JUDGMENT V. N. Kbare, J. 1. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner who was the Head Master in the institution known as Khadana Higher Secondary School, district Bulandshahr (here in after referred to as the institution) has come up before this court against an order passed by the Deputy Director of Education (I) Region, Meerut dated 4-8- 1981. 2. Brief facts of the case are these: The petitioner was appointed as Head Master in Junior High School known as Khadana Junior High School which was subsequently raised to the status of Higher Secondary School. The petitioner was subsequently appointed as Head Master of the said institution. On 16-7-1977 the Managing committee of the institution suspended the petitioner and initiated a disciplinary proceeding against him. The committee of Management proposed dismissal of the petitioner from service. On 14-7- 1978 the District Inspector of schools, Bulandshahr disapproved the aforesaid proposal of the committee of Management. The committee of Management there after preferred an appeal against the order of the district Inspector of Schools refusing to accord approval to the proposed dismissal of the petitioner from service to the Deputy Director of Education (I) Region, Meerut. The Deputy Director of Education allowed the appeal preferred by the committee of Management and remanded the matter to the District Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahr for decision afresh on merits. On remand the District Inspector of schools, Bulandshahr accorded approval to the proposal of dismissal of the petitioner from service and sent the said order by post to the petitioner which was received by him on 2-5-1980. On 26-5-1980 the petitioner preferred his appeal by registered post which was received by the office of the Deputy Director of Education on 3-7-1980. On 14-8-1980 the Deputy Director of Education, Meerut rejected the appeal of the petitioner on the ground that the appeal having not been preferred within one month from the date of communication of the order to the petitioner, the appeal was barred by time. It is against this order that the petitioner has come up before this court. Heard counsel for the parties. 3. It is against this order that the petitioner has come up before this court. Heard counsel for the parties. 3. Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Intermediate Education Act provides that any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against an order of the district Inspector of schools under clause (b) whether before or after commencement of U. P. Inter Mediate Education (Amendment) Act 1966 within one month from the date of communication of the order to that party and the Regional Deputy Director may after such further inquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, confirm, set aside or modify the order and the order passed by the Regional Deputy Director shall be final. 4. No doubt Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act uses expression may prefer an appeal within one month from the date of communication of the order. "The word 'prefer' means 'to lay (a matter) before anyone formally for consideration, approval or sanction; to bring forward, present, submit (a statement), bill, indictment, information, prayer etc. To put, place or set (something) before any one for acceptance'- Murray's Dictionary. In chaturbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of state for India AIR 1927 Alld. 215 it was observed 'To prefer a claim in writing to a person within the meaning of Section 77 clearly means......That it must reach him. In secretary of state v. Firm Imperial Metal Works, AIR 1926 Alld. 214 it was observed that by using the word 'preferred' the Legislature did not mean anything different from service. In Narain Ram Chandra Kelkar v. Union of India, AIR 1961 ALJ 983 it has been held that the law is not that the claim must be preferred; it is that It must be preferred to a particular person and it cannot be said to be preferred to a particular person unless he receives it. In view of these decisions it must be held that the expression 'prefer' occurring in Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act means that the appeal has to be lodged as to reach the addressee, the appellate authority within time. The next question that arises for consideration is that as to what would be the effect if an appeal is preferred well within time, but the memo of appeal is received by the appellate authority after the period of limitation due to the negligence of the postal department ? The next question that arises for consideration is that as to what would be the effect if an appeal is preferred well within time, but the memo of appeal is received by the appellate authority after the period of limitation due to the negligence of the postal department ? In the present case the order of the district Inspector of schools was received by the petitioner on 2-5-1980 and the period of one month was to expire on 2nd of June, 1980 from The appeal was sent by post on 26th of May 1980 from Bulandshahr to the office of the Deputy Director of education which located in Meerut. The distance between the Meerut city and Bulandshahr is said to be 50- 60 Kms. In ordinary course the time taken for delivery of letter by postal department is 2 or 3 days. In the present case the appeal was received on 3-6-1980. Neither the Act nor the regulations framed there under provides the mode of preferring appeal to the Deputy Director of education. It is does not provide that the appeal should be preferred by personal presentation or through counsel or by post. It is admitted between the parties that one of the mode of preferring an appeal is by sending the memo of appeal by post which is accepted by the appellate authority. In view of this who so ever is aggrieved by the decision of the district Inspector of schools may prefer an appeal to the Deputy Director of Education by post. In other words the person aggrieved has implied authority to prefer an appeal by post but the appeal may be preferred well within time through post as to reach the appellate authority in ordinary course within time. If there is any unreasonable delay in transit due to the negligence of the post office, the person aggrieved cannot, be held responsible for it as in such situation the appellant has no control over the action of the post office. 5. In Bhikha Lal v. Munna Lal, AIR 1974 Alld. 366 it was held that if there is an implied authority to pay rent due by money order, payment of rent by money order although well within time but money order reaching landlord after expiry of 30 days, the tenant has not committed any default. 5. In Bhikha Lal v. Munna Lal, AIR 1974 Alld. 366 it was held that if there is an implied authority to pay rent due by money order, payment of rent by money order although well within time but money order reaching landlord after expiry of 30 days, the tenant has not committed any default. The position may be different in case the appellant choses to prefer an appeal on the last date of limitation by post. The appeal, preferred by post, in such a case, obviously cannot reach the appellate authority in ordinary course within time. IN the present case the appeal was sent on 26-5-1980 by post from Bulandshahr and in ordinary course it should reach meerut within 2 or 3 days. There occurred a delay of one day due to unreasonable delay in transit. Due to negligence of the post office the appeal could not have been dismissed on the ground that it was preferred beyond the period of limitation. 6. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Education (I) Region Meerut, dated 4-8-1981 is not sustainable in law and deserves to be quashed. In view of above the order dated 4-8-1981 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education is quashed. The writ petition is allowed with costs. The Deputy Director of Education (I) Region, Meerut is directed to treat the appeal of the petitioner preferred within time and decide the same on merits. Since the matter is a pretty old one, the Deputy Director of Education (I) region, Meerut is further directed to decide the appeal within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Petition allowed.