K. K. BIRLA, J. This revisions arises out of the order passed on 8th December, 1987 allowing the criminal revision and dropping the proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. passed by the VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar. 2. Ths necessary facts leading to this revision may be narrated :- One Kripa Ram was the bhumidhar of the plots Nos. 84, 516 and 514 situate in village Rohana Kalan. According to Jai Prakash and Shyam Lal, the present revisionists, Kripa Ram agreed to sell these plots to them by agreement to sell dated 27th November, 1976. By sale-deed dated 5th February, 1987 Kripa Ram sold those plots in favour of Ashok Kumar and others, the present opposite parties Nos. 2 to 13 (here in after referred as the second party ). By application dated 20-2-87 the present revisionists initiated the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. against the second party. The preliminary order in the case was passed on 28-3-87. Vide plaint dated 29-1-87 the present revisionists had already filed a suit for specific performance against Kripa Ram for specific performance of the afore said agreement. By the impugned order dated 4th August, 1987 the S. D. M. had ordered the attachment of the land in dispute under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. considering it to be a case of emergency. Being aggrieved Ashok and others perferred a revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge. One of the objections raised before the Revisional Court was that the impugned order is interlocutory order. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was of the opinion that an order under Section 146 (1) is an interlocutory order but according to him, a civil suit was pending between Jai Prakash and Kripa Ram since January 1987, the petition under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was moved on 20-2-87 and as such the impugned order did not remain an inerlocutory order and a revision was maintainable against that order. He was further of the opinion that though in the suit the relief for possession has not been sought for, in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr P. C. both the parties claimed their respec tive possession. The second party is not a party in the civil suit. The second party has moved an application dated 25-8-87 under Order I, Rule 10 and Sec tion 151, C. P. C. for being impleaded in the suit. The second party is not a party in the civil suit. The second party has moved an application dated 25-8-87 under Order I, Rule 10 and Sec tion 151, C. P. C. for being impleaded in the suit. Its copy is on record of the 1st Revisional Court. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was further of the opinion that such aggrieved persons could move the Civil Court for being impleaded and that the question of possession may be involved in the civil suit. On these premises, he was of the opinion that the proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were not maintainable in view of the principle Lald down in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahanih v. State reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 472. He, accordingly, ordered the dropping of the pro ceedings and for returning back the possession of the disputed land to the person from whose possession it was attached. Being aggrieved by this order Sri Jai Prakash and Shyam Lal have preferred this revision. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel the revisionists that no revision was maintainable against the impugned order which is an inrterlocu-tory order. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge himself had agreed with this legal proposition based on the cases cited in the impugned order. The learned counsel for the opposite parties does not dispute this. The mere fact that a civil suit is pending will not make the impugned order as non-interlocutory order so as to make a revision maintainable against that order. If the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. are not maintainable on account of the pendency of a civil suit, those proceedings may come to end on that ground. It will be quite different from saying that on account of that circumstance an interlocu tory order will loose its such character. Therefore, the finding of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, in this regard is misconceived and cannot be main tained. 4. However, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the second party that under Section 397, Cr. P. C. the Court may itself examine the record and also look to the regularity of any proceedings. It is contended that the records of both the lower Courts before this Court, that in view of the civil suit the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. the Court may itself examine the record and also look to the regularity of any proceedings. It is contended that the records of both the lower Courts before this Court, that in view of the civil suit the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were not maintain able and as such the proceedings taken under Section 145, Cr. P. , were without jurisdiction or bad-in-law and this aspect can be considered by this Court, even though the revision against the impugned order were not maintainable. Reliance is placed for this proposition on the case of Ham Sumer Puri Mahanth (supra ). 5. The specific plea in this regard was not raised before the S. D. M. nor he considered this aspect while passing the order dated 4th August, 1987. But from the order of the 1st Revisional Court it appears that the question whether the present proceedings should be dropped on the facts of the case was raised before him. The learned counsel for the parties have raised argu ments in this regard before me. Considering the scope of Section 397, Cr. P. C. this aspect is being considered. 6. The copy of the plaint of suit No. 98 of 1987 is on the record of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. The relief claimed is for specific performance of the contract dated 27th November, 1976 and in the alterna tive for recovery of Rs. 75, 000 from the defendant, (Kripa Ram) paid by way of earnest money. No relief for permanent injunction with regard to land in dispute has been prayed for. Nothing has been alleged in the plaint regarding the possession after the execution of this agreement. The injunction applica tion and order passed thereon is also on the record. The temporary injunction is for restraining the transfer of the disputed land in any manner. 7. It is quite established principle of law that the multiplicity of the proceedings should be avoided. In the case Ram Sumer Puri (supra) as well it has been held that the multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litiga tion. In the application under Section M5, Cr. In the case Ram Sumer Puri (supra) as well it has been held that the multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litiga tion. In the application under Section M5, Cr. P. P. C. the revisionists alleged that Kripa Ram executed an agreement for sale dated 27-11-76 and had given the possession of the disputed land to them, since then, according to them they were in possession from that time. 8. It is contended on behalf of the second party that they are the transferee for consideration of the land in suit. They have already moved an application for being impleaded in the suit. The right of the parties including the question of possession is involved in that suit, even though the specific relief for the possession might have not been sought by the revisionists. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the revisionist than Kripa Ram is not aparty to the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. , the second party is not a partly in the suit, that the scope of both the proceedings is different and as such the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. are maintainable. On consideration of the respective contentions raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the contentions raised on behalf of the second party should prevail. 9. In the case of Ram Sumer Pun (supra) it has been held that and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such an injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of the litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. 10. In the case of Sheomurti Pandey v. Bharatilal Pandey reported in 1987 AWC page ` it has been held that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. may be dropped even if the parties in the civil suit are not the same. In the case before me the suit is against Kripa Ram. The second party has already moved for being impleaded as defendants. They claim to be the transferees for consideration. No doubt in the petition under Section 145, Cr. P. C. may be dropped even if the parties in the civil suit are not the same. In the case before me the suit is against Kripa Ram. The second party has already moved for being impleaded as defendants. They claim to be the transferees for consideration. No doubt in the petition under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Kripa Ram has not been impleaded as a party but as pointed out earlier in the petition it is alleged that the possession was delivered by Kripa Ram. It is furthet alleged in the petition itself that the second party has got executed collusive and fictitious sale-deed. Therefore, it was in the knowledge of the revisionists that the second party had a sale-deed in their favour. Ins tead of impleading them in the suit as they were transferees, the revisionists choice to file a petition under Section 145, Cr. P. C. against the second party and avoided forum of the Civil Court against them. It may also be pointed out that in spite of the petition under Section 145, Cr. P. C. the S. D. M. has passed the preliminary order against Kripa Ram as well. Therefore, for all purposes Sri Kripa Ram is also a second party in the case. On these facts it is clear that the revisionists claim to be in possession on the basis of delivery of possession by Kripa Ram in pursuance of the agreement to sell and they would have, rather should have approached the Civil Court regarding the possession by making necessary assertions in the plaint and seeking proper remedy in the suit itself. I am, therefore, of the opition that the revisionists could have approached the Civil Court, this litigation amounts to multiplicity of the litigation and is not in the interest of the parties. Therefore, I do not consider it is a fit case for interference in the impugned order. 11. The revision is accordingly, dismissed. Revision dismissed. .