Ram Dass Yadav v. IVth Additional District Judge — 1990 DIGILAW 948 (ALL)

JUDGMENT R.B. Mehrotra, J. By means of this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner, who is tenant of premises No. 433B, Sunder Bhawan, Sadar Bazar Jhansi has challenged the order of Fourth Additional District Judge Jhansi dated 15th May 1990 in R.C. Appeal No. 2 of 1986 between Ajai Prakash Pateria and Anr. v. Ram Pass Yadav and Ors.. 2. Necessary facts giving rise to the present petition are that Sri Ajai Prakash Pateria and Sri Vijn Prakash Pateria morel an application u/s 21(1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 with the allegation that they are the owner and landlord of the House No. 433-B, Sunder Bhawan, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi and Ram Dass is tenant of the house at the rate of Rs. 12 50 paise per month Earlier, ihis house was owned by Sri Ram Bahadur Ganga Sahai Mushaddi K>an On 13th November, 1980 this house was purchased by the present landlord by registered sale-deed of the same date The landlord Respondent's case is that they are in the employment in Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd, Jhansi (herein after referred to as 'BHEL') situate in Khailar. They hive not been allotted any house in the residential colony of BHEL. The landlord further stated that at present they are living with their parents in house No. 76A Sadar Bazar, Jhansi. This house, in which landlord's parents are living is owned by Cantonment Board and their parents are only tenant of the house. The landlord has a family of four members. The applicant No. 1, Ajai Prakash Pateria, his wife and five years old daughter and the applicant No. 2 Smt. Vijai Prakash Pateria, who is unmarried. The landlord served a notice on the tenant and the tenant having refused to vacate the premises moved an application before the prescribed authority u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as an Act) for the release of the house on the ground of bonafide requirement. 3. The present Petitioner, the tenant of the premises in dispute contested the application and filed written statement contending therein that the need of Respondent/Landlord is not bonafide. The Petitioner tenant's had been living in the house in dispute for the last thirty years. The landlord never applied for allotment of any house in BHEL, even though residential accommodation is provided by BHEL to accommodate their employees. The Petitioner tenant's had been living in the house in dispute for the last thirty years. The landlord never applied for allotment of any house in BHEL, even though residential accommodation is provided by BHEL to accommodate their employees. The Respondents have wilfully not applied for the allotment of any house in the residential colony of BHEL for the purposes of digging out a ground for evicting the Petitioner tenant. 4. It was specifically contended in the written statement by the Petitioner tenant that besides the house No. 76A, situate in Sadar ttazar, Jhansi, where the landlord's parents are living. There is another house No. 41, situate in Hazaryana, Jhansi, which is lying vacant and if the Petitioner has any need of the house he could have occupied the said house No. 41 situate in Hazaryana. This house No. 41 situate at Hazaryana consists of six rooms, court yard, latrine and bath room. It was stated In the said written statement that the Petitioner can comfortably accommodate himself in this house. The Petitioner tenant also contended that house No. 76A, where the Petitioner’s parents are residing consists of six rooms and the Petitioner can comfortably live with their parents as they have no other child except the Petitioner and only for two persons, house No. 76-A, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi, is quite big enough where the Petitioner’s family can also be accommodated. 5. This written statement was filed by the Petitioner’s tenant on 18th April 1984 Subsequent thereto Sri Ajai Prakasb Pateria, who is one of the landlord of the premises in dispute filed his affidavit on 19th April 1984 stating that he has no concern with the house No. 41 situate at Hazaryana, Jhansi and stated that he is not the owner of the said house, neither he has any right over the said house the allegation of the Petitioner tenant that the landlord are the order of the house is patently incorrect. This affidavit of Ajai Prakash Pateria has been filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Subsequent thereto another affidavit was filed on 13th August, 1984 in respect of the landlord's case by Sri MurlMhar, father of the landlord, wherein he also did not state that houre No. 41, Hazaryana Jhansi is not vacant or any body else is residing in the said house. 6. Subsequent thereto another affidavit was filed on 13th August, 1984 in respect of the landlord's case by Sri MurlMhar, father of the landlord, wherein he also did not state that houre No. 41, Hazaryana Jhansi is not vacant or any body else is residing in the said house. 6. Subsequent, to the filing of the aforesaid affidavit, the Petitioner tenant filed his affidavit against asserting that the landlord are the owner of house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhinsi, which is lying vacant and the landlord's need can be satisfied by occupying the said house. It was also stated that alleged compromise decree in respect of Home No. 41 was collusive. 7. In reply to this affidavit for the first time an affidavit was filed by the Respondent's landlord on 10th October, 1985 stating that not only that house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi does not belong to them but it is in occupation of the tenant Roop Narain. In support of the aforesaid stand two more affidavits were filed by the landlord-Respondent, one of Roop Narain Shandilya, who has stated that he is fen-ant of the house No. 41-Hazaryana Jhansi and the other affidavit was filed by one Sri Narain Dass, who h the owner of the house No. 42-Hazaryana saying that Roop Narain is not his tenant. 8. Besides, above statement on oath soma documents were also filed from both the sides in respect of the aforesaid house The Petitioner tenant filed a copy of the voter list of the year 1984, where’s in Roop Narain Shandilya son of Hajari Lal, was shown to be occupying house No. 42-Hazaryana Jhansi. The Respondent landlord filed three letters dated 26th September, 1980, 12th November, 1980 and 22nd December, 2-9-82 alleging to be written by the brother of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, wherein the address of Roop Narain Shandilya is mentioned as house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi and also a compromise decree between Murlidhar, the father of the Petitioners and Smt. Kishori Devi, grand mother of the Petitioners, wherein it was decreed that Smt. Kishori Devi will be the owner of house No. 41 through Murlidhar, during her life time. 9. 9. In the first of round of litigation between the rarities that the Prescribed Authority held that the geniuses of the compromise decree can not be looked into in the proceedings under Rent Control Act and directed release of the accommodation in favour of Respondent-landlord Aggrieved thereby the Petitioner filed appeal. The appellate court allowed the appeal and remanded back the matter to the Prescribed Authority for abjudicating the need of the parties qua availability of h use No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi to the landlord and examine the genuiness of the compromise decree in respect of the said house. 10. On remand the Prescribed Authority held that the compromise decree was collusive between the parties and was obtained for the purpose of evicting the present tenants, after purchasing. The house in dispute, The Prescribed Authority also held that house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi continues to be joint family property and the Respondent landlord has a right of residence in the said house. The circumstances which the Prescribed Authority took into consideration for arriving at the said findings are summarised hereunder: (1) That decree is a compromise decree between mother and son. (2) Since the plaint and the written statement has not been filed it is not clear as to whether the house in dispute was a Hindu joint family property, it Is also not clear that what properties have been divided amongst coparceners and in what manner? (3) The compromise decree is only in respect of house no. 4's which says that Smt. Kishori Devi is declared to be owner and in possession of house No. 41 Hazaryana Jhansi, through the Defendant namely Murlidhar, she may continue to live in the house during her life time, but will have no right to transfer it, and after the death of Smt. Kishori Devi, Lalit Prakash Pateria, minor will be owner of the house and the Defendant will have no right in it. The decree makes it clear that in respect of hou'se No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi, Smt. Kishori Devi was conferred oniy limited rights, she was authorised to remain in possession of the said house, but she had no right to transfer the same. 11. On the basis of the said decree the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that Smt. Kishori Devi can not be held to be absolute owner of house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi. 11. On the basis of the said decree the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that Smt. Kishori Devi can not be held to be absolute owner of house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi. The most important aspect of the matter which has been emphasised by the Prescribed Authorhy after the remand is that even though the court may not be competent to look into the validity of a compromise decree in Rant Control proceedings, but the Rent Control Authorities can always consider that the accommodation falling in share of a family member on the basis of the said compromise decree which is alleged to be collusive is available for accommodating the landlords comfortably In the aforesaid background the Prescribed Authority looked into the circumstances regarding the questions of landlord being accommodated in house No. 41 Htzaryana, Jhansi despite the said compromise decree and held that landlord can accommodate themselves in House No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, despite the said compromise decree. 12. Thereafter the Prescribed Authority considered the question as to whether house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi is vacant or is occupied by the tenant Sri Roop Narain as such is not available for satisfying the need of the Respondent landlord. The Prescribed Authority on considering the evidence of the parties recorded the finding that Sri Roop Narain is not oxupying, house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi, as tenant. 13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the Respondent-landlord filed appeal. The appellate court allowed the appeal and held that the genuineness of compromise decree can not be looked into in the Rent Control proceedings and also held that the house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi was in occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, as such was not available to Respondent-lord, for satisfying their bonafide need of a residence. 14. Aggrieved by the said decree the Petitioner tenant has filed the present writ petition. 15. Two questions arise for consideration in the present matter: (i) Whether it was permissible for the Prescribed Authority to examine the availability of accommodation in house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, for satisfying the need of the Respondent, despite the alleged compromise decree declaring Smt. Kishori Devi (the grand mother of the Respondent-landlord) to be limited owner of the said house. (ii) Whether house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi was in occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya as tenant. I will deal with the first question, first. (ii) Whether house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi was in occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya as tenant. I will deal with the first question, first. Assuming that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to look into the validity of the said decree but (he Prescribed Authority had every right to look into the circumstances of availability of the house for the Respondent-landlord, who were grandson of the aforesaid Smt. Kishori Devi. There is no case of any strained relationship between the grand mother and the grand daughter-in-laws. There is no whisper as to why the present Respondent-landlord could not have resided with their grandmother, if the said house is available. There is no whisper as to why Smt. Kishori Devi is not ready to accommodate her grand son even assuming that she is the owns of the said house. All these factors could have been taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority for adjudicating the genuineness and bonafide of the landlord's need. The Prescribed Authority did not commit any mistake in taking these factors into account and coming to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case the Respondent-landlord coulu have been accommodated themselves in house No. 41-Hazaryana Jhansi, if the same was vacant and available despite the saia compromise decree. 16. The learned Counsel for the Respondent Sri B.N. Agarwal, has vehementally urged that even though in the earlier proceeding the Prescribed Authority was directed to consider the genuiness of the compromise decree the appellate court committed no mistake in taking a view that the validity of the compromise decide could not be looked into by the Prescribed Authority, as the view taken by the appellate court is in accordance with the decision of this Court the first order of the appellate authority was only a remand order which is interlocutory in character, was not necessarily to be challenged in the High Court at that stage, as held in the case of AIR 1981 707 (SC) so no interference is called for in the appellate court's impugned judgment, taking a view that the geniuses of the decree cannot be looked into. 17. The counsel for the Respondents then place reliance on a decision of this Court Khem Chand v. IV Additional District judge, Bulandshahr 1989 (2) ARC 344. 17. The counsel for the Respondents then place reliance on a decision of this Court Khem Chand v. IV Additional District judge, Bulandshahr 1989 (2) ARC 344. In this decision it has been held that the validity of the decree passed by the Civil Court can not be challenged in co-lateral proceedings. 18. On the other hand learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court Manohar Lal v. District Judge 1982 ARC 398 where in this Court has held that the question of title of accommodation Js not decisive in the matter. It is not inflexible rule that in considering the need of the landlord, only accommodation which can be taken into consideration is that which is owned by him. The court held that the appellate court was not justified la law in thinking that the accommodation of the father could never be considered as available to his son. 19. Thus the question which require consideration, is regarding, judging the scope of bonafide of Respondent-landlord qua availability of accommodation for accommodating them in house No. 41, Hazaryana, Jhansi, in the light of the said compromise decree of a court. The Prescribed Authority was justified in looking into these circumstances and coming to the conclusion that despite a decree of the court, in the circumstances of the case, landlord can avail of the accommodation available in the disputed premises, subject matter of the decree, and this will not amount to adjudicating the validity of a decree. In this view of the matter I am clearly of the opinion that in the circumstance of the present case the prescribed authority was wholly justified in judging the need of the Respondent-landlord, taking into consideration the nature of the compromise decree on the basis of which Smt. Kishori Devi is said to be the owner of the house in dispute and coming to the conclusion that the responded landlord can accommodate themselves in the said house, despite the said decree. 20. The other question which arise for consideration in the present case is regarding the fact as to whether house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi was vacant on the date the Respondent-landlord moved application or the same was in occupation of a tenant. 20. The other question which arise for consideration in the present case is regarding the fact as to whether house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi was vacant on the date the Respondent-landlord moved application or the same was in occupation of a tenant. The Prescribed Authority on examining the evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, was not occupied by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya as a tenant. The reasons given by the Prescribed Authority in coming to the said conclusion are as under: (1) That the Petitioner-tenant has stated in the very beginning in his written statement that the house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi, is an ancestral property of the Respondent landlord which consisted of six rooms, a latrine, court yard, bath room and the need of the Respondent-landlord can be suitably adjusted in the said house. In this connection the Respondent-landlord in their affidavit dated 19th April 1984 and in the affidavit of their father namely Sri Murlidhar on 13th August, 1984 did not say that the said house is in occupation of Roop Narain Shandilya as tenant but only took a stand that the Respondents are not the owner of the said house The Respondents were mainly relying on the compromise decree, referred to earlier, in the judgment. However, subsequently for the first time in the affidavit dated 10th October, 1985 the Respondents have taken a stand that Roop Narain Shandilya is a tenant of the house in dispute This seems to be an after thought and is liable to be rejected on this ground alone. (2) Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, has stated in his affidavit that he is tenant of Smt. Kishori Devi and has been paying rent to her through Sri Murlidhar Pateria but no document worth the same has been filed by the Respondents for proving the tenancy between Smt. Kishori Devi and Sri Roop Narain Shandilya. Neither there is any rent deed nor receipt showing the payment of rent by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, to Smt. Kishori Devi. The Respondent-landlord has not produced any ration card or copy of the voter list to prove the tenancy of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya in house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi. Neither there is any rent deed nor receipt showing the payment of rent by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, to Smt. Kishori Devi. The Respondent-landlord has not produced any ration card or copy of the voter list to prove the tenancy of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya in house No. 41 Hazaryana, Jhansi. (3) That the only documentary proof which the Respondent-landlord has filed for proving that the said house is in occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya arc three letters, addressed to Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, which shows that he was residing in house No. 41-Hazaryana. Jhami. Only on the basis of these letters it can not be said that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, was occupying the house an tenant. The inference drawn by the Prescribed Authority on the basis of aforesaid letters was that it may be that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was occupying the house on behalf of its owner but that does not prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya became tenant of the house. (4) that the Petitioner have filed certified copy of the voter list wherein Sri Roop Narain Shandilya has been shown to be occupying the house No. 42 Hazaryana, Jhansi and normally the presumption of correctness is attached in respect of the voter list, as such, there is no reason to discard the same. The Prescribed authority refused to accept the statement given on oath by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya and Sri Narain Dass, who claimed himselt to be the owner of the house No. 42-Hazaryana, Jhansi and stated that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was not his tenant. These affidavits were filed to nullify the voter list filed by the Petitioner. 21. Talcing Into account all the aforesaid factors the prescribed authority came to the conclusion that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was not occupying the house as senant. The appellate court reversed the finding of the prescribed authority mainly on the ground that the letters filed by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya are of the year 1980 and there is no justification for disbelieving those letters which prove that Roop Narain Shandilya is living in house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi and the same Is not vacant. 22. The appellate court reversed the finding of the prescribed authority mainly on the ground that the letters filed by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya are of the year 1980 and there is no justification for disbelieving those letters which prove that Roop Narain Shandilya is living in house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi and the same Is not vacant. 22. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has vehemently attacked the approach of the appellate court, and submitted that the appellate court has not given any reason for discarding the findings of the Prescribed authority holding that the landlord has failed to prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, was tenant of the premises in dispute. The only finding recorded by the appellate court is that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is living in the said house. The said finding is not enough for judging the need of the Respondents-landlord The nature of possession of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was necessarily to be enquired in to by the appellate court and the appellate court could have held the need of the Respondent landlord bonafide only on coming to the conclusion that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is tenant of Smt Kishori Devi and occupying the house No. 41 Hazaryaua, Jhansi as tenant of the house. Merely on the basis of occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shanditya, it can not be said that the bouse No. 41-Hazaryuna, Jhansi, was not vacant. The contention of Sri Macdhyan is that if the said occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was either illegal or was permissive then the landlord's need could have been considered from different angle qua the availability of house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi for accommodating the landlord. 23. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court Arun Kumar Solanki v. VIII Additional District Judge Agra 1989 (1) ARC 523 and Munnl Devi v. Radha Devi 1989 (1) ARC 301. In the aforesaid decision It has been held that reactions 11 and 13 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act) Is a complete code in itself and no one can be held to be tenant except in accordance with the procedure contemplated by the aforesaid two section. In the aforesaid decision It has been held that reactions 11 and 13 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act) Is a complete code in itself and no one can be held to be tenant except in accordance with the procedure contemplated by the aforesaid two section. If any person is occupying an accommodation either without getting the said accommodation released in accordance with the provisions of the Act or getting the same allotted in accordance with Section 16 of the Act, he is not entitled to claim himself to be tenant. Of course an exception to the aforesaid General rule has been carved out u/s 14 of the Act but in the present case since Sri Roop Narain Shandilya, claimed himself to have become tenant only from the year 1980, Section 14 permits regularisation of occupation of a person with the consent of the landlord, only upto the date of 5th July 1976. So Section 14 of the Act is not attracted in the present case. 24. Sri Mandhyan, submitted that without an allotment order, occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is only that of an unauthorised occupant and the Respondents-landlord was under an obligation to pet the aforesaid authorised occupant evicted from the premises for satisfying his need instead of moving an application for evicting the Petitioner tenant from the premises in dispute. According to Sri Mandhyaa this fact itself shows that the need of Respondents-landlord is not bonafide. Sri Mandhyan has also cited decision of this Court Km. Madhu Saxena v. I Additional District Judge, Rampur 1984 (1) ARC 339, wherein this Court took a view that if finding of fact is recorded under misapprehension then such finding can not be accepted as a finding of fact and can be interfered with by the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the t constitution. 25. Learned Counsel for the Respondents Sri B.N Agarwal equally vehmentally opposed this submission and have argued that is these proceedings landlords were not required to prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was occupying the premises as tenant and Sri Roop Narain Shandilya as well as the Respondents-landlord both have sworn on affidavit that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is occupying house No. 41-Hazaryana. Jhansi, as tenant and the appellate court having believed their testimoney there is no justification for this Court to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court. In support of this contention Sri Gupta has cited Ram Kumar v. Shanker Lal 1990 ARC 592, where in this Court has held: That the court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has only a supervisory power and can not act as a court of appeal. The court laid down that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the court has only to see whether there is any error apparent on the face of record. 26. Sri Agarwal have also submitted that even if there are some irrelevant consideration in the appellate court's judgment, the same should not be quashed only on the said grouad. This Court should see the over all approach of the court and should also look into the circumstances of the case before interfering in the findings of appellate court. For the aforesaid proposition Sri Gupta has placed reliance on the case Goving Ram v. If Addl. District Judge 1982 ARC 279, wherein this Court has held: The finding which has been recorded leaving aside certain irrelevant matter, is a finding of fact and no such ground has been made out by the Petitioner, which may entail any interference in the said finding by this Court. 27. Sri Agarwal thereafter contended that in the facts of this case this Court should not interfere as the landlord can not be deprived of his own house. There is no justification for this Court interfering with the Judgment of the appellate court, by which the only house belonging to the Respondents landlord has been released in their favour. Sri Gupta has placed reliance on a decision of this Court Dayalumal v. III Additional District Judge 1989 (2) ARC 51, wherein this Court has held: It is true that tenant if evicted from the accommodation in question will be put to some difficulties. But that by itself is not a ground to deprive the landlord of the house of his accommodation which he purchased 9 1/2 years ago for his own use and occupation with his growing family. 28. Sri Gupta also submitted that the release application was filed in the year 1990 and ten years has lapsed thereafter. But that by itself is not a ground to deprive the landlord of the house of his accommodation which he purchased 9 1/2 years ago for his own use and occupation with his growing family. 28. Sri Gupta also submitted that the release application was filed in the year 1990 and ten years has lapsed thereafter. The Petitioner tenant has not made any attempt to get any house allotted. This itself is a good ground for allowing the Respondents-landlord's request for release of the premises. In support of the aforesaid contention reliance was also placed on the case N.S. Dutta v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad 1984 (1) ARC 113, where in this Court has held that: This Court is entitled also to take into account the fact that the neither it bas been alleged nor proved to have made effect to have an alternative accommodation. ...Moreover non availability of accommodation to the tenant is in itself not adequate ground to reject the landlord's application. Sri Aparwal contended that since the Petitioner has not made any effort for getting a house allotted, as Such, there is no justification for not allowing the release application of the landlord. 29. This aspect of the matter, however, has no relevance on the question of bonafide need of the Respondent's landlord. If the Respondent's landlord fails to satisfy his bonafide need, the question of finding alternative accommodation by the tenant is wholly irrelevant. The only question which requires consideration in the present matter is bonafide need of the Respondent landlord qua availability of house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi and the nature of occupation of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya. 30. Having careful consideration of the aforesaid contention I am of the opinion that the appellate court has recorded a finding accepting Sri Roop Narain Shandilya as tenant of the premises on the basis of affidavit filed by Respondent-landlord Sri Narain Das and Sri Roop Narain Shandilya and the three letters addressed to Sri Roop Narain Shandilya at 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi. 31. So far as Sri Narain Das is concerned, his affidavit only goes to prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is not his tenant, as lie is owner of house No. 42-Hazaryana, Jhansi. 31. So far as Sri Narain Das is concerned, his affidavit only goes to prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya is not his tenant, as lie is owner of house No. 42-Hazaryana, Jhansi. So far as the affidavit of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya and the Respondent-landlord are concerned they also do not prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was residing as tenant of Smt. Kishori Devi is house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi. The prescribed authority was justified in taking a view that since neither any ration card nor any rent receipt have been produced by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya or the Respondent-landlord to prove the tenancy of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya in house No. 41-Hajiryaoa, Jhansi. It is not proved that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was living as tenant to house No. 41 Hizaryana, Jhami Moreover in this case Sri Roop Nirain Shandilya, in his affidavit has clearly stated that he has taken house in dispute on rent from Smt. Kishori Devi Prtteria. It is admitted on record that by means of a compromise decree passed in Suit No. 527 of 1981 decided on 17th December 1981 Km. Kishori Devi is alleged to have become its exclusive owner so on the basis of affidavit of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya it is clear that his tenancy must have come into existence after 17th December 1981 as such there is substantial force in the contention of Sri Mandhyan that assuming for the sake or argument Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was inducted by Smt. Kishori Devi after 17th December 1981. The said induction was contrary to law and the occupation of Sri Roop Narain was handily a was only that of trespasser. The affidavit of Sri Roop Narain shandilya is silent on the question as to from which date he became temnt of Smt Kisnori Devi. This silence in the affidavit of Sri Roop Narain Shandila and the decree date 17th December 1981 clearly prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya has some how occupied the house after 17th December 1981. 32. In the aforesaid background the dates of the letters hide by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya for proving his house No. 41-Hazjrjana, Jhansi are also relevant The date of the letter filed by the landlord for proving that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was' residing in house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, are the letters dated 26-9-1980, 12-11-1980 and 22-12-1982. 32. In the aforesaid background the dates of the letters hide by Sri Roop Narain Shandilya for proving his house No. 41-Hazjrjana, Jhansi are also relevant The date of the letter filed by the landlord for proving that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was' residing in house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, are the letters dated 26-9-1980, 12-11-1980 and 22-12-1982. Atleast there is no explanation for the letters dated 26-9-1980 and 12-11-1980, on the own showing of Sri Roop Narain Shandilya he was inducted as tenant in the premises by Smt. Kisnori Devi who claims to be owner of house on the basis of compromise dated 17--12--1981. In these circumstances the letters tiled by the Respondent-landlord do not prove that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya was occupying the premises as tenant. 33. The genuinness of these letters become very much doubtful by mere circumstance that Sri Roop Narain Shandilya himself claimed to have become tenant only after 17-12-1981 There is no explanation as to now these letters could have been sent on the address before the said date. 34. the appellate court has laboured a lot in taking a view that since by means of a compromise decree house No. 41-Hazaryana, Jhansi, tell in the share of Smt Kisnori Devi, Respondents-landlord, has no connection with the same This aspect of the matter bas been considered in earlier part of my judgment where 1 have held that the nature and circumstances of the said compromise decree were such that the prescribed authoring could have looked into the nature of decree for the purpose as to whether the Respondent-landlord can be accommodated in house No. 41-Hajaryana, Jhansi. 35. In view of the above discussions 1 am clearly of the opinion that the judgment of the appellate court is vitiated in law as it tailed to appreciate the issues involved in the case and failed to consider the reasoning of the prescribed authority in coming to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the need of the Respondent-landlord was not jonahed. 36. 36. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition, set aside the judgment of the appellate court dated 15th May 1990 and sent back the case to the appellate authority to decide afresh the question of jonahed need of the Respondent landlord in the light of the observations made above, so far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order by any of the parties. 37. The parties shall bear their own costs.