Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. This writ appeal has been preferred by the petitioner in W.P. No. 5896 of 1980, aggrieved by the dismissal of the same by the learned single Judge of this Court. The respondents in the writ petition are the respondents herein. To appreciate the grievances of the appellant, it is necessary to broadly set forth the facts leading to the appellant filing the writ petition, though we may refer to the relevant factual aspects in detail as and when occasion therefor arises, while dealing with the points aroused in the writ appeal. While the appellant was serving in Wig India, Madras, a unit of the second-respondent, he was visited with an order on 31st August, 1968, issued by the Manager, Wig India, Madras, transferring him from Madras to the Head Office of the second-respondent at New Delhi. The fact remains that the appellant did not comply with this order of transfer, though he was relieved from Wig India, Madras, and further he drew the travelling allowances. The appellant was accorded the leave facilities upto the end of April, 1969, and thereafter his failure to comply with the order of transfer was counted as absence without leave. Ultimately, on 19th February, 1971, the appellant was given the articles of charges as follows : 1. That Shri L. Raghupathy, Section Officer has been absenting himself without leave unauthorisedly since 1st May, 1969 and has failed and refused to join duty inspite of being warned and advised. 2. That he was transferred from Wig India. Madras to Head Quarters Office, New Delhi, vide Office Order No. Estt. 51/68 dated 31st August, 1968, but he has refused to comply with these orders and till date, has not joined duty, despite repeated instructions, vide this Office Memo letter No. STC/A-6(250)/67 Estt. dated 30th April, 1969, 15th May, 1969, 11th September, 1969, & 2nd February, 1971. 3. That he drew the T. A. Advance for the purpose, but instead of utilising it towards transfer-journey, he has kept it with himself till date which amounts to misappropriation of the Corporation's money. 4. The above acts on the part of Shri L. Raghupathy, are in contravention of the Revised Service Regulation No. 19 of the Corporation, are 'unbecoming an employee' of the Corporation, and tantamount to gross misconduct' as per rule 3 of the STC of India Ltd., Employees' (Conduct) Rules 1967. 4. The above acts on the part of Shri L. Raghupathy, are in contravention of the Revised Service Regulation No. 19 of the Corporation, are 'unbecoming an employee' of the Corporation, and tantamount to gross misconduct' as per rule 3 of the STC of India Ltd., Employees' (Conduct) Rules 1967. After the formality of an enquiry, on 4th August, 1971 the appellant was removed from service. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Chairman of the second-respondent, New Delhi, and that appeal was rejected and this constrained the appellant to approach the first-respondent under Section41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, if occasion therefor arises, and the first respondent dismissed the appeal of the appellant on 31st August, 1979 and this order of the first-respondent was put in issue in the writ petition. The learned single Judge and did not accept the points of attack put forth by the appellant with regard to the order of his removal from service upheld by the first - respondent and dismissed the writ petition. This is how the appellant is before us by way of the present writ appeal. 2. The first point urged by Mr. V. M. Lenin, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the order of transfer itself was passed by an authority not competent to pass the same and hence there was no obligation on the part of the appellant to obey such an order and on account of the disobedience of that order, there could not be levelling of charges as done in the case against the appellant and he could not be penalised on the basis of those charges. That the Manager, Wig India, Madras, was not the authority competent to pass the order is not being disputed before us by the second-respondent. For a servant of the second-respondent of a cadre like that of the appellant, the order of transfer could be passed only by the Divisional Manager (Administration). Headquarters at New Delhi. Certain documents were pressed into service by the second-respondent before the learned single Judge and before us in this writ appeal to say that the order of transfer did have the sanction of the competent authority. Two letters-one dated 24th August, 1968 and the other dated 29th August 1968 are being relied on by the second-respondent in this behalf. Certain documents were pressed into service by the second-respondent before the learned single Judge and before us in this writ appeal to say that the order of transfer did have the sanction of the competent authority. Two letters-one dated 24th August, 1968 and the other dated 29th August 1968 are being relied on by the second-respondent in this behalf. The letter dated 24th August, 1968 runs as follows :'THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED (WIG INDIA) 60, Industrial Estate, Ambattur Madras - 58 Ref : STC/MS/WI/M/68 N. Vaidyanathan, Manager, Dear Shri Bhanot, We have been operating one post of Section Officer in this Office against the post of Labour Officer in the scale of Rs. 400-950 sanctioned for Wig India in terms of Office Order No. Estt/179/68 dated 27th March, 1968 but which has remained unfilled. Since, in view of the exigencies of work in the factory, it has been decided to fill this post immediately. One of the Section Officers in this establishment will be thereby rendered surplus in relation to the sanctioned posts of Section Officers. It is accordingly proposed to transfer Shri L. Raghupathy a Section Officer now working in Wig India, to the Head Office. During the recent visit of Director Shri Fernandes to Madras, this subject was discussed by G. M. Shri Joseph and the proposal for transfer of Shri. L. Raghupathy was agreed to by the Director. We shall be grateful if necessary orders are issued immediately. With kind regards, Yours Sincerely, (Sd.) N. Vaidyanathan Shri K. N. Bhanot, Joint Divisional Manager (Admn) State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., New Delhi. 1'. The letter dated 29th August, 1968 runs as follows : R. Sahai, Deputy Divisional Manager (E) 29th August, 1968. No. STC/A-11 (15)/68-Estt. Dear Shri Vaidyanathan, Please refer to your confidential D.O. No. STC/Ms/WI/M/'68 dated the 24th August, 1968 to Shri Bhanot. The transfer of Shri L. Raghupathy to Headquarters has been approved with immediate effect. You may kindly issue necessary orders under advice to us and ask Shri Raghupathy to report here immediately after availing usual joining time. No. STC/A-11 (15)/68-Estt. Dear Shri Vaidyanathan, Please refer to your confidential D.O. No. STC/Ms/WI/M/'68 dated the 24th August, 1968 to Shri Bhanot. The transfer of Shri L. Raghupathy to Headquarters has been approved with immediate effect. You may kindly issue necessary orders under advice to us and ask Shri Raghupathy to report here immediately after availing usual joining time. Formal orders from Headquarters will issue as soon as the reports here.With regards, Yours sincerely (B. Sahai) Shri N. Vaidyanathan, Manager, Wig India, Madras.' These letters could not be a substitute for an order of transfer being passed by the competent authority, namely, the Divisional Manager (Administration), Headquarters, New Delhi, which never happened in this case. From neither of these two letters, it is possible to spell out that a regular order of transfer of the appellant was passed by the competent authority and the process of implementation of the same alone was done by others. No regular order of transfer of the appellant passed by the competent authority has seen the light of the day. This aspect was, in fact, taken note of by the enquiry officer in the domestic enquiry, though he would opine that the appellant ought to have complied with the subsequent instructions issued by the office to report for duty after the expiry of the sanctioned leave with the end of April 1969. The first-respondent, however, was of the view that even assuming that the order of transfer was irregular, the appellant, as per the Service Conditions could be transferred any where in India and further there was a decline to vary or revise the order of transfer by the higher in the hierarchy of administration, even though the appellant agitated for the same. In this view, the first-respondent did not countenance the pleas put forth by the appellant, attacking the order of transfer. The learned single Judge adverted to the two letters, extracted above, and further adverted to the opinion of the first respondent over those two letters and approved of the same. As already expressed by us, these two letters cannot be a substitute for an order of transfer being passed by the authority, who alone was competent to pass the order of transfer. The lacuna in this behalf cannot be set at right by placing reliance on these two letters. As already expressed by us, these two letters cannot be a substitute for an order of transfer being passed by the authority, who alone was competent to pass the order of transfer. The lacuna in this behalf cannot be set at right by placing reliance on these two letters. Hence, there is force in the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of transfer was not passed by an authority competent to pass the same and the infirmity which it suffered did not stand cured by the circumstances pleaded by the second respondent. 3. Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the second-respondent, however, would submit that the Service Rules have no statutory force, they having been only formulated pursuant to powers under the Articles of Association of the second respondent and a violation of them, assuming that it did happen, could not make the order passed, illegal. We may accept this line of submission, put forth by the learned counsel for the second-respondent; yet the service rules being binding on both the master and the servant, they cannot be violated to the prejudice of one or the other. Each party is bound by them and that is the sanctity of the service conditions. Viewing the Service Rules as reflecting only conditions of service, yet, they being binding on the parties, it is not possible to uphold the order of transfer passed in violation of them and the appellant will be legitimate in saying that such an order of transfer need not be complied with and non-compliance could not entail a formulation of charges and penalisation of him on that basis. The only order of transfer, breach of which was complained of, was passed by the Manager, Wig India, Madras, who was admittedly incompetent to pass the same. It was not a case and such was not the charge levelled of the appellant disobeying any other order of transfer passed by the competent authority. The decline by the higher in the hierarchy of administration to revise or vary the order of transfer, which inherently suffered lack of authority, is of no relevance and consequence at all. It was not a case and such was not the charge levelled of the appellant disobeying any other order of transfer passed by the competent authority. The decline by the higher in the hierarchy of administration to revise or vary the order of transfer, which inherently suffered lack of authority, is of no relevance and consequence at all. Service Rules reflecting the conditions of service must be annexed due solemnity and sanctity and the parties must be held bound to them and they cannot be thrown to winds to suit the convenience of one to the chagrin of the other. 4. To get over this result, Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the second-respondent, would advance a theory of acquiescience. He would state that the appellant accepted the order of transfer, without any murmur, at the initial stage and he cannot be allowed to go back over the same and project a line of protest at the subsequent stage. The features pressed forth by the learned counsel for the second-respondent to buttress the theory of acquiescence are : The appellant himself wanted the relieving order by making a request therefor and further requested the grant of travelling allowances and only wanted to go on leave on account of certain personal difficulties experienced by him. 5. The following proceedings are being relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent : 'Submitted : Ref : O.O. No. Estt/51/68 dated 31st August, 1968. I request that necessary Relieve Order may kindly be issued to me. (Sd.) 2nd September, 1968. Manager may like to issue suitable orders. (Sd.) 2nd September 1968. Manager. Already bill issued. (Sd.) 2nd September, 1968'. '2nd September, 1968. The Manager Wig India Ambattur Madras - 58. Sir, With reference to your O.O. No. Estt/51/68 dated 31st August, 1968 transferring to Delhi Office. I request you to kindly grant me the following T.A. advance for carrying out orders. 1. 1st Class fare for self and three children (3 half tickets) incidental plus. 2. Luggage charges for the transportation of personal effects. 3. Salary Advances. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd. L. Raghupathy Section Officer.' 'Administration. 2nd September, 1968. BILL Dr. Travelling Allowance of Estt. Authority : Manager's sanction dated 2nd September, 1968. Being the advance of transfer travelling allowance granted to Sri L. Raghupathy. Section Officer for his transfer to New Delhi - Rs. Luggage charges for the transportation of personal effects. 3. Salary Advances. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd. L. Raghupathy Section Officer.' 'Administration. 2nd September, 1968. BILL Dr. Travelling Allowance of Estt. Authority : Manager's sanction dated 2nd September, 1968. Being the advance of transfer travelling allowance granted to Sri L. Raghupathy. Section Officer for his transfer to New Delhi - Rs. 1, 000-00 (Rupees One thousand only.) Sd. Section Officer (A). To Accounts (Local) together with copy of Manager's sanction dated 2nd September, 1968'. 'THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD., WIG INDIA STC/MS/WF/Stores/1/68 Plot No. 60. Ambattur Industrial Estate, Madras - 58. Dated : 2nd September, 1968. Section Officer (Production/Stores) Sub :- Transfer of Shri L. Raghupathy Section Officer - Relieving Order. With reference to the Office Order No. ESTT 31/68 dated the 31st August, 1968 Shri L. Raghupathy. Section Officer (Stores) has been relieved of his duties in this section with effect from the afternoon of the 2nd September, 1968.He is directed to report for duty to the DDM (A), STC, New Delhi, after availing his usual joining time. Sd. M. Vidayanathan, Manager. To Shri L. Raghupathy, Section Officer (Stores) Copy to : P.A. to Manager/GM, Administration (2 copies/Accounts DDM (A) STC, New Delhi, DRM (A), STC, Madras." 18, Rama Rao Garden Street, Madras - 14. 11th September, 1968. Mr. B. Sahai, Deputy Divisional Manager (E), State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., New Delhi. Dear Sir, As per Office Order No. Estt/51/68 dated 31st August, 1968 issued by Wig India, I stand transferred therefrom, and relieved of my duties with effect from A.N. of 2nd September, 1968. As per the above order I am expected to report for duty to you by about the 16th September, 1968, after availing of the permissible joining time. But on account of certain personal circumstances involving domestic difficulties like disturbance in children's education, non-availability of proper arrangements to leave the family alone in Madras etc., I find myself unable to proceed to Delhi, and report for duty. I therefore request that I may kindly be sanctioned leave on half pay for 30 (thirty) days commencing from the 16th September, 1968. Thanking You, Yours faithfully, (Sd.) X X X L. Raghupathy.' It must be noted that on 11th September, 1968, in his representation to the Director of the Second respondent. I therefore request that I may kindly be sanctioned leave on half pay for 30 (thirty) days commencing from the 16th September, 1968. Thanking You, Yours faithfully, (Sd.) X X X L. Raghupathy.' It must be noted that on 11th September, 1968, in his representation to the Director of the Second respondent. New Delhi, the appellant had registered his protest on the basis of the defect in the order of transfer, in the following lines : 'While the order itself can be termed defective and hence technically questionable on the ground that transfer orders of Section Officers have to be issued only by the Head Office and the Head of a regional unit has not been endowed with such competency (except within his own region) yet, my appeal for the present, is based purely on humanitarian grounds.'Thereafter he had been agitating for reversal of that order. 6. Here we are asked to accept a case, advanced by the second-respondent, that the appellant acquiesced in the in the order of transfer and hence he cannot challenge it. There are certain principles, which could not be lost sight of when a plea of acquiescence is put forth by one party against the other to deny the legitimate claims of the latter. Acquiescence denotes conduct, which is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon a right legitimately due to him. It may also denote a conduct from which the opposite party is justified in inferring such an intention. Is only a form of estoppel, and it is of the essence of acquiescence that the party acquiescing should be aware of his rights; and by words or conduct should represent that he assents to what is a violation of his rights and that the person to whom such representation is made should be ignorant of the other party's rights, and should have been deluded by the representation into thinking that his wrongful action was assented to by the other party. The question of estoppel or acquiescence is essentially a question of fact, which has to be decided on proper materials placed before the Court. Once the facts are established, acquiescence is a matter of legal inference by the Court. The question of estoppel or acquiescence is essentially a question of fact, which has to be decided on proper materials placed before the Court. Once the facts are established, acquiescence is a matter of legal inference by the Court. It is fundamental that the plea of acquiescence should have been specifically expressed by the party, who wants to build a case no it, and there should be an issue on that point at the appropriate state, so that the opposite party, who is asked to face that plea of acquiescence could meet it effectively. Acquiencence could not be a matter of bare presumptions and assumptions. It is a question of fact, which has got to be pleaded and further has got to be proved. The burden of proof of the ingredients of acquiescence is on the party, who relies on the same. If there was no plea of acquiescence and if there had been no opportunity for the opposite party to counter plead and place counter evidence on this question, it would not be proper for the Court to permit the party, who wants to rely on the theory of acquiescence, to press forth the same, at any stage he likes. During the course of the agitation before the appellate authority under the Act, namely, the first-respondent the second-respondent never thought of pleading a theory of acquiescence specifically, so that the appellant could have counteracted it in an appropriate manner and there could have been an occasion for the appellate authority under the Act, namely, the first-respondent to investigate into and decide it and we in turn could be legitimately obliged to consider the said plea and further test as to whether the said plea and further test as to whether the said plea has been properly appreciated or not on facts by the said appellate authority. The counter statement of the second respondent before the appellate authority under the Act, namely the first-respondent is bereft of the factual ingredients which are now being relied on by the second-respondent to choke the voice of protest by the appellant regarding the infirmity in the order of transfer passed against him. The counter statement of the second respondent before the appellate authority under the Act, namely the first-respondent is bereft of the factual ingredients which are now being relied on by the second-respondent to choke the voice of protest by the appellant regarding the infirmity in the order of transfer passed against him. Learned counsel for the second-respondent was under the impression that what has been stated as follows in paragraphs 3 and 7 in the counter statement of the second-respondent before the appellate authority under the Act, namely the first-respondent, is sufficient to form a factual basis for the plea of acquiescence :'The order was accepted by the appellant and he was relieved at Madras on the 2nd September, 1968. He also drew the Travelling Allowance advance for journey to New Delhi.' 'It is significant to note that even though the appellant accepted the order of transfer and was relieved at Madras and also drew the T.A. Advance for his journey to Delhi, he had misutilised that money for some other purpose and had not reported to duty at the Head Office.' The inadequacy of the factual basis for a plea of acquiescence is patent and it is not the duty of the Court to expand the plea and to read something into it to support this theory of acquiescence now thought of and put forth before the Court. 7. Even when we scan the materials, relied on by the learned counsel for the second-respondent on the question of acquiescence, we must frankly express that the well laid down ingredients to form a basis for a plea of acquiescence are totally absent. The appellant had been given the order of transfer on 31st August, 1968. It is not claimed that on the date of the order of transfer the appellant was aware of the infirmity which it suffered and inspite of that he accepted that order and wanted to implement it. The appellant had been given the order of transfer on 31st August, 1968. It is not claimed that on the date of the order of transfer the appellant was aware of the infirmity which it suffered and inspite of that he accepted that order and wanted to implement it. Rightly learned counsel for the appellant says that asking for the relieving order; obtaining the same and drawing the traveling allowances, all of which happened in quick succession on the day of the order of transfer, namely, 31st August, 1968 and on the next working day, namely 2nd September, 1968 (we are told that 1st September, 1968 was a holiday being a Sunday) would not amount to the appellant acquiescing in an order of transfer, which to his knowledge was infirm. These could be only characterised as formalities, which a servant, like the appellant, ought to go through, whether he likes them or not and certainly we could not annex to these formalities, gone through by the appellant, as amounting to conduct by which he represented to the second respondent that he has assented to a violation of his rights about which he was conscious at that time and the second respondent, who faced the conduct was ignorant of the appellant's right and was deluded by that conduct of the appellant into thinking, that the second respondent's wrongful action was assented to by the appellant. Hence, this theory of acquiescence now conceived of and expressed before us by the learned counsel for the second-respondent to stifle the legitimate voice of the appellant on the question of the order of transfer suffering the infirmity. Accordingly, we sustain the first point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 8. The second point urged by Mr. V. M. Lenin, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the order of transfer was tainted with bias and mala fides.Before the appellate authority under the Act, namely the first respondent, the appellant in his Appeal Petition did not put forth any case of bias with regard to the order of transfer. The appellate authority under the Act, namely the first respondent, points out that even during the course of the enquiry there was no whisper of victimisation at all. The appellate authority under the Act, namely the first respondent, points out that even during the course of the enquiry there was no whisper of victimisation at all. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition in paragraph 3 this is what the appellant stated : 'I respectfully submit that there was some misunderstanding between me and the then General Manager one Z. K. Joseph of Wig India. In order to wreak vengeance against me the then General Manager seems to have instructed the Manager, Wig India, to issue a transfer order to me even though I had hardly worked for one year and eight months only at Madras.' There is no expatiation as to what was the misunderstanding that weighed with the person who actually made the order of transfer in doing so. The allegations are vague, inadequate and they cannot form a foundation for a theory of bias tainting the order of transfer. Hence, we eschew the second point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. Thirdly, learned counsel for the appellant would submit, relying on the Service Rule, that there was no compelling circumstances to transfer the appellant against his will outside the region in which he was appointed. This theory was also not pleaded anywhere, except before us. We do not think we should permit the appellant through his learned counsel to advance this theory for the first time before us. 10. Our sustaining the first point, put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, will enable the appellant to succeed in the writ appeal. However, Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the second respondent, would advance a case that charges 1 and 2 may be viewed inter-related, but charge No. 3 being one relating to mis-appropriation has got to be sustained on facts and so sustained the order of removal from service must be maintained. It is true that in a case involving more than one head of charges, if the punishment could be law-fully supported on one head, it is not for the Courts to consider whether that ground alone should have weighed with the authority punishing the servant. It is true that in a case involving more than one head of charges, if the punishment could be law-fully supported on one head, it is not for the Courts to consider whether that ground alone should have weighed with the authority punishing the servant. A few of the authorities of the highest Court in the land, expressing the above view, can be set down as follows : State of Orissa v. Vidyabhushan Mohapatra 1963 AIR(SC) 779, 1963 (1) LLJ 239 , 1963 (S1) SCR 648. Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh (1969-II-LLJ-743), and Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, Jammu and Kashmir Industries Ltd. (1990-I-LLJ-32) 11. We may not have any difficulty in appreciating and acting upon this theory, because it is one countenanced by the highest Court in the land, if in fact charge No. 3, relating to misappropriation of the travelling allowances could be said to have been substantiated. The appellant drew the travelling allowances obviously unaware of the infirmity which the order of transfer suffered. Realising subsequently the violation of his rights by an incompetent order of transfer, the appellant has been agitating for reversal of the order of transfer and his agitation continued throughout without any sagging. The second-respondent, through its authorities, never gave the impression that the grievances of the appellant will be sympathetically viewed and dealt with and he would be retained at Madras only. If there had been such an indication at some point of time and the appellant, inspite of that, retained the travelling allowances drawn by him, culpability may be attempted to be thrown against the appellant on that count. There ought to have been a dishonest intention on the part of the appellant to misappropriate or convert to his own use the travelling allowances drawn by him. The facts and circumstances of the case do not establish that the appellant had an intention of making a wrongful gain for himself or causing a wrongful loss to the second-respondent and, as rightly pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant, we are convicted that the appellant was only building hopes against hopes that his grievances will have redressal at some point of time and if that contingency should happen he would have hastened to return the amounts drawn by him by way of travelling allowances. On the other hand, if ultimately his endevours to have to order of transfer reversed fail, certainly the appellant would have been obliged to go to the place to which he was transferred by utilising the amounts drawn by him towards the travelling allowances. The ingredients for sustaining a charge of misappropriation being what they are, we cannot say that the charge of mis-appropriation stood established. In this connection, we feel obliged to extract what the appellant stated in answer to this article of charge given to him, as follows :'Misappropriation of T.A. Advance : The T.A. Advance was drawn in good faith with absolute belief that the Management would mend the wrongs done to me by issuance of an Office Order. According to me the term 'misappropriation' mentioned would mean the 'wrong use' of money. I am not aware whether I have used it wrongly in any other way than that for which it was intended for. The money is being kept with me with fond hopes to utilise this money for the same purpose for which it was intended provided the Office Order issued by the Manager, Wig India. Madras, was cancelled and revised Officer Order issued by the appropriate authority. In that sense it cannot be said that there was any misappropriation of the money. I may also be permitted to state that there were occasions for the Management also to recover the said amount lying with me or to adjust the said amount against the amount due to me from the management. I am not aware of the circumstance under which the money was not recovered from me at the appropriate time according to the Rules and also why the said amount could not be adjusted against the amount due to me. Incidentally, I may mention that the term used in the charge 'misappropriation' is a harsh one and I need not go beyond than drawing the attention of the Chief Personnel Manager to sub-rule 3(b) of Rule 12 of Classification, Control and Appeal Rules 1967, wherein, it has been impressed that articles of charges are to be sustained by means of documents and by means of witnesses.' The Enquiry Officer found that charge No. 3 cannot be upheld against the appellant; but the punishing authority opined differently. The appellate authority under the Act, namely the first-respondent did not go into this aspect at all. The appellate authority under the Act, namely the first-respondent did not go into this aspect at all. Our analysis of the position as above leads us to apply the theory advanced by the learned counsel for the second-respondent for sustaining the punishment under the third head of charges. 12. The result our above discussion is the appellant succeeds in the writ appeal; the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 5986 of 1980 is set aside : the said writ petition will stand allowed; quashing the order of the first respondent, impugned in the Writ Petition, and as a result the order dated 4th August, 1971 removing the appellant from the services of the second-respondent will stand set aside. The appellant even in the year 1980 when he filed the Writ Petition was stated to be aged 51 years. The age of superannuation in the services of the second-respondent, we are told, is fifty-eight. The appellant, if he had continued in service, without being hurt by the order of removal, would have got superannuated anterior to this date for our judgment. Hence, the result of our allowing the Writ Appeal and passing the above orders will only enable the appellant to work out all the benefits annexed to his services on the basis that he continued therein and got superannuated in the usual course. We make no order as to costs.