Raj Rani Kapoor v. Bhupinder Singh — 1990 DIGILAW 929 (ALL)

JUDGMENT N. N. Mithal, J. 1. This revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act was finally disposed of by this court on 28- 8-1986. Since reported in 1986 AWC 1214. The court had set aside the findings recorded by the trial court and after pointing out the errors which the trial court had committed, gave certain directions to the trial court and remanded the matter to it for deciding the suit afresh in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. The tenant being aggrieved by the order passed by this court approached the Supreme Court and the Special Leave Petition by him was allowed and the matter was remanded to this court with a direction that the High Court itself should decide the questions passed by it instead of remanding the matter to the trial court. THIS is how the matter has come up again before this court for disposing of the revision. 2. Sri S. P. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the applicant landlady and SRI Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the tenant opposite party both have been quite fair in stating that the observations made by this court on the points raised need not be reiterated and the court may, therefore, confine itself in deciding the controversies which were left for decision by the trial court after remand. In view of this categorical statement of the learned counsel for the parties, the court does not think it necessary to go over again on the points which had been considered by it earlier and the said judgment shall form an integral part of the findings that are proposed to given. The controversy set at rest by the previous judgment dated 28-8- 1986 is that the structure raised by the opposite party in the backyard of the disputed premises was a 'construction' within the meaning of the said word in section 20 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972. What, however, remains to be decided is whether the raising of that construction has disfigured the building so as. to come within the mischief of section 20 (2) (c). 3. What, however, remains to be decided is whether the raising of that construction has disfigured the building so as. to come within the mischief of section 20 (2) (c). 3. The other point concluded on the earlier occasion was that the tenant was under a statutory liability to pay the entire amount of enhanced water-tax and one fourth of the enhanced amount of House-tax besides rent, since there was no contract in writing to the contrary. The question that remained so be decided on the question of default were (i) whether House-tax and Water tax paid by the defendant formed part of the rent;- (ii) whether the entire amount of rent etc. had been deposited to satisfy the condition of section 20 (4) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972; and (iii) whether the defendant was not entitled to get the benefit of section 20 (4) having purchased a residential building ? 4. I propose to take up the first point first. The finding recorded by the trial court is that the offending structure was supported on poles embedded in the ground and is fastened to the building by means of angle iron brackets using nuts and bolts. The whole structure can be removed without causing any damage to the main building by unscrewing the nuts and bolts and thus dismantling it step by step. The trial court further found that there existed a 'U' wide road towards north i.e. to the back of the building. The question that remains to be decided is whether raising of structure of this nature which is visible from the road towards the north can amount to disfiguring the building ? While the petitioner contended that the offending construction caused disfigurement of the building as it was open to view from the road on the north and had made the whole look of the building ugly, the plea of the tenant was otherwise. According to Sri Sudhir Chandra, by raising the tin shed neither any disfigurement has taken place nor the demised building has been affected in any manner. 5. In support, Sri Chandra has relied on some decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, such as Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, 1987 SC 617, Om Prakash v. VIII Additional District Judge, 1989 (1) ARC Tl9 and Mooli v. Additional District Judge, Mathura, 1999 (II) AWC 1268=1989 (2) ARC 152. 5. In support, Sri Chandra has relied on some decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, such as Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, 1987 SC 617, Om Prakash v. VIII Additional District Judge, 1989 (1) ARC Tl9 and Mooli v. Additional District Judge, Mathura, 1999 (II) AWC 1268=1989 (2) ARC 152. IN the case in hand our concern is limited to those cases where the tenant by raising some construction has caused disfigurement of the demised premises. 6. In the Supreme Court decision provisions of U. P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952 were being considered where 'disfigurement' of the building does aot figure among the grounds for eviction. Under the provisions of the said Act the tenant would be liable to be evicted if the construction made by him result in material alteration of the building. It is in this context that the Supreme Court took the view that permanent and temporary nature of the constructions raised was material for determining the question of material alteration. IN 1989 (1) ARC 119 also the tenant had only removed the intervening walls to enlarge the size of the shop and thus convert three shops into two. IN these circumstances the plea of material alteration and disfigurement were repelled. Besides the court was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, finding of fact recorded by the trial and revisional courts were accepted. IN the third case the only finding recorded by the lower courts was that the tenant, while reconstructing the 'Kotha', had laid a new roof from which it was concluded that this had caused disfigurement. This court did not approve of this approach and held that the court in such a case must record a further finding that consequent upon the raising of the construction disfigurement had taken place. The only evidence on this point in this case consists of a few photographs of the structure but these only go to establish that the shed is not embedded in the main building and is fully supported on poles. There is no independent evidence to suggest that to a passer by these structures appear to be ugly and/or revolting to the conscience so that it may be said that it had caused any disfigurement of the building. There is no independent evidence to suggest that to a passer by these structures appear to be ugly and/or revolting to the conscience so that it may be said that it had caused any disfigurement of the building. As pointed out by the trial court, no commission was got issued by the plaintiff nor is there any independent evidence. The solitary statement of the plaintiff's husband on this point was found in-sufficient in proving disfigurement. In the absence of any such evidence, therefore, it is difficult for me to hold that mere raising of the tin shed bad resulted in disfigurement of the building. As pointed out in my earlier judgment in this case, disfigurement does not depend upon any single factor but is the cumulative effect of a variety of factors and circumstances, such as the place, nature, magnitude and its over-all effect on the look and appearance of the existing construction on the mind of a person. Since there is no evidence as to how one would react after looking at the structures complained of as to its effect on its over all appearance, it cannot be said that in this case, the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the disputed construction had caused disfigurement of the building. 7. Coming now to the second question as to default. It may be pointed out that a dispute between the parties lies in a very narrow compass. 8. According to the plaintiff, the defendant opposite party was liable to pay monthly rent along with House-tax and Water-tax besides all increases made from time to time in Water-tax and enhanced amount of House-tax to the extent of 25% thereof. The opposite party, however, contended that according to agreement between the parties the defendant was only- liable to pay a fixed amount towards these taxes i.e. Rs. 56.25 per month, notwithstanding any future increase in taxes. In view of this, it is urged that the defendant having deposited the entire rent, interest and costs etc. on the first date of hearing, he was entitled to avail the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act It is undisputed that Rs. 280.00 per month was the agreed rent of the premises and he was paying to the landlady at this rate in July, 1972 also when the present rent law was enforced. Apart from this, admittedly Rs. 280.00 per month was the agreed rent of the premises and he was paying to the landlady at this rate in July, 1972 also when the present rent law was enforced. Apart from this, admittedly Rs. 56.25 per month was being paid towards House-tax and Water-tax in respect of the disputed premises. The question posed once again is whether there existed any agreement between the parties whereby the tenant's liability to pay Water and House-tax was irrevocably fixed at Rs. 56.25 per month. The case of the defendant was that ever since the inception of his tenancy, the amount of Water and House Tax had been varied every now and then as a result whereof the parties wanted to settle for a fixed amount of Taxes to be paid. The finding recorded by the trial court was in favour of the tenant and was based on the sole ground that at no point of time, the amount of House-tax and Water-tax added upto Rs. 56.25. This ground, however, was found so be insupportable on the evidence and, therefore, it was upset and it was directed that the same may be decided afresh by the trial court after remand. But now since this aspect also has to be decided by this court it will be necessary to scan the evidence in this behalf. 9. It will be noticed that the plaintiff has filed Annexure 1 along with an affidavit on 2-5-1988 giving out the split up of House-tax and Water-tax according to the assessments of the annual letting value of the building made by the Nagar Mahapalika periodically. The statement gives details of various amounts which became payable as Water-tax or House-tax from time to time. The correctness of the figures mentioned in Annexure I has not been challenged, only its effect on the liability of the tenant has been disputed. This Chart gives the position of annual assessment, the rate at which House- tax and Water-tax is being levied during the period 1968-69 to 1972-73 and .also the actual Water-tax and House-tax payable for the building. A similar Chart for the period 1972-73 to 1982-83 has also been filed as Annexure 2 with the same affidavit. A look at these Charts will show that there has been an upward revision in the annual assessment with corresponding revision of Water Tax and House Tax. A similar Chart for the period 1972-73 to 1982-83 has also been filed as Annexure 2 with the same affidavit. A look at these Charts will show that there has been an upward revision in the annual assessment with corresponding revision of Water Tax and House Tax. From these Charts, it will be obvious that immediately before the enforcement of U. P. Act 13 of 1972, the building was assessed to water-tax and House-tax amounting to Rs. 56.25 per month. The rent receipts filed on the record also show that this was the amount of taxes which the tenant used to pay to the landlord in addition to rent. 10. In the written statement, the defendant gave no inkling as to when and in what manner the alleged agreement had taken place. The plea was very vague. There is also no independent evidenee to support the version of the tenant. Admittedly there was no written agreement either. From both sides, there is assertion and denial. IN such a state of affairs, the agreement set up by the tenant has not been proved. This leads us to the question whether the sum of Rs. 56-25 paid by the tenant as taxes were part of the rent or were independent of the rent. This would be relevant in view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. The contention sought to be pressed upon me for acceptance is like this. The petitioner's learned counsel with reference to the provisions of section 20 of the Act, pointed out that no document evidencing the terms of tenancy was executed and admittedly the defendant used to pay Rs. 280/- per month by way of rent (as understood in common parlance) besides Rs. 56.25 per month, simultaneously with the rent. This was the admitted position Just before U. P. Act 13 of 1972 was enforced. The contention raised on this premise was that the two amounts i.e. Rs. 280/- and Rs. 56.25 together constituted rent for purposes of section 20 of the Act, and this entire amount was 'rent'. 12. To fully understand the impact of this submission a look at the relevant provision may be necessary. The contention raised on this premise was that the two amounts i.e. Rs. 280/- and Rs. 56.25 together constituted rent for purposes of section 20 of the Act, and this entire amount was 'rent'. 12. To fully understand the impact of this submission a look at the relevant provision may be necessary. Section 20 of the Act, leaving out the non essential part, is quoted as under "20 (1) (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely : (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand : Provided ........................ (3) ... ... ... ... (4) In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground ? Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality notified area or town area. (5) ... ... ... (6) ... ... ... Thus, when a suit against a tenant is filed on the ground of his having failed to pay the rent after demand the tenant can avail another opportunity of saving his tenancy by depositing the entire amount of rent etc. in the court on the first date of hearing. 13. (5) ... ... ... (6) ... ... ... Thus, when a suit against a tenant is filed on the ground of his having failed to pay the rent after demand the tenant can avail another opportunity of saving his tenancy by depositing the entire amount of rent etc. in the court on the first date of hearing. 13. The question then arises as to what is meant by the term 'rent' ? To begin with, therefore, we must examine what really this term means. The term 'rent' has not been defined in the Rent Act and it must, therefore, be given the same meaning which is given to it in the Transfer of Property Act, which embodied the ordinary law applicable between landlord and tenant. According to section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, the term 'rent' means money, a share of crops, service or other thing of value rendered' periodically or on specified occasion by the tenant to the landlord in consideration of the transfer of right to enjoy the premises. In other words, 'rent' forms consideration for the transfer of a right to enjoy the premises. Thus, whatever forms that consideration must be termed as 'rent' whether it be in the nature of money or a share of crops or service or any other thing of value. To determine rent one must, therefore, examine what constitutes the consideration for the right to enjoy landlord or lessors property. 14. For creating a relationship of landlord and tenant the landlord transfers to the tenant the right to enjoy the premises for a certain time, express or implied or in perpetuity and any thing which the tenant pays as a consideration tor this transfer of right to enjoy the property will be taken to mean rent for the premises. It will also be of some assistance to quote here Mulla who, in his Commentary of Transfers of Property Act, observed "In Indian Law any payment by lessee that is part of consideration of the lease is rent." 15. The submission of Sri S. P. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the revisionist, was that since in the present case it was not disputed that the tenant was liable to pay House-tax and Water-tax in addition to Rs. 280/- per month as rent these amounts together would from the rent for the purpose. of section 20 of the Act. The submission of Sri S. P. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the revisionist, was that since in the present case it was not disputed that the tenant was liable to pay House-tax and Water-tax in addition to Rs. 280/- per month as rent these amounts together would from the rent for the purpose. of section 20 of the Act. The only point of difference between the parties appears to be that while according to the landlord, these taxes (House-tax and Water-tax) were payable by the tenant notwithstanding any variation in their quantum, the case of the tenant was that he was liable to pay at the fixed rate of Rs. 56.25 irrespective of any variation in the actual levy of House- tax and Water-tax. It would, therefore, be safe to assume that the tenant in any case was liable to pay taxes at the rate of Rs. 56.25 per month. Notwithstanding the fact that under the provisions of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the primary liability to pay these taxes is on the owner landlord but in this case indisputably all these taxes were payable by the tenant. Whether these taxes should be deemed to be part of the rent, one has to examine the matter in the light of what has been said earlier. If, as consideration of the right to enjoy the demise of the premises the tenant under took to pay Rs. 280/- plus House-tax and Water-tax per month or Rs. 56.25 the amount so payable will form that consideration and would be rent payable in respect thereof. 16. It is true that only a sum of Rs. 280/- per month has been termed as rent in the various documents and the remaining has been mentioned as House-tax and Water-tax but despite this one must look to the substance of thing because it is that which alone matters. IT is entirely immaterial if the payment is described as rent or not. What is necessary is to ascertain what is the consideration payable by the tenant to the landlord for the enjoyment of the demised premises and that consideration, howsoever it be described or allocated, would be the rent of the premises. IT is entirely immaterial if the payment is described as rent or not. What is necessary is to ascertain what is the consideration payable by the tenant to the landlord for the enjoyment of the demised premises and that consideration, howsoever it be described or allocated, would be the rent of the premises. The net result of the discussion made above leads to the conclusion that the rent payable by the tenant consisted of two parts i.e. 'rent', as understood in common parlance, and the other "taxes" in respect of House- tax and Water-tax and these two together from the rent payable for the property. Thus the total amount of rent as payable by the tenant on 15-7-1972 was Rs. 280/- plus Rs. 56.25 i.e. Rs. 336.25 per month inclusive of taxes and this whole amount would be rent payable for the right to enjoy the property. 17. In addition to the above amount, according to the case of the plaintiff, the tenant was also liable for all subsequent enhancements in Water- tax and House-tax to the extent of Rs. 25 per cent of the increase therein. The argument is based on Section 7 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 and it is alleged that irrespective of the agreement as to rent between the parties, additional statutory liability has been cast on the tenant in the shape of increased water-tax and 1 /4th of the increase in House-tax levied in respect of the demised premises and such amount is also payable as rent. Whether this is so and what impact on the right of the parties would be has to be examined next ? 18. When this revision was decided earlier on 28-8-1986 since reported in 1986 AWC 1214, the legal effect of section 7 of the Act was considered in detail and the parties have not questioned the enunciation of the legal position given at the time. The relevant portions as to this aspect are quoted below ; "A statutory liability has also been added to the agreed rent. This liability stands on a different footing. The relevant portions as to this aspect are quoted below ; "A statutory liability has also been added to the agreed rent. This liability stands on a different footing. Even though House-tax and Water- tax or any other tax may not be payable as part of the rent by the tenant as per agreement existing at the time of the enforcement of U. P. Act 13 of 1972, yet from the aforesaid date, some liability to pay taxes has been created under the Act and under Section 7 it would be deemed to be part of the rent." At another place in that judgment it was mentioned "This would mean that apart from the amount which was payable as the agreed rent when the Act commenced, his rent liability would increase so as to include the entire water-tax plus 25 per cent of the increase in House-tax. All these amounts added together would then become payable by the tenant as rent and will have to be accounted for towards rent for the purpose of default the Act." Thus the factual position at the inception of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 and thereafter is that the tenant was under an obligation to pay Rs. 280/- plus Rs. 56.25 total Rs. 386.25 per month by way of rent in addition thereto he would further be liable to pay the entire enhanced amount of Water-tax and 25 per cent of the en-chanced House-tax also as rent. In this connection it will be relevant to consider only the Chart filed by the plaintiff for the period 1972-73 to 1982-83. According to it, from 1972-73 to 1975-76, the rate at which the House-tax was levied was Rs. 16.25 and it was raised to Rs. 17 50 per cent in 1976-77 and this has continued up to 1982-83. During the period 1973-74, even the annual value of the building was raised from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 330/- per month and there was a consequent increase in House-tax and Water-tax payable for the premises. In view of these changes, the House-tax was raised from Rs. 40.625 in 1972-73 to Rs. 53.625 recording an increase of Rs. 13/,- per month in House-tax. The liability of the tenant, therefore, increased by 3.25 per month being 25 per cent of the increase in the House-tax. Similarly the Wafer-tax also increased from Rs. 16.625 to Rs. In view of these changes, the House-tax was raised from Rs. 40.625 in 1972-73 to Rs. 53.625 recording an increase of Rs. 13/,- per month in House-tax. The liability of the tenant, therefore, increased by 3.25 per month being 25 per cent of the increase in the House-tax. Similarly the Wafer-tax also increased from Rs. 16.625 to Rs. 20.265 per month in 1973-74 and to Rs. 41.250 in 1981-82, thus recording an increase of Rs. 5/- from 1973-74 to 1980-81 and of Rs. 25.625 per month from 1981-82 onwards. This entire increase in Watert-tax is payable as rent by the tenant. 19. The contention of Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the tenant however, was that the amount paid at the rate of Rs. 56.25 has nothing to do with the statutory liability and can at best be recovered as an independent claim by the plaintiff. The statutory liability for taxes under section 7 must be deemed to have been satisfied by deposits made by the tenant and if that amount is fully covered by the deposit, the tenant can not be said to be in default. The argument is fallacious, as held earlier, rent for the premises includes any thing which is paid for the right to enjoy the property. The statutory liability guaranteed under section 7 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 is in addition to the contractual liability and this also under the law is payable as rent. The tenant was, therefore, obliged to deposit the entire amount of rent payable by him if he wanted to take the benefit of Section 20 (4) to avoid bis eviction. It will be relevant to consider here a few decisions relevant to the point. In AIR 1976 Alld 362-P. N. Kureel v. Beni Prasad, a learned Single Judge of this Court has relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1957 SC 309 : "The term 'rent' has not been defined in the Act. Hence it must be taken to have been used in its ordinary Dictionary meaning. The term 'rent' is comprehensive enough to include all payments agreed to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided and at the cost of the landlord. The term 'rent' is comprehensive enough to include all payments agreed to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided and at the cost of the landlord. Therefore, all that is included in the term 'rent' is within the purview of the Act......... 20. The learned Single Judge, therefore, held that rent includes all payments agreed by the defendant to be paid to his landlord for use and occupation not only of the building but also for furnishing, electric installation and other amenities. In H. K. Wattal v Mababir Glass, 1968 ALI 1068, it has been observed that the term 'rent' has a- wider meening that what is given in Section 105 of the Transfer or Property Act. In Navnit Prasad v. Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad, AIR 1957 Bom 163 . it was held that rent need not be necessary in the form of cash only and it may be in the nature of Municipal Tan.es. Similarly in Someshwar Dayal Seth v. Sri DwardhishJi Maharaj, AIR. 1950 Alld....... this Court has held that Municipal Taxes if agreed to be paid by the tenant from part of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord Thus where according, to the agreement between the parties, the tenant -as to pay rent in addition to Municipal Taxes, the Municipal Taxes will form part of the rent payable by the tenant. The legal opinion, therefore, appears to be unanimous that the taxes paid by the tenant also form part of rent and, therefore, cannot be separated from the total liability of the tenant. The submission of Sri Sudhir Chandra, therefore, that the amount deposited by the tenant under Section 20 (4) may first be appropriated towards adjustment of enhanced taxes under Section 7 and if the payment satisfies that liability, the tenant should be relieved form eviction can not he accepted. In this case, the tenant bad to deposit Rs. 280/- plus Rs. 56.25 plus the entire increase in Water-tax and 25 per cent of increase of House-tax and this total amount, if not deposited from the first date of hearing, would clearly put the tenant in default. 21. There is another angle to look at this aspect. In this case, the tenant bad to deposit Rs. 280/- plus Rs. 56.25 plus the entire increase in Water-tax and 25 per cent of increase of House-tax and this total amount, if not deposited from the first date of hearing, would clearly put the tenant in default. 21. There is another angle to look at this aspect. Sri Chandra urged that the rent1 receipts show that there was no balance after payment of Rs. 280/- and taxes at the rate of Rs. 56.25. According to him, alter the receipt of this nature has been issued, the liability of the tenant in respect of tax liability under Section 7 of U.P.Act 13 of 1972 will also stand satisfied. This argument, however, ignores that even according to the tenant the payments made by him were not in full and final satisfaction. The rent receipts also do not show this and even the defendant's evidence is silent on this point It is urged that from the conduct of the parties it will be presumed that the payment made by the tenant was final. Apart from the fact that the term 'full and final payment' has special meaning and significance, it is absent in this case. There is nothing to indicate that the payment was made in full and final satisfaction Merely because no balance is shown in the rent receipt, it does not follow that the liability in respect of? what the tenant is liable to pay under the statute also stands wiped off Statutory liability can not be discharged in this fashion. The only ground on which the tenant claimed that he was not liable to pay the amounts payable under Section 7 is that there was an agreement between the parties to pay a fixed amount of Rs. 56.25 per month as taxes notwithstanding any increase in rent This argument has already been repelled as there can not be any estoppel against statute. I have also found that there was no agreement even between the parties which limited the right of the landlord in any manner. 22. The tenant while making the payment of Rs. 56.25 did not appropriate it toward any particular liability. When the landlord issued the receipt, he appropriated the same towards his liability to pay Rs 56.25 towards taxes. I have also found that there was no agreement even between the parties which limited the right of the landlord in any manner. 22. The tenant while making the payment of Rs. 56.25 did not appropriate it toward any particular liability. When the landlord issued the receipt, he appropriated the same towards his liability to pay Rs 56.25 towards taxes. According to Section 60 of the Contract Act, therefore, this appropriation can be consider only towards that amount and can not come to the benefit of the tenant to discharge the liability under Section 7 of the Act. 1 am. therefore, of the opinion that the tenant was liable to pay the taxes and the increased taxes according to Section 7 as rent. The tenant has claimed benefit* under Section 20 (4) as he claims to have deposited the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest and cost of the landlord. In this case, the notice of demand was sent on 25-7-1983 claiming arrears from 1-3-1983 to 20-6- 1983 along with arrears of taxes. The suit was instituted on 4-J 0-1983 and on the first date of hearing on 16-2-1984 the tenant deposited Rs.-6600/-. A copy of the application filed by the tenant and mentioning the break up of the amounts deposited by him is annexure-4 to the affidavit dated 2-5-1988 and gives the following details : Rs. 360/- as rent from March 1983 to February 1984 at the rate of Rs. 280/- p.m. Rs. 164/- as interest on the above rent at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. Rs. 675/- as taxes from March, 1983 to February at the rate of Rs. 56.25 per month. Rs 35/- as interest on the above taxes. Rs. 283/- as half of the lawyers fees. Rs. 30/- as Clerk's fee. Rs. 1510/,- as Court fees. Rs. 338/- as other expenses (much more than) actual expenses are being deposited. Rs. 200/- extra to meet any deficiency, if any in calculation. Rs. 6600/- Total. 23. IBIS break up of deposit shows that while the tenant has deposited taxes at the rate of Rs. 56.25 for the period in question, no deposit has been made in respect of the arrears of taxes under Section 7. Rs. 200/- extra to meet any deficiency, if any in calculation. Rs. 6600/- Total. 23. IBIS break up of deposit shows that while the tenant has deposited taxes at the rate of Rs. 56.25 for the period in question, no deposit has been made in respect of the arrears of taxes under Section 7. I have already held above that the tenant was liable to pay these taxes also on the first date of hearing to claim the benefit of Section 20 (4). It was very fairly conceded by Sri Sudbir Chandra that in case tenant's liability to pay rent extends both to Rs 56.25 and increases in Water-tax and. House- tax, then the tenant has committed default. That being the admitted position, it is held that the defendant is guilty of default in the payment of rent and has failed to avoid his eviction by complying with sub-section (4) of Section 20. 24. AFTER recording this finding, it is not necessary for the Court to consider whether the benefit of sub-section (4i cannot be claimed by the tenant as he and members of his family have acquired another residential building. But since the parties have addressed the Court on this question also, this alternative plea also deserves to be considered The proviso to Section 20 (4) lays down that nothing in sub-section (4) shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition any residential building in the same city, Municipality, notified area or town area In the light of this provision what is relevant to consider is (1) that the tenant or any member of his family has built or otherwise acquired a building, (2) the building acquired is a residential building, (3) the building is in a vacant state or has been got vacated after acquisition and lastly (4) such building is situate in the same city or municipality etc. In the present case it is not disputed that the tenant and members of his family has acquired a residential building, such building is situate in the same city and that the said building was* vacant at the time of acquisition. In the present case it is not disputed that the tenant and members of his family has acquired a residential building, such building is situate in the same city and that the said building was* vacant at the time of acquisition. What is disputed by the tenant, however, is that when acquired the building was in a dilapidated condition and, therefore, it was not fit for habitation and, therefore, it can not be said that the building was really in a vacant state. The argument of the tenant is that the main purpose behind this proviso is that where the tenant is himself possessed of an alternative accommodation to which he can shift the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 20 should not be allowed. Since, according to the counsel, the whole purpose behind the Act is to safeguard the interest of the tenant, the Section should be interpreted liberally in favour of the tenant. The submission, however, does not appear to be sound. No doubt the rent laws are essentiality for the benefit of the tenant and Section 20 puts restrictions on the right of the landlord to evict a tenant. It is only in certain given conditions that the landlord has been given a right to bring a suit for eviction and one. such situation is when the tenant commits default. Even in such cases an extra precaution has been taken and the tenant has been given a second opportunity of saving his tenancy under sub-section (4) provided he makes amends for his earlier default. Now this is a concession which has been given to a tenant This concession, however, has been restricted by the legislature with a view to counter balance it with the right of the landlord and in doing so it has been provided that where the tenant already has alternative accommodation, this benefit should not be given. The tenant, therefore, has to strictly prove that he is entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4). The tenant, therefore, has to strictly prove that he is entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4). In Surendra Singh Ahluwalia v. Smt- Pushpa Devi, 1986 Vol.1 ARC 409 Honourable N. D. Ojha, J., as he then was, while considering the question of burden held thus : "Since it was the applicant who had claimed the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act, it was for him to establish that the proviso thereto was not applicable, when the suit was instituted by the respondent she could not envisage that the applicant will claim .the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act and incorporate the necessary plea in this behalf in the plaint. Since the applicant was claiming the benefit of Section 20 (4) it was for him to establish that he was entitled to the said benefit and he could be entitled to the said benefit only if he had not only complied with the requirement of Section 20 (4) but also succeeded in establishing that his case was not covered by the proviso thereto." 4. 25. IN view of this clear pronouncement of this Court, it is not necessary to spend more time on this aspect. The burden clearly being on the tenant, it was for him to show that the proviso was not applicable in his case and that he was entitled to claim the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 20. 26. IN the court below neither the plaintiff nor the defendant filed a certified copy of the sale deed. The petitioner landlord claimed that he was all along under the impression that the burden being on the tenant, he would file the copy of the sale deed which he did not do. Ultimately when the matter came up before this Court, after the decision of the S. L. P. by the Supreme Court, the landlord applied for admission of four documents including a certified Copy of the sale deed By a detailed order dated. 19-1- 1990 the said documents were admitted in evidence and certified copy of the sale deed has since come on the record. The sale deed shows that the tenant had purchased a portion of premises No. 113/158, Swarup Nagar, - Ranpur in his name along with his wife and one minor son. 19-1- 1990 the said documents were admitted in evidence and certified copy of the sale deed has since come on the record. The sale deed shows that the tenant had purchased a portion of premises No. 113/158, Swarup Nagar, - Ranpur in his name along with his wife and one minor son. Learned counsel for the tenant was candid enough to say that he will not dispute that this building was a residential building and as already mentioned earlier, his argument is confined only to this extent that the building was in a dilapidated condition and, therefore, can not be regarded to be in a vacant State. The recitals in the sale deed indicate that portion of a bigger house has been purchased and the purchaser had undertaken to construct a wall to separate the portion purchased by him from the remaining portion. There is no mention in the sale deed that the property was either in a ruinous condition or was dilapidated The proviso does not lay down that the property purchased should be in a habitable condition and only then it will be deemed to be in a vacant state, fn fact a similar situation had arisen in the case of Mohdi Nazir v. Haji Abdul Sbakur, 1976 AWC 390 and Honourable Satish Chandra, J. (as Bis Lordship then was) had this to say : "It is immaterial whether the tenant or a member of his family actually resides in that house (acquired house). The fact that subsequent to acquisition the building may have either partly or wholly fallen down ? seems to be equally irrelevant.........The only material circumstance is that the tenant has acquired a residential building in a vacant state." This clear .pronouncement leaves no room for doubt that the only requirement of law is that the tenant or a member of his family should have acquired a residential building in a vacant state The question whether it is habitable or not is totally foreign to the consideration. In view of this, in my opinion, the tenant is not entitled to claim any benefit of Section 20(4). 27. Having considered the entire matter, I find that the order passed by the Court below suffers from serious illegality and must be set aside The revision is accordingly allowed and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs. Revision allowed.