P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal is taken up for hearing by treating it as included in the day's cause list. ( 2 ) THE appellant claims to be a partner of a Firm which carries on business as Commission Agents and Dealers and Exporters of Drugs, Spices, Fruit products etc. The Partnership Firm is the lessee of a godown, which admeasures about 1700 sq. ft. (Carpet Area), situate at 21, Jagat Banerjee Ghat Road, P. S. Shibpur, Howrah. ( 3 ) THE Howrah Improvement Trust which is stated to be the Implementing Authority (Development Scheme) required the land on which the godown is situate for the widening of the approach road of the Second Hooghly Bridge. The land was requisition along with the land of other persons for the said purpose. That gave rise to a previous Writ Petition, C. O. No. 15095 (W) of 1986, which was filed by as many as 104 persons and the principal grievance in the said Writ Petition was that the concerned authorities had not provided alternative site as was done in other cases. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by a judgment rendered on 9/12/1986 by directing the respondent authorities to provide alternative accommodation to the Writ Petitioners on proper verification and enquiry on or before 7/04/1987 and directing the Writ Petitioners also to quit and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises and/or sites in their respective possession to the said authority on or after 15/04/1987. The further direction in the judgment was that the respondent authorities 'shall provide such alternative accommodation only after being satisfied that the petitioners were in actual possession and for that purpose the respondents would be entitled to Call for from the petitioners the rent receipts or other documents which would be necessary to be examined'. The trial Court did not order that the alternative accommodation would be of equal size and nature. ( 4 ) THE Writ Petition out of which the present appeal arises was filed because, according to the appellant (Writ Petitioner), he was not provided with alternative accommodation. The trial Court did not order that the alternative accommodation would be of equal size and nature. ( 4 ) THE Writ Petition out of which the present appeal arises was filed because, according to the appellant (Writ Petitioner), he was not provided with alternative accommodation. The stand of the respondent authorities was that they could not consider the claim for alternative accommodation advanced by the appellant since his name did not figure in the cause title of the previous Writ Petition and it was, therefore, presumed that he was not entitled to the benefit of the direction with regard to the giving of alternative accommodation. The trial Court, in course of its judgment under appeal, has found that the appellant was in fact a party to the previous Writ Petition and directed that he should be given alternative accommodation in terms of the judgment rendered in the previous Writ Petition. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the appellant a further contention was advanced before the trial Court that whereas the carpet area of the godown in his possession was 1700 sq. ft. , the respondent authorities were offering him an area in the newly constructed market complex which admeasured 150 sq. ft. only and that the allotment of such alternative accommodation was not in accordance with and in compliance of the direction contained in the judgment rendered in the previous Writ Petition. The trial Court rejected this submission on the ground that no direction with regard to an equivalent area being provided by way of alternative accommodation was given and that the appellant was not entitled to claim such benefit under the said judgment. ( 6 ) HENCE the present appeal. ( 7 ) IT has been submitted before us that the expression 'alternative accommodation' must mean alternative accommodation of equal size and nature and that, therefore, the appellant was entitled to the allotment of equal area in the new market complex. The argument has been stated merely to be rejected. No such implication can be read in the judicial expression 'alternative accommodation' in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case. A person whose premises are requisitioned is entitled to compensation under law and that is his only right. The argument has been stated merely to be rejected. No such implication can be read in the judicial expression 'alternative accommodation' in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case. A person whose premises are requisitioned is entitled to compensation under law and that is his only right. If the right to claim alternative accommodation flows out of a scheme which is framed outside the law but is supplemental to the requisition proceeding, such scheme should specifically provide that an equivalent area would be given by way of alternative accommodation. No such scheme has been produced before us and we cannot, therefore, hold that any such right was independently created in favour of the appellant. ( 8 ) THERE is a vague allegation in the Writ Petition that some of the Writ Petitioners in the previous matter were offered alternative accommodation having equivalent area and that the appellant was being discriminated against. There is no precise material on the record of the Writ Petition to sustain such plea and, as such, the plea of discrimination cannot be regarded as having been made out. ( 9 ) TWO judgments of the Supreme Court were cited before us in support of the plea that there is an obligation on the part of the respondent authorities to provide equal area by way of alternative accommodation. ( 10 ) IN Karjan Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 532 the interim order earlier granted in a Writ Petition instituted under Art. 32 of the Constitution was vacated on the condition, inter alia, that alternative land of equal quality, not exceeding three acres in area, would be given to the person whose possession was being taken consequent upon acquisition and that, if that was not possible, then alternative employment where he would be assured a minimum wage would be provided. We are unable to read in this judgment any declaration of law to the effect that alternative accommodation, equal in size and nature, should invariably be provided to all persons whose lands are acquired or requisitioned under any law in force. Be it stated that the Writ Petitioners in that case were tribals and other persons belonging to the weaker sections of the Society and that the direction aforesaid was given specifically keeping in view the said fact. Be it stated that the Writ Petitioners in that case were tribals and other persons belonging to the weaker sections of the Society and that the direction aforesaid was given specifically keeping in view the said fact. ( 11 ) IN State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , land was notified for acquisition at the instance of the Meerut Development Authority for its Housing Scheme undertaken with the object of providing housing accommodation to the residents of Meerut City. 17 persons, who owned a portion of the land which was acquired, challenged the acquisition proceedings in the High Court. The acquisition of the entire land having been set aside by the High Court, the State as well as the Meerut Development Authority preferred appeals to the Supreme Court. One of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents (original Writ Petitioners) before the Supreme Court was that many of the persons whose land had been acquired were also without houses or shop sites and that if they were to be thrown out of their land they should also be made eligible for some relief at the hands of the Meerut Development Authority in view of the fact that their land was being expropriated for the purpose of providing housing accommodation to the residents of the city of Meerut. While allowing the said appeals, a reference was made to S. 21 (2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which, inter alia, provides that the power of the authority or the local authority with respect to disposal of land should be so exercised as to secure, so far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the authority or the local authority concerned and are willing to comply with any requirements of the authority or the local authority concerned as to its development and use, have an opportunity to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them. The Supreme Court then proceeded to make the following observations :"although the said section is not in terms applicable to the present acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question. "these observations have to be properly read in light of the facts of the case. In the first place, land was there acquired from adjoining villages for providing housing accommodation in an urban area and that is why it was observed that all Development Authorities throughout the country "when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas" should follow the principle laid down in S. 21 (2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. In the case in hand, land is not requisitioned for "land development in urban area" in that sense. The requisitioning or acquisition of land for widening approach road to a new bridge across river Hooghly, which is being constructed to relieve great congestion on the existing Howrah Bridge, cannot be equated with acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation to the residents of a city. In the next place, since many of the persons whose land in surrounding villages was acquired in that case were without houses or shop sites and sinced their land was being expropriated for providing housing accommodation to the residents of the City, a direction was given that "as far as practicable" a house site or shop site should be given to each of the expropriated persons who had no house or shop site in the urban area in question. In the last place, the direction was to provide accommodation accordingly "of reasonable size on reasonable terms". It was not and could not have been contemplated that equivalent area should be provided to the concerned persons under the Housing Scheme. In the last place, the direction was to provide accommodation accordingly "of reasonable size on reasonable terms". It was not and could not have been contemplated that equivalent area should be provided to the concerned persons under the Housing Scheme. The reasonableness has to be viewed not only in the context of the need of the person seeking alternative accommodation but also of the availability of space at the site where the alternative accommodation has to be provided by the concerned authorities. It is difficult to appreciate how in the new market complex as large a space as the appellant's godown which is requisitioned could be provided. ( 12 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. ( 13 ) NO separate order is required to be passed on the application for interim relief which too stands dismissed in light of the foregoing order. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. 14shyamal KUMAR SEN, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.