JUDGMENT R.K. Gulati, J. - The petitioner was an employee of Central Bank of India working in a Branch at Agra and was discharged from service, as a result of the disciplinary proceedings taken against him. The order of punishment was upheld in appeal. The mercy petition to the Managing Director of the Bank also yielded no relief to the petitioner. Hence, through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment mooted to him. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed two contentions before us, the first being that the petitioner was not allowed a fair opportunity to defend himself, inasmuch as the Management had not produced certain register and ledger during the enquiry proceedings in spite of specific demand as a result whereof the case of the petitioner was prejudiced. 3. Before dealing with this contention, we may mention that out of the two charges levelled against the petitioner, one charge was that on 22nd September, 1984 he debited Rs. 72.46 and Rs. 108.70 to the profit and loss account in respect of interest on M.M.D.C. and credited the said amount to his over-draft account illegally and also withdrew the money subsequently. Thus, he took pecuniary benefit of Rs. 181.16 fraudulently to which he was not entitled either in factor or in law. 4. The contention that the register and the ledger were not produced before the disciplinary authority, was also raised before the departmental authority namely, before the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The concurrent findings of the said authorities are that all the relevant documents were provided to the petitioner during the course of enquiry proceedings and no prejudice was caused by non-production of the register and ledger of which the petitioner was making complaint. On the contrary, the findings of the Departmental Authorities are that the petitioner was allowed access to the original vouchers which were in his own hand and which formed the very basis of the disciplinary action against him. The non-production of the register on which the vouchers in question were entered by the Bank contained only the entries posted from these vouchers and had no relevance nor could it prejudice the case of the petitioner in any manner. Accordingly, there was no breach of the principles of natural justice. The non-production of the register on which the vouchers in question were entered by the Bank contained only the entries posted from these vouchers and had no relevance nor could it prejudice the case of the petitioner in any manner. Accordingly, there was no breach of the principles of natural justice. In spite of our repeated insistence the learned counsel for the petitioner made no attempt whatsoever, to apprise the Court of nature of prejudice that was caused to the case of the petitioner by non-production of the register and the ledger complained of. In fact, no attempt was made before us to assail the findings recorded by the hierarchy of departmental authorities. Accordingly, we reject the first contention. 5. The second and the last contention urged was that the quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner was excessive and this case deserves interference by this Court. The area of interence by this Court as the quantum of punishment in exercise of its writ jurisdiction is very limited. Generally, the High Court does not interfere with the quantum of penalty nor it is the function of this court to say what would be the appropriate and adequate punishment on proof of a particular charge. It is a matter entirely within the competence of the disciplinary authority. The settled view is that the High Court should not generally interfere in the penalty but there are no such feters in exercise of its inherent powers and the High Court can remove the gross injustice and do justice in a given case. It is also well settled that the magnitude of the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the lapses committed. 6. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1983 SC 454 , the Supreme Court observed that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of the disciplinary authority. But where the finding is utterly perverse the High Court can always interfere with the same. Again in Banjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the Supreme Court pointed out that if the punishment is strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interence, it cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review. But where the finding is utterly perverse the High Court can always interfere with the same. Again in Banjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the Supreme Court pointed out that if the punishment is strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interence, it cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review. In this connection it was observed as under :- "Judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindicative or unduly harsh. It would not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of the bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Matrial if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." 7. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and on the facts of the present case, it is not possible for us to hold that the impugned decision of the disciplinary authority suffers either from irrationality or perversity. The integrity, trust and discipline from its employees are the very fundamentals of the Banking Industry or the Banking Establishment. The degree of seriousness and the measure of gravity of offence cannot be standardised and punishment would vary on the facts of each case. If an employee of the Bank indulges in fraud, cheating or misappropriation, such acts cannot be viewed lightly and are required to be dealt with severely, so that it has a desired effect of non-repetition and discouraging others from indulging in similar activities. In awarding the punishment of "discharge from service" the disciplinary authority has taken this aspect of the matter into account. 8. As to the commission of the offence, the petitioner in his reply dated 18.2.1985, voluntarily and unqualifiedly has confessed his guilt but requested for a lenient view. However, during the course of enquiry an unsuccessful attempt was made to wriggle out of the confession. 8. As to the commission of the offence, the petitioner in his reply dated 18.2.1985, voluntarily and unqualifiedly has confessed his guilt but requested for a lenient view. However, during the course of enquiry an unsuccessful attempt was made to wriggle out of the confession. Even on the evidence brought on record, the guilt of the petitioner was adequately proved. It is on record, in the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, that at a belated stage the petitioner set up a totally new defence, namely that the money was withdrawn for payment of certain items allegedly purchased for the Bank, but this story did not find favour with the concerned authorities. The original vouchers of the alleged expenditure could not be produced and the duplicate ones which were produced during the course of enquiry remained unproved and were found to be not genuine documents. 9. In dealing with the question about the quantum of punishment the appellate authority has also referred to the past service record of the petitioner. It appears that prior to the impugned proceedings, in another disciplinary proceeding ensuing from the charge-sheet served in July 1979, the petitioner was given the punishment of 'Dismissal' from the Bank's service vide order dated 13.12.1982 passed by the then disciplinary authority,. However, the appellate authority, to give one chance to the petitioner to improve, reduced the punishment from 'Dismissal' to stoppage of three increments by its order dated 24.1.1984. The petitioner instead of amending himself committed another misconduct which resulted in his discharge from service. In these special circumstances the appellate authority affirmed the punishment awarded to the petitioner. 10. In view of the above discussion, we cannot say that the power of punishment was not exercised bonafide. No rule or regulation was brought to our notice to show that the awarded punishment for the irregularities committed by the petitioner could not have been given to him. Apparently the punishment awarded was within the competence of the disciplinary authority. As already noticed this Court will not consider the question of punishment, as a Court of appeal would unless the punishment is wholly unwarranted and strikingly disproportionate to the charge. On the facts of the present case and having regard to the nature of the charges found, we do not feel inclined to hold that the punishment is unduly harsh or is not just. On the facts of the present case and having regard to the nature of the charges found, we do not feel inclined to hold that the punishment is unduly harsh or is not just. As already shown, in awarding the punishment the appropriate authority has taken into account all the relevant considerations and the facts and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, it is not a fit case in which in exercise of our power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an interference is called for. 11. For what has been stated above, this writ petition is without any merit and is rejected summarily.