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1990 DIGILAW 95 (PAT)

Habibur Rahman Ansari v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court

1990-03-08

B.P.SINGH, SATYESHWAR ROY

body1990
Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. The petitioner, now an employee of respondent No. 2, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO), was discharged with effect from 24-12-1975 from his service by Indian Tube Co. Ltd., now a Division of TISCO. An industrial dispute was raised and the appropriate Government referred the matter to the Labour Court. The Labour Court held that discharge of the petitioner was unjustified and ordered for re-instatement with full back wages by award dated 28-11-1981. India Tube Co. Ltd. filed C.W.J.C. No. 609 of 1982 (R) challenging the award That writ petition was disposed of on compromise which was recorded on 9-7-1982. 2. TISCO said the petitioner Rs. 22,000 as per terms of compromise. He was allowed to join his duty by TISCO and thereafter his wage was paid. According to the petitioner, TISCO did not pay him the bonus, which he was entitled from 1976-77 to 1981-82 under the Bonus Act, 196S (the Bonus Act). He filed an application under Sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the I. D. Act) for computation of the bonus from 1976-77 to 1981-82. Alongwith the application he annexed statement showing the amount he was entitled to receive as bonus for the aforesaid years. Statement of calculation has been marked as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The stand taken by TISCO before the Labour Court was that Rs. 22,000 had been paid by TISCO to the petitioner in settlement of all claims inclusive of bonus as per terms of the compromise recorded in the writ petition. It also took the stand that the application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act was not maintainable. 3. The Labour Court held that the sum of Rs. 22,000 included bonus on the petitioner was entitled to claim it separately. Relying on Major D. Aranha V/s. Universal Radiators Coimbatoor and Ors. 1975(1)LLJ 254 i 1975 Lab IC 1180, the Labour Court held that as the claim of the petitioner was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act, the claim for computation of bonus was not maintainable under Sec. 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act. Copy of the order of Labour Court is Annexure 3 to the writ petition! Correctness of that order is the subject-matter of this writ petition. 4. Copy of the order of Labour Court is Annexure 3 to the writ petition! Correctness of that order is the subject-matter of this writ petition. 4. Two questions arise for adjudication in this case: (a) Whether the Labour Court has correctly interpreted the terms the compromise on the basis of which the writ petition had been disposed of. (b) Whether the Labour Court was correct in law in holding that the application filed by the petitioner under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act was not maintainable and his remedy was under Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act i.e., by a reference under Sec. 10 of the I.D. Act. 5. So far point No. (a) is concerned, it is necessary to reproduce the terms of the compromise, which is part of order dated 9-7 1982, copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. It run as follows: (i) The petitioner shall pay to respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs. 22,000 by way of total settlement of all claims under the award upto 30th June, 1982. (ii) Respondent No. 2 shall be paid his full pay with effect from 1st of July, 1982 ; provided that respondent No. 2 joins the duty by the 15th of July, 1982. (iii) The provident fund amount of Rs. 8918.87 which has already been withdrawn by respondent No. 2, shall be liable to be deposited by him in Provident Fund Account. The mode of payment will be by adjustment to be made by the petitioner from out of sum Rs. 22,000 which the petitioner has been liable to pay to respondent No. 2 as per the terms contained in Paragraph 1 aforesaid. (iv) The amount of gratuity already withdrawn by respondent No. 2 shall not be liable to be refunded by respondent No. 2 but shall be liable to be adjusted at the time of his superannuation in due course, subject to the provisions of any law in force at the time. Parties have agreed that so far as the payment of bonus is concerned, they shall calculate it in accordance with law and on due calculation such amount as may be due to respondent No. 2, shall be paid by the petitioner in respect of the arrears of bonus having already been calculated. The application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs. 6. The application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs. 6. By the aforesaid award the Labour Court had directed reinstatement of the petitioner with back wages and other benefits. So far the award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement was concerned, that was sustained in C.W.J.C. 609 of 1982 (R). the only modification made in that writ case in the award with the consent of the parties was with regard to the monitory benefits petitioner was entitled under that award. The monitory benefit that the petitioner was entitled pursuant to the award was the back wages from 1-1-1978 and other benefits. 7. The Labour Court was of the opinion that in view of the language used in Clause-1 of the terms of compromise quoted above which stated that payment of Rs. 22,000 by the Company to the petitioner was in settlement of all claims under the award, the petitioner was not entitled to claim bonus for the aforesaid period separately. It failed to notice the last part of the terms of the compromise by which the parties had agreed that they would calculate the bonus in accordance with law and on such calculation, the amount would be paid to the petitioner. If Rs. 22,000 included bonus for the period in question there was no necessity for the parties to agree also that bonus would be calculated in accordance with law and after due calculation the sum would be paid The finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner was not entitled to claim bonus separately for the years in question is manifestly incorrect. 8. For disposing of point No. (b) about manifestly of the application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act, it is necessary to notice Sec. 22 and 39 of the Bonus Act. In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is entitled to bonus for the period 1976-77 to 1981-82. It is not a case as to whether the petitioner was entitled to bonus under (he Bonus Act. What is in dispute is that is the amount he is entitled to get. 9. Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act reads as follows: 22. It is not a case as to whether the petitioner was entitled to bonus under (he Bonus Act. What is in dispute is that is the amount he is entitled to get. 9. Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act reads as follows: 22. Reference of disputes under the Act,-Where any dispute arises between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under this Act or with respect to the application of this Act to an establishment in public sector, then, such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or of any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State and provisions of that Act or, as the case may be, such law, shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, apply accordingly. Sec. 39 of the Bonus Act reads as follows: 39. Application of certain laws not barred. Save as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes in force in a State. 10. We may notice that Sec. 21 of the 3onus Act provides for recovery of bonus due from an employer to in employee under the settlement or award or agreement. In this cue, we are concerned with the bonus under the Bonus Act. In Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewsar Chand and Ors. V/s. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Crains and Kirana Merchants Workers Union and Anr. -- , the Supreme Court had occasion to no lice the scope of the Bonus Act and the true view of certain provisions of that Act including Secs. 22 and 39. In Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewsar Chand and Ors. V/s. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Crains and Kirana Merchants Workers Union and Anr. -- , the Supreme Court had occasion to no lice the scope of the Bonus Act and the true view of certain provisions of that Act including Secs. 22 and 39. In that case, the Bonus Act did not apply, and the claim for bonus was made before the Bonus Act, As this is the first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of the Bonus Act and which stilt holds the field, the observations of the Supreme Court may be gainfully quoted in extenso: It will be noticed that Sec. 22 provides the where a dispute arises between an employer and his employees (1) with respect to the bonus payable under the Act, or (2) with respect to the application of the Act, such a dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State and the provisions of that Act and such law, as the case (nay be, shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, apply accordingly. An Industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act would be between a workman as defined in that Act and his employer and the dispute can be an industrial dispute if it is one as defined therein. But the definition of an "employee" under Sec. 2(13) of this Act is wider than that of a woman under the Industrial Disputes Act. A dispute between his employer and an employee, therefore, may not fall under the Industrial Disputes Act and in such a cave the Act would not apply and its machinery for investigation and settlement would not be available. That being so, and in order that such machinery for investigation and settlement may be available. Sec. 22 has been enacted to create a legal fiction whereunder such disputes are deemed to be industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other corresponding law. For the purposes of such disputes the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or such other law are made applicable. Sec. 22 has been enacted to create a legal fiction whereunder such disputes are deemed to be industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other corresponding law. For the purposes of such disputes the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or such other law are made applicable. The effect of Sec. 22 thus is (1) to make the dispute referred to therein industrial disputes within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act or other corresponding law and (2) having so done to apply the provisions of that Act or other corresponding law for investigation and settlement of such disputes. But the application of Sec. 22 is limited to only two types of disputes referred to therein and not to others. Sec. 39, on the other hand, provides that save as otherwise expressly provided the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act or any other corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of disputes between an employer and an employee. If a dispute, for instance, were to arise as regards the quantum of available surplus, such a dispute not being one falling under Sec. 22, Parliament had to make a provision for investigation and settlement thereof through such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act or other corresponding Act in force in a State, Sec. 39 by providing that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act or such corresponding law makes available the machinery in that Act or the corresponding Act available for investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes thereunder for deciding the disputes arising under this Act. As already seen Sec. 22 artificially makes two kinds of disputes therein referred to industrial disputes and having done so applies the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and other corresponding law in force for their investigation and settlement. But what about the remaining disputes ? As already seen Sec. 22 artificially makes two kinds of disputes therein referred to industrial disputes and having done so applies the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and other corresponding law in force for their investigation and settlement. But what about the remaining disputes ? As the Act does not provide any machinery for their investigation and Settlement, Parliament by enacting Sec. 33 has sought to apply the provisions of those Acts for investigation and settlement of the remaining disputes, though such disputes are not industrial disputes as defined in those Act....The distinction between Sec. 22 and Sec. 39, therefore, is that whereas Sec. 22 by fiction makes the disputes referred to therein industrial disputes and applies the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and corresponding laws for the investigation and settlement thereof, Sections 39 makes available for the rest of the disputes the machinery provided is that Act and corresponding laws for adjudication of disputes arising under this Act. 11. As held by the Supreme Court in Sanghvis case (supra), only under two circumstances, Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act is attracted and one such is with respect to the bonus payable under the Bonus Act. Sec. 10 of the Bonus Act provides for payment of minimum bonus and Sec. 11 provides for payment of maximum bonus. I may notice that both sections underwent amendments. But provision for payment of minimum and maximum bonus was in the original the Bonus Act as well as in the amendment Act. When Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act speaks about dispute with regard to bonus payable under the Bonus Act, it refers to disputes as to whether employees are entitled to payment of minimum bonus under Sec. 10 or maximum bonus under Sec. 11 and if under Sec. 11 at what rate. In such a situation, if there is a dispute and that dispute as an industrial dispute must be investigated and settled under the provisions of the I D. Act by a reference under Sec. 10. Sec. 22 will also be attracted when there is dispute with regard to the applicability of the Bonus Act. For settlement of all other disputes, Sec. 39 of the Bonus Act makes available other provisions of the 1. Sec. 22 will also be attracted when there is dispute with regard to the applicability of the Bonus Act. For settlement of all other disputes, Sec. 39 of the Bonus Act makes available other provisions of the 1. D. Act, and one such provision is Sec. 33-C, From the passage of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanghvi Jeevraj (sic) will be noticed that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a dispute with regard to question of available surplus under Sec. 5 of the Bonus Act shall have to be resolved under the machinery of I.D. Act as provided under Sec. 39 and not under Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. 12. Scope of Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act has been repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court. It has been held that even if the employer disputes the workmans right to claim benefits, the Labour Court has a right to adjudicate that to see whether the workman has a right to receive the benefit claimed. Reference may be made to Central Bank of India Ltd. V/s. P.S. Rajagoplan -- . While adjudicating the application filed under that section, the Labour Court can give relief to the workman only if he proves that he has an existing right to get the benefit. The Labour Court in such a proceeding cannot create a right in favour of the workmen for giving him the benefit because for that the workmen must raise an industrial disputes 13. Before the Labour Court, TISCO did not dispute the right of the petitioner to claim bonus at the rate paid by T1SCO to its other employees. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on Anand Oil Industries V/s. Labour Court, Hyderabad -- . In that case an employee moved the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D, Act claiming minimum bonus under Sec. 10 of the Bonus Act The employer moved the High Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application in view of the Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. A Pull Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court after noticing that in Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act the word "employees- has been used, held that Sec. 22 does not enlarge the definition of industrial dispute and as a dispute raised by an individual workman with regard to payment of bonus an industrial dispute. A Pull Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court after noticing that in Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act the word "employees- has been used, held that Sec. 22 does not enlarge the definition of industrial dispute and as a dispute raised by an individual workman with regard to payment of bonus an industrial dispute. Sec. 22 of Bonus Act will not apply. This reasoning for excluding applicability of Sec. 22 is not available in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sanghvi (supra). It, however, further held that if the provision of the Bonus Act applied, the employer is bound to pay minimum bonus, whether he earns any profit or not, and it cannot be said to be a dispute which requires to be adjudicated by reference under Sec. 10 of the I.D. Act, in such a situation application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act is maintainable to compute the bonus the employee is entitled as the minimum rate. This view was accepted as correct by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kohinoor Company Products Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer, Second, Labour Court Nagpur 1986 Lab IC 1055. This is the correct legal position. 14. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of TISCO relied on Maj D, Aranha, (supra) and submitted that in that case also the employee tiled an application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act claiming that he had not been paid bonus and it was held by the Madras High Court that the dispute within the meaning of Sec. 22 of the Bonus Act and the application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the I. D. Act not maintainable. In that case the employer resisted the claim of the employee on the ground that the amount paid to him included bonus. There was, therefore, no dispute about right of the employee to get bonus If right to receive bonus was not in dispute. I find no reason why the application under Sec. 33-C(2) in that case was not maintainable. In that case the employer resisted the claim of the employee on the ground that the amount paid to him included bonus. There was, therefore, no dispute about right of the employee to get bonus If right to receive bonus was not in dispute. I find no reason why the application under Sec. 33-C(2) in that case was not maintainable. It may be noticed that it does not appear from the judgment whether it was a case to which Sec. 11 of the Bonus Act was attracted, for if it was a case of payment of bonus at the minimum rate, i.e., under Sec. 10, application under Sec. 33-C(2) was maintainable, I am unable to accept the view expressed in that case. 15. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that as before the Labour Court, TISCO did not dispute the correctness of the calculation given by the petitioner, direction should be given by this Court to pay that amount. That will not be proper. TISCO has not disputed that it has paid bonus to its employees for the period 1976-77 to 1981-82. Nothing has been shown that the petitioner was disentitled to bonus at the rate at which it was paid to other employees during the aforesaid period. It is, therefore, a matter of calculation. It is fit and proper that it be computed by the Labour Court. 16. In the result, this application is allowed, the order of the Labour Court (Annexure 3) is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Labour Court for computing the amount the petitioner is entitled as bonus for the period 1976-77 to 1981-82. The petitioner shall be entitled to Rs. 1000 (Rupees one thousand) as cost. B.P.Singh, J. 17 I agree.