Paramasivam, the second respondent herein, whereby certain machineries belonging to the second respondent were hired out to the petitioner on payment of certain monthly instalments for a period of two years. The said agreements further provided that the said machineries and equipments had to be installed at 48 Mambalam High Road and they should not be removed without the written consent of the second respondent and the machineries were to be returned to the second respondent after the expiry of 24 months. The petitioner, in violation of the specific directions contained in the said three agreements clandestinely removed and shifted the machineries to No.11, Meeran Labbai Street, by vacating the premises No.48, Mambalam High Road and did not return the machineries despite the expiry of the period of 24 months and started using the same without payment of the lease amounts. Consequently, the second respondent lodged a complaint before the first respondent the Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras-8. Which was registered in Crime No.1157 of 1986 culminating in the filing of the final report under Sec.173(2), Cr.P.C. against the petitioner, after the seizure of the machineries., which is now pending as C.C.No.1479 of 1987 on the file of the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras-15. The aggrieved petitioner came forward with the petition in Crl.M.P.No.2514 of 1987 to quash the said proceedings. 2. The second respondent filed M.P.No. 1628 of 1986 before the Court below for return of the machineries. Likewise, the petitioner also filed M.P.No.1616 of 1986 praying for the return of the machineries. The Court below did not at all pass any order on those petitions. But, nonetheless, the second respondent filed Crl.M.P.No.3005 of 1987 praying for return of the machineries. The second respondent also initiated certain proceedings before the competent civil forum and they are stated to be pending. 3. The Court below did not at all pass any order on those petitions. But, nonetheless, the second respondent filed Crl.M.P.No.3005 of 1987 praying for return of the machineries. The second respondent also initiated certain proceedings before the competent civil forum and they are stated to be pending. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would report to make three submissions and they are: .(1) Since the competent civil forum has seized of the dispute between the parties, initiation of criminal action is not maintainable in law; (2) In any event, if the materials gathered by the investigating agency as reflected in the final report are taken for granted to be true and nothing but true, even then it cannot at all be stated that an offence Under Sec.409 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out against the petitioner; and .(3) Since the Court below has not passed any order either in the M.P. filed by him or by the second respondent respecting the return of the machineries, there is no order available for this Court for any further order to be made adjudging the impropriety or illegality of such an order having been made. Learned counsel for the second respondent would, however, repel such submissions. 4. To the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, I am unable to affix my seal of approval. The fact that the parties resorted to initiate proceedings before competent civil forum is not by itself sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court, when there are prima facie materials available pointing out the constituting of an offence. There may be a case in which there is plausibility of initiating actions, both civil and criminal before competent forums. The question here to be considered is whether the case on hand is one where there are primordial requisites for initiation of both the actions. Here comes into consideration the second submission urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. No doubt, the material facts collected by the investigating agency point out the existence of three agreements entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent. The recitals in those agreements would point out in no uncertain terms that the machineries and equipments were hired out by the second respondent to the petitioner on payment of certain monthly instalments. No doubt, the material facts collected by the investigating agency point out the existence of three agreements entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent. The recitals in those agreements would point out in no uncertain terms that the machineries and equipments were hired out by the second respondent to the petitioner on payment of certain monthly instalments. They would further point out that the machineries and equipments should not be removed from the original place of installation and they should be returned to the second respondent after the expiry of 24 months. There is no pale of controversy at all that the said machineries and equipments had been removed by the petitioner and installed in a different place of his choice and did not even opt to pay the monthly instalments even subsequent to the expiry of 24 months. The moot question that will arise for consideration on these facts is as to whether such materials could be construed to have prima facie constituted an offence under Sec.409, I.P.C. 5. Before a person can be convicted of criminal breach of trust, it must be proved firstly, that there was an entrustment of property, or dominion over property secondly that there was dishonest misappropriation or conversion by a person to his own use of the property or that there was dishonest use or disposal of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust was to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he had made, touching the discharge of such trust, or that he wilfully suffered any person to do so. 6. In the case on hand, no doubt true it is that the equipments and machineries were entrusted with the petitioner. The equipments and machineries cannot at all be stated to have been misappropriated or converted to the use of the petitioner, in as much as those machineries and equipments were seized by the investigating agency during the course of investigation. What all could be stated against the petitioner is that he violated the condition of the removal of the installation of the machineries from the original place of installation to the place of his choice contrary to the provisions of the agreement. What all could be stated against the petitioner is that he violated the condition of the removal of the installation of the machineries from the original place of installation to the place of his choice contrary to the provisions of the agreement. The further violation he had committed was that he used the machineries even after the expiry of the period of 24 months as agreed upon without even paying the monthly instalments for such trust. Whether these two violations could be construed as dishonest use or disposal of the properties in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust was to be discharged or of any legal contract, which he had made touching the discharge of such trust. 7. Appropriate it is at this juncture to consider the meaning of the words “dishonestly” “wrongful gain” and “wrongful loss”. Sec.24, I.P.C., defines “dishonestly” thus: “Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, said to do that thing “dishonestly”. Sec.23, I.P.C., defines the expressions “Wrongful gain” “wrongful loss” and gaining “wrongfully” and “losing wrongfully” and it runs as follows: “Wrongful gain” is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. “Wrongful Loss” is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. A person is said to “gain wrongfully” when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquired wrongfully. A person is said to “loss wrongfully” when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when such person, is wrongfully deprived of property”. 8. On the face of the definitions as extracted above, it is crystal clear that the petitioners, who happened to acquire the machineries and equipments from the second respondent by lawful means, in the sense of entering into agreements, wrongfully retained the properties after the expiry of the period of 24 months and by such wrongful retention and user of the machineries, it is to be construed that he made wrongful gain by unlawful means by retention of those machineries and equipments and consequent user of them, thereby causing wrongful loss to the second respondent, who was unlawfully deprived of the machineries and equipments, to which he was legally entitled to, after the expiry of the period of 24 months. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that there are prima facie materials for constituting an offence under Sec.409, I.P.C. and therefore it is the second submission of the petitioner also bristles next to nothing. 9. As respects the third submission, revolving on the question of return of the machineries to the second respondent, no order can be passed by this court, which especially there is no order on this aspect of the matter by the Court below. 10. For the foregoing reasons, both these petitions deserve to be dismissed and consequently, they are dismissed.