M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition the petitioner who is a registered graduate in medicine and voter in the 1st respondent-University of Mysore as well as a contesting candidate for the membership of Senate, is aggrieved by the acceptance of the nomination of the. 3rd respondent as a candidate for contesting for the office of Senator in the election scheduled to he held on 11-2-1990. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case arc as follows: ( 3 ) SENATE is one of the authorities enumerated under Section20 (a) of the Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). In terms of Section 21 of the Act seven members from several faculties including medicine are entitled to be the members of the Senate and in that behalf contest for that office. The petitioner and respondent-3 are such candidates who have filed their nominations. Apparently, the nomination of respondent-3 was objected to by the petitioner before the Returning Officer who was none other than the 2nd respondent, who is also the registrar of the University. Three objections contained in the statement of the petitioner filed as such before him came to be rejected by the Returning Officer by his order dated 27-1-1990. With reference to the nomination of rcspondent-3-Dr. Mahadeva, he came to the conclusion that it cannot be rejected on account of the opinion received by him in that behalf from the Chancellor of the University. Therefore he accepted the nomination despite objection founded on the prohibition contained in Section 33-A (2) of the Act. Therefore, the writ petition has been presented challenging the validity of the election held and the acceptance of nomination of respondent-3. ( 4 ) THE petitioner presented this writ, petition on 6-2-1990. Itcame up for orders on 7-2-1990, By an order made by me in the connected matter, election was permitted to be held and the result of respondent-3 was directed to be withheld. Thereafter it was called for further orders and by consent of the learned counsel for the parties, taken up for final disposal and disposed of by the following order. Thereafter it was called for further orders and by consent of the learned counsel for the parties, taken up for final disposal and disposed of by the following order. ( 5 ) SRI S. P. Shankar, learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner, contended that acceptance of the nomination by the registrar was incorrect and opposed to law in as much as the express prohibition contained in Section 33-A of the Act was totally overlooked and as such acceptance of nomination of 3rd respondent was clearly impermissible in law. He also contended that under Statute 15 of Statutes framed with reference to the elections to the authorities of the University, decision of the returning Officer being final it was amenable to the writ jurisdiction as there is no other remedy provided to question the said decision. Lastly he has contended that when the question goes to the root of the matter on the validity of the nomination, this court should not decline to exercise jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution even though the Statute may provide another forum. ( 6 ) SRI H. N. Narayan, learned counsel appearing forrespondent-3, and Sri Devadas learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 the University and the Returning Officer, have placed strong reliance on Section 48 of the Act as well as statute 26 of Statutes relating to elections to the authorities of the University. Reference will be made to the Statute and particular provision of law in the course of the order while discussing the merits of the matter. ( 7 ) SECTION 33-A has fallen for consideration by this court at anearlier point of time in W. P. No. 19168 of 1989, One N. Chandrappa who was respondent-2 in the other batch of petitions disposed of by me today, filed the said writ petition seeking for a declaration that the provisions of sub-section (21 of section 33-A of the Act was prospective, and not retrospective, and the term of office held by the members of the authority mentioned in Section 20 of the Act prior to coming into force of act 23 of 1986 should not be taken into account for purposes of section 33-A of the Act. This court declined to issue rule on the sole ground that Section 33-A (2) of the Act does not take away or impair any vested right acquired under the existing laws, but only part of the requisites are drawn for its action from a time antecedent to its passing and it cannot properly be called 'retrospective Statute'. But content of sub-section (2) of Section 33-A was not gone into by the learned Judge. It is in that circumstance that Mr. S. P. Shankar wants this court to examine the scope and ambit of Section 33-A (2) of the Act and the prohibition contained therein and. rule whether the 3rd respondent's nomination should have been accepted or rejected. ( 8 ) THIS court must decide the question raised by the other sidewith reference to decided cases first. Therefore, I have to examine the question whether this court should interfere with the election under Article 226 of the Constitution despite adequate remedy provided under the Statute of the University for resolving the dispute contemplated under Section 48 of the act. Section 48 reads as follows:"48. Disputes regarding memberships: (1) If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor. (2) The decision of the Chancellor on that question shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law. "the language employed in sub-section (1) makes it abundantly clear that where a member if elected is entitled to be a member of any authority of the University and in view of the prohibition contained under Section 33-A of the Act would clearly fall within the question which requires to be considered by the Chancellor on a reference made in that behalf. Sub-section (2) makes it clear in terms that such decision of the Chancellor on reference shall not be called into question and shall be final. The Chancellor is none other than the Governor of the State of Karnataka and when duty is conferred on such high authority, this court should hesitate to interfere with matters pertaining to election in terms of Statute 26 on a reference being made. The Chancellor is none other than the Governor of the State of Karnataka and when duty is conferred on such high authority, this court should hesitate to interfere with matters pertaining to election in terms of Statute 26 on a reference being made. Statute 26 of the statutes reads as follows:"statute 26: Disputes: when any question arises under Section 48 of the Act, the aggrieved person may move the Vice-Chancellor to make a reference to the Chancellor stating the grounds of his objection within ten days from the date of declaration of the result of election; and such application being made, it shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to make a reference to the chancellor within ten days of the receipt of the application. "the procedure contemplated in Statute 26 will come into operation only when the result of the election is announced and not before. It is indicated by the fact that the period within which the dispute may be raised for reference sought is ten days from the declaration of results and as such only leaves one in no doubt that result of election being declared is a condition precedent. The procedure contemplated under Statute 26 does not become operative if a nomination is improperly accepted under Statute 15 and decision of the Returning Officer is final. Aggrieved person will have to await the result of the election and thereafter move for an appropriate remedy in accordance with the procedure laid down in Statute 26. ( 9 ) COURTS are more reluctant to interfere in the matter ofelections in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution if there arc other forums or other remedies provided under the Representation of Peoples Act as well as other special laws like in this case, the Karnataka State universities Act, 1976. The Supreme Court has taken divergent views having regard to cases of election which have come before the courts. In that behalf it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v surjeet Singh,. That matter went before the Supreme Court by the appeal of Bar Council of Delhi against the judgment of the delhi High Court allowing two writ petitions filed by the 1st respondent therein. In that behalf it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v surjeet Singh,. That matter went before the Supreme Court by the appeal of Bar Council of Delhi against the judgment of the delhi High Court allowing two writ petitions filed by the 1st respondent therein. The Delhi High Court by its order had set aside the election of the Bar Council of Delhi held in 1978. The short question that called for determination before the Supreme court was whether the entire process of election could be called into question before the Delhi High Court by-passing the procedure prescribed by the Advocates Act of 1961 which provided for in Rule 34 of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules framed under the said Act for resolving the dispute. Adverting to that aspect of the case, the Supreme Court held thus:"there is no substance in the last submission made on behalf of the appellants. The manner of resolving disputes as to the validity of election is provided for in Rule 34 of the Delhi Bar council Election Rules. This is not an appropriate and adequate alternative remedy to defeat the writ petitioner on that account. Firstly, no clause of Rule 34 covers the challenging of the election on the ground in has been done in this case, secondly, the Election Tribunal will not be competent to declare any provision of the Election Rules ultra vires and invalid. Our attention was specifically drawn to clause (8) of rule 34 which says: 'no petition shall lie on the ground that any nomination paper was wrongly rejected or the name of any voter was wrongly included or omitted from the electoral roll or any error or irregularity which is not of a substantial character'. As we have said above, it is not a case where the name of any voter was wrongly omitted from the electoral roll but it is a case where the preparation of the whole electoral roll was null and void because of the invalidity of the impugned proviso. "from the above ruling it is clear that there may be cases in which the High Court under Article 226 may interfere if a case is made out notwithstanding the fact that other forum to resolve the dispute are provided under the relevant Statute. "from the above ruling it is clear that there may be cases in which the High Court under Article 226 may interfere if a case is made out notwithstanding the fact that other forum to resolve the dispute are provided under the relevant Statute. ( 10 ) CONTRARY to this, the Supreme Court in the case of K. K. Shrivastava v B. K. Jam, in another Bar Council's case ruled as follows:"where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms. Merely because the challenge is to a plurality of returns of elections, a writ will not lie. "similar view is expressed by another Division Bench of the supreme Court in the case of election conducted under the Tamil nadu Panchayats Act, 1958. In S. T. Muthusami v K. Natarajan and Others, the Supreme Court observed that "it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with an election process at an intermediate stage after the commencement of the election process and before the declaration of the result of the election held for the purpose of filling of a vacancy in the office of the chairman of a Panchayat Union under the provisions of the tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958, on the ground that there was an error in the matter of allotment of symbols to the candidates contesting at such election. The parties who are aggrieved by the result of the election can question the validity of election by an election petition which is an effective alternative remedy. " ( 11 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the last two decisions of the Supreme Courtsupport the stand taken by the respondents. But this court must consider all the facts of the case; even the facts which the petitioner himself has not noticed. Rejection of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer is not on any ground decided by him, but on the communication received or opinion expressed by the Chancellor in regard to the objections raised by the petitioner. But this court must consider all the facts of the case; even the facts which the petitioner himself has not noticed. Rejection of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer is not on any ground decided by him, but on the communication received or opinion expressed by the Chancellor in regard to the objections raised by the petitioner. Therefore, if the rejection of nomination is on account of the opinion expressed by the Chancellor as is evident as per annexure-B the impugned order of the Returning Officer, then seeking reference to the Chancellor would not be an effective remedy as he is bound to consider his earlier opinion if the contents of Annexure-B is to be accepted by this court. Therefore this is a fit case in which this court should proceed to decide the matter in issue notwithstanding the fact that there is efficacious alternate remedy. ( 12 ) IT is in the light of this, it is necessary to extract therelevant portion of the order:"with respect to objection No. 3, the University is guided by the clarifications that are received from the Chancellor, university of Mysore, Mysore, according to which the nomination paper of Dr. Mahadeva cannot be rejected. In fact by his letter dated 24-1-1990, the Under Secretary to government has clearly stated that on the strength of the opinion of the Advocate-General a person nominated or elected for two consecutive terms, to any of the authorities of the universities, specified under Section 20 is eligible for nomination to the same authority if there is a break after completion of two consecutive terms; and a person after completion of two consecutive terms in a particular authority is barred from holding the same authority if there is no break and the bar is not in respect of other authorities enumerated in Section 20 of the KSU Act, 1976. ( 13 ) IN view of the above, it has become necessary to examinethe bar under Section 33-A of the Act which reads as follows:"33-A: Certain restrictions on the holding of office by nominated and elected members of the authorities. (1) Any member nominated to any of the authorities specified in Section 20 shall hold office during the pleasure of the person or authority nominating him. (. (1) Any member nominated to any of the authorities specified in Section 20 shall hold office during the pleasure of the person or authority nominating him. (. 2) No person nominated or elected to any of the authorities specified in Section 20 shall hold office for more than two consecutive terms in such authority". Sri S. P. Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on sub-section (2) of Section 33-A which employs negative language imposing prohibition. Therefore the learned counsel commended to the court that it, is a mandatory bar. Therefore the real question that falls for determination is what exactly is the meaning of the term "two consecutive terms" occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 33-A of the Act? ( 14 ) ON facts, which are not disputed, the 3rd respondent waselected and served as Senator from 1980 to 1983 and 1983 to 1986 and therefore he cannot contest for membership of the senate in view of the express bar under Section 33-A (2) of the act. ( 15 ) AS against this, it is submitted by the learned counsel forrespondent-3 that while as a fact it is true that the 3rd respondent was a Senator for the periods between 1980 and 1986, he did not serve the complete three years term. That assertion was not denied. In fact, Sri H. N. Narayan made a submission that the petitioner was a Senator for two terms between 1980 and 1986. However, he pointed out that there is no bar for holding the office for a third term if it does not follow the earlier two consecutive terms. In other words, he wants the court to interpret sub-section (2) of Section 33-A in a manner so that the meaning of 'two consecutive terms' does not act as total bar but only to give a liberal meaning to the words 'two consecutive terms' thereby prohibition being read into 3rd term following the two consecutive terms and not another term with a break. To put it more clearly, during the period 1986-89 the petitioner was not a member of the Senate and bar under sub-section (2) of Section 33-A of the Act would not be attracted for such person to file his nomination for the period 1990-1993. The question is not whether a member serves a full term or not. To put it more clearly, during the period 1986-89 the petitioner was not a member of the Senate and bar under sub-section (2) of Section 33-A of the Act would not be attracted for such person to file his nomination for the period 1990-1993. The question is not whether a member serves a full term or not. Other provisions in the Act such as filling up a casual vacancy in an office provide the clue Casual vacancy filled is for the remaining period of the terms and not for a fresh term of 3 years. ( 16 ) ELECTION is held for the period 1990-1993 is not in dispute. In that view of the matter two consecutive terms acting as prohibition for a third term cannot be total prohibition. The other members may contest for the office of Senate to be members for no more than six years at any given point of time. The right to serve the University in such capacity merely because he has served for two consecutive terms cannot be denied. This may be made clear further by taking illustration of other possible event which is not unlikely" 'a' may contest for the office of membership of Senate for the period 1980 to 1983 and not contest for the same office in 1983-1986 but contest for another term and again contest for the following term. In all he will be eligible to serve on the senate for a period of nine years. Thus the bar under Section 33-A (2) is not attracted. "therefore as a rule this court should accept an interpretation so as not to attract the bar under Section 33-A (2) of the Act if it is possible. The important thing to note is, the bar is created so that none monopolises a particular office for all times to come and all are given a chance to serve the University in any particular office, Thus understood the bar is restricted to the third consecutive term and no more. In that view of the matter I feel that the petitioner has not made out a case for interference by this court. ( 17 ) THE petition is dismissed. The University may nowannounce the result of the election. ( 18 ) SRI Devadas, learned counsel for respondents ispermitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. --- *** --- .S